Open access information
37S 6 makes provision for the 'mandatory proactive release' of 'open access information' unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of that information. Part 3 of the GIPA Act deals with 'open access information'. Section 18 describes what constitutes 'open access information' for the purpose of s 6. Included in this description is an agency's register of 'government contracts': see para 18 (e).
38The term 'government contract' is defined in cl 1 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act to mean the following:
government contract means any of the following contracts between an agency and a private sector entity:
(a) a contract under which a party agrees to undertake a specific project (such as a construction, infrastructure or property development project),
(b) a contract under which a party agrees to provide specific goods or services (such as information technology services), other than a contract of employment,
(c) a contract under which a party agrees to transfer real property to another party to the contract,
(d) a lease of real property
39Division 5 of Part 3 deals with Government contracts with the private sector. There is no dispute that the PDA is a government contract falling within the meaning of the provisions in Division 3. S 27 in this Division requires every government agency to keep a register of contracts, to which it is a party, that has (or is likely to have) a value of $150,000 or more. S 29 prescribes the basic information that is to be registered in the register of contracts, as follows:
29 Information to be entered in register-class 1 contracts
The following information about a class 1 contract is to be entered in the government contracts register:
(a) the name and business address of the contractor,
(b) particulars of any related body corporate (within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth) in respect of the contractor, or any other private sector entity in which the contractor has an interest, that will be involved in carrying out any of the contractor's obligations under the contract or will receive a benefit under the contract,
(c) the date on which the contract became effective and the duration of the contract,
(d) particulars of the project to be undertaken, the goods or services to be provided or the real property to be leased or transferred under the contract,
(e) the estimated amount payable to the contractor under the contract,
(f) a description of any provisions under which the amount payable to the contractor may be varied,
(g) a description of any provisions with respect to the renegotiation of the contract,
(h) in the case of a contract arising from a tendering process, the method of tendering and a summary of the criteria against which the various tenders were assessed,
(i) a description of any provisions under which it is agreed that the contractor is to receive payment for providing operational or maintenance services.
40Where the contract is as a result of a tender process, as in the case of Barangaroo South, s 30 requires additional information about the contract to be entered into the register.
30 Additional information for class 2 contracts
(1) ...
(2) The additional information required to be entered in the register for class 2 contracts is as follows:
(a) particulars of future transfers of significant assets to the State at zero, or nominal, cost to the State, including the date of their proposed transfer,
(b) particulars of future transfers of significant assets to the contractor, including the date of their proposed transfer,
(c) the results of any cost-benefit analysis of the contract conducted by the agency,
(d) the components and quantum of the public sector comparator if used,
(e) if relevant, a summary of information used in the contractor's full base case financial model (for example, the pricing formula for tolls or usage charges),
(f) if relevant, particulars of how risk, during the construction and operational phases of a contract to undertake a specific project (such as construction, infrastructure or property development), is to be apportioned between the parties, quantified (where practicable) in net present-value terms and specifying the major assumptions involved,
(g) particulars as to any significant guarantees or undertakings between the parties, including any guarantees or undertakings with respect to loan agreements entered into or proposed to be entered into,
(h) particulars of any other key elements of the contract.
41Where that contract has a value of $5million or more, s 31 requires the agency to place a copy of the contract on the register.
42The PDA, between BDA and LL, falls into the latter category. However, s 32 provides that 'confidential information' does not need to be included in the register. That section is in the following terms:
32 Confidential information not required to be included in register
(1) A requirement of this Division to include information or a copy of a contract in the government contracts register does not require the inclusion of:
(a) the commercial-in-confidence provisions of a contract, or
(b) details of any unsuccessful tender, or
(c) any matter that could reasonably be expected to affect public safety or security, or
(d) a copy of a contract, a provision of a contract or any other information in relation to a contract that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a record would result in there being an overriding public interest against disclosure of the record.
(2) If an agency does not include a copy of a contract in the register, or includes only some of the provisions of a contract in the register, because of this section, the agency must include in the register:
(a) the reasons why the contract or those provisions have not been included in the register, and
(b) a statement as to whether it is intended that the contract or those provisions will be included in the register at a later date and, if so, when it is likely that they will be included, and
(c) if some but not all of the provisions of the contract have been included in the register, a general description of the types of provisions that have not been included.
