In our opinion a banker who carries on business in more than one State is engaged in trade, commerce and intercourse among the States. It was said by Willes J. in Harris v. Amery [1] in a passage cited by Jessel M.R. in Smith v. Anderson [2] that banking is not strictly a trade. Presumably that was because his Lordship considered that trade consisted of trafficking in goods, that is to say the buying and selling and exchange of goods. But in a modern community it is clear, we think, that traffic in intangibles is just as much trade and commerce as traffic in tangibles. In Brandao v. Barnett [3] Lord Campbell said that "there is no finding that the exchequer bills were in the possession of the defendants in the course of their trade as bankers." In Foley v. Hill [4] Lord Brougham made several references to a banker as a person carrying on a trade. He said that the trade of a banker consisted of using the money which he received from his customers as his own and trading with it. In Forget v. Baxter [5] Sir Henry Strong, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said, in reference to the business of stockbrokers: "It cannot be doubted that the purchases and sales of shares by the appellants in the ordinary course of that business were operations of commerce." The same view has recently been expressed by Frankfurter J. in the Supreme Court of the United States in Freeman v. Hewit [6] . In reference to a sale by a broker to a purchaser in one State of securities owned by a person in another State he said: "Of course this is an interstate sale. And constitutionally it is commerce no less and no different because the subject was pieces of paper rather than machines." In Bank of India v. Wilson [7] cited in W. & A. McArthur Ltd. v. Queensland [8] it was held that both a bank and a telegraph company were carrying on a trade within the meaning of the Acts relating to inhabited houses. Pollock B. [9] referred to the meaning of trade as including that of "an occupation; particular employment, whether manual or mercantile, distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions." The same view of the meaning of trade was expressed by Sutherland J. in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers Inc. v. United States [1] . He cited Bank of India v. Wilson [2] and also a statement by Mr. Justice Story to the same effect. In Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta Ltd. [3] Lord Wright said, in a passage cited by Rich J. in Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth [4] : " "Trade" is a very wide term: it is one of the oldest and commonest words in the English language. Its great width of meaning and application can be seen by referring to the heading in the Oxford English Dictionary. But it must always be read in its context." The power of Congress under the Constitution of the United States is to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. It was held in Paul v. Virginia [5] and several subsequent cases that issuing a policy of insurance was not a transaction of commerce but in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association [6] these cases were overruled and it was held that the business of insurance when conducted across State lines is part of inter-State commerce. A number of definitions of the meaning of banking were handed in during the argument of which the definition of a bank in the Imperial Dictionary cited in Russell on Banker and Customer in Australia, 3rd ed. (1935), p. 52, is short and precise - " Bank. - An establishment which trades in money; as establishment for the deposit, custody and issue of money, as also for granting loans, discounting bills, and facilitating the transmission of remittances from one place to another; a company or association carrying on such business." In In re Shields' Estate [7] Fitzgibbon L.J. said, in a passage cited with approval by Isaacs J. in Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v. Permewan, Wright & Co. Ltd. [8] : "In my opinion, the essence of the trade, business, or calling of a banker, is not primarily or essentially to be found in the mode in which he disposes of the money which is deposited with him, but in the mode in which he receives the money of others. If he keeps open shop for the receipt of money from all who choose to deposit it with him; if his business is to trade for profit in money deposited with him for the purpose, he answers the description of a "Banker"." In Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore [9] Viscount Maugham, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said: "In the ordinary case of a bank, the business consists in its essence of dealing with money and credit." It seems to be clear that in Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons [1] the Privy Council would have considered banking to be within the regulation of trade and commerce, that is within Class 2 of s. 91 of the British North America Act, if banking had not been specifically mentioned in Class 15 of that section. The powers of the Canadian Parliament in relation to the regulation of trade and commerce and in relation to banking are each powers over the whole subject matter. The first power is not, like the corresponding power in s. 51 (1) of the Australian Constitution, confined to trade and commerce with other countries and among the provinces. There is therefore a reason why particular aspects of trade and commerce over which it was intended that the Commonwealth Parliament should have power irrespective of their overseas or inter-State character should be specifically enumerated. This may explain the presence of the specific powers with respect to insurance and trade marks, in addition to the power with respect to banking, in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution. These powers do not appear in s. 91 of the Canadian Constitution, but they have been held in certain aspects to be within the trade and commerce power (Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Alberta [2] ; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [3] ). There is no reason therefore why laws with respect to banking, insurance and trade marks should not be trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of s. 92 simply because they are specifically enumerated in s. 51 and may not fall, so far as they are trade and commerce with other countries and among the States, within s. 51 (1). But it was contended that inter-State banking was not trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of s. 92 because that section contains the words "whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation." It was submitted that these words indicated that the section was confined to trade and commerce in the sense of traffic in goods because only goods could be carried by land or sea. This construction of the section really seeks to read the word "whether" as "if" or "provided." The submission was discussed and disposed of in the joint judgment of Knox C.J., Isaacs J. and Starke J. in McArthur's Case [4] and there is nothing in the subsequent cases to throw any doubt on the correctness of the views there expressed. In R. v. Smithers [5] Higgins J. said: "It is curious that the section seems to overlook the possibility that a man may walk across the border into another State, as well as be carried "by internal carriage or ocean navigation"; but these words must be merely meant to exhaust all kinds of carriage, if there be carriage. If not, they qualify the words "trade" and "commerce" as well; and a State might, then, impose a duty on, or obstruct the passage of, cattle driven over the border: a result which would be absurd."