Bannerman, Ronald Moore & Anor v Mildura Fruit Juices Pty ltd [1984] FCA 166

Practices Act 1974 - Validity of notice - Requirement that notice identify matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act - Sufficiency of the manner in

Melbourne Home of Ford Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (No. 2) (1979) 40 F.L.R. 428;

Davenport v. Trade Practices Commission (1983) 47 A.L.R. 505;

W.A. Pines Pty. Ltd. v. Bannerman (1980) 41 F.L.R. 175;

Melbourne Home of Ford Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (1979) 36 F.L.R. 450;

Pyneboard Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (1982) 57 F.L.R. 368;

Chalmers Leask Underwriting Agencies v. Mayne Nickless Ltd. (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 626.

No. V G97 of 1983 RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION v. MILDURA FRUIT JUICES PTY. LTD.

Bowen C..1., Davies and Neaves JJ. Canberra 21 June 1984

BETWEEN: RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

JUDGES MAKING ORDER: Bowen C.J., Davies and Neaves JJ. WHERE MADE: Canberra DATE OF ORDER: 21 June 1984 THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed. -

BETWEEN: RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

Appellants. AND: MILDURA FRUIT JUICES PTY. LTD. Respondent CORAM: Bowen C.J., Davies and Neaves JJ. DATE: 21 June 1984 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BOWEN C.J and . NEAVES J. On 12 October 1982 Mr. R.M. Bannerman, the

Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, ("the Commission") signed a notice pursuant to sub-section

155 (1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ("the Act")

addressed to Mildura Fruit Juices Pty. Ltd. ("the respondent") requiring it to furnish to the Commission certain information and to produce to the Commission certain documents. The notice was subsequently served

to believe that a person is capable of furnishing information, producing doc- uments ... relating to a matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of this Act ... a member

of the Commission may, by notice in writing served on that person, require that person -

to furnish to the Commission ... "any such information;

to produce to the Commission ... any such documents;

"is capable of furnishing information and producing documents relating to matters that constitute, or may constitute, contra- ventions by producers of orange juice drink products in Aystralia, of -

sub-section 52(1) of the Act, namely that companies supplying orange juice products in trade or commerce have engaged or are engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive, namely, representing as orange juice and orange juice concentrate, pro- ducts which do not consist wholly of juice obtained from oranges; and/or representing as orange juice drink and orange juice drink concentrate, products containing a lesser per- centage of juice obtained from oranges than that indicated on containers of the products; or

sub-section 53(a) of the Act, namely that companies producing orange juice products, in trade or commerce, in

connection with the supply of orange juice, orange juice con- centrate, orange juice drink and orange juice drink concentrate, have falsely represented or are falsely representing the products as being of a particular standard, quality, grade or composition; or

iii. section 55 of the Act, namely that producers of orange juice products

or are engaging in conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing pro- cess, the characteristics or the suitability for their purposes,

or the quantity, of products labelled and described as orange juice, orange juice concentrate, orange juice drink and orange juice drink concentrate."

The notice then required the respondent to furnish the information specified in Schedule-I to the notice and

to produce the documents specified in Schedule II thereto.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 for

a review of the decision of the Chairman to serve the notice upon the respondent and sought an order pursuant to section 16 of that Act declaring that it was not

The validity of the notice was attacked on a number of grounds. The learned primary judge rejected all of the grounds with which he found it necessary to deal with the exception of the ground that the statement

in paragraph i of the notice in relation to "orange

juice drink and orange juice drink concentrate" did not properly identify a matter that constitutes, or that may constitute, a contravention of the Act. In relation to this ground of attack his Honour said -

"Apart from any regulation, statute or other relevant instrument, I do not see how it can be likely to mislead or deceive to describe as "orange juice drink" a product if that product is in fact orange juice drink. It would appear to me to be misleading or deceptive conduct to wrongly label the product as containing a greater percentage of orange juice than it in fact did contain but one would think that the question of whether it was orange juice drink would depend upon the amount of orange juice in the product and not what was on the label. That is to say it may be likely to mislead or deceive to call a product "orange juice drink" if it contains only 1 percent of orange juice but it would not be likely to mislead or deceive to call a product "orange juice drink" if it contained 99 percent of orange juice irrespective of what, if any, percentage of orange juice was shown on the label. The question of whether a product is labelled in a manner which wrongly states the per- centage of orange juice in it does not appear to be related to the question of whether the product is properly represented as "orange juice drink". This depends on whether the product complies with any relevant statutory definition of "orange juice drink" or if there is no such defini- tion whether in fact it falls within that description.

