Bar-Mordecai v Medical Council of NSW

Bar-Mordecai v Medical Council of NSW - [2015] NSWCATOD 58 - NSWCATOD 2015 case summary — Zoe

[3]

THE EVIDENCE

Much of the evidence that was originally sought to be relied upon by Mr Bar-Mordecai was either withdrawn or struck out as irrelevant.
There was a particular problem that the applicant sought to rely upon extensive material that had no relevance to the issues of his fitness to be reinstated.
Most of the material in his statement of 168 pages dated 12 January 2015 was, at first glance, irrelevant to those issues.
The material in evidence was as follows: 8.1 The application filed 12 September 2014; 8.2 The applicant's statement of 12 January 2015. 8.3 Document titled "Medical Board of Australia - Recency of Practice Registration - Standard" 8.4 Document titled "Medical Board of Australia - Information on Returning to Practice" dated 13 April 2011. 8.5 Form provided by Medical Board of Australia entitled "Plan for Professional Development and re-entry to practice" 8.6 Document from AHPRA recording complaints made in period in 1998 - January 2009 in respect to the applicant. 8.7 Medical Board of Australia document entitled "Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for doctors in Australia" dated March 2014. 8.8 Exhibit R2 article "The Key to creating patient trust", "Extravagant Hospitability" by Toni Gitles and Harriet Cavanah Dart. 8.9 Exhibit R3 - document written by the applicant title "The Battered Litigant Syndrome". 8.10 Exhibit A1 - 2 volumes comprising draft text book prepared by applicant. 8.11 Affidavit of Elias Mordecai sworn 29 January 2015. 8.12 Affidavit of Ruby Mordecai sworn 28 January 2015. 8.13 Affidavit of Paul Miron sworn 12 February 2015. 8.14 Affidavit of Cynthia Deutsch sworn 12 February 2015. 8.15 Affidavit of Paula Carew sworn 26 February 2015. 8.16 Affidavit of the applicant sworn 11 March 2015. 8.17 Affidavit of Isaac Mordecai sworn 16 March 2015. 8.18 Affidavit of Julia Zho sworn 17 March 2015. 8.19 Reasons of The NSW Medical Tribunal regarding disqualification of the applicant dated 6 September 2000. 8.20 Judgment of the Supreme Court of NSW (Patten AJ) dated 25 February 2005 in proceedings Attorney General v Bar Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142 8.21 Reasons of the NSW Medical Tribunal in application of the applicant for reinstatement dated 12 December 2006. 8.22 Reasons of the NSW Medical Tribunal dated 18 March 2009 refusing further application by the applicant for reinstatement. 8.23 Decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia of 1 June 2010 in Bennet v Swallow (2010) FamCAFC 100 on appeal from the decision of a single judge summarily dismissing an application by Mr Bar-Mordecai and his parents for access to the children of his daughter. Appeal dismissed. 8.24 Decision of Garling J in the Supreme Court of NSW on 17 August 2012 hearing application by the applicant for leave to commence proceedings by way of 1 appeal and then proceedings against 7 judges personally (2 deceased). (Application of Bar-Mordecai [2012] NSWSC 942) 8.25 Decision of Schmidt J in the Supreme Court of NSW on 27 February 2013 on application of the applicant for leave to bring pleadings in negligence against a psychiatrist he had consulted [2013] NSWSC 120 8.26 Decision of the Medical Tribunal of NSW in Michael Bar-Mordecai v the Medical Council of NSW [2013] NSWMT 5 (3 April 2013). 8.27 Decision of Garling J in the Supreme Court of NSW in application of Michael Bar-Mordecai [2013] NSWSC 1265 (5 September 2013) refusing leave to commence proceedings for review in the Medical Tribunal of the 2000 decision cancelling his registration. 8.28 Decision of Garling J in the Supreme Court of NSW dated 5 September 2013 in application of Michael Bar-Mordecai [2013] NSW SC 1250, being a decision refusing leave to commence proceedings pursuant to Section 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (1 of 2 applications). 8.29 Decision of Schmidt J in Attorney General for NSW v Bar-Mordecai [2013] NSWSC 1307. 8.30 Decision of Garling J in the Supreme Court of NSW dated 12 September 2013 in Application of Michael Bar-Mordecai [2013] NSWSC 1286 - refusal of application for leave to commence proceedings against 2 psychiatrists. 8.31 Decision of Garling in the Supreme Court of NSW dated 11 April 2014 in Application of Michael Bar-Mordecai [2014] NSW SC 414 - refusal of application for leave to commence proceedings against a psychiatrist for medical negligence. 8.32 Judgement in Mankiewicz v Swallow [2014] FamCA 579. 8.33 Decision of Adams J in the Supreme Court of NSW in Application of Michael Bar-Mordecai [2014] NSWSC 1202 dated 1 September 2014 granting the application f the applicant to apply to the Civil & Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision to remove him from the Register of Practitioners and restoration of his registration. 8.34 Decision of the NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal in Bar-Mordecai v Medical Council of NSW [2014] NSWCATOD 142 (dated 28 November 2014). 8.35 Decision of the NSW Civil & Administration Tribunal in Bar-Mordecai v Medical Council of NSW [2014] NSW CA TOD 158 (dated 8 December 2014).

[5]

Complaint 1 - respondent was guilty of professional misconduct and that he: 1.1 Between August 1983 and about 25 June 1994 the practitioner treated Patient A whilst at the same time having a personal and sexual relationship with that Patient. 1.2 Between August 1983 and about 25 June 1994, while treating Patient A, obtained financial advantages from the Patient (he testified at the hearing that he received over $1 million in cash, property and benefits from Patient A). 1.3 Between August 1983 and about June 1994 the practitioner, while treating Patient A, undertook a course of conduct to obtain financial benefits from his Patient on her death, including: 1. Destroyed or suppressed the 1989 will of Patient A. 2. Took videos and photographs of Patient A during her life. 3. Acquired financial interest in and with and from Patient A. 1.4 On or about June 1994 the practitioner administered 30 milligrams of morphine to Patient A (Patient A became unconscious 4 minutes after the injection and died 6 minutes after the injection). 1.5 On or about 25 June 1995 the practitioner inappropriately signed a medical certificate of cause of death for Patient A in circumstances where the practitioner: - was treating the Patient; and - considered himself to be a potential beneficiary from the estate of Patient A; and - was at that time engaged in a personal relationship with the Patient. (He testified that as at 25 June 1994 he was treating Patient A, he considered himself to be a potential beneficiary from her estate, and he was her defacto husband.) 1.6 The practitioner lied on oath in written or oral testimony in proceedings in the Supreme Court of NSW 12009 of 1994. (He falsely alleged that Patient A had died without leaving a will and that he had been her defacto spouse, and therefore entitled to the totality of her estate, as she left no issue. The Medical Tribunal was satisfied of this ground from evidence that he gave at the hearing before the Tribunal.) 1.7 The practitioner failed to keep a drug register in June 1994 for drugs of addiction contrary to Regulation 58 of the Regulations to the Poisons Act 1966 (the applicant conceded that he did not comply with Regulation 58 and said that he generated a drug register on his computer. When it was put to him that that was not as required in the Poisons Act, he said "…that is my drug register. Whether it is in the Poisons Act or not, it is my drug register that is what I use and that is what I tender here as evidence…". He was asked whether he considered himself obliged to keep a drug register as that term is used in the Poisons Act, and said "…no I didn't". then the following exchange occurred: Question: "Do you consider yourself obliged to comply with the letter of the Law?" Answer: "No, Mr Joseph, I do not. I think if we have technology and the Law has not caught up with that technology, then the technology should be accepted". He conceded that at times he altered his "drug register", but the fact of such alteration was not recorded in his "drug register".

