EARLIER PROCEEDINGS
21The AWU claim for a wage increase for the CPCM operators has followed a particularly tortuous path to this arbitration. On Wednesday, 21 December, 2005, the AWU had lodged an earlier s.130 notification of an industrial dispute with BlueScope Steel over the rates of pay for CPCM operators. The AWU claimed then - as it also now claims - that there were changes to the skills and responsibilities of the CPCM operators which warranted an adjustment to the rates of pay for them in accordance with wage fixation principles, viz:
"...Changes in work value may arise from changes in the nature of the work, skill and responsibility required or the conditions under which work is performed. Changes in work by themselves may not lead to a change in wage rates. The strict test for an alteration in wage rates is that the change in the nature of the work should constitute such a significant net addition to work requirements as to warrant the creation of a new classification or upgrading to a higher classification..."
22In particular, the AWU had consistently asserted that a reduction in the manning levels flowing from the decision of Grayson DP in BHP Steel (JLA) Pty Limited v Australian Workers Union has led to an increase in workload and the skills required of the CPCM employees.
23The current wage fixation principles have recently been confirmed by the decision of the Full Bench of the Commission (Boland J - President, Walton J - Vice President, Harrison and Grayson DPP and Tabbaa C) in the 2010 State Wage Case No.2 [2011] NSWIRComm 29. However, with that decision of the Full Bench there have been some changes, essentially to the format of the wage fixation principles dealing with arbitrated matters, to which Mr Hatcher referred both in opening submissions and his final submissions in this hearing and which I will discuss in greater detail later in this decision since they appear to have a significant impact on my determination of the matter before me in this hearing.
24The earlier s.130 notification by the AWU was allocated to me and it was the subject of a conference on Monday, 16 January, 2006 and Monday, 6 February, 2006. Conciliation failed to settle the matter. I programmed it for arbitration, issuing the certificate of attempted conciliation required by s.135 and lodging it in the prescribed manner. In fact, I inspected the operations of the CPCM on Monday, 20 March, 2006 and set proceedings down for a further mention on Monday, 1 May, 2006 for the purpose of programming the matter for arbitration.
25However, with Work Choices, operating on and from Monday, 27 March, 2006, restrictions were imposed on the State industrial jurisdiction as far as the operations of BlueScope Steel were concerned. In proceedings before me on Monday, 1 May, 2006 the representative of BlueScope Steel at that time raised that as a jurisdictional issue, ie that the restrictions imposed by Work Choices proscribed variation to the BlueScope Steel Award which was what was being sought by the AWU. Consequently, the proceedings were aborted.
26I adjourned the proceedings on Monday, 1 May, 2006 and Monday, 8 May, 2006 to give the parties the opportunity to consider their respective positions with the matter. Those dates for mention were vacated at the request of BlueScope Steel due to the unavailability of a BlueScope Steel representative at that time. I reconvened the proceedings on Monday, 22 May, 2006, standing the matter over generally at that time to await further developments. However, on my own initiative, I set the matter down for further mentions on Tuesday, 13 June, 2006 and Tuesday, 1 August, 2006. The attitude of BlueScope Steel remained unchanged.
27An amendment to the State IR Act in 2006 provided that a member of the State Commission may be empowered to exercise additional functions - conciliation or arbitration - conferred upon that member by the parties to a dispute themselves. That jurisdiction was conferred by s.146A of the State IR Act. But at that stage BlueScope Steel indicated that it was not prepared to provide a s.146A referral agreement to permit the arbitration of the AWU claim (or other such unresolved AWU claims at that time) to go forward. The question remained at that time whether or not the matter may remain on foot without such a s.146A referral agreement. In the alternative, further conciliation was suggested with respect to the AWU claim on behalf of the CPCM operators but I considered it most unlikely that such further conciliation would be fruitful, having regard to the progress of the matter to date.
28The s.130 matter was therefore scheduled for arbitration to determine whether the matter may proceed independently of a s.146A referral agreement. The AWU had in the proceedings on Tuesday, 13 June, 2006 foreshadowed an application to refer this matter to a Full Bench of the Commission and I reserved its position in that respect but directed the parties to provide written statements of contention in support of their argument on jurisdiction with the matter being set down for a further mention for programming on Tuesday, 3 October, 2006.
29Bearing in mind that I had already conducted an inspection of the site on Monday, 20 March, 2006 as a prelude to the arbitration of the AWU claim on behalf of the CPCM employees, the argument with this particular matter centred on whether or not the issue was part-heard at the time that Work Choices came into effect. If that were so, the matter may proceed to arbitration according to transitional arrangements to Work Choices. It would seem to me that it was open to conclude that the inspection of the operation of the CPCM on Monday, 20 March, 2006 formed an integral part of the hearing of the claim and that, in fact, the AWU claim was therefore part-heard. That was the position taken by the AWU.
30In that respect, for instance, I note that in Council of the City of South Sydney v Horiatopoulos (1992) 47 IR 93 at pp.95 to 98 the Full Bench of the Commission (Cullen and Glynn JJ and Patterson CC) considered that a claim was part-heard at the point where certain evidentiary material - a letter - was received in proceedings. Consequently, if the inspection was a part of the evidence in these current proceedings - and I thought it was - then the matter would have remained within jurisdiction as a part heard matter, notwithstanding that Work Choices had intruded in the meantime.
