Given that the plaintiff commenced employment in 1972, the defendant relies upon the provisions of earlier enactments of the Industrial Relations Act 1976 and the Master and Servant Act 1856, which contain comparable provisions. The plaintiff contends that the Act, s47, is not a term of the contract of employment and relies on the authority of Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited [1995] HCA 24; (1995) 69 ALJR 797, in support of the proposition that there is an implied term in the contract of employment that reasonable notice ought be provided before termination and that such is not affected by the Act, s47. The plaintiff's case is that the Act, s47, does not constitute a term of the contract of employment and that since the actual contract is silent, a term is implied by law that any termination ought be one affording reasonable notice. In Byrne, employees, who had been dismissed for acts of theft, sought relief claiming that their dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, relying on a breach of a clause of the Transport Workers (Airlines) Award 1988. The court declined to import the clause into the contract of employment or to convert statutory rights into such contract. In their joint judgment, Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ recognised the distinction between an obligation created by statute and one arising from a contract. A statutory term may become a term of the contract by agreement between the parties (True v Amalgamated Collieries of W A Limited [1940] AC 537) and a person may not contract out of rights and obligations imposed by statute (Josephson v Walker [1914] HCA 68; (1914) 18 CLR 691). But the existence of a statutory provision does not become 'crystallised custom' (Byrne at 801). To that extent, the authority of Byrne does not advance the plaintiff's case insofar as it depends on a term implied by law. However, the authority does not preclude the finding that a term can be implied by virtue of the conduct of the parties and that if such a term can be found it is not vitiated by the Act, s47. The parties may, by express agreement, provide for a period longer than that provided by statute, and if such a term can be implied by conduct, the same applies. If neither are present, then the Act provides the statutory right and precludes any other term from being implied by law. This approach is not inconsistent with that taken by Wright J in Hutt v The Cascade Brewery Company Limited A99/1991, although in that case the court was not required to consider the question of term arising by conduct.