[6]

Complaint 2: 2.1 In about 1995 the practitioner, whilst treating Patient B, in a consultation disclosed to the husband of Patient B (Patient C) confidential information provided to the practitioner by Patient B. 2.2 In about 1995 the practitioner in consultation gave inappropriate advice to Patient C concerning his relationship with Patient B (the findings were that the Patients were husband and wife. In the course of the consultations, the applicant advised the husband that "he should consider separation, document everything, get another girlfriend and that the practitioner could assist him to find someone suitable among the practitioner's own friends". The husband testified that when he was contemplating possible divorce the applicant advised him that it was no use continuing with the marriage because the wife "was angry at all men and it was not a personal matter". He suggested that the husband find a girlfriend. The applicant also offered to assist the husband in gaining custody of the Patients' children in any subsequent family law proceedings. He also offered to participate with him in a scheme to hide some of the husband's income for purposes of those proceedings. (In the hearing the applicant also stated that in NSW there is little or no patient confidentiality between medical practitioner and the patient.)

In the conclusions of the Tribunal the following findings were made: At the time of the commencement of this unfortunate history in 1983, the respondent was a young man of 36. He then committed the improper and unethical conduct of embarking upon a close and personal relationship with a lady who was then his patient. This is clearly professional misconduct within the meaning of the Medical Practice Act. If his behaviour after that date had been exemplary, the Tribunal may have been inclined to the view that the interest of the public did not warrant his deregistration. Unfortunately, his behaviour since 1983 has been far from exemplary. On almost every aspect on which his conduct was criticised he firmly maintained that he was correct and that everyone else was wrong. During the lifetime of (the patient) he continued accepting gifts of a substantial nature from her. But on or shortly after her death his greed got the better of him and he then set about destroying or suppressing her Will so that he could found a claim for the totality of her Estate. In the course of maintaining this claim he lied on oath in written and oral evidence to the Supreme Court. His conduct with two other female patients after the death of (the patient) demonstrates that he still lacks any understanding of the proper rules of conduct governing medical practice. His attitude to the use of morphine and his previous methods of use is not in accordance with any data available and is very much criticised by many of the clinical experts and by the pharmacologist Prof. Starmer. He continued selectively to quote part of Dr Moyhahan's report erroneously to support his view that his action of using morphine in this dosage in these particular circumstances was supported by him and by the Coroner. He was quite blind to the difficulties into which he was placed by his signing the medical certificate as to the cause of death of Eveline Hillston. He is not prepared to accept that as a registered Medical Practitioner he is required to do by the law in respect to the keeping of a drug register. Throughout the hearing before this Tribunal, whenever the question of the use of Schedule 8 drugs was raised, whether as to the dosage of morphine given in relation to a specific clinical situation, or the recording required by law regarding the use and documentation of Schedule 8 drugs, or the safe keeping of these drugs in a locked cupboard, the respondent showed an attitude of mind in which he regarded himself as having superior knowledge for which he could give no reference or support other than his own perceived experience in contrast with the expert evidence called. In relation to the allegations in Complaint 2, the Tribunal notes that the respondent remains dogmatic that his conduct was correct and that his views were unchanged after hearing the opinion of his peers. Of particular concern to the Tribunal are the serious defects in the character of the respondent demonstrated by: 1. His inability to distinguish the boundaries of the professional doctor / patient relationship with resulting transgressions thereof; 2. His repeated acts of sexual relationships with patients; 3. His avarice as demonstrated by his suppression or destruction of the Will of his late patient so that he could found a claim for the totality of her Estate; 4. His lack of integrity as demonstrated by his lies on oath in written and oral evidence to the Supreme Court. Dr Bar-Mordecai appears still to have no insight or remorse for his admitted transgressions and this is a matter of profound concern to the Tribunal.
Mr Bar-Mordecai appealed the Medical Tribunal's decision. On 28 May 2002 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs.

[7]

