The Family Provision Act s 9 Considerations
189Now the issue of "eligible person" is resolved in Mrs Barlevy's favour, the question arises whether any, and if so what, order for provision should be made in her favour. Family Provision Act s 9 sets out the steps the Court must consider in determining whether or not to make any provision under s 7. Family Provision Act s 9 relevantly provides as follows:
"9 Provisions affecting Court's powers under secs 7 and 8
(1) Where an application is made for an order under section 7 by an eligible person who is such a person by reason only of paragraph (c) or (d) of the definition of eligible person in section 6 (1), the Court shall first determine whether, in its opinion, having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present), there are factors which warrant the making of the application and shall refuse to proceed with the determination of the application and to make the order unless it is satisfied that there are those factors.
(2) The Court shall not make an order under section 7 or 8 in favour of an eligible person out of the estate or notional estate of a deceased person unless it is satisfied that:
(a) the provision (if any) made in favour of the eligible person by the deceased person either during the person's lifetime or out of the person's estate, or
(b) in the case of an order under section 8:
(i) if no provision was made in favour of the eligible person by the deceased person, the provision made in favour of the eligible person under this Act out of the estate or notional estate, or both, of the deceased person, or
(ii) the provision made in favour of the eligible person by the deceased person either during the person's lifetime or out of the person's estate as well as the provision made in favour of the eligible person under this Act out of the estate or notional estate, or both, of the deceased person,
is, at the time the Court is determining whether or not to make such an order, inadequate for the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life of the eligible person.
(3) In determining what provision (if any) ought to be made in favour of an eligible person out of the estate or notional estate of a deceased person, the Court may take into consideration:
(a) any contribution made by the eligible person, whether of a financial nature or not and whether by way of providing services of any kind or in any other manner, being a contribution directly or indirectly to:
(i) the acquisition, conservation or improvement of property of the deceased person, or
(ii) the welfare of the deceased person, including a contribution as a homemaker,
(b) the character and conduct of the eligible person before and after the death of the deceased person,
(c) circumstances existing before and after the death of the deceased person, and
(d) any other matter which it considers relevant in the circumstances.
(4) Nothing in subsection (3) (a) limits the generality of subsection (3) (b), (c) and (d) and the Court may consider a contribution of the same nature as that referred to in subsection (3) (a) or of a different nature in so far as it considers it relevant under subsection (3) (b), (c) or (d)."
190The operation of s 9(2) and s 9(3) are well established in authority. The Court must consider in a Family Provision Act application whether or not the provision made in favour of the plaintiff by the deceased either during the deceased's lifetime or out of the deceased's estate is now "inadequate for the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life of the eligible person": Family Provision Act s 9(2). If the Court makes a determination of inadequacy, the Court must then determine "what provision (if any) ought to be made in favour" of the plaintiff taking into consideration the matters set out in Family Provision Act s 9(3)(a)-(d).
191The separate nature of these two questions under Family Provision Act s 9(2) and (3) was affirmed by a majority of the High Court in Singer v Berghouse (No 2) (1994) 123 ALR 481; (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 209:
"The first question is, was the provision (if any) made for the applicant inadequate for [his or her] proper maintenance, education and advancement in life''? The difference between adequate'' and proper'' and the interrelationship which exists between adequate provision'' and ``proper maintenance'' etc were explained in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd . [1938] AC. The determination of the first stage in the two-stage process calls for an assessment of whether the provision (if any) made was inadequate for what, in all the circumstances, was the proper level of maintenance etc appropriate for the applicant having regard, amongst other things, to the applicant's financial position, the size and nature of the deceased's estate, the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty.
The determination of the second stage, should it arise, involves similar considerations. Indeed, in the first stage of the process, the court may need to arrive at an assessment of what is the proper level of maintenance and what is adequate provision, in which event, if it becomes necessary to embark upon the second stage of the process, that assessment will largely determine the order which should be made in favour of the applicant. In saying that, we are mindful that there may be some circumstances in which a court could refuse to make an order notwithstanding that the applicant is found to have been left without adequate provision for proper maintenance. Take, for example, a case like Ellis v Leeder (1951) 82 CLR 645, where there were no assets from which an order could reasonably be made and making an order could disturb the testator's arrangements to pay creditors."