A representation that a product con- tains a greater percentage of orange juice than it in fact contains may well be a contravention of s. 52(1) but the alleged contravention identified is unrelated to this question but depends on the truth of a representation that the product is orange juice drink. The attempt made by the applicant by telex on 5 November 1982 to get

some clarification of the alleged contra- ventions did not receive a helpful reply. Much of the information required and many of the documents sought relate to orange juice drink and orange juice drink con- centrate. I consider that this matter was not properly identified."

The proceedings before the learned primary judge were conducted on the basis that, if the Court held that the notice was invalid in any respect, the Court should not consider whether any part of it was a valid exercise of power. Consequently, his Honour declared that the notice was invalid and that the

From this decision the appellants appealed. Following the service of the notice of appeal the respon- dent gave notice pursuant to Order 52, rule 22(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules that the respondent proposed to contest those findings of fact and law which the learned primary judge had made adversely to it. However, prior to the appeal coming on for hearing the respondent withdrew that notice. The appeal therefore proceeded only upon the issue whether the notice, in so far as it referred in paragraph i to companies supplying orange juice products in trade or commerce "representing as orange juice drink and orange juice drink concentrate, products containing a lesser percentage of juice obtained from oranges than

that indicated on containers of the products" properly

identified a matter that constitutes, or may constitute,

Counsel for the appellants was invited to present an argument that that part of paragraph i of the notice to which reference has been made or, alternatively, the whole of that paragraph, could be excised from the notice without affecting its validity or destroying the requisite relationship between on the one hand the information required to be furnished and the documents required to be produced and on the other the matters stated in paragraphs ii and iii of the notice. Counsel declined the invitation so that the appeal proceeded on the same basis as the proceedings before the learned primary judge, namely that, if paragraph i of the notice did not properly identify a matter within the meaning of that expression in sub-section 155(1) of the Act, the

Sub-section 155(1) of the Act has been the subject of consideration in a number of decisions of this Court. For the most part those decisions, in so far as they have concerned questions as to the validity of notices issued under the sub-section, have concerned questions other than the sufficiency of the manner in which the notice has identified the matter that is said to constitute,

or may constitute, a contravention of the Act. Decisions

which have been concerned with the latter question are the decision of Smithers J. in Melbourne Home of Ford Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (No. 2) (1979) 40 F.L.R. 428 at pp. 431-2, 441 and the decision of Northrop J. in Davenport v. Trade Practices Commission (1983) 47 A.L.R. 505. In both cases the denotation of the relevant matter was held to be sufficient. The language of sub-section 155(1) relevant to the question which now falls for decision was also discussed in some detail by the Full Court in W.A. Pines Pty. Ltd. v: Bannerman (1980) 41 F.L.R. 175; see also Melbourne Home of Ford Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission (1979) 36 F.L.R. 450 at p. 474 and Pyneboard Pty. Ltd. v. Trade

The requirement that a notice under sub-section 155(1) identify the matter that constitutes, or may con- stitute, a contravention of the Act has a twofold purpose. In the first place it is necessary that the notice dis- close on its face that it is an exercise of the power which the sub-section confers. That power depends upon the existence, objectively determined, of a "matter", in the sense in which that expression has been explained in earlier decisions of the Court, that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act and a belief in the person issuing the notice that the recipient is

capable of furnishing information or producing documents

relating to the matter so identified. Secondly, the identification of the matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the Act provides for the recipient the point of reference by which to judge whether the notice validly requires the specified information to be furnished or the specified documents to be produced. It will only validly do so if the information and the documents specified in the notice can be seen, from the face of the notice itself, to be "information or documents that relate to a matter of the kind described in the sub-section and identified in the

When the matter was heard at first instance the senior counsel who then appeared for the appellants expressly disavowed any reliance on the provisions con- tained in the pure foods legislation of the States and the Australian Capital Territory either as giving meaning to the expressions "orange juice drink" and "orange juice drink concentrate" in the notice or as providing a background against which those engaged in the trade would understand those expressions. On the hearing of the appeal senior counsel for the appellants resiled from this position

and sought to justify his right to do so by reference to

what was said by the High Court in Chalmers Leask Under-

writing Agencies v. Mayne Nickless Ltd. (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 626.