FINDINGS IN ATTORNEY GENERAL V BAR MORDECAI [2005] NSW SC 142

The Attorney General sought orders under the Supreme Court Act for Mr Bar-Mordecai to be required to obtain leave of the Supreme Court before commencing any proceedings or continuing any proceeding he had already commenced. He relied upon 40 different proceedings instituted by Mr Bar-Mordecai.
Patten AJ relied upon part of the findings of Bryson J of the Supreme Court in relation to proceedings under the Family Provision Act which were head together by Bryson J on 47 hearing dates from 9 September 2002 to 29 November 2002. Bryson J in a 154 page judgment of 28 February 2003 stated: "In the Summons in proceedings 3039 of 2002 Mr Michael Bar-Mordecai claimed an order that the letters of administration granted to Mr Allan Hillston be revoked, that Mr Allan Hillston be removed as administrator and that Mr Michael Bar-Mordecai be appointed administrator. He filed a Statement of Claim in those proceedings; the Statement of Claim makes various claims for damages, costs and interest, on the basis of allegations which contain much material which is obviously extraneous; the Statement of Claim when taken as a whole cannot be understood, and it cannot be treated as a pleading of facts which support the claims in the Summons". "A great deal of time and attention was given during the hearing to issues relating to Mr Bar-Mordecai's credit. On many subjects he was shown by cross-examination, or even by comparison of evidence which he has given at different places, to be an unreliable witness. He has often given evidence which contradicts his evidence in other places or which introduces qualifications or supplementary explanations so far-reaching as to disavow evidence which he has given elsewhere. From time to time, when confronted with some adverse evidence, he produced new affidavits, with new explanations of conduct or events which he could well have produced earlier, if they were true. He did not produce the evidence of persons whom, in a complete and convincing presentation of his case, it would reasonably be expected that he would call. He left significant parts of the events with little or no explanation; his case was particularly unsatisfactory in not giving credible circumstantial explanations of the evolution of decisions of Mrs Eveline Hillston to make gifts, and his own participation in their evolution." "Mr Bar-Mordecai made many claims that he was under difficulties in presenting his evidence because he suffered memory loss as a result of an injury in a motor accident in January 1992; however he produced no medical evidence which confirmed the existence of any such memory loss, or explained how it might have arisen, although very often challenged by the plaintiff's counsel to produce such evidence. He described it as intermittent memory loss (t990126) and described his short term and long term memory defects. He very often explained himself in evidence by reference to his alleged memory loss. However on many occasions he gave evidence, or made statements during submissions which showed striking capacity for recollection (if indeed the recollections which he then apparently displayed were genuine). He professed to have remarkably detailed and complete recollections of many events, even in the distant past, and he produced such recollections on occasion with great speed, although on other occasions he professed to have extreme difficulty in calling to mind circumstances which may well have been quite important both at the time and since." "I do not accept that Mr Bar-Mordecai has any disability or condition, which has diminished his powers of recollection. In my finding he simulates memory loss when it is suitable to him to do so, and on the whole he has rather better powers of recollection than the average person, although he is not frank or sincere in what he claims to recollect, or not to recollect". "In my evaluation, Mr Michael Bar-Mordecai exhibited extremely unsatisfactory demeanour as a witness. As a witness he was markedly an opportunist. It was extremely difficult, on occasions, to bring him to address directly questions, which were important; however he did not have corresponding difficulty in bringing his mind and expression to bear on matters, which he perceived to be of assistance to his case. He often gave what were nominally answers which, in fact, were unresponsive, or instead of answering a question launched into what would perhaps, if the question had been answered, have been an excuse or explanation for an answer adverse to him. He often obtruded references to grievances, including altogether improbable grievances, into answers when the grievances had little or no relation to the matter in hand". "I do not believe that Mr Bar-Mordecai is in truth a person whom fate and malignity have exposed to an astonishing number of improbable circumstances, lies and hostilities. When he has given unsupported evidence of something which is improbable, my view is that I should not accept his evidence. In addressing allegations the evidence for which is solely or substantially evidence of Mr Bar-Mordecai alone I am unable to find facts on the basis that his evidence is in any way reliable. Written records made by him are also unreliable. It is no use attempting to weigh up degrees of probability and improbability and attempting to assess how much improbability is too much; his evidence is simply unreliable. I do not see any relevant limits to what he would be prepared to say, or to what he would be prepared to accuse somebody else of doing. He would say anything. Some things he has asserted seem like fantasies from the travels of Baron Munchausen. Perhaps some of these are true, but there is no way of concluding that they probably are true. I do not regard any of his evidence as reliable. It is not even appropriate to treat his evidence as reliable when it was or seemed to be adverse to his own interest, as he had no real perception of what his interest was, and sometimes strongly maintained positions adverse to his apparent interest. Except where his evidence accords with something which is otherwise well established, for example by admissions in pleadings or by contemporaneous records which can be regarded as having an objective source or by witnesses who can be treated as reliable, little of what he has himself stated in evidence can be acted on."
There was a finding by Patten A J that numerous proceedings initiated by Mr Bar-Mordecai were "without substance", or "untenable" or "manifestly hopeless" and were vexatious.
In 2002 Mr Bar-Mordecai had commenced a series of proceedings in the Supreme Court against 2 Supreme Court Judges, 3 Judges of Appeal and the other members of the Medical Tribunal Panel that ordered his de-registration in 2000. All of the defendants made applications for the proceedings to be struck out or permanently stayed.
Dowd J heard the applications and held each of the judicial officers immune to such claims because of judicial immunity and the statements of claim therefore disclosed no cause of action.
In relation to the actions against the members of the Medical Tribunal other than Judge Cooper, Dowd J held that the action was an attempt to re-litigate issues that had been determined by the Tribunal and upheld by the Court of Appeal. He considered the actions against the members of the Tribunal other than Judge Cooper to be an abuse of the court's process.
Dowd J dismissed all of the applications by Mr Bar-Mordecai.
Patten AJ held that he agreed with Dowd J in finding that the judicial officers had immunity, and also the conclusions in relation to the claims against the other members of the Medical Tribunal. He also found that it was probable that the proceedings were instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the persons against whom they were brought. He found those proceedings to be vexatious within Section 84(1).
He made a similar finding in respect to the applications of Mr Bar-Mordecai to appeal to the Court of Appeal in respect to the various orders made by Dowd J. All of those applications had been dismissed as either incompetent or out of time. He held that they were, "…vexatious as being utterly without prospect of success".
Patten AJ referred to a statement of claim filed in the Common Law Division on 28 June 2002 by Mr Bar-Mordecai making a claim against "United Medical Protection". He said the statement of claim was 24 pages. He held that the cause of action as pleaded in the statement of claim was "…plainly vexatious within S84(1) in that, on its face the claim was manifestly hopeless". In any event, the defendant was wrongly named and the nominated defendant being in liquidation, proceedings against it required leave of the court.
When Mr Bar-Mordecai subsequently filed an application for leave, he filed an amended statement of claim. There was also before the Master a motion by the defendant for an order that the statement of claim be set aside. The Master held that on the merits, there was no serious issue to be tried between Mr Bar-Mordecai and the proposed defendant. She refused leave to file an amended statement of claim.
Mr Bar-Mordecai filed a summons seeking leave to appeal that decision. But before the Registrar of the Court of Appeal the summons was withdrawn. Patten AJ concluded that the application for leave to appeal was a vexatious proceeding.
Patten AJ also found that Mr Bar-Mordecai commenced another action by statement of claim in the Common Law Division in November 2003 naming "United Medical Protection" as defendant. It found that "…it seems that he intended to plead, in substance, the same cause of actions as pleaded in the earlier proceedings"… Patten AJ held that the statement of claim "…should be regarded as vexatious, in that it did not plead a comprehensible cause of action".
The Master heard a motion by the defendant to strike out the statement of claim. She held that substance of the case for which Mr Bar-Mordecai wished to present was hopeless and ordered that the statement of claim be dismissed with costs.
Patten AJ also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal by Mr Bar-Mordecai against the decision of the Medical Tribunal ordering his de-registration. The appeal was unanimously dismissed on the grounds that it did not raise any question of law. Patten AJ held that in the light of the reasons of the Court of Appeal he would stop short of categorising the appeal itself as vexatious.
Before Patten AJ the Attorney General also relied upon an appeal by Mr Bar-Mordecai against the decision of Judge Williams in the District Court. A claim had been made against Mr Bar-Mordecai and his brother for professional negligence. The negligence alleged was that of Mr Bar-Mordecai. Upon evidence before Patten AJ, he determined that Mr Bar-Mordecai's appeal failed because no notice of appeal appointment was filed by the appellants within the time allowed, and the appeal was then taken pursuant to the Rules to be discontinued. On the limited material available to him, Patten AJ held that he was unable to conclude that the appeal was vexatious within Section 84(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970.
Patten AJ made the following orders: 1. That Michael Jacob Bar-Mordecai shall not without leave of this court institute proceedings in any court. 2. That any legal proceedings instituted by Michael Jacob Bar-Mordecai in any court before the date of this order shall not be continued by him without the leave of this court. 3. That Michael Jacob Bar-Mordecai pay the costs of these proceedings.

