16 The President went on in his judgment (at page 420) to say that:
Once an offer is made which turns out to be higher than the judgment recovered, prima facie the rule applies. On the theory of the rule the litigation after that offer (which, ex post, is shown to have been a reasonable one) has been occasioned by the refusal or failure of the plaintiff to accept the offer. That is why, exempting order apart, the plaintiff must bear the costs from that time. Far from seeing any practical difficulties in such an operation of the rule, I consider that it is precisely the way in which the rule maker expected and provided that rule would apply.
17 The President continued (at page 423) that it was important that Courts not approach the exercise of the discretion to 'otherwise order' (now changed into the words I have indicated earlier) in a mechanical way. Further, that even skilled legal practitioners did not have the gift of prophecy and that calculating damages verdicts was inescapably inexact because of the many imponderables which have to be taken into account. His Honour added:
Yet the general considerations of chance and risk would have been known to the rule maker when part 19A, rule 9, of the District Court Rules was introduced into the District Court rules.
18 Kirby P further added that:
If this puts the plaintiff's legal representatives in an impossible position and, in practice, forces the settlement of cases for sums less than they are worth because the costs of litigation cannot be wagered against their risks, the complaint must be against the terms of the rules and the apparently narrow provision for exempting orders.
19 I should say that, as I mentioned earlier, the rule has changed since its consideration in Hillier v Sheather and, if anything, has been tightened up. Cole JA in Hillier succinctly said at page 431:
Subject to the Court's power to make a contrary order, once an offer is made and not accepted, [the rule[ operates upon that offer. It lies alive yet dormant awaiting the decision of the court in that action. If the decision is less favourable to the plaintiff than an offer made by the defendant in accordance with [the rule] is immediately enlivened in respect of that offer.
20 Statements also abound in that case, and in earlier cases, as to the rationale and reason for the rule. See, for example, the judgment of the Court in Maitland Hospital v Fisher. The judgment of the Court comprising the Kirby P, Mahoney and Samuels JJA said at 725 that:
Litigation is inescapably chancy. The purpose of the rule is to put a premium on realistic assessment of cases. It is not to demand perfect foresight which is denied even to the judges. That is why a discretion is retained under the rule, for the Court to order otherwise than as the rule provides. But the ordinary provision is expected to apply in the ordinary case. It has added a new duty to the functions of legal practitioners advising litigants. It is a duty which is both protective of the interests of litigants and of the public interests in the prompt and economical disposal of litigation.
21 The issues arising under the particular rule were considered more recently in the Court of Appeal in Morgan v Johnson (1998) 44 NSWLR 578 where Mason P reviewed the authorities, some of which I have referred to. His Honour indicated, in extracting the principles to be applied, that:
The prima facie consequence of non-acceptance will be that the rule will be enforced against the non-accepting party. (at 581)
22 His Honour cited New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 and Hillier at 422. The President went on to say that this was because from the time of non-acceptance,
notionally the real cause and occasion of the litigation is the attitude adopted by [the party] which has rejected the compromise.
23 Mason P also referred to and quoted from an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal of Houatchanthara v Bednarczyk, an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal of 14 October 1996. This was a case where the difference between the offer of compromise and the verdict was only $750. Clarke JA said as follows:
It is clear that if the rule operates, the plaintiff will be significantly disadvantaged, but that disadvantage flows naturally from the risks of litigation. The idea behind the rule is to encourage settlement or compromise of proceedings, and more specifically, to encourage litigants to give serious consideration to the settlement of proceedings. Where an offer is made by a defendant to a plaintiff, the latter is put on notice that unless he or she accepts that offer, there is a significant risk that the order provided for by the rule may follow. In declining to accept the offer, the plaintiff undertakes the risk and the consequences that flow naturally from that risk. Whereas, as here, the claim was a very small one, the risk was very great indeed.
24 Handley JA, in agreeing with the order proposed by Clarke JA, referred to the rule as establishing a prima facie rule which should be applied unless the unsuccessful party is able to point to special factors which justify departure from that rule in the particular case. His Honour went on:
General factors which apply in most, if not all cases, such as hardship, and difficulty in predicting the result of the trial cannot support an exercise of the discretion in favour of the unsuccessful party.
25 Santow J agreed with the judgment of Clarke JA.
26 It seems abundantly clear that the discretion that her Honour had in relation to costs, and specifically under subrule (6), miscarried. There was no material before her Honour from which she could come to the conclusion that this was an exceptional case and that for the avoidance of substantial injustice, an order other than that provided for by the rule should occur. It follows, in my view, that the appellant must succeed in the appeal.
27 The orders which I would propose are as follows: