Bartlett v Weatherill

The facts

1. The appeal and cross-appeal turn solely on the question of damages. There is no challenge to the finding that Mr Bartlett engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct or conduct that was likely to mislead or deceive in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)). Accordingly, the narrative of facts, which is largely taken from the Magistrate's reasons, can be summarised briefly.
2. Dr Weatherill lives in Mount Gambier, South Australia. He practices as an obstetrician and gynaecologist. He obtained his pilot's licence and a single engine Cessna 172 aircraft which he used both for professional and personal purposes. In about October 2012 he decided to upgrade his aircraft and purchase a faster version. He decided on a Cessna 400 aircraft. There were few Cessna 400's in Australia but many in the United States. As it happened, one of the few Cessna 400's in Australia was owned by a man who lived in Aldinga, just south of Adelaide. Dr Weatherill made enquiries of the owner who told him that it would not be for sale for less than $500,000.
3. Dr Weatherill's research had led him to believe that he could purchase a Cessna 400 for significantly less than $500,000 in the United States. At that time the Australian and US dollars were at relative parity. He contacted Mr Bartlett, who was a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer, to ask him to estimate the cost of bringing a Cessna 400 to Australia from the US. Mr Bartlett provided an estimate (which was not quotation) of $52,395, excluding GST. In reliance on the estimate, Dr Weatherill decided to purchase the Cessna 400 from the US for US$370,000 and bring it to Australia.
4. Ultimately Dr Weatherill spent a total of about $490,000 on purchasing the Cessna 400 (for $370,000) and bringing it to Australia ($120,000). This figure was much more than he expected to have to spend, based on Mr Bartlett's estimate. The Cessna 400 was registered in Australia and obtained its Certificate of Airworthiness. Dr Weatherill described it in an email to Mr Bartlett dated 17 May 2013 as "a very good aircraft for years to come".

The Local Court proceedings

1. By statement of claim filed in the Local Court on 17 November 2014, and amended by the filing of an amended statement of claim on 17 April 2015, Dr Weatherill alleged that Mr Bartlett had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct or conduct that was likely to mislead or deceive in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law by, relevantly, representing that the estimate of transport costs was $52,395 (excluding GST). Dr Weatherill claimed damages pursuant to s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law. As referred to above, the Magistrate found that the estimate was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive and that a "reasonable" estimate would have been $86,000. There was no challenge in this Court to these findings.
2. In the Local Court, Dr Weatherill argued (based on the particulars of loss in the amended statement of claim) that he was entitled to the difference between what he actually spent on getting the aircraft to Australia and associated costs ($130,703.02) and the sum of the estimate ($52,395, excluding GST) and agreed extras, which gave rise to a claim for $58,857.77, together with interest pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). Mr Bartlett argued that, even if he had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, Dr Weatherill had suffered no loss as he had paid $490,000 for an aircraft that was worth at least $500,000.
3. The Magistrate did not accept either of these submissions as to the way in which damages ought be assessed. The way in which his Honour assessed damages appears from the following extract from the reasons for judgment: His evidence is consistent with the proposition that he was quite willing to pay up to $438,000, that is allowing for the bracket that I have referred to, so that money could not be otherwise utilised, it had to be paid for the aircraft. It was the difference between this - that is, $438,000, and the actual cost to him, $490,000, that is, $52,000. To be factored into this is the fact that he now has an asset that is probably worth more, even allowing for inflation, than what he in fact actually paid for it, largely due to the exigencies of exchange rate variation. The sum of $52,000 has to be reduced, in my view, to reflect this advantage that he has undoubtedly obtained in relation to the aircraft. The excess expenditure has borne fruit, in my view, by the fact that he now possesses an asset of some considerable value. The loss of use of the money is at best from about April 2013, by which time all moneys had been paid not only to Bartlett but also to the seller in America, up to now, which is a period of about three years approximately, by which time any loss, in my view, had been compensated for by the increase in the value of the asset. Whilst I accept that there is an estimate or guess in relation to the setting of a figure, it seems to me that the parameters that I have already indicated are the appropriate way of approaching this. As I have said, my view is the starting point in relation to this is the sum of $52,000. However, as I have said, that figure in my view has to be reduced because of, relevantly, the change in the value of the asset since then and the fact that he still owns that asset and it is of considerable increased value. It seems to me, as I have said, that it is a loss of the use of money over a period of time, which is no more than three years, that has to be compensated for, whilst also taking into account the increasing value of the asset that he purchased in 2012. Whilst I accept that this is a matter where there might be some argument, and I accept, as I have already said, the element of guess, but an intelligently formed view of guess, in my view - I think the appropriate sum to allow in relation to this is the sum of $25,000.