[12]

Other matters relating to good character The Tribunal made the following findings relevant to this aspect: 1. That when Justice Bryson was presiding over litigation to which he was a party, he told Dr Roberts, a psychiatrist, that he was contemplating an assault on the Judge as a means of gaining tactical advantage in the proceedings. Although he did not act upon the threat, and Dr Roberts opined that he wouldn't, the Tribunal was alarmed he had considered such conduct. 2. The Tribunal referred to the paper noted "Battered Litigant Syndrome" which Mr Bar-Mordecai had written, and in which he stated that a person suffering from the syndrome may contemplate maiming or killing a judicial officer, and also said that any such behaviour was a "cry for help" and the "battered litigant" should not be held responsible for the assault. 3. The Tribunal noted that Mr Bar-Mordecai conceded that the paper was based exclusively on his own experience as a "battered litigant'. 4. Dr Phillips testified that he was "worried" that the paper was "highly personalised" and was "without reference to the established medical, legal or sociological literature". 5. The Tribunal was also concerned that Mr Bar-Mordecai had been embroiled in litigation for a decade and "he is dissatisfied with every judicial officer whom he has encountered. He levels the most serious criticisms against Judge Cooper, whom he described as 'a thief' determined to rule against Mr Bar-Mordecai, whatever the merits of the case. He is convinced that the NSW Judicial System is riddled with corruption and meshed in conspiracy. He has complained to the International Criminal Court about most, if not all, judicial officers who have made findings against him….. the 'battered litigant syndrome' he calls for a legislation making "judicial batterers' accountable for their actions". The Tribunal concluded in relation to these aspects: "Suspicion, dislike or even hatred of the judiciary is not prima facie evidence in the lack of good character in rendering a person unfit for practice as a medical practitioner. However, respect for the rule of law does bear on the question of good character.

[14]

Competence The Tribunal noted that Mr Bar-Mordecai was still maintaining that the administration of a 30 mg dose of morphine to Patient A was appropriate. He described the finding of the 2000 Tribunal in relation to the dosage as a "bogus finding of fact" and a "wilful perversion of the course of justice". However, he did concede that he had come to appreciate that the prevailing view is otherwise. He told the Tribunal that if reinstated he would not administer a 30mg dose or morphine, but would dose in 5mg increments. The Tribunal noted that since 2000 Mr Bar-Mordecai had updated his medical knowledge by researching and creating a computerised information system based on symptoms, signs, and test results. Dr Philips had given evidence that the system was "very interesting" and "quite impressive", but noted that it had not yet been peer reviewed. Dr Roberts expressed a view that Mr Bar-Mordecai's theoretical knowledge is comparable to that of other general practitioners because of his many years of experience and research associated with his computerised information system. Dr Roberts, however, that Mr Bar-Mordecai would need some retraining and may benefit from general practitioner supervision. Dr Phillips said that if Mr Bar-Mordecai was reinstated, initially he should practise in a hospital environment where he could be closely supervised. The Tribunal noted that Mr Bar-Mordecai had not proposed any firm "return to practice plan". 1. It also noted that despite Mr Bar-Mordecai giving evidence that he had "significant interaction" with his brother, a general practitioner, where they discussed professional issues, and if his registration was restored that he may practice with his brother, the brother did not give any evidence and there was no evidence that he was willing to supervise.

The Tribunal also found: "It is 9 years since Mr Bar-Mordecai engaged in general practice. General practice involves clinical skills as well as intellectual knowledge. Any appropriate "return to practice plan" would include supervision. Mr Bar-Mordecai considers himself to be highly skilled and more knowledgeable than an average general practitioner. He considers hospital medicine to be irrelevant to general practice. The Tribunal doubts that he would accept - let alone embrace - supervision, either in a hospital environment or in a general practice environment."

[18]

DECISION OF MICHAEL BAR-MORDECAI V MEDICAL COUNCIL OF NSW [2013] NSW MT 5 - 3 APRIL 2013

This was the decision of Coalfax SC, DCJ in the Medical Tribunal. Mr Bar-Mordecai had filed an application for reinstatement as a medical practitioner pursuant to the leave granted by Justice Beech-Jones in April 2012.
The matter was listed for Mr Bar-Mordecai to show cause why his application should not be struck out as an abuse of process. The issue was whether the application complied with the conditions in the orders of Justice Beech-Jones.
Mr Bar-Mordecai filed in court a document foreshadowing an application that Judge Coalfax SC, who was to hear the matter, disqualify himself.
The Judge found that the grounds that Mr Bar-Mordecai sought to rely upon in seeking disqualification were that "…other judicial officers who have functioned as either chairperson or the deputy chairperson of this Tribunal have engaged in what he described as corrupt conduct", and a fair minded onlooker "would conclude that I, being a judicial colleague of those other judges, would be prepared to participate in some form of judicial conspiracy…".
Judge Coalfax said that had no dealings with Mr Bar-Mordecai of any kind before 25 March 2013 and his knowledge of the background to his application had been formed exclusively by reference to the Tribunal file. He refused the application for disqualification.
In relation to the show cause application, he found that on 4 separate occasions Mr Bar-Mordecai had filed material in the Tribunal which had been inconsistent with, and in breach of, the conditions of leave granted by the Supreme Court on 24 April 2012. He determined that because of the persistent breaches of that leave the continuation of the application would be an abuse of process. He ordered that the application be dismissed as an abuse of process of the Tribunal and also ordered that no further application or document be accepted by the Tribunal for filing, "…without a further order being made by the Supreme Court.."