192The High Court recently confirmed this approach to the operation of Family Provision Act s 9 in Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 213 ALR 692; (2005) 221 CLR 191 at [112]. The defendant contested whether or not Mrs Barlevy had established the necessary elements under Family Provision Act s 9(2) and whether application of Family Provision Act s 9(3) called for much provision to be made in her favour.
193As I have found that Mrs Barlevy's claim to be an eligible person is made out not only on the basis that she was in a domestic relationship at the time of his death but on the basis of sub-paragraph (d) of the definition of 'eligible person", the requirements of Family Provision Act s 9(1) are engaged. It is therefore necessary for the Court to determine whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) "there are factors which warrant the making of the application". And if there are no such factors, then the Court must refuse to proceed.
194Do Family Provision Act s 9(1) Factors Exist?
195I have found that Mrs Barlevy was living in a domestic relationship with Dr Rotkopf at the time of his death: Family Provision Act , s 6 "eligible person" (a)(ii). Thus, it is not strictly necessary for the Court to decide whether the plaintiff qualifies as an "eligible person" under subparagraph (d) as a person who was wholly or partly dependent upon a deceased person who was a member of the deceased person's household. I have already identified that evidence exists sufficient for the Court to infer that Mrs Barlevy was "an eligible person" qualifying under subparagraph (d). Were the question of eligibility dependent upon Mrs Barlevy qualifying under subparagraph (d), this is a case in my view where there are factors which warrant the making of the application sufficient to satisfy Family Provision Act , s 9(1). The existence of those factors means that the Court could receive solely under subparagraph (d) to determine the application.
196Family Provision Act , s 9(1) only applies to certain classes of applicants who are not generally to be regarded as natural objects of testamentary recognition by a deceased person. This suggests that the "factors" referred to in Family Provision Act , s 9(1) are factors which when added to facts which render the applicant an "eligible person" also give the applicant the status of a person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by a deceased person: see Re Fulop (deceased) (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 at 681 per McLelland J and Churton v Christian [1988] NSWCA 23; (1988) 13 NSWLR 241 at 252E. Where persons affected by Family Provision Act , s 9(1) have the circumstances of their relationship with the deceased set out it can sometimes immediately be seen that they are persons who would be regarded by most observers as natural objects of testamentary recognition: Churton v Christian [1988] NSWCA 23; (1988) 13 NSWLR 241 at 252E.
197There is direct evidence, which I accept, that Dr Rotkopf did want Mrs Barlevy to receive an interest in his estate. She was the contemplated object of his testamentary intentions. This emerges from the memorable piece of evidence from the solicitor, Ms Perla. When dealing with the issue of why it was when Dr Rotkopf seemed to be concerned about claims upon his estate that he should give instructions to Ms Perla to give quite a large proportion of his estate to Mrs Barlevy, Ms Perla replied:-
"Your Honour, he wasn't concerned about her claiming of his estate. He was concerned about her claiming in his lifetime. The co-habitation agreement is to do with separation, that he could take from her. On my initial consultation with him...he has discussed with me a will. At the same time as being concerned about Susan getting money on a separation, he is saying to me he wants to leave to Susan, she is number one in his will...Because the two things are different, when he is dead he doesn't need his money anymore. It is in his lifetime that he didn't want her to be able to make a claim under the Property Relationships Act , so that was the difference."
198This distinction is evident from the draft will that Ms Perla prepared for Dr Rotkopf on 31 January 2006. The will provides that Mrs Barlevy would get 75 percent of his estate if she continued to care for him and only 40 percent, if by the time of his death they had separated. Though not executed the document shows that Dr Rotkopf contemplated that she was a substantial object of his testamentary intentions even after they had separated and she had ceased to care for him. Ms Perla was a most reliable witness and I accept this evidence from her.
199Another factor which also satisfies Family Provision Act , s 9(1) in this case is that Mrs Barlevy showed immense patience and equanimity with Dr Rotkopf in the last months of his life when his unpredictable behaviour was at its worst and directed against her. She put up with a great deal. She would leave him from time to time to get space to preserve her personal resources to continue to deal with him. But these were in my view only natural acts of self-preservation undertaken to allow her respite to return and continue with the relationship. He made her angry but as she says she always "cooled down" and came back. I accept her evidence that she had decided to come back when he died and that she had the conversations with him that she says she did, just before he died. She demonstrated a very high standard of patience and commitment in these circumstances almost equivalent to that of a de facto partner, although she was not his de facto partner at the very end of his life. In this context it is also to be noted that her de facto relationship with him had lasted just under two years before it broke down and resumed as a close personal relationship. This was another factor qualifying her as a natural object of his testamentary recognition and warranting the making of the application and for the Court proceeding with it: Family Provision Act , s 9(1).
