The meaning of "post-graduate qualification" in the Tasmanian nursing industry
68 As a lawyer, I have a particular pre-disposition towards the meaning of the term "post-graduate". As a secondary student I yearned to attend university to enrol in a combined course in Economics and Law. I fulfilled my aspirations and left university having graduated with two degrees, one in Economics, one in Law. With that background, if asked what a post-graduate qualification is, I would have immediately answered, "a master's degree or a doctorate or a graduate diploma for which an initial degree was a prerequisite". I would have considered curious the proposition that a person, trained as a nurse in a hospital, would consider himself or herself to be a graduate, and that any specialty course, which such a person undertook and completed after finishing "initial training", would be considered a post-graduate course.
69 This case, however, is not about lawyers or economists. Nor is it about the understanding of those who approach the construction of cl 13.3 with narrow views borne of a total life experience removed from a proper understanding of the nursing industry in Tasmania. For this reason, I consider that Mr Targett's views as a senior public servant and industrial relations professional are not much more advanced or probative than those of the lawyer or the economist, in the sense described at [68] above.
70 Words should not be "interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industry realities"; see City of Wanneroo per French J at 378. Context is critical when one comes to construe industrial agreements. As Burchett J (with whom Drummond J relevantly agreed) said in Short v F W Hercus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 at 518 to 520:
"The context of an expression may thus be much more than the words that are its immediate neighbours. Context may extend to the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association. Context may also include, in some cases, ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken. When the expression was transplanted, it may have brought with it some of the soil in which it once grew, retaining a special strength and colour in its new environment. There is no inherent necessity to read it as uprooted and stripped of every trace of its former significance, standing bare in alien ground. True, sometimes it does stand as if alone. But that should not be just assumed, in the case of an expression with a known source, without looking at its creation, understanding its original meaning, and then seeing how it is now used. Very frequently, perhaps most often, the immediate context is the clearest guide, but the court should not deny itself all other guidance in those cases where it can be seen that more is needed. In literature, Milton and Joyce could not be read in ignorance of the source of their language, nor should a legal document, including an award, be so read.
That much is fairly clear. Where there is seen to be a difficulty, the court can often go to the history of the matter. A number of illustrations will be found in Nurses (South Australia) Award (Interpretation) Case (supra). But an ambiguity or obscurity may not be immediately seen on the face of a document. Both the problem and its solution may appear only when the wider context from which an expression first sprang is brought to notice. Is the court then forbidden to look past the document itself that is before it? The respondent says the instant award is clear, and we must shut our eyes to what went before. I think there are two answers to this argument. On the one hand, I do not accept that the award is clear on its face. The fact that I have given it a meaning by a process of construction (as it happens, contrary to the respondent's contention) cannot disguise the possibility of understanding the language, as the learned judge understood it, differently: cf Pickard v John Heine & Son Ltd (supra) at 9, per Isaacs ACJ. That is certainly sufficient to justify a reference to its source. Where the circumstances allow the court to conclude that a clause in an award is the product of a history, out of which it grew to be adopted in its present form, only a kind of wilful judicial blindness could lead the court to deny itself the light of that history, and to prefer to peer unaided at some obscurity in the language. 'Sometimes', McHugh J said in Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 21, the purpose of legislation 'can be discerned only by reference to the history of the legislation and the state of the law when it was enacted'. Awards must be in the same position.
But even if the language, read alone, appeared pellucidly clear, the tendency of recent decisions - and this is the other answer to the argument put - would seem to require the court to look at the full context. Only then will all the nuances of the language be perceived. The judgment of Mason J (with which Stephen and Wilson JJ expressed agreement ) in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) 1982 149 CLR 337 at 347-353 contains an extended discussion of the principles upon which a court may take account, when construing a contract, of the circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties upon those particular terms. In the course of that discussion, Mason J suggested (at 350) that 'perhaps…the difference…is more apparent than real' between the view that evidence is admissible only to resolve an ambiguity, not to raise it, and the view that extrinsic evidence is receivable both to raise and to resolve an ambiguity. He concluded (at 352):
"The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties, although…if the facts are notorious knowledge of them will be presumed."