43The Note at the end of this Division states 'Any exception under this Division from the requirement to include information about or a copy of a contract on a government contracts register does not of itself constitute grounds for refusing an access application'.
Public Interest Test
44The test to be applied in determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure is set out in s 13. That test is in the following terms:
13 Public interest test
There is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information for the purposes of this Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure.
45Subsection 12(1) of the GIPA Act provides that there is a general public interest in favour of disclosure of government information. Subsection 12(2) provides that public interest considerations in favour of disclosure are not limited. The section goes on to provide some examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of government information. These include:
Note. The following are examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of information:
(a) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs, enhance Government accountability or contribute to positive and informed debate on issues of public importance.
(b) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of agencies and, in particular, their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public.
(c) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to ensure effective oversight of the expenditure of public funds.
(d) The information is personal information of the person to whom it is to be disclosed.
(e) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal or substantiate that an agency (or a member of an agency) has engaged in misconduct or negligent, improper or unlawful conduct.
46The public interest considerations against disclosure are limited. These are set out in s 14 of the GIPA Act.
47Subsection 14(1) provides for certain government information to be conclusively presumed to give rise to an overriding public interest consideration against disclosure. That information is set out in Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act. Where government information falls within this description, the public interest test in s 13 is satisfied without further inquiry. BDA, LL, nor KPMG have asserted that any of the grounds in Schedule 1 apply.
48The only other public interest considerations against disclosure are those set out in the table to subs 14(2). These are not conclusively presumed to give rise to an overriding public interest against disclosure. For the purpose of this application, the relevant public interest considerations against disclosure are as follows:
1 Responsible and effective government
There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects (whether in a particular case or generally):
(a)
.....,
(b)
...,
(c)
...,
(d)
prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions,
(e)
reveal a deliberation or consultation conducted, or an opinion, advice or recommendation given, in such a way as to prejudice a deliberative process of government or an agency,
(f)
...,
(g)
found an action against an agency for breach of confidence or otherwise result in the disclosure of information provided to an agency in confidence,
(h)
...
4 Business interests of agencies and other persons
There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects:
(a)
...,
(b)
reveal commercial-in-confidence provisions of a government contract,
(c)
diminish the competitive commercial value of any information to any person,
(d)
prejudice any person's legitimate business, commercial, professional or financial interests,
(e)
...
49The application of the public interest test and the public interest considerations against disclosure are discussed in more detail below.
50Section 15 sets out the principles that are to be applied when determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. That section provides as follows:
15 Principles that apply to public interest determination
A determination as to whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information is to be made in accordance with the following principles:
(a) Agencies must exercise their functions so as to promote the object of this Act.
(b) Agencies must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner.
(c) The fact that disclosure of information might cause embarrassment to, or a loss of confidence in, the Government is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.
(d) The fact that disclosure of information might be misinterpreted or misunderstood by any person is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.
(e) In the case of disclosure in response to an access application, it is relevant to consider that disclosure cannot be made subject to any conditions on the use or disclosure of information.
51Where the information for which access is sought concerns a person's business, commercial, professional or financial interests, section 54 of the GIPA Act requires an agency to consult with that person before providing access where (a) the person may reasonably be expected to have concerns about the disclosure of the information, and (b) those concerns may reasonably be expected to be relevant to the question of whether there is a public interest consideration against disclosure of the information. It is as a result of BDA's consultation, under this section, that LL and KPMG have become a party.
52Provision is made for personal factors of an applicant to be taken into account in determining where the public interest lies: see s 55 of the GIPA Act. Personal factors are described in subs 55(1) to include an applicant's motive for making the access application.
53Application of the public interest test
In Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Camilleri (GD) [2012] NSWADTAP 19, at [24] and [25], the Appeal Panel noted the structured approach within the GIPA Act to the question of whether an agency has properly refused acess. In that regard the Appeal Panel said the following:
24 Putting to one side the cases where a conclusive presumption is relied upon, the Act envisages a two-step approach to the question of whether information has been properly refused.