Grounds raised

1. Mr Bartlett appealed on the following grounds: 1 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the plaintiff's loss was the difference between the amount that the plaintiff paid for the cost of transporting the aircraft in question to Australia plus the cost of reassembly and the estimate for those costs that had been given to the plaintiff [transcript of judgment page 17 lines 7-13]. 2 Having found that at the time of judgment 'any loss…had been compensated for by the increase in the value of the asset', the Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the appropriate measure of the plaintiff's damages was the loss of use of the plaintiff's money equal to the difference between the amount paid by the plaintiff and the estimate given to the plaintiff [transcript of judgment page 22 lines 20-21; 30-31]. 3 Having found that the 'loss of the use of money over a period of time…that has to be compensated for' must 'also tak[e] into account the increasing value of the asset that [the plaintiff] purchased in 2012', the Magistrate erred in law in failing to then do so in calculating the plaintiff's damages [transcript of judgment page 22 line 30-33]. 4 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding, without any evidence, that the plaintiff had suffered a loss of $25,000 by reason of the loss of use of the sum of $52,000 between April 2013 and June 2016 [transcript of judgment page 22 lines 30-38]. 5 The Magistrate erred in law in not giving any reasons for having determined that the value of the loss of use of $52,000 between April 2013 and June 2016 was $25,000.
2. Mr Gration, who appeared on behalf of Mr Bartlett, confirmed that grounds 4 and 5 were alternatives to grounds 1-3. Accordingly, he accepted that if he was successful on grounds 1-3, the remaining grounds would not arise.
3. The jurisdiction of this Court to review decisions of the Local Court in the circumstances of this case is limited to an appeal on a question of law (s 39 of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW)) or an appeal by leave on a mixed question of law and fact (s 40 of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW)). I am satisfied that each of the grounds raised by Mr Bartlett raises a question of law.
4. Dr Weatherill's cross-appealed on the following grounds (as extracted from the cross-summons and renumbered): 1 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the subject aircraft was an asset probably and most certainly worth in excess of $500,000. 2 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the subject aircraft was probably now more valuable than when purchased in 2012. 3 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding damages assessed at $52,000 should be reduced to reflect the fact that the subject aircraft was now probably worth more. 4 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the excess expenditure, as determined, increased the value of the subject aircraft. 5 The Magistrate erred in law in concluding that damages determined at $52,000 should be reduced because of the change in value and the increased value of the subject aircraft.
5. Other orders were sought and grounds framed which related to the question of costs. Mr Darvall confirmed that these orders and grounds had been superseded as the Magistrate had determined the costs questions and made costs orders. Accordingly, they do not need to be considered further, except in so far as the costs of the Local Court proceedings are affected by the orders which I make.
6. Although, as framed, the grounds that are pressed do not raise questions of law and at best raise questions of mixed law and fact, Mr Darvall, who appeared for Dr Weatherill, confirmed in his written submissions that each of the grounds ought be read as a "no evidence" ground. In other words, Dr Weatherill submitted that there was no evidence for any of the findings by Curran LCM listed in his cross-appeal grounds. The allegation that there is no evidence for a particular factual finding raises a question of law: Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32 at [91] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. Accordingly, on this basis, Dr Weatherill is entitled to appeal as of right in respect of the reformulated grounds.
7. It is convenient to address the first two grounds of the cross-appeal at the outset since the Magistrate's finding that the Cessna 400 was worth more than $500,000 was fundamental to Mr Gration's submission on the appeal that Dr Weatherill had suffered no loss. The written submissions, as referred to above, confined the first two grounds to the allegation that there was no evidence for the findings that the aircraft he purchased was worth more than $500,000; or that it was more valuable than it was when it was purchased in 2012.