[20]

DECISION OF MAGISTRATE MILLEDGE ON 25 JUNE 2013 IN TS v MB

This was the hearing of an application by the daughter of Mr Bar-Mordecai and police on behalf of his grandchildren, who were born in 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006. Mr Bar-Mordecai represented himself. The magistrate found that the daughter had "reported an historic sexual assault to police in 2007, and in 2008 she gave a very full and comprehensive statement setting out the physical and mental abuse that she alleges she suffered at the hands of her father, the defendant in these proceedings. Her account of her sexual torment is significant and the police took the reporting of that very seriously and they commenced to investigate the very serious allegations that she made against her father. Given her physical and mental state, [she] believed that she could not continue with the investigation knowing that it would result in court proceedings, and that she would, by necessity, be part of those court proceedings".
The original apprehended violence order had been made in 2007. At the beginning of the proceedings Mr Bar-Mordecai sought to have his daughter psychologically examined to have her assessed to ensure that she was mentally capable of giving evidence, and also to assess her state of mental capacity with regards to the purporting of the sexual abuse.
Mr Bar-Mordecai told the magistrate that his daughter suffers mental health issues. There was some other evidence that she was suffering from "serious and significant post traumatic stress disorder" and that the mental anguish that she suffered at the hands of her father will "…stay with her for the rest of her life".
Mr Bar-Mordecai admitted that his daughter should not be relied upon because she was suffering from "false memory syndrome" and that others had planted these types of thoughts and that she was severely influenced by others, particularly her mother and her mother had her own mental health problems.
The magistrate found that the daughter was "unable to look at him" and that she was very apprehensive about coming to court and tried to give her evidence via remote facility.
Mr Bar-Mordecai cross-examined his daughter at length. The magistrate found that "…he was certainly not kind to the witness. It was obvious to everybody that she had no time for her father, the defendant, that she believed that she had good reason not to have any dealings with her father. In fact, in her viva voce evidence, she reinformed what she had said in her statement".
The daughter's evidence had been that prior to making her statement to police in 2007 she had no contact with her father for 20 years. She said she wanted to continue to have no contact with him. She testified that she does not trust him with her children and she believes her children are getting to the age that she was when he perpetuated sexual abuse on her.
She said that she did not believe that he could be trusted anywhere near her children, even if he was to be supervised. She said that she wanted him to have absolutely nothing to do with her family. She was demonstrably distressed in her evidence. Her discomfort was obvious.
The court accepted her evidence that she wanted no relationship with her father.
The magistrate said "…even if Mr Bar-Mordecai's assertions were correct and that she has imagined or made up the sexual abuse that she said that she suffered at his hands and that she was suffering some significant mental illness, as he maintains, if that were the case his actions could only aggravate her and make her distress worse. That is, if what he says is correct. So if he really believes that, why does he not have consideration for her situation and desist? Her wishes are clear. She is the mother of the children. The children are only young. The eldest was only 16 at the time of this application. They are children that should be under her control. Why, if he believes that if his daughter is suffering serious mental illness would he continue to push and push and push on the issue of seeing the grandchildren?"
The magistrate did not accept that the daughter was suffering from false memory syndrome or that she was engaged in parental alienation or that she had serious mental health issues. The magistrate was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the allegations made by the daughter were correct.
The police accepted those allegations and indicated that they are waiting for her mental ill health to improve to where she becomes more resilient and can continue with her complaint, at which time they will re-initiate the investigation.
In cross examination Mr Bar-Mordecai asked her why she would think that he could possibly abuse his grandchildren. She responded "…I have found my father to be highly unpredictable when I was a child. I have no reason to believe that he is going to respect people's boundaries or their wellbeing in the meantime. I have no reason to think that he would treat my children any differently to the way he treated me if they don't have responsible adults to take care of them, and I have never - I don't even consider it - that question. You know "why would I abuse my grandchildren. This person has no access to my children at all".
She said in her evidence too that Mr Bar-Mordecai had never met 3 of her children and had had no contact with her eldest child since she was less than 1 year old. She said "…they are my children. I get to protect them. You don't get to any of them to abuse them".
The daughter referred in her evidence to a statement made by Mr Bar-Mordecai in a letter he sent to her legal representatives saying that "… he believed that he would be wearing his daughter down and that she would be worn down to a frazzle". 1. The magistrate concluded that there were good grounds for extending the order and she extended the AVO restraining Mr Bar-Mordecai from having any contact with his daughter or her children for another 10 years.
The magistrate also made an order that Mr Bar-Mordecai pay his daughter's costs in the amount of $22,977.42. These were the costs of the proceedings.

[21]

DECISION ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2013 OF JUSTICE GARLING IN APPLICATION OF MICHAEL BAR-MORDECAI [2013] NSWSC 1265

This was an Application of Mr Bar-Mordecai. He sought that the Supreme Court "register the applicant as of right, and without an enquiry, on the grounds that he was unlawfully de-registered". In the alternative it sought an order for leave for him to lodge an application for review of the 2000 decision of the Medical Tribunal revoking his registration. He also sought an order that the hearing by the Medical Tribunal be by a "newly constituted Medical Tribunal be established, with an impartial judicial officer or no judicial officer having regard to the history of the matter and the plague of judicial corruption inherent in the Medical Tribunal of NSW, as identified by E Elkaim DCJ of the Medical Tribunal of NSW in his orders dated 21 February 2013".
He also sought "an order that the Medical Council of NSW not be joined as a party / contradictor in the Medical Tribunal litigation in terms of having relied on expert medical witnesses to advocate and give false evidence and unfounded expert opinion so as to mislead the Medical Tribunal of NSW".
In addition he sought an order of costs, although he did not indicate against whom the order was sought.
Justice Garling found that part of the application was in effect an appeal against decisions of Beech-Jones J and Fullerton J refusing leave, and that Section 14(6) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act prohibited any such appeal.
He found that the material provide to the Court in the application disclosed that the principal point of challenge to be argued as justifying re-registration was "lawlessness and inappropriateness of the previous decisions of the Medical Tribunal of 6 September 208 and March 2009 and that that was not permitted by legislation and domed to fail.
He also found that there was no evidence of other material provided with the application which addressed the present fitness to practice of Mr Bar-Mordecai "which is an essential pre-condition to the Medical Tribunal granting the orders sought and the proposed application". He held that there had therefore been a failure to comply with Section 14 (3)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act and the court, for that reason alone, was obliged to dismiss the application.
He also indicated that it was not open to the court and it had no power to make orders 1, 3, and 4 sought in the summons, and that those applications were therefore an abuse of process and ought to be summarily dismissed.
The court ordered that the application for leave was dismissed and the summons was otherwise dismissed.

