Azar v Kathirgamalingan

Whether r 31.10 applies to surveillance evidence 13Senior counsel for the defendant asked the Court to note that despite this application the defendant does not concede that the rule applies to surveillance film. 14Photograph is not defined in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ( UCPR ) to the extent that note 31.10.15 in Ritchie's Uniform Civil Procedure NSW suggests that surveillance film falls within the rule, it was submitted that the Practice is incorrect. 15The Court was not referred to any decision of a superior court in NSW which is directly on point. It would appear that there is none. 16In Boyes v Colins [2000] WASCA 344 the Western Australian Full Court determined that video film was a discoverable document. Under the relevant rules the definition of document included film and the matter was determined on that basis. Justice Ipp referred to the question of whether video film fell within the definition of photograph . The defendant's counsel had initially accepted that it was but submitted that it was open to the Court to find otherwise [33]. 17The Court informed counsel that due to insufficient time for this issue to be argued and determined fully, the Court would deal with this application on the basis that r 31.10 applies to surveillance evidence.

Whether leave ought be granted 18The defendant submitted that if r 31.10 does apply leave ought be granted because this is an exceptional case because the plaintiff's credit is in issue to a greater extent than in other matters. 19Senior counsel for the defendant relied upon the following authorities:

• Australian Postal Commission v Hayes & Anor 87 ALR 283 (Willcox J)
• Robbins v Harbord (1994) 62 SASR 229 (Supreme Court of South Australia in Banco)
• Broken Hill Proprietary Co Limited v Mason & Jennings (1996) 67 SASR 456 (Debelle J) as authority for the proposition that the opportunity of presenting a case involves not merely the opportunity of adducing evidence but of testing the opponent's evidence and that these are examples of cases where access to film was withheld until after cross-examination. They involved situations not dissimilar to that which occurred in Markus v Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd (1983) 25 NSWCCR 1 (Clarke J). 20The plaintiff's submissions focussed firstly, on the trend in litigation in more recent times towards what was colloquially referred to as a cards on the table approach as opposed to the former, often referred to as trial by ambush . The submissions refer to a number of authorities including:
• Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 346
• Jaber v Rockdale City Counsel [2008] NSWCA 98 21More recently, Halpin & Others v Lumley General Insurance Ltd [2009] NSWCA 372, was not a personal injuries case but concerned a refusal to pay an insurance claim. At first instance the defendant had obtained an order excluding certain affidavits and other potential evidence from the scope of an order requiring each party to serve the evidence on which it intended to rely at the trial. The plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged this order in the Court of Appeal. After observing that the trial judge had the power to make such an order pursuant to s 61 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 ( CPA ) and r 2.1, the Court then considered whether such an order should have been made taking into account ss 56 - 58 of the CPA . 22Sackville JA, with whom Tobias JA agreed, referred to the two approaches to litigation and said at [101]: "There is no inconsistency between these statements of principle and the existence of a power, exercisable for good cause and appropriate circumstances, to direct that a party may withhold affidavits until trial. The making of such a direction does not imply that the trial is to be conducted 'by ambush', nor that the party seeking the direction has failed to co-operate in identifying and elucidating the issues in trial. On the contrary, the statutory criteria that must be taken into account for a direction to be made should ensure that the issues are clearly defined and that the party seeking the directions demonstrates that the 'dictates of justice' will be served by the direction." 23His Honour concluded at [107]: "For these reasons I conclude that courts in New South Wales have power under the CP Act and the UCPR to make orders relieving one party to civil litigation from complying, in whole or in part, with directions that would otherwise that party to disclose to the other in advance of the trial all affidavits and reports to be adduced in evidence at the trial." 24In a separate judgment Basten JA, agreed with the orders proposed and stated at [317]: "The reasonable entitlement of a defendant to preserve pre-trial confidentiality in the results of its investigations, in the face of suspected fraud, remains a legitimate interest." 25His Honour went on to say, however, that there is no reason to require a judge at a pre-trial stage to assume or to be satisfied that there is fraud, untruthfulness or deceit although the judge would need to be satisfied that there is some real basis for suspicion so that withholding the material is legitimate in all the circumstances. 26Obviously caution is required before one party is given what could be regarded as a forensic advantage by being exempted from a requirement of the rules. Mr Daley submitted that the making of the orders sought would cause unfairness to the plaintiff, as she may not now be able to recall the events recorded in this evidence. This is not unusual in personal injury litigation especially where some years have elapsed since the accident and the plaintiff is unwell. Plaintiffs are only required to give their evidence to the best of their recollection, imperfect as that may be. A plaintiff giving truthful evidence generally has nothing to fear from surveillance evidence. On the other hand, the disclosure of such evidence would give the plaintiff, not giving evidence in a truthful manner, the opportunity to tailor his or her evidence to meet the film. Whilst openness and cooperation are not only desirable but are now also required in modern litigation it is not necessarily appropriate where credit is an issue. 27For these reasons the Court concludes that in the circumstances of this case the orders sought in [(i)] and [(ii)] of the notice of motion ought be made. Whilst in so concluding the Court is mindful of the possible consequences of such orders in the context of the relevant provisions of the CPA , in particular s 56 (Over-riding purpose) the Court is nevertheless required to follow the dictates of justice (s 58). 28Order (iii) which the defendant seeks is an order giving leave to the defendant to show the film to his experts and not being required to serve supplementary reports dealing with the film until after cross-examination. The Court declines to make this order because it would give the defendant an unfair advantage as the plaintiff will not have had such opportunity.

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