25 The new Act has a more structured approach to the decision-making task than was seen under the previous legislation. The agency case for refusal must rely on one or more of the section 14 Table considerations. The Tribunal's task is then to weigh that case against the factors favouring disclosure (s 13), mindful of the injunctions that appear in both ss 12 and 15. It is important, in our view, that the Tribunal proceed in the structured way reflected by these provisions. The Table considerations are concerned with systemic features of the operation of government.
54That is, on external review, where the conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure in subs 14(1) does not apply, the Tribunal (as the agency before it) must first be satisfied that one or more of the public interest considerations against disclosure (which are closed) in the table to subs 14(2) applies to the information in issue. If so satisfied, the Tribunal must then weigh these factors against the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure, which are not closed, to ascertain where the balance lies. In doing so, the Tribunal (as the agency before it), must have regard to the general public interest in favour of disclosure in subs 12(1) and the requirements of s 15 (i.e. exercise its functions to promote the objects of the Act and disregard matters such as a disclosure of information might embarrass the Government, or be misunderstood).
55Ultimately, in determining where the balance lies between the competing interests, this 'is a question of fact and degree, requiring the weighing of competing matters, and is a task that is not amenable to mathematical calculation': see Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council [2011] NSWADT 307 at [70].
56The public interest considerations against disclosure - generally
As set out above, the public interest considerations in cl 1 and cl 4 of the table to subs 14(2) of the GIPA Act are predicated with the words - 'could reasonably be expected to' have the prescribed effect as set out in one or more of the paragraphs in each clause. It is accepted that these words are to be given their ordinary meaning and 'require a judgement to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous': see Attorney-General's Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR180, 64 ALR, per Bowen CJ and Beaumont J, at 190 and 106, as applied in McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45, at [61], Re Lobo and Department of Immigration and Citizenship 92011) 124 ALD 238, at [62] to [64] and [74], Nature Conservation Council v Department of Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services (NSW) [2012] NSWADT 195 at [146], Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council [2011] NSWADT 307, at [56] and [57] and Woodhouse v City of Sydney Council [2012] NSWADT 95 at [32] to [34].
57The abovementioned remarks of Bowen CJ and Beaumont J, in Cockcroft (supra), have been widely accepted. However, it is instructive to repeat their observations in full:
[In] our opinion, in the present context, the words "could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information" were intended to receive their ordinary meaning. That is to say, they require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like. To construe s 43(1)(c)(ii) as depending in its application upon the occurrence of certain events in terms of any specific degree of likelihood or probability is, in our view, to place an unwarranted gloss upon the relatively plain words of the Act. It is preferable to confine the inquiry to whether the expectation claimed was reasonably based (see Kioa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 159 CLR 550 ; 62 ALR 321 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J).
The majority of the Tribunal thought that an assessment of what was more probable than than not was called for. As Woodward J has pointed out, there are difficulties in this approach for the legislature has chosen not to introduce the notion of a "probable" result (cf Ex parte White; In re White (1985) 14 QBD 600). It is also unnecessary to consider whether an "even chance" or something of that kind is needed. It is preferable to confine oneself to the language of the provision itself and to attempt to form an opinion, on the evidence, as to what can reasonably be expected to happen if disclosure occurs. In our opinion, in departing from the terms of s 43(1)(c)(ii) and requiring the applicants to establish a case on the balance of probabilities, the majority of the Tribunal fell into error in their construction of the provision.
[bold emphasis added]
58In the same decision, at p 196, Sheppard J made the following remark:
... stringent though that test may be, it does not go so far as to require the decision-maker to be satisfied upon a balance of probabilities that the production of the document will in fact prejudice the future supply of information.
59Although Cockcroft (supra), concerned the meaning of the term in the context of s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982, (FOI Act (Cth)), as I have indicated above, it has been accepted that the term, as used in other exemptions in that Act, the exemptions in Schedule 1 of the former NSW Freedom of Information Act 1989 (FOI Act (repealed)) and in the table to subs 14(2) of the GIPA Act, have the same meaning.