Was the provision Inadequate?
Mrs Barlevy's Means
200Mrs Barlevy has few assets and a modest pension income. She was not cross-examined to establish that her account of her assets was inaccurate or that she had other assets or income. Her only holding in real estate is a one half interest as tenant-in-common in equal shares with her daughter, Golda in an apartment in New South Head Road, Bondi. Her half interest in this unit is valued at $190,000.
201She has other movable assets, which are: a 1990 Honda Civic motor vehicle valued at $3,000; together with furniture, chattels fittings clothing and personal items worth between $8,000 and $10,000; and, a cheque account with a credit balance of $50.00. She has no life or superannuation policies, nor any jewellery of any commercial value.
202Mrs Barlevy's liabilities are significant. They are: a mortgage debt to Westpac over the Bondi apartment in the sum of $156,635.00 for the repayment of which she is solely responsible; an NAB Visa Card debt of $22,777; an ANZ Visa Card debt of $11, 282; and, a debt to a Mr Peter Wise of $27,000.
203Mrs Barlevy has a modest income. Her only source of income at this time of her life is the aged pension, which is paid to her at the rate of $552.00 per fortnight. She says that she is unable to work as a domestic assistant any more. I accept that she is not capable of such work. The aged pension is likely to be her only source of future income.
204Mrs Barlevy suffers from lower back and hip pain and she tires easily as a result. I accept her evidence about this disability. I find that within the foreseeable future she will herself probably require some assistance in carrying out domestic chores about her apartment. She takes three medications daily for various medical conditions, including medication to control her blood pressure. In addition to her ordinary household expenses, the cost of this medication is $15.00 per month.
Adequacy of the Provision
205Dr Rotkopf made some small provision for Mrs Barlevy during her lifetime but none was made for her out of his estate. The provision made by way of gifts to Mrs Barlevy during Dr Rotkopf's lifetime was not of a size that allowed her to accumulate any assets so as to be weighed against her present claim. From time to time Dr Rotkopf gave Mrs Barlevy money to allow her to make regular mortgage payments to Westpac, when she was short of money. Apart from that, the money he gifted to her was measured at the level of domestic service wages and was only sufficient to meet their joint household expenses. These payments were not enough for her to save and provide for her future. Mortgage payments have been a substantial drain on her resources.
206I accept Mrs Barlevy's account of her present accommodation situation. Her daughter Golda has a three-year-old child Liam. They live in the two-bedroom Bondi apartment. Mrs Barlevy says that the Bondi apartment is too small for the three of them. That is why she is still living in Kingsford. I accept that her daughter is not presently working full time with such a young child and that her daughter cannot presently be relied upon to assist with meeting mortgage commitments on the Bondi apartment.
207There is no evidence that Mrs Barlevy spent excessive sums of money that have not been accounted for. On the contrary the evidence as to Mrs Barlevy's modest assets and as to her way of life are a strong basis themselves to infer, and I do, that Dr Rotkopf did not make substantial provision for her during her lifetime beyond what the evidence of payments to her shows. The lack of any provision for her out of the estate is inadequate for her proper maintenance, education and advancement in life. She still only possesses a motor vehicle, which is 20 years old. She has not been able to accumulate any jewellery or other precious personal items. She has no superannuation or life insurance. In short she has not been able to accumulate any fund to protect her against life's adverse contingencies, let alone provide for some of life's small comforts. This is not entirely surprising. She has worked in unskilled and fairly low paid domestic occupations all her life. Her priorities are focussed on the support of her children and grandchildren.
208She claims that her immediate needs show that the lack of provision for her out of the estate is inadequate for her maintenance and advancement in life. I accept her case as to this.
