Barns v Barns

Held, that by virtue of sec. 26 of the Administration and Probate Act 1891 (S.A.), which continued to be in force in North Australia, the resealing of the

• The Testator's Family Maintenance Ordinance 1929 (N.T.) provides : - "4. (1) Tf any person (in this ordin- ance called 'the testator') disposes of or has disposed of his property by will in such a manner that the wife . or children of the testator, or any of them, are left without proper main- tenance, education or advancement in life, the Court may, at its dis- cretion, on application by or cn behalf of the wife or children, or

any of them, order that such provision as the Court thinks fit shall be made out of the estate of the testator for the maintenance, education and advance- ment of the wife or children, or any of them, . . . 5, An appli- cation for an order shall not be heard by the Court, unless the application is made within six months after the date of the grant by the Supreme Court of North Australia of probate of the will" &e,

probate was as effective for the purposes of the Testator's Family Maintena Ordinance 1929 as if it were an original grant, and the Supreme Court accor. ingly had jurisdiction to entertain the application. q

Appuication for leave to appeal and appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory.

In the matter of the will of Ernest Felix Holmes, late of Port Darwin, Northern Territory, deceased, his widow, Cleopatra Holme: of New South Wales, and his infant daughter, Lilian Cleo Holme (by her next friend, the said Cleopatra Holmes) applied, by originating summons, to the Supreme Court of North Australia for an order that such provision as the Court thought fit should be made 7 of the estate of the testator for the maintenance, education and/o advancement of the applicants. The respondents to the originating

Godfrey in his capacity as a beneficiary, and other persons as bene- ficiaries. Probate of the will of the testator was granted in New South Wales to the executors above mentioned and an exemplific: tion of the probate was resealed in North Australia. Certain term of settlement were agreed upon by all parties to the summons, but the Supreme Court dismissed the application on the ground that the Testator's Family Maintenance Ordinance 1929 (N.T.), under which - the application was made, was limited to cases in which probate o letters of administration with the will annexed had been granted by _ the Supreme Court of North Australia and the resealing was n0 equivalent to a grant. : The applicants now applied to the High Court for leave to app from such dismissal. Further material facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Rich J. hereunder.

(1) ). The matter is one of urgency because at present the exe:

are unable to make any provision for the testator's widow and child. All parties are willing that this application be granted and the appeal proceeded with.

Godsall and Sheldon, for the respondent the Permanent Trustee Co. of New South Wales Ltd.

J. A. Ferguson and Dignam, for the other respondents.

Ricu J. We grant leave to appeal, and the appeal may be proceeded with now.

Jordan K.C. (with him Wickham), for the appellants. The Administration and Probate Act 1891 (8.A.) is in force in the Northern Territory. By virtue of secs. 26 and 29 of that Act the resealing in the Northern Territory of the probate granted in New South Wales operates as an original grant of probate as from the date of such reseal. There is no reason for giving a restricted meaning to sec. 26. Nothing in sec. 5 of the ordinance makes it necessary to hold that sec. 26 cannot be applied to it. The purpose of sec. 5 is to ensure that time shall not run against an applicant until someone has, in the relevant jurisdiction, been vested with authority to represent the estate : the period of six months is fixed as being the time within which it is reasonable for any such application to be made. The ordinance is obviously a remedial ordinance, and it contains nothing which suggests that sec. 26 of the Administration and Probate Act cannot be applied to a particular case because such application would frustrate some intention existing in the ordinance itself.

Godsall and Sheldon, for the respondent the Permanent Trustee Co. of New South Wales Ltd.

J. A, Ferguson and Dignam, for the other respondents.

Ricu J. We are all of opinion that the learned Judge had juris- diction, and we therefore set aside the order made by him. Our reasons for so doing will be put in writing and delivered at some future date.

H. C. or A, 1931-1932, et} Hormes " PERMANENT TRUSTER Co. oF New Sourn Wars Lrp.

1931-1932. Ww Hormes v. PERMANENT 'TRUSTEE Co. oF New Sovrn Wats Lrp.

Ricu J. This is an appeal by leave from an order of the Supren Court of the Northern Territory of Australia (Porter vy. The King: Ex parte Yee (1); Wall v. The King; Ex parte King Won and Wah On (No. 1] (2)). The order, which was made on 7th November 1931, dismissed an application made under the Testator Family Maintenance Ordinance 1929 (N.T.). The application was made by the testator's widow and infant daughter under the Suprer Court Ordinance 1911 (No. 9 of 1911) (N.T.). Under that ord a Supreme Court of the Northern Territory was established which should have in the Northern Territory all the jurisdiction and ns

whereby he appointed the respondents the Permanent Trus Company of New South Wales and Sydney Seller Godfrey, executor The testator died on Ist August 1929 without having revoked or altered his will. He was domiciled in Darwin in the North Territory and the bulk of his property is situated there. On 2 August 1929 probate of his will was granted to the executors by Supreme Court of New South Wales. On 10th December 1929 and 10th June 1930 exemplifications of such probate were respectivel)

learned Judge was that although the application had been made six months after resealing, resealing was not equivalent to a grat of probate and a grant of probate or letters of administration indispensable. The Northern Territory was annexed to the Provine

(1) (1926) 37 C.L.R. 432. (2) (1927) 39 C.LIR. 245.