Counsel for the respondent, while not conceding that

the appellants were entitled, on the hearing of the

Territory legislation, was content to have the matter

raised and argued and the hearing proceeded on that

basis. In the circumstances it is unnecessary to consider

further the appellants' right to raise the issue for the

Food made Standards Regulations 1982 under the Food Act 1981

and Drug Regulations, 1961 under the Health Act, 1911-

Public Health (Food and Drugs Standards) Regulations 1971

Public Health (Sale of Food and Drugs) Regulations made under the Public Health Ord- inance 1928-1951.

For convenience the Victorian legislation only was referred to in detail, it being common ground between

the parties that the legislation of the other States

and the Australian Capital Territory, if not in identical

terms, was relevantly to the same effect as the Victorian

Regulation 70 of the Food and Drug Standards Regulations 1966 of the State of Victoria deals with "Soft Drinks". Sub-regulation (1) relates to fresh fruit drinks and fruit squash drinks. Sub-regulation (2) deals with fruit juice drinks, paragraph (a) of that sub-regu- lation providing -

"(a) Fruit juice drinks are drinks composed of fruit juice, potable water carbonated or not, and which contain not less than:-

(i) 25 per cent of blackcurrant juice or lemon juice; or (ii) 50 per cent of pineapple juice, pear juice or apple juice or mixtures of pineapple juice, pear juice or apple juice; or

(iii) 35 per cent of all other fruit juices not named in paragraph (i) or (ii) or mixtures of fruit juice not named in paragraph (ii) of this sub-regulation."

Sub-regulation (4) deals with labelling and provides -

"Every package containing fruit juice drink shall have attached thereto a label on which shall be written the words FRUIT JUICE DRINK immediately following the name of the flavour or drink in letters of the same size, colour and type.

This statement shall be followed immediately by a statement of the propor- tion of the juice of the fruit or fruits named in the label in letters with a letter height of at least 3 millimetres."

Sub-regulation (5) relates to fruit drinks. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of that sub-regulation provide -

of passion fruit juice." The regulations do not contain any provisions to similar effect in relation to fruit juice concentrates or fruit

For the sake of simplicity the matter was argued in relation to the expression "orange juice drink" in para- graph i of the notice and little attention was directed to the expression "orange juice drink concentrate". This, no doubt, was a convenient course and it is convenient to follow it in stating the reasons for our conclusion. However, as will appear, the latter expression gives rise to an

For the appellants it was argued that the relevant words in paragraph i of the notice were apt to encompass circumstances that constitute, or may constitute, a contravention of sub-section 52(1) of the Act. It was said that the trade in orange juice

drink is carried on within the framework of the State

and Territory legislation to which reference has been

made and that traders engaged in that area of commerce, including the respondent, must be taken to have some familiarity with it. Traders would understand that under that legislation orange juice drink must contain at least 35 per centum of orange juice and every package contain- ing orange juice drink must have attached a label stating the proportion of orange juice which it contains. It was further said that, although conduct in representing as orange juice drink a product which does not contain at least 35 per centum of orange juice may amount to conduct that is misleading or deceptive or that is likely to mislead or deceive and so be acontravention of sub-section 52(1) of the Act, that was not the matter which the relevant words in the notice identify. What they identify was said to be a matter of much narrower compass. They were con- cerned only with those situations in which the following circumstances co-exist namely, a representation that the product is orange juice drink, the product in fact contains less than 35 per centum of orange juice and the container of the product indicates that the product contains a percentage, being 35 per centum or more, of orange juice. It followed, so the argument ran, that the notice was asserting that in such circumstances the discrepancy between the percentage of orange juice indicated on the container and the true percentage of orange juice in the product will be such that conduct in representing that