Grounds 1 and 2 of the cross-appeal

1. A finding of fact for which there is some evidence does not reveal an error of law: Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 at 155-156. Mr Gration responded to the first two grounds by identifying the evidence to support the two findings sought to be impugned by Dr Weatherill.

The finding that the aircraft was worth more than $500,000 (ground 1 of the cross-appeal)

1. The evidence relied on by Mr Gration was, in substance, evidence about the worth of the Cessna 400 owned by the man who lived in Aldinga. Mr Gration relied on Dr Weatherill's admissions that he had been told that he could pick up a Cessna 400 in Australia for around $500,000 and that the Aldinga plane was "not for sale for anything under half a million". Dr Weatherill's evidence was that he hoped to be able to obtain such an aircraft for a cheaper price by importing one from the US.
2. Mr Darvall submitted that this evidence was insufficient to prove the value of the aircraft which Dr Weatherill owned. He argued that not all aircraft were equal and that an examination would be required of the comparable hours flown and maintenance performed on each to ascertain their respective values.
3. The difficulty with Mr Darvall's submissions is that they fail to take account of the nature of this Court's jurisdiction, which is not to conduct a rehearing of the evidence before the Magistrate. As long as there is some evidence, of whatever probative value, that the aircraft he purchased was worth about $500,000, there is no error of law on the basis that there is "no evidence" to support it.
4. I am satisfied that the evidence referred to by Mr Gration is such that the first ground of the cross-appeal is not made out.

The finding that the aircraft was worth more as at the hearing than when it was purchased in 2012 (ground 2 of the cross-appeal)

1. The material relied on by Mr Gration to support this finding was the movement in the rate of exchange from the time of purchase (when the US and Australian dollars were at relative parity) to the time of the judgment (when the US dollar had increased in value as against the Australian dollar). He submitted that courts were entitled to take judicial notice of movements in exchange rates and that this was what the Magistrate had done in making this finding. He also relied on the evidence (based on admissions made by Dr Weatherill) that the US was a significantly larger market for Cessna 400 aircraft than was Australia where there were only three at the time Dr Weatherill was considering purchasing one. Mr Gration referred to the passage from the Magistrate's reasons for judgment (extracted more extensively above) where his Honour referred to the aircraft Dr Weatherill purchased being worth more "largely due to the exigencies of exchange rate variation".
2. In my view, this material and evidence is sufficient to defeat the "no evidence" allegation made in the second ground.

Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the appeal and the balance of the cross-appeal