of South Australia by letters patent dated 6th July 1863 issued under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 44. Pursuant to sec. 122 of the Constitution, South Australia surrendered the Northern Territory to the Commonwealth, and by the Northern Territory Acceptance Act 1910, which provided for the surrender and acceptance, it is enacted that " all laws in force in

the Northern Territory at the time of the acceptance shall continue >

in force, but may be altered or repealed by or under any law of the Commonwealth." By the Northern Territory (Administration) Act 1910, sec. 5, it is provided that where any law of the State of South Australia continues in force in the Territory by virtue of sec. 7 of the Northern Territory Acceptance Act 1910, it shall, subject to any ordinance made by the Governor-General, have effect in the Territory as if it were a law of the Territory. Sec. 13 of the same Act empowered the Governor-General to make ordinances having the force of law in the Territory. This section was superseded by a similar provision in sec. 59 of No. 16 of 1926. By the Testator's Family Maintenance Ordinance (No. 21 of 1929) it is provided as follows : - '" 4. (1) If any person (in this ordinance called ' the testator') disposes of or has disposed of his property by will in such a manner that the wife, husband or children of the testator, or any of them, are left without proper maintenance, education or advance- ment in life, the Court may, at its discretion, on application by or on behalf of the wife, husband or children, or any of them, order that such provision as the Court thinks fit shall be made out of the estate of the testator for the maintenance, education and advancement of the wife, husband or children, or any of them. (2) The applicant shall serve on the executor or on such other persons as the Court directs, notice of the application referred to in the last preceding sub-section. (3) The Court may attach such conditions to the order as it thinks fit, or may refuse to make an order in favour of any person on the ground that his character or conduct is such as, in the opinion of the Court, disentitles him to the benefit of an order, or on any other ground which the Court thinks sufficient. (4) In making the order the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that the provision shall consist of a lump sum or periodic or other payments. 5. An application for an order shall not be heard by the Court, unless the application is made within six months after the date of

° the will, or letters of administration with the will annexed of th

estate, of the testator: Provided that, in any case where 1

Prrmaxexr testator has died after the thirty-first day of December one tho

nine hundred and twenty-four and before the date of the commen

New Sovrit ment of this ordinance, an application for an order may be

by the Court if the application is made within six months after th date of the commencement of this ordinance or within six month after the date of the grant by the Supreme Court of North Austra of the probate or letters of administration, whichever is the la date."

As the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory has all jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court of South Austra prior to the acceptance of the Territory, it is necessary to examil the law in South Australia as to the effect of resealing prol By sec. 26 of the Administration and Probate Act 1891 (S.A.) (8 Buchanan v. The Commonwealth (1) ) it is provided that " W any probate or administration granted by any Court of comp jurisdiction in any of the other Australasian Colonies, or in United Kingdom, or any probate or administration granted by a foreign Court, shall be produced to and a copy thereof deposite with the Registrar, such probate or administration shall be sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court of South Australia, and shall have the like force and effect and the same operation in Australia, and every executor and administrator thereunder have the same rights and powers, perform the same duties, and b subject to the same liabilities, as if such probate or administration had been originally granted by the Supreme Court of South Australia." Probate includes exemplification of probate (sec. 29).

Now, the New South Wales probate having been sealed by Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, the New South Ws probate had thereupon the like force and effect and the same operati in the Northern Territory as if it had been originally granted by Supreme Court of South Australia. The words are plain enough. resealing operates as an original grant when it takes place. Thereis no reason for giving a restricted meaning to sec. 26. The resealing

has the same operation as a grant for all purposes, as much for the purposes of sec. 5 of the Testator's Family Maintenance Ordinance 1929 as for any other purpose. Sec. 5 contains nothing which makes it necessary to hold that sec. 26 cannot be applied to it. Sec. 5 does not create substantive rights. It is merely a

machinery section. It insures, on the one hand, that time shall N!

not run against an application until there is some one who can represent the estate in the Northern Territory, and, on the other hand, that any application shall be made within a reasonable time after a representation is constituted (fixed at six months). This is secured just as much by resealing as by an actual grant. There is no difference between actual probate and constructive probate material for the purposes of the Testator's Family Maintenance Ordinance. Tt cannot be suggested that any purpose of that ordinance would be frustrated unless, notwithstanding sec. 26, constructive probate is excluded and the operation of sec. 26 restricted. There is no reason for restricting the section, and it clearly applies to sec. 5 of the ordinance. This kind of legislation is not novel. It prevails within the Commonwealth and in New Zealand. In the days of Henry II. the power of disposing did not extend to all a man's property. That is the general law of Scotland at the present day. Similar provisions exist in Latin countries, analogous, I suppose, to the Roman law of quarta legitima. The ordinance brings the Territory into line with the States of the Commonwealth, and is remedial in its character and '' must be so construed as to give the most complete remedy which the phraseology will permit " (Gover's Case (1) ; Bull v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (2) ). " Nor ought a Court of law to be alert in placing a restricted construction upon the language of a remedial Act" (Samuel v. Newbold (3); Wilson v. Moss (4) ).

For these reasons I am of opinion the learned Judge was wroug in declining jurisdiction. It becomes unnecessary to consider whether Ordinance No. 4 of 1931 applies to or affects the present application.

1. (1875) 1 Ch. D. 182, at p. 198. (3) (1906) A.C. 461, at p. 467. ( (2) (1913) 17 C.L.R. 370, at p. 384. (4) (1909) 8 C.L.R. 146, at p. 165,

H.C.orA. Eyarr J. I agree with my brother Rich that the appeal s eS be allowed. Hotes

McTiernan J. The appeal should be allowed. I agree with the judgment of my brother Rich.

eceumed Appeal allowed. Order of Supreme Cow ed aside. Matter remitted to be dealt wit according to law. Costs of all parties out of the estate, those of the personal representative and of the widow as between solicitor client.

Solicitor for the applicants, J. S. Harris, Darwin, by A. C. Bo & Co. Solicitors for the respondent the Permanent Trustee Co. of Ne South Wales Ltd., Minter, Simpson & Co. Solicitors for the other respondents, S. H. Henderson and Vindin & Littlejohn. J. Be