209Through her counsel Mr Confos, Mrs Barlevy describes her immediate needs reasonably. I accept her evidence as to her current financial situation and make the following findings about her needs. She has the continuing anxiety of meeting the monthly mortgage payments for her daughter and herself to keep the Bondi apartment. She needs a new car as her car is not reliable and is costing money on repairs. To stabilise her financial situation she needs to pay off the credit card debts and the debt to Mr Wise. I accept that the Bondi apartment is too small for herself, her daughter Golda and her grandson Liam and that she needs a residence of her own. Mrs Barlevy presently has no financial capacity to take a holiday for pleasure or to broaden her horizons. The lack of life insurance and superannuation means that she has no funds to meet the unexpected contingencies of life. She will also have to balance her household budget in the future, something she is only barely able to do now.
What provision should be made?
210The appropriate order for provision that should be made out of Dr Rotkopf's estate in Mrs Barlevy's favour is to be inferred from her financial needs.
211First provision for Mrs Barlevy should include a sum sufficient to pay out the mortgage on the Bondi apartment. She owes $156,633 to Westpac in relation to this property. Provision should also be made for a separate residence for her. It is not inconsistent for both of these to be provided for. Mrs Barlevy is very short of funds to which she can have resort to meet contingencies or to supplement her income. The Bondi apartment is a potential source of income for her in the future, if her daughter Golda goes elsewhere or, when her daughter is more financially secure her daughter may be able to pay her an occupation fee. Since the trial some payments would have been made on this mortgage, so an allowance of $150,000 for this is appropriate.
212Second, provision for Mrs Barlevy should include a fund to assist in the purchase of a new motor vehicle. Mrs Barlevy's own health is not good. Requiring her to take public transport, when her present vehicle becomes unusable or uneconomic to run, is likely to test her presently painful medical conditions and add stress to her life. An allowance should be made for a motor vehicle. She has claimed $30,000 which is appropriate on this account. I would allow slightly more so that she can buy a slightly better vehicle that will last her longer and be more comfortable. I would allow her $35,000.
213Thirdly, provision for Mrs Barlevy should include a sum to pay off all Mrs Barlevy's debts, which are a source of potential anxiety for a person of her age. These debts add to $61,059 (being $22,777 plus $11,282, plus $27,000). Including potential interest charges since the hearing I would allow $65,000 on this account for Mrs Barlevy.
214Fourthly, Mrs Barlevy wishes to live in her own home in the Eastern suburbs if Sydney, where she has lived all her life. I accept that her advancement in life means that she need not be accommodated in the small two-bedroom apartment in Bondi, in which her daughter and her son Liam could be expected to occupy one each of the two bedrooms. Her advancement in life means that she should live separately if she wishes, and she does. This can be achieved by renting elsewhere. But to require her to negotiate the financial and physical uncertainties of renting for an unlimited period into her old age in my view are not to provide for her proper maintenance and advancement in life. The security of a place of her own choice in the long term will provide for her maintenance and advancement in life. Including stamp duty and legal fees an estimate of $600,000 is given for the provision of such a residence. Her Bondi unit is worth $380,000 (when her and her daughter's interests are aggregated). It is appropriate for her in my view to live in a unit of that approximate value. I would allow $450,000 inclusive of transaction costs. My fixing of this figure also takes into account the benefit she has received already from her occupation of Sturt Street, Kingsford.
215Fifthly, Mrs Barlevy claims a sum sufficient to go on an overseas holiday in the sum of $20,000. Whether for pleasure or the educational experience of travel, the making of allowance for a holiday or holidays is appropriate for Mrs Barlevy's advancement in life. At the age of 69 she can be expected to live many more years and to need the refreshing experience of a holiday from time to time. I would allow $20,000 on this account.
216Sixthly, Mrs Barlevy claims that a sum of $50,000 is appropriate to meet the unexpected contingencies of life, especially given her poor health and age. Given that her mortgage on Bondi will have been paid off she now has another potential source of supplementary income in the future. So I will allow $30,000 on this account.
217Finally, Mrs Barlevy submits that an order for provision for her should include an annual sum sufficient to provide for her ongoing annual medical expenses, car running expenses, property outgoings and maintenance (of any property she were to purchase), household and living expenses and domestic assistance. She estimates these future expenses. Her estimates are the following:-
Medical Expenses $2,500
Car running Expenses $3,000
Property Outgoings and Maintenance $3,500
Household and Living Expenses $8,000
Cost of Domestic Assistance $5,200