1. The determination of the first four grounds of appeal and the balance of the cross-appeal requires consideration of the principles for the assessment of damages under s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law for breach of s 18. It has been accepted that the statutory provisions ought not be confined to common law concepts of causation and loss. Nonetheless, several principles have been held to be applicable by analogy. Moreover, a consideration of the authorities decided by reference to the Australian Consumer Law and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), reveals that the principles in cases such as the present are well-established. Mr Gration referred me to several cases relating to similar principles and charted the jurisprudence under s 236 and its statutory predecessor, s 82 of the Trade Practices Act. However, it is sufficient for the purposes of these reasons to refer to the authoritative summary in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Limited (1998) 196 CLR 494; [1998] HCA 69 in the following passage: [48] A party that is misled suffers no prejudice or disadvantage unless it is shown that that party could have acted in some other way (or refrained from acting in some way) which would have been of greater benefit or less detriment to it than the course in fact adopted. Thus, the party that is misled will have suffered loss if a chose in action which was acquired was worth less than the amount paid for it. There may well be other ways in which it might suffer loss or damage. For example, consequential loss may be suffered. But no loss of that kind was alleged in this case and, putting that kind of loss to one side, we focus only on loss said to be suffered by the making of the contract. [49] It is necessary, then, to determine whether the value of what was acquired is less than what was paid. How is value to be assessed? It is to be assessed objectively, not according to what either or both of the parties to the contract believed that it would obtain from the contract. That is, the value of what in fact was acquired is to be identified according to what price freely contracting, fully informed parties would have offered and accepted for it. It is only by comparison with the value assessed in this way that there can be an assessment of whether the party that is misled could have obtained some greater benefit or incurred less detriment. What is important is what that party could have done, not what it might have hoped for or expected. Some examples may serve to illustrate the point. [50] If a person agrees to pay $50,000 for goods which the vendor falsely represents are worth $100,000 but which are, in fact, worth $50,000, what loss has the purchaser who is misled suffered by agreeing to buy (assuming no more is known)? If a person agrees to pay interest at the rate of 10 per cent for a loan which the lender falsely represents would ordinarily command interest at a rate of 15 per cent but which, in fact, would ordinarily command interest at 12 per cent, what loss has the borrower who is misled suffered by agreeing to borrow (again, assuming no more is known)? And so the examples could be multiplied. [51] The reason that neither of these persons suffers a loss is that viewed objectively each obtained rights having a value (a value determined objectively) at least equal to what it paid for those rights. It is only if some alternative (less detrimental or more beneficial course) were available, that it can be said that the contract which was made was less valuable to the party that was misled than had been represented - for it is only then that a comparison of value can be made. [52] The fact that each of the misled parties in the examples given may have thought that it was to obtain some advantage from the transaction is not to the point. The contravening conduct has left the party that was misled no worse off than it was before the contravention occurred. [Footnotes omitted.]
2. It can be seen from the Magistrate's reasons set out above that his Honour failed to apply what was said in Marks v GIO. What his Honour did was to start with what Dr Weatherill had actually paid, $490,000, and deduct what he was willing to pay, $438,000. The figure of $438,000 was calculated by adding the purchase price of $370,000 and the figure of $68,000, which comprised Mr Bartlett's actual estimate plus a margin of 20% (to take account of the circumstance that it was an estimate). This calculation produced a figure of $52,000. However, the Magistrate was plainly conscious of the circumstance that Dr Weatherill had acquired an aircraft which was worth more than he had paid for it. Whether it was worth significantly more than he had paid for it because of the strengthening of the US dollar against the Australian dollar (after he had paid for the aircraft at a time of relative parity between the currencies) was irrelevant since, irrespective of these changes, it was worth at least $500,000, which was more than he paid for it. To take account of the advantage which Dr Weatherill had obtained as a result of the transaction, the Magistrate effectively halved the calculated amount and rounded it down to $25,000.
3. There are two principal errors in the Magistrate's approach, which I note for completeness was ultimately supported by neither party. First, it ignored the principle that the wronged party needs to establish actual loss before an award of damages can be made. Secondly, it contaminated the assessment of damages by including "expectation" loss and by using what Mr Weatherill was prepared to pay as an integer in the calculation. This second matter was inconsistent with what the plurality of the High Court said in Marks v GIO at [49] (extracted above): "What is important is what that party could have done, not what it might have hoped for or expected."
4. Mr Darvall's submissions on appeal were, in the main, based on his contention in the cross-appeal that the aircraft he purchased had not been shown to be worth $500,000, which I have rejected for the reasons set out above. Mr Darvall submitted that Dr Weatherill's loss ought be assessed by reference to the Magistrate's undiscounted figure of $52,000 (being the difference between what Dr Weatherill had to pay and what he can be taken to have expected to pay (Mr Bartlett's estimate plus 20%)). He relied on Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; [2001] HCA 52 in support of the proposition that Dr Weatherill was entitled to reimbursement of his additional expenses. He also relied on what Gaudron J said in the following passage in Marks v GIO at [20]: Moreover, there may be cases where an applicant establishes that, but for the contravention of s 52 of the [Trade Practices] Act, he or she would not have entered into the contract in question or into any other contract or arrangement of that kind. It is possible - although not inevitable - that, in that situation also, the loss will be the same in money terms as it would have been if the representation were contractual.
