58 On appeal, the Full Court held that the Council was empowered to vary the condition by the terms of s 41 of the Planning and Development Act 1966 (SA). Cox J (with whom King CJ and Lego J agreed) said that the proper construction of the statute (which expressly referred to the revocation of a condition) led to a conclusion that the power to revoke a consent condition was inherent in the scheme created by the section itself. That conclusion, of course, demonstrates the importance of having regard to the particular statutory provisions under which the approval is given and the conditions imposed. However, on his way to that conclusion his Honour had articulated the general principles which had to be applied. He rejected the submission that a power to impose conditions varies with it a power to vary them, as a general proposition, with respect to the kind of planning consent with which the legislation was concerned. He pointed out that the legislation prohibited an owner of land from erecting a building without the consent in writing of the local Council. That implied a decision by the Council and its written notification to the owner. As his Honour pointed out (416), if the Council has resolved to grant its consent but not yet given the necessary notification to the owner, the formal act required by the section will not have occurred and it would be open to the Council to rescind its earlier decision. However once notification had occurred the Council may, by following its rescission procedures, formally disavow what it had done, but it could not effectively claim that it did not give the owner the consent in writing that the section required. He described the effect of the authorities in the following way (417):