the product is orange juice drink may be misleading or

We are unable to accept this argument. We can- not read the reference in paragraph i of the notice to the product containing a lesser percentage of juice obtained from oranges than that indicated on containers of the product otherwise than as epexigetical of the statement that the product is represented to be orange juice drink. The sense of the notice is that, because the percentage of orange juice contained in the product is less than that indicated on the container, the representation that the product is orange juice drink is false. But what is indicated on the container is.irrelevant to the question whether the product is properly described as orange juice drink. The answer to that question must depend exclusively upon the content of the product. It is, inour view, of no assistance to the appellants to say, as counsel for the appellants submitted, that the matter is sufficiently identified if one can postulate some sets of facts falling within the language used which will or may amount to a contravention of the Act notwithstanding that other sets of facts which clearly fall within the language used do not

We should add that the argument in support of the sufficiency of the identification in the notice of the relevant matter is in no way enhanced if the expression

"orange juice drink" is given its ordinary meaning un-

assisted by any considerations arising from the pure foods

legislation of the States and the Australian Capital

An alternative argument was presented for the appellants which, if accepted, would result in the matter identified in the relevant part of the notice encompassing a much wider range of conduct than would be the case if the primary submission were accepted. By this alternative argument counsel contended that the relevant words in paragraph i of the notice refer to two separate situations. In the first of these the conduct concerned is conduct amounting toa representation that the product is orange juice drink, that expression being given its ordinary meaning or, alternatively, a meaning reflecting the pure foods legislation of the States and the Australian Capital Territory. In the other situation the conduct concerned is conduct amounting to a representation on the container of the product that the percentage of orange juice is greater than that which the product in fact contains.

We do not agree that the recipient of the notice, even one having knowledge of the trade and the relevant legislation regulating that trade, would read the notice in the dual sense which the argument asserts. The language of the notice clearly points to conduct in representing a product

as orange juice drink and could not, we think, reasonably

be said to convey to the recipient that the matter being investigated was the incorrect statement on containers of the percentage of orange juice said to be in the product divorced from any representation that the product was orange juice drink. Indeed, the subtlety of counsel's argument only serves to demonstrate that the language used is not apt to convey with sufficient particularity to the recipient of the notice what was the matter which was the concern of the Chairman and which was considered to provide a sufficient foundation for the requirement to furnish the specified information and to produce the

What has been said in relation to the reference in paragraph i of the notice to orange juice drink is equally applicable to the reference to orange juice drink concentrate. There is, however, a further difficulty for the appellants arising from the circumstance that the pure food legislation upon which they rely to give meaning to the expressions used in the notice does not prescribe a product standard in relation to fruit juice drink con- centrate as it does in the case of fruit juice drink.

In these circumstances it is difficult to postulate that a container of orange juice drink concentrate would indicate a percentage of juice obtained from oranges that the product is said to contain. Rather it would

seem that any reference to such a percentage would be

not to the concentrate itself but to the resulting product on the footing that, when diluted according to the directions given on the container, that product

It would not be fruitful to attempt to state in definitive terms the manner in which the requirement that a notice under sub-section 155(1) identify the matter that is said to constitute, or that may constitute, a contravention of the Act is to be satisfied in all cases. Each case will depend upon its own circumstances. Suffice it to say that the matter must be identified in such a way that the recipient can perceive the general ambit of the subject matter of the investigation that is being undertaken and so that the twofold purpose to which we have referred is satisfied. In our opinion paragraph

i of the notice under consideration in this appeal does

I certify that this and the preceding fifteen (15) pages is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of Bowen C.J. and Neaves J.

BETWEEN : RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN and TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

DAVIES J : I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons prepared by the Chief Judge and Mr Justice Neaves. I agree with

them and with the orders proposed but I would add a few words of

Section 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) empowers the Chairman of the Commission, if he has reason to believe that a person is capable of furnishing information or of producing documents relating to a matter which constitutes or may

constitute a contravention of the Act, to require, by notice in

iting served on that person, that the person furnish tc tn Comm2zssion such information or produce to the Commissior such aocuments. Refusal or failure to comply with the notice to the extent that the recipient 1s capapie of complying with it renders

Provisions of chat kind are interpreted as reaquirine the

iver of the notice to identify in the notice, expressir or by

cessary aiunterence, the ainformétion or aocuments whicn are

sought and the matter or matters within the concern of the civer

of the notice to which the information and documents souscht

relate. Such identification should enable the recirient of the nevice readily to perceive that the giver oF the neiise is entitied to require the information or decuments sought. In Enow v Keating (1978) 19 ALR 372, Burt CJ examinec =. 266 of tne Incore

Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). His Honour said at p.375 ;

"As it arises upon the wording of that section and speciiticéilv upon the wordine of sub-s (i)(5b?) cf 1t, tne Guéstion simpir is whether The Cormissioner has been given a general power to pe exercisec by notice in writing to reauire 2 person, in the terms of the notice diver in thzs case, to appear anc give evidence or wnether tne power so drantead 1s restricted in that its prorer exercise requires that the notice in writings shoula identify the income or assessment ci a4 specific person as being the supject matter upon which the evidence to be given is tc oe 'cencernec .

Once the question is formulated in that wav tne answer to it would appear ts be seit evicent. The power which is civen can oniv be exercises br 'notice im writing' anc tc be witnin par (bh) of suc- wher s relaté to & person's income or assessment. For tnis reason there is 4 fatai defect in the short forr of notice addressed tc tne Bank catec c3rce February iS77 es it eses net Gescribe the documents requirec to pé rroaucec

Wnat par.(i)(b) nas in mand is that & notice may Dé Given requiring the recipient tc procuce 'ail DOOKS, aocuments anc other papers ain his custody or control relating wnereto , tnat if, to the income or assessment of the person wnose name is stated in the notice. Zt 2s then for the recirient to decide for himself, difficult though the task may De, wnich cr the cocuments answer the Gescripticn. If his decision is wrong he expcses himself to prosecution anc penaityv." Section i=5 cr the ctzsces kot i974 (Con rust

iven effect in like manner. Not only does the section provide 4

naity for breach of the obligation imposed upon the recipient

i the notice. but ¢.155(1) in terms does not empower the

Chairman to require the recipient of the notice to provide any

information whatever or any document wnatever but oniy

unftormation" and "such documents", that is tc sar, intermation and documents "relating to 4&4 matter that constitutes. or may constitute, a contravention of this Act'. The. notice will not ne a valic notice agiving rise to penal consequences ior non-compliance uniess it identifies what is the matter or matters that constitute or may constitute a contravention of the Act, ana

the information or Gocuments sought that relate thereto.

Smitnezrs J applied this principie in Meibourne Home of Fore

Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission anc Bannerman (No.2) (1979)

"It was submitted by Mr. Goldberaq that when a aeclaraticn is sought under s.163A(i)(a) an relation to the validity of the notice given to a person uncer s.155, that being an 'act or thine done... under this Act', the vaiidity of the

requirement in such a notice to furnish particular information depends upon it being apparent fror. the terms of the notice that sucn information does in fact relate toa relevant matter. I this submission as souna, It is

Northror, Deane anc Fisher Ja exrressec the same view in

Pyrnebdoard Pty Ltée anc Ors v Trade Practices Commission and Anor

bict Dp % 'S ry a ur 1) o o p 'S 'g 1) » t~ a om o Dal) ie] wey wr le) g rw) ro] 'Q 'D @ ba] ct ie) ry ct by! o =) a] ct rw a m & v tn

thought by tne learned triai Judge not aaequatéliv te identify 4@

Trade Practices Commission, having' reason to believe that Mildura Fruit Ju2ces Pty Ltda (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') is

capaple of furnishing information and producing documents relating to matters that constitute, or May constitute, contraventions by producers of orange juice products in Austréli1a, of -

1. sub-section 52(1) of the Act, namely that companies suppiying orange Juice products in trade or commerce have engaged or are engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is iixely to misieac or deceive, namely, ... representing as orange juice drink and orande juice drink concentrate, products containing a lesser percentage of juice obtained from oranges than that indicated on containers of the products; ..."