60Cockcroft's (supra) case was considered and applied in Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111, 108 ALR 163. At 176, after reciting the abovementioned paragraphs from the decision in Cockcroft, the Court (per Davies, Wilcox and Einfeld JJ) said:
Their Honours did not suggest, as was submitted by Mr Bayne, that it was sufficient that there be a possibility not irrational, absurd or ridiculous that the specified consequence would occur. Their Honours specifically rejected that approach, saying that the words "could reasonably be expected" meant what they said. The practical application of their Honours' view will not necessarily lead to a result different from that proposed by Sheppard J.
In the application of s 43(1)(b), there would ordinarily be material before the decision-maker which would show whether or not the commercial value of the information would be or could be expected to be destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed. It would be for the decision-maker to determine whether, if there were an expectation that this would occur, the expectation was reasonable.
...
... the question under s 43(1)(b) is not whether there is a reasonable basis for a claim for exemption but whether the commercial value of the information could reasonably be expected to be destroyed or diminished if it were disclosed. These two questions are different. The decision-maker is concerned, not with the reasonableness of the claimant's behaviour, but with the effect of disclosure. ...
61In my view, the approach adopted by their Honours above, remains the correct approach in determining whether the disclosure of information 'could reasonably be expected to' have one or more of the effects as prescribed in the clauses in the table to subs 14(2) of the GIPA Act. That is, the inquiry is not whether the occurrence of the prescribed effect is likely, possible or probable. The inquiry is whether the expectation of the claimed effect is reasonably based (cf the approach in Nature Conservation Council (supra), at [179]).
62The public interest considerations in favour of disclosure examples in subs 12(2), I note, are also predicated with the words 'could reasonably be expected' to 'promote', 'enhance', inform' and 'insure' public discussion, Government accountability etc. The term 'could reasonably be expected' in this context must have the same meaning.
63Clause 1(d) prejudice supply of confidential information
In Camilleri (supra) at [27] to [33], the Appeal Panel considered the operation of the public interest consideration against disclosure in cl 1(d) of the table of subs 14(2) of the GIPA Act and said the following:
27 The approach to be adopted is similar to that commended by the Appeal Panel under the previous legislation, there in connection with cl 13(b)(ii). ...
28 In Director General, Department of Education & Training v Mullett & anor (GD) [2002] NSWADTAP 13 (Mullett), the Appeal Panel said:
58 In our view cl 13(b)(ii) requires the Tribunal to engage in a relatively abstract analysis. It must ask whether material of the kind sought to be protected on the present occasion would, if released, prejudice the supply of similar material to government in the future, as a matter of reasonable expectation. That requires the Tribunal to characterise the nature of the material sought to be protected on the present occasion; to identify the extent to which material of that kind can only be obtained, or can only reasonably be obtained, by confidential communication; the extent to which guarantees of confidentiality may be necessary. We agree with the dicta of Young CJ in Ryder v Booth [1985] VR 870 as to how a similar question arising under the Victorian FOI Act's in-confidence exemption (whether disclosure would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of an agency to obtain information communicated in confidence) should be approached. His Honour said at 872:
`The question then is, would disclosure of the information sought impair (i.e. damage) the ability of the [agency] to obtain similar information in future. ... It may be noted that it is the ability of the [agency] that must be impaired. The paragraph is not concerned with the question whether the particular doctor whose report is disclosed will give similar information in future but with whether the agency will be able to obtain such information. ...'
29 This approach was endorsed in many subsequent Tribunal and Appeal Panel decisions. The same approach is required, as we see it, in relation to many of the s 14 Table considerations. They squarely focus on considerations relating to the conduct of the business of government. ...
30 ...
31 In this case the Tribunal was required to form an opinion on whether disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have the effect of prejudicing the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the agency's functions (cl 1(d)); or, ...
32 ...
33 In our view, the question of whether the information supplied is 'confidential information' must be examined, primarily at least, by reference to the agency's evidence as to the conditions under which it conducts the service within which the information was received. ...
64As outlined above, for the cl 1(d) public interest consideration to apply, the information in issue must not only be 'confidential information', it must also be information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions.