[26]

DECISION OF WATTS J OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA IN MANKIEWICZ V SWALLOW [2014] FAM CA 579

This was a decision of the Family Court of Australia. The proceedings comprised an application by Mr Bar-Mordecai's parents for orders for the children of Mr Bar-Mordecai's daughter to spend time with his parents. The children were then aged 16, 14, 10 and 7 years old. The 3 youngest had not met them.
The parents of the children strenuously opposed the application. In the proceedings before this Tribunal Mr Bar-Mordecai said that he assisted his parents in those proceedings. He also said he prepared the affidavits they relied upon in the proceedings. At the time his father was 93 years of age and his mother was 90 years of age.
The application filed by the parents of Mr Bar-Mordecai sought for him to be appointed to represent his parents as a McKenzie Friend. When the matter came to Court there was no appearance of Mr Bar-Mordecai's father, but Mr Bar-Mordecai was in the court room. His mother withdrew her application that her son represent her as McKenzie Friend.
There have been previous proceedings in 2009 between Mr Bar-Mordecai and his parents against the parents of the children in which Mr Bar-Mordecai and his parents were seeking almost identical orders. Orders had been made in the 2009 proceedings that Mr Bar-Mordecai's application for contact with the children be summarily dismissed. The application of the great grandparents was also dismissed.
In 2009 proceedings Mr Bar-Mordecai had been held to be a vexatious litigant and an order made under Section 118(1)(c) of the Family Law Act that he must not, without leave of the court having jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 1975 institute any proceedings under that Act.
Watts J found in his decision of 25 July 2014 "…during the 2009 proceedings and currently, the children's parents vehemently oppose the children seeing their maternal grandfather and their maternal great grandparents. It was recorded in 2009, the maternal great grandfather is a veteran litigant who the Supreme Court of NSW knows as vexatious. The mother says that she was sexually abused by her father as a child. The maternal grandfather denies this saying that his daughter has a mental illness".
Watts J found that Mr Bar-Mordecai is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals, the maternal great grandparents were acting in concert with Mr Bar-Mordecai, and that the evidence offered in support of the application failed to provide any evidence of any change since the decision in 2009.
He found that at that time 3 of the 4 children had never spent time with the great grandparents and the eldest child had spent no meaningful time with them for the last 10 years. In written submissions the applicant's relied upon "the uniqueness of the applicant's blood relationship with their great grandchildren and the universal acceptance that children have an inherent right to both their antecedence and their living heritage".
A similar submission was made unsuccessfully in the 2009 case. An order was made dismissing the applications.

[27]

DECISION OF ADAMS J IN THE SUPREME COURT ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2014 IN APPLICATION OF BAR-MORDECAI [2014] NSWSC 1202

There was a further application for leave to commence proceedings in the NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal or restoration of Mr Bar-Mordecai's registration.
The application was successful and Adams J made the following orders: 1. Leave is granted to the plaintiff to institute proceedings by lodging with the Executive Officer of the Medical Council an application for review by the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal pursuant to s 163A of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) of the Tribunal's order of 6 September 2000 that the plaintiffs name be removed from the Register of Practitioners. 2. The leave granted in order (1) is subject to the following condition
The proceedings are to be instituted by lodging an application for review limited to the following grounds 1. The applicant is a fit and proper person to practice medicine at the date of filing this application. 2. The applicant has 1. Maintained his knowledge and skills in medicine by having studied daily over 20,000 medical illnesses 2. Relearned the Mims; 3. Attended his brother's surgery for reskilling training in procedural medicine; 4. Authored a 700 page textbook of medicine in 2011, yet to be published; 5. Developed a computerized medical information system to assist a medical practitioner in the diagnosis of diseases; 6. Addressed the issues of emotional insight into each former ethical transgression so as not to reoffend; 7. Regularly physically exercised daily to keep his mind and body alert; 8. Attended discussions with his brother about various medical issues; 9. Having participated in self-educational activities over the last 9 years on a daily basis, relevant to the discipline of General Practice, by which he has further developed and maintained his competence and performance; 10. Observed and kept up to date with the laws and codes which affect the discipline of general practice; and 11. Created, maintained and updated a medical database of more than 2.06 gigabytes with 24,000 Files, 3,244 directories and subdirectories as at 6.9.2013 such that the medical information system can assist a GP in the practice of Medicine by providing a differential diagnosis, treatment protocols, and information on specific disease entities

[30]

INITIAL APPLICATIONS AT THE START OF THIS TRIBUNAL HEARING

When the hearing commenced on Monday 16 March 2015, Mr Bar-Mordecai sought that Acting DCJ G Mullane disqualify himself from sitting on the proceedings. The reasons offered were that Judge Mullane had previously been a judge of the Family Court of Australia at the same time as ADCJ J Boland, and they had conspired regarding the proceedings involving Mr Bar-Mordecai. There was no evidence of any conspiracy. That application was dismissed.
There was also an application by Mr Bar-Mordecai to disqualify the Tribunal member, Dr S Howle as he was his "employed" by the Medical Council and therefore has a conflict of interest. Dr Howle has at times been appointed as a delegate of the Medical Council. There was no evidence that he was employed by the Council and the application was refused and dismissed.
There was also an attempt by Mr Bar-Mordecai to have Dr S Mares disqualify herself from the panel as she was a psychiatrist and not a general practitioner as Mr Bar-Mordecai was. That application was also refused and dismissed. In this case the reason for the dismissal was that the requirement for Dr Mares' membership on the panel was she be a fellow medical practitioner; not necessarily a general practitioner.
There were also 5 other orders sought in the interim application filed by Mr Bar-Mordecai shortly before the hearing that were dealt with on the morning of the first day of the hearing. All 5 were refused and reasons given.
There was then an issue about 3 affidavits filed in Mr Bar-Mordecai's case. They were objected to and excluded from the evidence as they were irrelevant to the issues to be determined by the Tribunal.
There was also a history that Mr Bar-Mordecai had filed documents on a USB but had not filed paper copies for the Tribunal members or served papers copies on the Medical Council. He had not rectified this despite repeated orders that he do so by filing paper copies.
One USB that he had filed and for which he had not filed or served paper copies contained 600 pages. An order was made on the first day of the hearing that "if the applicant wishes to rely on any document filed with the Tribunal on USB, but not on paper copies, he must provide the Tribunal with the original and 4 paper copies by 10:00am tomorrow".
On the morning of 2nd day of the hearing there was a hearing on whether the Medical Council should be joined as a respondent to the proceedings. Mr Bar-Mordecai opposed them being a party to the proceedings or having leave to appear. The application was granted, despite his opposition, and reasons given.