31In any event, such an argument became otiose. A protocol was, in fact, ultimately developed between BlueScope Steel and trade unions representing its employees that, subject to compliance with the dispute settlement procedure in the BlueScope Steel Award, claims made may be processed in the State Commission by means of a s.146A referral agreement. The referral agreement ultimately provided to me was in the following terms:
"...The dispute concerns rates of pay of employees of the company working at the Springhill site on the Coupled Pickle Cold Mill line..."
32Clause 7 of the referral agreement, consistent with the protocol that had been developed, provided that unless the parties agreed to waive the requirement, leave of a Presidential member would be required as a prelude to arbitration, viz:
"...an application for leave for the matter to be arbitrated will be heard by a Presidential member of the Commission..."
33In a letter dated Thursday, 28 September, 2006 BlueScope Steel sought that I refer the matter in accordance with that clause. I therefore directed the parties to file brief written submissions concerning their claim for the consideration of Grayson DP and referred the file to him for his consideration.
34Grayson DP considered the matter in chambers on Thursday, 12 October, 2006. The Deputy President recorded on the file that:
"...having regard to the competing contentions, leave is granted to arbitrate in accordance with Clause 7 of the referral agreement in this matter..."
35The file was returned to me. I set the matter down for a mention and programming on Tuesday, 24 October, 2006 but vacated that day at the request of BlueScope Steel, and with the concurrence of the AWU. The matter proceeded to mention on Monday, 30 October, 2006. I made directions for the filing of the necessary evidentiary material and set the matter down for a further mention for programming on Tuesday, 12 December, 2006.
36The hearing was originally set down on Monday, 26 February, 2007 and Tuesday, 27 February, 2007 but was vacated at the request of the AWU which sought more time to consider its response to evidentiary material provided for and on behalf of BlueScope Steel. Ultimately, the matter was set down for arbitration in a hearing on Tuesday, 15 May, 2007 and Wednesday, 16 May, 2007. The hearing on Tuesday, 15 May, 2007 was also abandoned to permit the parties to confer further with respect to other jurisdictional difficulties which had been thrown up by the AWU claim in the light of the restrictions now imposed by Work Choices, ie essentially how to vary a Federal industrial instrument which is what the BlueScope Steel Award had now become.
37The matter resumed before me on Wednesday, 16 May, 2007. A further inspection of the CPCM was arranged at the request of the AWU for Tuesday, 12 June, 2007. The matter was set down for hearing on Monday, 25 June, 2007 and Tuesday, 26 June, 2007 but because of the absence of the AWU representative at that time due to his ill health, the AWU sought that the hearing be adjourned yet again. I set the hearing down on Monday, 24 September, 2007, Tuesday, 25 September, 2007 and Wednesday, 26 September, 2007 instead but it became necessary to also vacate those days as well. Ultimately, the hearing was scheduled for Monday, 3 December, 2007, Tuesday, 4 December, 2007 and Wednesday, 5 December, 2007. But that hearing did not proceed either.
38At the commencement of the hearing on Monday, 3 December, 2007, the AWU sought a further adjournment of the hearing. It was the intention of the AWU to brief counsel to advance the claim on behalf of the CPCM operators. BlueScope Steel opposed that further adjournment. Its representative had written to the AWU on Friday, 30 November, 2007 in the following terms:
"...We do not accept that the unavailability of counsel you now wish to brief, at this late stage, in circumstances of the AWU having at least six months to consider the relevant issues and accordingly brief counsel, is a reasonable basis for your application. Our client will be prejudiced by any further delay due to a key witness...having retired since the proceedings commenced and who is about to begin an extended trip around Australia. It will be significantly difficult to have (that witness) attend any future hearing dates should the matter be adjourned.
Further our client is prejudiced by continuing costs of preparation, briefing of witnesses and mentions for each adjourned hearing. It is in the interests of both parties to bring the proceedings to a conclusion. In the circumstances, we would not oppose the withdrawal of your application to that end and invite you to do so..."
39In my decision of Monday, 3 December, 2007 in the Coupled Pickled Cold Mill Work Value Case [2007] NSWIRComm 1088, I dismissed the s.130 notification by the AWU, commenting (at para.22):
"...In the circumstances, I see no good purpose in preserving this long outstanding matter. The only reason I can see to retain the existing s.130 matter as a live matter is to ensure some retrospectivity on any increase to wages for the CPCM employees in accordance with s.15(3)(a), ie from the date of lodgement of the s.130 notification. Such retrospectivity would, of course, be lost by the frequent adjournments of these proceedings, at the initiation of the AWU. The AWU would have the right to pursue its claim in due course, in a fresh notification under s.130, if it chose to do so. And, in the circumstances, I reserve its right to do so. But I dismiss the current s.130 notification..."
40The current s.130 notification, lodged on Thursday, 5 November, 2009, is the AWU's ultimate response to those comments.