119 In FD v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2008] NSWADT 88 at [46-54] I wrote:
"The discretion vested in a decision maker in determining whether a person is fit and proper, in any given context, was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 589 at 389, per Northrop, Miles and French JJ, to "give wide scope for judgement and allow broad bases for rejection." See also Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa ([1999] NSWADTAP 9 at [25].
In the present context, additionally to these principles, s.15(6) of the SIA provides that "for the purpose of determining whether the Applicant is a fir and proper person" the Commissioner may have regard to criminal intelligence or information which, among other things, "causes the Commissioner not to have confidence that improper conduct will not occur if the applicant were granted the licence."
The Act contains no definition of "improper conduct". Section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 ("the IA") says that:
"In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object."
S.34 of the IA then provides:
"(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, if any material not forming part of the Act or statutory rule is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material:
(a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the Act or statutory rule and the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule and, in the case of a statutory rule, the purpose or object underlying the Act under which the rule was made), or
(b) to determine the meaning of the provision:
(i) if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or
(ii) if the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the Act or statutory rule and the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule and, in the case of a statutory rule, the purpose or object underlying the Act under which the rule was made) leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable."
… The Macquarie Dictionary contains the following definition of "improper" -
"not in accordance with propriety of behaviour, manners, etc .: improper conduct. "
On that understanding, the improper conduct to which s.15(6) refers is conduct in the course of the regulated activity or as a consequence of the grant of a licence. In FD's case, were he granted a licence, this would be as an unarmed guard of persons or property, or in crowd control. The purpose and object of the Act appear to be the maintenance of the highest standards of personal integrity and conduct in the carrying out of regulated security activities.
What amounts to prospective improper conduct (having regard to criminal intelligence) in the context of such a licence, which the Commissioner is not confident will not occur, is a difficult question. Some guidance can be found from the Second Respondent Speech on the Security Industry Amendment Act 2002 - which, among other things, introduced s.15(6) and (7) to the SIA. Mr Gaudry, Parliamentary Secretary, in the Legislative Assembly on 12 November 2002, said:
"The intention of the Security Industry Act is to ensure that high standards of integrity and conduct are maintained within the security industry. Entry to the industry is restricted by the licensing system in order to protect the public interest by diminishing the likelihood of criminal activity within the industry. For this reason, persons convicted of specified offences are barred from working in security.