8 The defendant's claim that the summons be dismissed is the fourth prayer for relief in the notice of motion. I have already expressed a view about that issue. By the first prayer for relief, the defendant seeks, effectively, to vary order 4 made on 26 March. Although the documents of the plaintiff to which the order relates have been handed over to the plaintiff's new solicitors and the defendant is entitled, pursuant to the plaintiff's undertaking, to access those documents to enable it to properly conduct the assessments, it seeks to improve its position in relation to access.
Access to Documents
9 The current regime provides for access to the defendant at the offices of the plaintiff's solicitors. I am satisfied that the access regime is not working wholly satisfactorily from the defendant's perspective. There are 60 lever arch files that make up the documents. The defendant wishes to have the documents back but is content to wait until the conclusion of the Commercial List proceedings commenced by the plaintiff against Multiplex.
10 In argument before me the defendant stated that access for seven days would be sufficient. I can see no prejudice to the plaintiff if I grant that relief. I have the power to do so. The orders made on 26 March included a grant of liberty to apply on two days' notice. Liberty to apply encompasses an application such as this where the original orders and undertakings have encountered unforeseen difficulties or complications.
11 The plaintiff made submissions and led evidence in order to demonstrate that the defendant's complaints about the unsatisfactory nature of the access regime were unfounded. In the exercise of my discretion, I allowed two affidavits of Paraskevi Frangakis to be read, even though the deponent was in Greece and unavailable for cross-examination.
12 I did so partly because I am satisfied that the notice given by the plaintiff requiring the deponent's attendance for cross-examination was inadequate. Nonetheless, although I have placed marginally less weight on her evidence than I might otherwise have done, I regard the evidence of Miss Frangakis as inherently plausible and not unreasonable.
13 Valerie Higinbottom, an experienced costs assessor, also gave evidence. The effect of it was that the work that the defendant says it needs to do (for which the current regime for access is allegedly inadequate), goes beyond what is truly necessary. I do not propose to finally resolve that factual issue on this application. It is not necessary to do so other than to say that the evidence satisfies me that there is a reasonable factual basis for varying the order made on 26 March.