Q. See, I am asking you about the sentence where you say, 'This may or may not be the case' and I suggest to you that that was a considered view that you expressed in that sentence?
A. Right, well by - there I'm talking - all right, 'This may or may not be the case' refers to the fact that in a laneway of say 2 metres where an animal of extensive height goes past a handler, he is obviously closer to the animal than in a laneway of 3 metres and hence my comment that it may be the case that a - narrowing a laneway is more dangerous. However, I don't believe you should take that statement as meaning that I support wider laneways because if the gate doesn't interfere, it is a very dangerous situation for stock handlers and that is accepted through the industry."
77 In Mr Huefner's opinion, on the other hand, it was highly desirable to maintain the existing laneway width. In his report dated 24 March 2004 Mr Huefner wrote (at p 6):
"Vowles concurs that under given circumstances, the narrowing of laneways will increase the risk exposure of handlers. When analysed, there are two 'standard operational' scenarios:
1. The intercept scenario, ie a gate is used to channel a beast into a pen, and
2. The by-pass scenario, ie no gate is used and the animal(s) by-pass the handler.
In Scenario 1, where a gate is used, the animal does not perceive an 'escape' route (other than the valid one, ie run into the pen). The marginal lane width difference is therefore not critical other than its impact on the clear width into the pen.
With Scenario 2, ie where the animal by-passes a handler, a wider lane (3,000mm) will provide more space for the animal to 'escape' which it will do with less stress than if the space is more restricted, eg 2,500mm width.
In consequence, and under normal operational procedures, the wider lane (3,000mm) provides for a less stressful path for the animal and a lower risk exposure to the handler…
I'm therefore of the option that:
1. The ideal solution to the safety aspects raised is to have a lane width of 3,000mm (not 2,500mm or 2,400mm) AND have interfering gates.
2. At Dubbo, this solution is not possible without reconstruction costing some $5M.
3. The risk exposure frequency to handlers is significantly increased if the lanes are reduced to 2,500mm cf the current 3,100mm, hence such action is not recommended."
78 In his evidence Mr Huefner said (T 234-235):
"Q. What in your professional judgment is the proper answer to the question, whether it's a reasonable judgment call for the operator of saleyards such as Dubbo, given the dimensions in Mr Vowles' proposal, to make the decision that it's preferable to retain a 3 metre width compared to embracing his proposal?
A. I think it's highly desirable that the 3 metre width is retained because the risk due to the bypass handlers - handler, is actually quite unacceptable at the 2.4 metre dimension."
79 Mr Huefner went on (T 235):
"… In other words, we have two different risk criteria here, one being the interfering aspect and the other one being the bypass aspect. The conclusion that I have come to is that the number of times that an interfering gate is required compared with a number of times that a person - a handler may require the extra width, is disproportionate. The extra width will predominate significantly over the first one."
80 As I understand the above evidence, it was Mr Huefner's view there were significantly more occasions when a handler would require the extra width in the laneway than when he might require the protection of an interfering gate if available.
81 Mr Huefner in cross examination acknowledged that he designed yards at Naracoorte and at Mt Gambier with lane widths of 2.45 metres only. Mr Cranitch submitted that the fact that he had done so was inconsistent with Mr Huefner's evidence reviewed above. In cross examination (T 416-417) Mr Huefner gave the following evidence:
"Q. That doesn't seem to accord with the formula that you have espoused in this case, does it?
A. It looks like that on the figures but, first of all, (a) it is quite some time ago; secondly, we are in different parts of the country with different animals. I'll explain this a little further. In some, not all, of the Victorian yards that I designed there have been minor changes, not so much to the raceway widths or the laneway widths but to other parts of the facilities to accommodate the different sized cattle and the different cattle behaviours that have been - let's put it this way - put to me over the years by the various customers. So the yards are designed differently for Victoria, marginally differently, in Victoria say from New South Wales and particularly to the west of New South Wales, for example, the Forbes yards, they are at 3 metres and that particular decision was on the prompt of my customer, or Forbes Shire Council or the particular design people that I was dealing with there, and it was provided specifically for the purpose of allowing bypass, the additional safety of the bypass."
82 Notwithstanding the cross examination and the submissions of Mr Cranitch in point, I accept that what Mr Huefner wrote and his evidence in chief reflected his opinion honestly held, and I am not persuaded that such opinion is unsound.
83 For what appear to be historical reasons, stockyards in New South Wales have generally had wider laneways than in South Australia and in Victoria. Whilst I am satisfied that there would have been safety benefits for stockmen referable to the introduction of interfering gates, I do accept that there were advantages from the point of view of safety in maintaining the extra laneway width in a by-pass situation, and to lose this width by introducing interfering gates would have tended to increase the risk to stockmen opposed to passing cattle in laneways. I accept that Mr Vowles and Mr Huefner hold differing views as to the importance of these considerations, but, as I see it, the inevitable loss of laneway width that would have accompanied the introduction of interfering gates was a not insignificant factor responsibly to be weighed against the introduction in 1995 of the modifications central to the plaintiff's case. The defendant could not have provided interfering gates whilst preserving a laneway width of three metres unless the yards were reconstructed at a cost at a cost estimated by Mr Huefner at $5 million (see Mr Huefner's report Exhibit 6), and in my view the exercise of due care plainly did not demand expenditure of that magnitude.
84 I have given close attention to all the evidence on liability in this case and have read the evidence of Mr Vowles and of Mr Huefner several times. At the end of the day, however, after close attention to the submissions of counsel, I am not persuaded that in the failure to introduce interfering gates prior to the plaintiff's accident the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff.
85 It follows that the defendant is entitled to judgment in its favour.
86 Notwithstanding the conclusion I have reached on the issue of liability, I propose to shortly record my finding on the issue raised by the defendant that the plaintiff failed to exercise due care for his own safety.
87 Mr Taylor submitted that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in placing himself behind a gate in breach of an acknowledged safety measure. The plaintiff agreed that it was a basic precaution for any stockman not to stand behind the gate (T 106) and he acknowledged (T 107) that he should not have got caught behind the gate. It was submitted that the fact that he did place himself where he did evidenced a failure to exercise reasonable care.
88 I earlier expressed the finding that I preferred the evidence of Mr Barlow to that of Mr Prentice as to what occurred leading to the plaintiff's injury (para 21). Moreover, I have found that the behaviour of the beast and its approach towards Mr Prentice influenced the plaintiff to do what he did (para 22). I find that the plaintiff acted in an attempt to protect Mr Prentice from harm, and I infer that it was in pursuit of this objective that he put himself in the position of danger where the harm befell him. I find that the plaintiff's behaviour was commendable and courageous and I do not find that he acted unreasonably in pursuing his objective. The defendant failed to prove the absence of due care by the plaintiff for his own safety.
89 I propose to reserve the question of costs to afford the plaintiff the opportunity of advancing any available submissions as to why costs ought not to follow the event.