65The Tribunal has accepted that the word 'prejudice', in the context of the public interest considerations against disclosure, is to be given its ordinary meaning, namely: 'to cause detriment or disadvantage': see Hurst (supra) at [60], McLennan v University of New England [2013] NSWADT 113 at [38] and Sobh v Victoria Police (1993) 1 VR 41.
66Clause 1(e) reveal an opinion, advice, or recommendation so as to prejudice a deliberative process of government or an agency
This public interest consideration against disclosure is only relied by BDA, in respect of the disclosure of the information in the KPMG Report.
67In order for this public interest consideration against disclosure to apply, it is necessary to establish a connection between the particular opinion, advice or recommendation and the relevant deliberative process of the agency: see Van der Wall v University of Sydney [2008] NSWADT 213 at [36] and Re Waterford and Department of the Treasury (No 2) (1984) 5 ALD 588 at [58] to [61].
68Clause 1(g) disclose information provided to the agency in confidence
It is well established that even where information has not expressly been provided to an agency in confidence, this can be inferred from the circumstances in which it was provided. In these applications, I accept that the disputed information, to the extent it is information provided in the course of the tender process by LL, BM or KPMG, was provided in confidence.
69Clause 4(b) reveal commercial-in-confidence provisions of a government contract
The word 'reveal' is defined in cl 1 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act as follows:
reveal information means to disclose information that has not already been publicly disclosed (otherwise than by unlawful disclosure).
70For the purpose of Government contracts, 'confidential information' is defined in s 32 of the GIPA Act to include the 'commercial-in-confidence provisions' of the contract. These are defined in cl 1 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act as follows:
commercial-in-confidence provisions of a contract means any provisions of the contract that disclose:
(a) the contractor's financing arrangements, or
(b) the contractor's cost structure or profit margins, or
(c) the contractor's full base case financial model, or
(d) any intellectual property in which the contractor has an interest, or
(e) any matter the disclosure of which would place the contractor at a substantial commercial disadvantage in relation to other contractors or potential contractors, whether at present or in the future.
71To the extent the disputed deleted information is also information deleted from the copy of the PDA on BDA's website, BDA and LL argue that this information is a 'commercial-in-confidence provision' in that Agreement and hence the information, as it appears in the documents in these proceedings should be treated as such. In my view, consideration needs to be given to each deletion as to whether a disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to have the prescribed effect, as asserted by BDA and LL, and if it does whether, on balance it outweighs the public interest in favour of disclosure. That is, the fact that the parties have determined that a provision in the PDA falls within the abovementioned description of a 'commercial-in-confidence provision' in the Agreement is not conclusive and even if it does, the public interest test must still be applied to see where the balance lies.
72Clause 4(c) diminish the competitive commercial value of the information
In McKinnon v Blacktown City Council [2012] NSWADT 44 at [79] and [80], the Tribunal noted that the words 'commercial value' were modified by the adjective 'competitive' and after considering the ordinary meaning of that word, said:
"Competitive commercial value" therefore connotes information of commercial value gained in, or relating to, a competitive commercial or business context, including competitive information relating to the competitive purchase and provision of government services.
73In Nature Conservation Council (supra), at [160], the Tribunal held that the descriptor 'competitive' implied that the information would need to provide the person with a competitive edge.
74In McKinnon (supra), at [78], the Tribunal accepted the following meanings of the term 'commercial value':
- 'if [the information] is valuable for the purposes of carrying on the commercial activity in which the entity is engaged' (Sitel and Employment Advocate (2005) 40 AAR 552 at 561 and Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) QIC 94 at 16),
- 'if a genuine arms-length buyer is prepared to pay [to] obtain the information' (Sitel and Employment Advocate (2005) 40 AAR 552 at 561, citing Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491), and
- 'capable of being described as commercial in character' (Mangan and the Treasury [2005] AATA 898 [36]).
75Clause 4(d) prejudice a person's legitimate business, commercial or financial interests
There is no dispute that the disputed information largely concerns the legitimate business, commercial or financial interests of BDA, LL, BM and/or KPMG in so far as the information relates to their respective business, commercial or financial interests. He issue is whether a disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to prejudice those interests. In some instances, I have found that the asserted prejudice was not reasonably based.