It was conceded by Mr K.R. Handley, QC, senior counsel for

the appellants, that the above is an essential p and that the validity of the notice stands or falls with it. An inference from this concession 1s that some parts of the znrormation sought by the Chairman of the Commission ana sore of

the documents required by him to be produced relate to the above

part cf the notice and not to any other part of ait. What that

information 1s and what those documents are was not svtatec. ff

simpiy accept counsel''s concession in this regara.

The learneé triai Judze consicereca the sreciftiec matter te

be. in effect, uninteiligibie, althougn his Hhsnour ¢2¢ not use

"...I do not see how it can pe iikely to mas deceive to describe as 'orange juice dr product if that product is in fact orang drink. It would appear to me to be misieécin aeceptive conduct to wrongly labei the product @ conteaining 4& creater percentage of orance uic than 1t an fact d2c contain but one woulic thin

at tne Gu ton ci whether 1t was orancae juice drink would depend upon the amount of orandé juice in the proauct ana not what was on the, labei. ... The question of wnether a product 1s iabeiled in @ Manner wricn wroncly states the percentage of orange juice init does not appear to be relatec to the question of wnether the product is properiy represented as 'orange jJuzce drink' This depencs

on whether the proauct complies with any relevant statutery detinition cl 'orange juice Grinx or cif there is nc suck definition whevtner in fact <t Talis within thet cesctription.'

Amonest his contentions, Mr Handley submitted that -:t is surficient that conduct may constitute a contravention of the Act ana that thererore it 1s sufficient for a s.155 notice to speciiy

criteria which, taken together with other circumstances. coulc

constitute & contravention. Mr Hancleyv supmittec that tne subject notice surficientiy identifiec a relevant matter bo

yelerring tc &@ contravention or pessibie contravention cr =.f2'l: of tne Act having, inter alia, the following elements, namely :

& representation of products as ""orance juice drink" or "orange

Mr F.H. Callaway, counsel for the respondent, contendec that such an approach to the notice did not accord with t

pranciple. Mr Callaway submitted that a s.155 notice 1s not to

be read as if it were a pleading but rather that the notice must

udentify by language, whether formal or informal, what is th

contravention, of the Act and what information or documents

I prefer the submission put by Mr Callaway on this point. The notice should indicate to the recipient of the notice that

tne information and documents which the receiver is required to

supplv to the Commission are information and documents which th

Commission is entitled to require. The notice should qive to 12 recipient sufficient information to enable the recipient to perceive what are the matters in respect of which the Commission yreauires information or documents, that those matters constitute

contraventions or possible contraventions of tne Act and that tne

information and documents sought are relevant thereto.

That aunformation shouic be conveyed with "reasonable

clarity", the expression used by the Court in FPyneboard Pty ite anc Ors v Trade Practices Commissicn anc Anor, cited above, az p.275. At 9.376, the Court went on tc say :;

".,.1t shouid be stressed that the question whether notice discicses the necessary relatedness

Detween documents or information sought and tne ltaentifiean 'matters' ais, iike the question whether the terms of the notice are sufficzrentiy cieer, not to be approached in an over-tschnnical or hypercritical way. As was pointed our in Meipourne Home of Fore Pry Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (Nce.2) ((1980) 47 FLR at 3.173,, the power conrerread py s.155(1) 1S an investigative

power which authorizes questions both wide in scope and unspecific in subject matter. The fact that the recipient of the notice is or will, in the event, be unable to supply relevant information or dasclose relevant documents will not, ain itself, preclude the validity of a requirement in a s.155 notice. The relevant question 15 whether the information or documents

sought are capable, in a broad investigative context, of being properly 'regarded as related to any one of the 'matters' whicn the netice identifies."

Thus, é s.155 notice must be read having regard to the function which the Commission performs. It should not be read technically or narrowly and it may be expressed in ordinary languace. Nevertheless, the notice must convey to the recapient what is the duty which the service of the notice imposes upon him. The recipient should not have to strain for a meaning or be lett in

In my opinion, the subject part of the s.155 notice did not

sufficiently identify a matter that constitutes or might

constitute &@ contravention of the Act. I agree with the view expressec by the learned trial Judge with respect to it. In my opinion, that part of the notice 1s unintelligible and a4 reacer