5. Mr Darvall also cited, at length, passages from Rares J's judgment in Consort Express Lines Ltd v J-Mac Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2006] FCA 833.
6. I do not regard these decisions as supporting the approach for which Mr Darvall contended or qualifying the principles articulated in Marks v GIO.
7. In Henville v Walker, the appellant purchased and developed property by constructing units on the basis of misleading representations made by the respondent real estate agents. They suffered a net loss on the sale of the units amounting to $205,000. However, they also suffered other losses on the project which included interest on borrowings, and marketing expenses which, together with the loss on the sale of the units resulted in a total figure of $319,846.51. The High Court, by majority, held that the appellants were entitled to the higher figure since they would not have undertaken the development but for the misleading conduct. The higher award restored them to the position in which they would have been but for the misleading conduct and was equivalent to their actual loss on the project. Of present relevance, McHugh J said in Henville v Walker at [132]: In this case, the most appropriate approach is to identify what Mr Henville has suffered by way of prejudice or disadvantage in consequence of altering his position by reason of the breach of the Act. The measure of that loss is not determined by reference to what he would have received if Mr Walker's representations had been true. . . . the wrong which s 52 of the [Trade Practices] Act prohibits is the making of, not the failure to honour, the false representation. By entering upon the project, Mr Henville has lost $319,846.51. If Mr Walker had not made representations in breach of the Act, none of this loss would have occurred. The loss suffered is therefore directly attributable to a contravention of the Act even though other factors played their part in bringing about the loss.
8. The result in Henville v Walker is consistent with the principles set out in Marks v GIO. The appellants had suffered actual losses as a result of entering into transactions which formed part of the project which was undertaken as a result of their reliance on the respondents' misleading and deceptive conduct and were held to be entitled to damages equivalent to their total actual losses, as established by the evidence.
9. To the extent to which it could be argued that what Gaudron J said in Marks v GIO at [20] supports Dr Weatherill's contentions, this possibility is dispelled in the present case by the ensuing paragraphs of her Honour's judgment which follow [20]. Her Honour continued: [21] In this case, the appellants did not assert that, but for the contravention of s 52 of the [Trade Practices] Act, they would have entered into loan agreements which accorded with their understanding of their arrangement with the GIO. Indeed, there was no evidence that loan facilities of that kind were available. Nor did the appellants establish that, but for the contravention, they would have entered into loan agreements which were more beneficial than those entered into with the GIO. Again the evidence is that that was not possible. Nor did they claim that, but for the contravention, they would not have taken out loans at all. Rather, their case was simply that they suffered loss simply by variation of the margin. [22] There being no evidence of the kind to which I have referred, the appellants failed to establish that they had suffered any loss or damage and were, thus, not entitled to any remedy under s 82 of the [Trade Practices] Act. . . .
10. To borrow the language of Gaudron J in this passage, Dr Weatherill did not assert, much less prove, that another Cessna 400 aircraft was available at a price less than $500,000; or, indeed, that there was another course of action available to him that would have produced a better outcome. Had he not bought an aircraft at all, he would still have had the cash ($490,000) but would not have had the aircraft, worth $500,000. He did not prove that, had he purchased another aircraft, assuming another was available, it would have been available for a price less than $490,000. Dr Weatherill has not proved any scenario which would have put him in a better position than the one he was actually in, albeit in reliance on the misleading estimate.
11. Consort Express Lines Ltd v J-Mac Pty Ltd (No. 2) involved a claim by the applicant, a wholly owned subsidiary of which, Rho Beta 7 Ltd, had purchased a container vessel based on a survey conducted by the respondent, which was established to be misleading and negligent. The evidence established that the amount paid for the vessel, $5m, was in excess of its value, $3.5m. Relevantly, the applicant claimed damages in contract, in the tort of negligent misstatement and for misleading or deceptive conduct. Its claim included amounts for the costs incurred in repairing and restoring the vessel, as well as the cost of hiring substitute vessels during the periods when the vessel could not be used. Damages were assessed by reference to the cost of repairs and hiring. As it was held that the applicant was entitled to damages for breach of contract, negligent misstatement and under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act, it was not necessary to distinguish the awards on the basis of the different causes of action. On no view could it be said that Consort Express Lines Ltd had not proved actual loss.
12. Mr Darvall further submitted that Dr Weatherill did not bear the onus of proving loss. Rather, he contended that Mr Bartlett, as the wrongdoer, bore the onus of establishing that there had been no loss. I do not discern support for these propositions in the authorities. However, in any event, the Magistrate made findings (which are set out above) from which it followed that it had been established (notwithstanding that the onus did not fall on Mr Bartlett) that Dr Weatherill had suffered no loss.
13. Applying the correct principles to the present case, in order to obtain an award of damages pursuant to s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law, Dr Weatherill was obliged to prove that he had suffered actual loss as a result of his purchase of the Cessna 400 aircraft in reliance on Mr Bartlett's estimate. Before he relied on the estimate, Dr Weatherill did not own a Cessna 400 aircraft. As a result of his reliance on the estimate, he owned a Cessna 400 aircraft worth $500,000 and he had spent $490,000. Therefore he was $10,000 better off. His situation is not unlike that of the hypothetical injured party referred to in [50] of Marks v GIO, who bought goods for $50,000 believing them to be worth $100,000 when they were only worth $50,000, although Dr Weatherill, unlike the hypothetical purchaser, was better off by $10,000.
14. Although Dr Weatherill spent more than he had either hoped or expected in its acquisition, the value of the aircraft exceeded the total sum he had paid for it. Accordingly, he suffered no actual loss. As Mr Bartlett has succeeded on grounds 1-3, there is no need to consider grounds 4 and 5 of the summons, since the latter grounds are alternative grounds.