The fact is that words are frequently susceptible of more than one meaning. Paradoxically, ambiguity may be born of the reader's clarity of thought which perceives a potentiality for an alternative meaning. But in many cases only evidence of extrinsic facts can show that the potentiality has substance. The old case Macdonald v Longbottom (1859) 1 El & El 977; 120 ER 1177, to which Mason J referred, is an example, since there is nothing necessarily ambiguous in the expression "your wool" (indeed Erle J at 986; 1180 described it as "most explicit") - only evidence that at the time the vendor had both wool of his own growing, and also wool which he had bought in from others, could raise an ambiguity, while at the same time solving it once the other party was shown to have known the facts.
Mason J returned to the subject in his dissenting judgment in K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 315, when he said:
'Problems of legal interpretation are not solved satisfactorily by ritual incantations which emphasise the clarity of meaning which words have when viewed in isolation, divorced from their context. The modern approach to interpretation insists that the context be considered in the first instance, especially in the case of general words, and not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise.'
This is a broad proposition, applicable to problems of construction generally, although it was put forward in the context of statutory interpretation. In that context, this Court said (in the joint judgment of Neaves, Burchett and Lee JJ) in Busby v Chief Manager, Human Resources Department, Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 20 FCR 463 at 468:
'[A]s Dixon CJ said in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397, 'the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed'. See also the dissenting judgment of Mason J in K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 315, where he referred to 'the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that requires the words of a statute to be read in their context'. If that mode of interpretation is truly followed, there must be occasions when it leads to a passage being understood in a sense it would not bear upon a reading in isolation. This is not a shiny new rule, but an approach embedded in the law at least since Lord Coke: see Craies on Statute Law (7th ed, 1971), pp 96-101.'
The principles of statutory interpretation referred to are not inapplicable to an award which seeks, in a way, to legislate for the terms and conditions of employment of a number of persons engaged in a particular industry: cf Gorge A Bond & Co Ltd (In liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498 at 503.) Their application to the present problem would require the court to consider the wider context of the award provision as the product of a series of decisions which might reveal plainly its general purpose and policy. When the provision is read against that background, as I shall show, there can be no doubt that it was not intended to have a restricted meaning, but rather to have a wide operation in cases of redundancy, for whatever reason."
See also CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408.
71 Having regard to the context of the nursing industry in Tasmania as disclosed in the evidence, I have no doubt that the term "post-graduate qualification" was not intended to have a meaning restricted to a qualification obtained after an under-graduate degree at a tertiary institution.
72 Ms Turnbull's impressive and uncontradicted account of the history of nursing in Tasmania, in respect of the attaining of qualifications to practice general nursing, and endorsements for specialisation, tells against the restricted meaning referred to in the preceding paragraph. While Ms Turnbull retired in 1996, that does not affect the currency or significance of her evidence. The move to university qualifications instead of hospital-based qualifications had substantially commenced prior to her retirement. At the time of her retirement, Ms Turnbull was the most senior nursing public servant in the southern region, the most populous region of the State. She also had had extensive management experience far beyond that of Ms Stoker.
73 Ms Turnbull's evidence discloses that nurses in Tasmania, who trained in hospitals and qualified for their registration at such institutions, were regarded, in the industry, as graduate nurses. Most significantly, her evidence further discloses that courses subsequently undertaken were regarded as post-graduate courses. That position has not been washed away by the tide of history. Ms Stoker's personal interpretation of what a post-graduate qualification is, that is, a qualification "attained through a university", is at odds with the historical analysis provided by Ms Turnbull. It is also at odds with the final report to the Tasmanian Nurse Workforce Planning Project, with which Ms Stoker was charged with producing and publishing. As outlined in [53] above, that report lists, as post-graduate qualifications, a range of qualifications including midwifery. Midwifery is a qualification which, as at the time of the making of the Agreement, was only able to be attained by nurses who had been hospital trained, as distinct from being undergraduates of the University of Tasmania.
74 I prefer Ms Turnbull's clear, authoritative, uncontradicted and impressive evidence as providing the more accurate context within which cl 13.3 lives, rather than Ms Stoker's tentative, less authoritative, less factually based and less impressive evidence, which was first given almost as an afterthought in re-examination.
75 I am further unassisted by AQF and dictionary concepts about "post-graduate qualifications". As I said in Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Treasurer of the Commonwealth & Ors (1998) 82 FCR 175 at 181:
"…the specific meaning of [a term], in any particular usage, will depend on the context of its usage. The context delivers the necessary specificity of meaning."
Earlier also at 181, I observed that:
"… dictionary definitions are only helpful to the extent that they point broadly to the general meaning of the term…."