8 In support of these submissions, Mr Seton refers to a number of cases that deal with the application s 102 and subsequent s 96 of the EP & A Act, particularly in Vacik Pty Ltd v Penrith City Council [1992] NSWLEC 8, where Justice Stein said:
"Turning to the issue of s 102(1)(a). Is the proposed modified development substantially the same development as that in the development consent (as already amended)? In my opinion 'substantially' when used in this section means essentially or materially or having the same essence. The applicant for modification bears the onus of showing that the modified development is substantially the same."…
"In approaching the s102 exercise one should not fall into the trap of saying that the development was for a certain use - extractive industry - and, as amended, it will be for precisely the same use and accordingly is substantially the same development. What is important is that a development, particularly extractive industry, must be assumed to include the way in which the development is said to be carried out…".
9 Reference was then made to the judgement of Justice Bignold in Moto Projects No 2 Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council [1999] 106 LGERA 298 at 309 states:
"The relevant satisfaction required by s 96(2)(a) to be found in order that the modification power be available involves an ultimate finding of fact based upon the primary facts found. I must be satisfied that the modified development is substantially the same as the originally approved development.
The requisite factual finding obviously requires a comparison between the development, as currently approved, and the development as proposed to be modified. The result of the comparison must be a finding that the modified development is "essentially or materially" the same as the (currently approved development.
The comparative task does not merely involve a comparison of the physical features or components of the development as currently approved and modified where that comparative exercise is undertaken in some type of sterile vacuum. Rather, the comparison involves an appreciation, qualitative, as well as well as quantitative, of the development being compared in their proper contexts (including) the circumstances in which development consent was granted."
10 In exercising the applicant's onus to show the modified development is substantially the same, Dr Beverling referred to the aforementioned judgements, together with Shroders Australia Property Management Pty Limited v Shoalhaven Council [1999] 110 LGERA 130, where Her Honour Chief Judge Pearlman said:
93. Despite Mr Daubney's opinion (which was not shared by Mr Sanders, Mr Giles or Ms Chapman) that the amendments were significant either in their own right or considered in totality as part of the whole of the proposed development, I have concluded that they are not so substantial or significant as to constitute in effect a new development application. In my opinion, the essential nature of the proposed development remained the same before the amendments as after them. It was a development comprising a discount department store, a supermarket, specialty shops, a community centre, car parking and landscaping, and it remained of that essential nature after the amendments had been made. The amendments are, in my opinion, matters of design, configuration and appearance. Whilst some of them may be significant, they do not change the essence of the development as initially proposed.