[31]

THE HEARING

The hearing continued for 5 days and concluded on 20 March 2015.
During the hearing, and before Mr Bar-Mordecai gave oral evidence and was cross examined, the presiding member spoke to him about problems as to the contents of his statements, particularly the material that was irrelevant in the issue before the Tribunal.
As a result of that discussion, Mr Bar-Mordecai obtained the help of a barrister overnight and the following day, referring to the 168 page statement by him dated 12 January 2015, informed the Tribunal of the parts of the document that he would not rely upon. The parts that he did not rely upon amounted to more than 70% of the material in the document. He also announced that he would not rely on an earlier affidavit of similar length.
An order was made, however, that the material relied upon would be treated as having been submissions made by him.
Pursuant to section 163 of the National Law this tribunal is the appropriate review body. The application by Mr Bar-Mordecai is made pursuant to his right to make the application under Section 163A(1)(b) of the National Law. Section 163B defines the powers the Tribunal has on determining the review. In the case of review, such as this one, of an order for deregistration, the Tribunal may, as Mr Bar-Mordacai seeks, make a reinstatement order, pursuant to which the National Board may decide to reregister him.
Section 163C provides that: 1. A review under this division is a review to determine the appropriateness at the time of the review of the order concerned. 2. The review is not to review the decision to make the order, or any findings made in connection with the making of that decision. 3. In addition to any other matter the review may take into account, the review must take into account any complaint made or notified to a Council or a National Board, or a former Board under a repealed Act, about the person, whether the complaint was made or notified before or after the making of the order that is the subject of the review and whether or not the complaint was referred under Subdivision 2 of the Division 3 or any other action was taken on the complaint.
The ultimate issue in a hearing such as this is "whether the Tribunal can conclude on the basis of all the evidence that an applicant is now a fit and proper person to be restored to the register" (Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission [1998] NSW SC33.
In making that assessment as to the present and future fitness of the applicant to practice, the Tribunal can, of course, draw inferences from past conduct. From the evidence, and particularly from Mr Bar-Mordecai's evidence and his oral and written submissions, there are several areas which cause considerable concern to the Tribunal.

[32]

PREOCCUPATON / OBSESSION

Although the application which Mr Bar-Mordecai signed on 12 September 2014 recited clearly the conditions of his leave to commence these proceedings, throughout the proceedings his focus was not the application to review his fitness to practice. In his written statement of January 2015, most of the material that was withdrawn as irrelevant was material that was focussed on his obsessional preoccupation with injustices that he perceives have been done to him by the Medical Tribunal and the courts, and his perceptions of misconduct and conspiracy by many judicial officers, including a Chief Judge of the District Court, Judges of the Supreme Court, Judges of the District Court, a magistrate, a Judge of the Family Court, the Full Court of the Family Court, and various Tribunal members.
He did not offer evidence to substantiate his complaints about those people. His justification appears to be that each made a decision that was different or contrary to what he had sought.
During the hearing he was repeatedly reminded by the presiding member that the issue to be determined by the Tribunal was his fitness to practice and not complaints that he had against the judiciary and others in relation to other proceedings, or errors he alleged in the decisions in previous Tribunal decisions.
His withdrawal on legal advice of more than 70% of the material in his principal statement indicates the extent of irrelevant material and the strength of his obsession.
Throughout the hearing he appeared to have no ability to resist lapsing into the same preoccupation rather than focussing on the issues in the proceedings.
After he had informed the Tribunal members of the deletions to be made to his statement of January 2015, he subsequently made oral submissions and written submissions, both of which were focussed primarily on his complaints about decisions of the Courts and Tribunals and his allegations of errors and conspiracy.
He continued to argue that the decision of the Medical Tribunal in 2000 was erroneous in various respects, that the HCCC knowingly made false allegations in those proceedings, that it was not wrong for him to have administered the dose of morphine that was the subject of one of the complaints found proven by the 2000 Medical Tribunal hearing, and various other issues about decisions including the decision of the magistrate in the proceedings for extension of the apprehended violence order for protection of his daughter and her children.
It appears that Mr Bar-Mordecai is obsessed by the issues relating to perceived injustices and conspiracies by the courts and Tribunals, and that he rarely has insight into this, but even when he does have insight, he is again overwhelmed by the obsession.

[33]

RIGIDITY - DEALING WITH AMBIGUITIES

The skills of a medical practitioner include the ability to entertain and deal with alternatives in diagnostics, in treatment, and in other areas.
Throughout his evidence, Mr Bar-Mordecai demonstrated that he does not have such ability.
He has a rigidity of mind. It is demonstrated, for example, in his conclusion that the decision of the Tribunal in 2000 was unlawful because he heard it reported that it was written by Cooper DCJ and, although the 3 other members of the Medical Tribunal signed it, he believes they did not read it.
On his evidence there was no adequate reason for him to have dismissed the possibility that the 3 other members did read the reasons before they signed them. He rejected that possibility out of hand.
Even now, nearly 15 years after the Medical Tribunal found on expert evidence that his prescribing of 30mg of morphine was contrary to good practice, he still does not entertain even the possibility that it was.
Another example was that because 2 Supreme Court Judges who had in separate judgments about 1 month apart on the same evidence, refused his leave application, they had conspired. He rejected out of hand any possibility that both of them may have been correct on the evidence before them.
In the period since the decision in September 2000, Mr Bar-Mordecai has rigidly denied that he obtained financial advantages from Patient A. He did not accept the finding of the Medical Tribunal in 2000 that he did. His response, however, did not dispute the benefits that he had received from the patient. His response was to say that he had extended benefits to her that exceeded the financial advantage that he had obtained from her.
There is no evidence that he ever accepted that finding of the Medical Council in 2000 that he did obtain financial advantages from her until the 4th day of the hearing, when after some persistent questioning by the presiding member, where he continued to deny being guilty of receiving any financial advantage, eventually he said "…now that the Judge has pointed it out…" that he did receive a financial advantage. He then claimed that he felt remorse for that. He denied lying. He then said later when it was put to him that he had taken nearly 15 years to change that position, he said "…I considered it that I had to take into account what I gave her. Now I know that I was wrong…"
With the background the Tribunal does not accept that evidence as truthful. The Tribunal's view is that he still adheres to the view that the finding of the 2000 Medical Tribunal hearing that he had received a financial advantage was wrong, and does not in truth accept the possibility that it is correct.
Another example of his rigidity was that in his written evidence he stated that he would not work in a hospital setting. He appeared to thereby be dictating that the Tribunal should not impose any such condition as he would not comply with it.
Mr Bar-Mordecai has not practised medicine since September 2000, and he made his statement of January 2015. He stated in paragraph 15 of that document that he is "more competent to be medically registered and to practice medicine than his (sic) peers in general practice". His reason for this is that he has spent time while deregistered compiling what he describes as a text book and a software program for diagnosis and treatment.

