CONSIDERATION
25 Certain principles applicable to the approach to be taken by an appellate court on judicial review need to be stated. The first relevant principle was considered by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. That judgment cites Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 where the Full Federal Court stated at 287:
The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.
26 The majority in Wu Shan Liang also stated at 272:
These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. [Footnote omitted]
27 Secondly, it is not an error of law if the decision-makers express their reasons sequentially. Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1 said at 5:
Decision-makers commonly express their reasons sequentially; but that does not mean that they decide each factual issue in isolation from the others. Ordinarily, they review the whole of the evidence, and consider all issues of fact, before they write anything. Expression of conclusions in a certain sequence does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence as a whole. I do not think that the tribunal member intended to convey that she made up her mind about the evidence of the applicant/appellant before taking account of the evidence of the witness who was said to corroborate him.
28 In Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 the Full Court at [90] made reference to the artificiality of relying upon only one paragraph of the Minister's decision to found a challenge to its validity.
29 Thirdly, the decision 'should be read as a whole': see Board of Trustees v Edington (2011) 119 ALD 472 at 491.
30 Fourthly, as a matter of general principle it is for the decision-maker to give such weight to the relevant considerations as he or she deems appropriate, unless directed otherwise. The observations of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at [41] are relevant. His Honour said:
It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v. MacKellar; Reg. v. Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd; Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council; Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council. [Footnotes omitted]
31 The decision records the Senior Member's consideration of the mandatory requirements of the Direction. For example, she considered the nature and seriousness of the applicant's conduct as required by cl 10.1.1 of the Direction; whether the applicant was a minor when he began living in Australia (cl 10.2 of the Direction); the length of time that the applicant had been a resident in Australia (cl 10.3); any relevant international law obligations including the best interests of the child as described in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (cl 10.4) and the best interest of any child that might have been affected, namely the applicant's three children (see cl 10.4.1).
32 Thereafter the decision addressed matters which were described as 'not primary', namely the applicant's family ties to Australia and the nature of the relationship (see cl 11), the applicant's links to Papua New Guinea and the hardship which is likely to be experienced by the applicant or immediate family members resident in Australia (see cl 11.1 of the Direction) if the visa were cancelled.
33 Clause 5.1(1) of the Direction refers to the regulation, in the national interest, of the coming into and the presence in Australia of non-citizens (see above). Clause 5.1(2) provides:
In this regard, in order to safeguard the Australian community and to enable it to effectively discharge its duties and responsibilities to the Australian people, the Government seeks to protect the Australian community from unacceptable risks of harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens. (Emphasis added)
34 The Senior Member adopted the identical words 'unacceptable risks' in the decision at [86], thereby indicating that the Senior Member was mindful of the objective of the Direction. In this respect the Senior Member gave great weight to the protection of the Australian community, as demonstrated by the decision. Under the primary considerations the Senior Member reviewed the applicant's prior conduct and concluded that whilst the applicant might have a 'greater insight into his problems' and had taken 'some steps towards rehabilitation'. She was not satisfied that when released from gaol '[the applicant] will resist the temptation of using illicit drugs, which may in turn cause him to re-offend'. Significantly, at [47] of the decision the Senior Member said inter alia:
In my view, given his past history of serious offences including crimes of violence and drug use and his failure to comply with judicial orders, he represents an unacceptable risk to the Australian community. Thus, the first primary consideration strongly favours the cancellation of Mr Baker's visa.
35 In respect of the other primary considerations the Senior Member found that the applicant's young age when he came to Australia weighed in the applicant's favour, but that this consideration did not outweigh the first consideration, namely the protection of the Australian community. The Senior Member also found that the length of time the applicant had resided in Australia before he engaged in criminal activity weighed in his favour, but this factor also did not outweigh the first primary consideration.
36 The Senior Member also found the absence of a relationship between the applicant and T1 and T2 and the fact that the applicant would be unlikely to resume a relationship with those children while they lived with their mother meant that this factor did not weigh in favour of the discretion to not cancel his visa being exercised. The factor of the applicant's relationship with R1 was deemed to be only marginally in the applicant's favour.