Remedy

1. Mr Gration accepted that it was appropriate for this Court to make final orders to dispose of the Local Court proceedings rather than to remit the matter to the Local Court to be determined according to law. Mr Darvall submitted that it ought be remitted but did not contend that, if I allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal, there would be any residual question which the Local Court would need to determine.
2. This Court has power under s 41 of the Local Court Act to vary the terms of a judgment or order and set aside the judgment or order. Although there are constraints on this power which arise from the nature of the supervisory jurisdiction conferred by s 39 of the Local Court Act, I do not consider there to be any reason why I ought not set aside the Magistrate's order for judgment in favour of Dr Weatherill and substitute an order that there be judgment in the Local Court in favour of Mr Bartlett. There are substantial reasons of utility, cost and time, for this Court to determine the matter finally: Owners Strata Plan 4003 v Mustafa [2012] NSWSC 780 at [12]-[17] per Beech-Jones J.

Costs

1. Orders for costs consequential on the result in the Local Court were made by the Magistrate. They will need to be revisited in light of this decision. Both Mr Gration and Mr Darvall accepted that the appropriate course was to make directions for written submissions following delivery of these reasons in order to provide the parties with an opportunity to address me on costs. I propose to determine the question on the papers unless either party considers an oral hearing to be necessary. Were it not for the making of offers germane to the outcome, costs would, in the ordinary course follow the event. In other words, but for relevant offers, Dr Weatherill would have to pay Mr Bartlett's costs of the Local Court proceedings and of the proceedings in this Court on the ordinary basis. However, I will defer making any costs orders pending the receipt of submissions, or agreed orders, in accordance with the directions set out below.

Orders

1. For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: 1. Allow the appeal in the summons filed on 29 July 2016. 2. Dismiss the cross-appeal in the cross-summons filed on 13 September 2016. 3. In Local Court proceedings 2014/00338451: 1. Set aside the order for judgment made by Curran LCM on 8 June 2016. 2. Order judgment in favour of the defendant (Clinton Bartlett) against the plaintiff (Dr Colin Weatherill). 1. Reserve for further determination the costs orders in the Local Court proceedings and in this Court. 2. Direct the parties to serve and provide to my Associate within seven days any application for costs of either proceedings, together with submissions and any evidence in support. 3. Direct the parties to serve and provide to my Associate within a further seven days any response to an application for costs by the other party. 4. Grant liberty to both parties to apply to list the matter before me for oral argument if thought necessary.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 16 April 2018