[34]

INSIGHT

The fact that although he has not practised medicine for more than 14 years, but has no ambivalence about his belief that he is "more competent to be medically registered and to practice medicine than his (sic) peers in general practice" demonstrates a serious lack of insight.
What was at stake in these proceedings for Mr Bar-Mordecai was whether the Tribunal would find him fit to practice medicine. Despite that, his focus in the proceedings was his obsession with perceived past injustices.
Although the Medical Board of Australia has published documents setting out the "Recency of Practice Registration Standard" and a document entitled "Information on Returning to Practice" and a form entitled "Plan for Professional Development and re-entry into Practice", Mr Bar-Mordecai did not complete a plan for return, for professional development or for re-entry into practice, and appeared to have no regard to the other documents provided as published by the Medical Board.
He had no real proposal for resuming practice and no Entry to Practice Plan. That was the same situation that the Tribunal noted in the 2009 hearing of his then application for review and reinstatement. He still did not recognise that such preparations might assist his application.
He gave oral evidence that perhaps he would work in his brother's practice. But he provided no evidence by his brother that he would agree to employ him, even if this were deemed to be an appropriate arrangement. This was a continuance of an inadequacy found by the Medical Tribunal in 2009 and one of the reasons it rejected his application then. But in these proceedings he still failed to address the issue.
In the period that he has been disqualified, he has prepared a text book of his extensive readings of medical periodicals. But he has not had any peer review of that document. He has also prepared a software program to assist medical practitioners in diagnosing and treating conditions. Again, he has not had any peer review of that document. That was the same situation that arose at the 2009 hearing of the Medical Tribunal. He does not recognise the need for endorsement of the textbook by anyone with expertise other than himself or for review by someone with more recent clinical expertise than his and with objectivity. He assumes his own expertise is sufficient, even though the Tribunal in 2009 expressly found that it wasn't.
He sought to tender the software program and the text book, but without any evidence from anyone with any expertise as to the quality and accuracy of both. He apparently appeared to believe that his own opinion in circumstances where he had not practiced for more than 14 years, would be sufficient to satisfy the Tribunal as to the quality and accuracy of both. He lacked insight. He appeared to have no insight into the need for assessment by someone with more objectivity and more recent clinical expertise than he has.
Generally, Mr Bar-Mordecai appeared to have no insight into the fact that he was focussing on irrelevant issues in relation to his application.
Also his failure to provide the Tribunal with any peer assessment of his professional skills or knowledge indicated lack of insight.
He said in his evidence that he proposed that his brother provide employment for him as a doctor, or if necessary, supervision or mentoring. But his brother refused to attend the hearing for cross examination and, on objection, his affidavit was excluded from evidence. There was no evidence that his brother was willing for him to act in any of those roles. This was another inadequacy of his case that was also noted by the Tribunal that heard his review application in 2009. Again he failed to recognise and address that issue.
There is a requirement for general practitioners to do refresher courses in CPR every 3 years. Mr Bar-Mordecai's evidence was, that notwithstanding he was proposing to be restored to the register to practice medicine, he had not attended any refresher course in CPR because, he said, "I don't need to".
He was proposing, if permitted to practice, to do so as a sole practitioner, notwithstanding that he had not practiced for more than 14 years. His proposals did not include any available supervisor or mentor. His perception seems to be that the Tribunal would accept his opinion that he is as clinically competent as most of the general practitioners who have been in continuous practice since his registration was cancelled.
The Tribunal accepts the submission from the Medical Council that another indication of lack of insight was that for the period since his de-registration, he has kept himself occupied by studying medicine, but has not sought any employment in an associated area, such as the medical or hospital fields.
Exhibit R3 is a paper by Mr Bar-Mordecai regarding the "Battered Litigant Syndrome". He has identified this syndrome and written this 9 page article. He is not a psychologist or a psychiatrist and has no expertise in the area to which the article relates. He says that he has discovered the syndrome. The article has not been peer reviewed and has not been submitted or accepted for publication in any professional publication. Mr Bar-Mordecai apparently believes that the article should be accepted because he has written it. This is another issue that the Medical Tribunal relied upon in 2009 in refusing Mr Bar-Mordecai's application for his registration to be restored. He apparently still considers that his own opinion should be enough.

[39]

EMPATHY

It is important for a medical general practitioner to be able to empathise with patients and demonstrate that, in order to obtain the trust and confidence of the patient.
The evidence before the Tribunal of Mr Bar-Mordecai's attitudes towards his daughter and his treatment of her in AVO matters in the Local Court does not show that he has any empathy for her. That is consistent with his lack of empathy for her and her husband in the Family Court proceedings by him on his own behalf and by his parents on his behalf, seeking contact with their children, which they strongly opposed.
Furthermore, there is that evidence and other oral evidence given in these proceedings regarding his attempts to obtain contact to his grandchildren. The circumstances of the children are that they have lived their whole lives with their mother and she has been alienated from him for close to 16 years. She complained to the police that he sexually abused her as a child. Her 3 youngest children have had no contact with him or his parents. He has been asking for 16 years for contact with the eldest child but has always been refused.
He said that he does not think it is intrusive to ask for an order that his daughter have a psychiatric examination. He said that he thought her reaction "wouldn't be totally adverse". He said that he didn't know what the 16 year old granddaughter's perception would be if she knew that he or his parents were making an application for contact with the grandchildren.
He was asked about whether there was an impact on his daughter and her husband when his father appealed the decision of the Family Court refusing contact with the children by his parents. He conceded that there was. When asked why they continued to appeal, knowing the consequences for his daughter and her husband, he said "because I think that every person is selfish and I want to see my grandchildren. To see your seed flower is very important. It had a very big input on my parents and me of not seeing them".
In that evidence and in other evidence about his comprehension of the effect on his 16 year old granddaughter of the contact litigation, he demonstrated that he had no real empathy or concern for the position or experience of that granddaughter and the other grandchildren.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (43 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (10)

Cited By (1)