37 In written submissions, the applicant referred to the decision of the High Court in Teoh. At page 292 of that decision Mason CJ and Deane J said:
A decision-maker with an eye to the principle enshrined in the Convention would be looking to the best interests of the children as a primary consideration, asking whether the force of any other consideration outweighed it.
38 The Senior Member carefully considered the interests of all children before reaching her decision. In relation to T1, the Senior Member said at [59]:
I accept that [the applicant] had a relationship with T1 until he went to gaol and I accept that he does not want her to see him in gaol. I accept that Mrs Baker, her grandmother, has endeavoured to maintain her family's connection with T1 while Mr Baker is in gaol. I do not know the likely effect on T1 of any separation or her wishes. I understand that she lives with her grandparents. The mother's role in her parenting is unknown. Her attitude towards her father's offences and his subsequent imprisonment - if indeed she knows him to be in gaol at all - is unknown. It was unclear if there was any formal shared care arrangement in place in relation to T1 and whether such an arrangement, formal or otherwise, could be re-activated on his release. Notwithstanding the limited available evidence, I find that it is likely to be somewhat in T1's best interests that she have the opportunity to resume a relationship with her father should she wish to do so.
39 However, the Senior Member concluded at [68] in respect of T1:
While I consider that it is marginally in the best interests of T1 that Mr Baker remain in Australia so that he can be in a position to resume a parenting role, this primary consideration however does not outweigh the 'protection of the Australian community': Tuatara v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 1324 at [45] - [47]
40 As to the children T2 and R, the Senior Member observed at [63]:
I consider that there is little prospect of Mr Baker having contact with T2 and R in the foreseeable future, let alone providing them with daily care, given his history of chronic drug abuse, his long criminal history and the violent assault upon their mother. He has not lived with T2 and R since 2008 and is subject to an Apprehended Violence Order preventing him from having contact with their mother. These factors, in my view, make it doubtful that he would be able to pursue any kind of close or meaningful relationship with his children in the future.
41 At [65] the Senior Member said:
The Direction acknowledges that it is generally presumed under Australian law that a child's best interests are served by remaining with its parents. In this case, living with both parents is not a realistic option for any of the children, especially T2 and R. Mr Baker's solicitor agreed that any relationship Mr Baker might have with T2 and R in the future was unlikely to occur in the absence of a court order. Whether he would succeed in obtaining such order is, in my view, unclear.
42 At [66] the Senior Member said in relation to T2 and R:
In summary, I do not consider that it is necessarily in the best interests of T2 and R that Mr Baker remain in Australia. In forming that view, I placed particular weight on Mr Baker's disregard for his children's welfare in supplying their mother with heroin.
43 The above demonstrates that the Senior Member treated, as a primary consideration, the welfare of the applicant's children. Accordingly, the requirement referred to in Teoh has been satisfied.
44 As to the other considerations, the Senior Member acknowledged that the impact of his visa cancellation on his family might result in emotional distress to them, but again this factor did not outweigh the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. The Senior Member also acknowledged that some hardship might be suffered by the applicant upon resettling in Papua New Guinea and that he may not have access to treatment for his drug dependency issues in Papua New Guinea as he might have if he remained in Australia. Nevertheless, such a consideration was insufficient to outweigh the interests of the protection of the Australian community.
45 The Court accepts that the Senior Member's observation of the 'unacceptable risk' that the applicant posed to the Australian community 'outweighs all other considerations' could be said to be unclear in that she did not specify whether the 'other considerations' took into account the totality of the primary considerations as well as the non-primary considerations. However, when the decision is read as a whole it is clear that the Senior Member weighed all issues sequentially. The Senior Member considered the character test at [3]-[9], then having done so moved to the critical issue of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion not to cancel the applicant's visa. Such an inquiry required an examination of the nature and seriousness of the applicant's conduct, the risk of a repetition of such conduct, and of the primary and other considerations. Accordingly, the Senior Member fulfilled her duty of deciding whether the applicant's visa should be cancelled. Each of the relevant matters taken separately were considered in reaching the decision to cancel the visa.
46 The Court concludes that in [86] of the decision the Senior Member was stating her finding that cumulatively 'all other considerations', both primary as stipulated in cl 10 and 'Other considerations' in cl 11 of the Direction, were insufficient to outweigh the overriding consideration of harm to the Australian community.
47 It follows that the application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.