I can see no logical reason why Mr Lowe cannot return to work. He is keen and enthusiastic to do so. There is no scientific reason in terms of health and safety why he should not return to work."
32 A further report was obtained by the company from Dr Kafataris dated 23 August 2001 (Att G to ex 6). In this report Dr Kafataris analyses the information available from the workplace assessment report, concluding that it is not possible to guarantee that Mr Lowe would be able to sustain his duties in the long term without risk of a substantial worsening in his lower back function and overall condition. Dr Kafataris repeats his caution that the possibility of disc herniation requiring surgical intervention is likely to rise with the length of time the duties of a bread vendor are performed, noting that these circumstances are exacerbated when the duties are performed in inclement weather and at a faster pace. Dr Kafataris concludes his report stating his suggestion that, from an occupational health and safety point of view, Mr Lowe would be better served by not returning to these duties.
SUBMISSIONS
33 Mr Lloyd was critical of the company's disregard of the opinions of Dr Sooy and Professor Ryan in favour of the views expressed by Dr Kafataris. Mr Lloyd submitted that the company was inappropriately dismissive of Mr Lowe's own view, albeit subjective, that he was fully fit and ready to resume the duties of a bread vendor with which he is intimately familiar, having undertaken them for some 12 years.
34 Mr Lloyd noted that at no time had the company attempted to provide occupational rehabilitation to Mr Lowe, considering him excluded from such activity by the company policy on the basis that his injury was not compensable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act 1987.
35 Mr Lloyd relied upon the opinion of Professor Ryan to support his proposition that there were no barriers to Mr Lowe's return to his pre-injury duties, asserting that the company has taken a narrow and blinkered view of the matter, refusing to countenance any opinion other than that of Dr Kafataris.
36 Mr Lloyd submitted that the company's reliance on the Occupational Health and Safety Act ('OH&S Act') is inappropriate and that legislation provides no prohibition to Mr Lowe's return to work. Mr Lloyd submitted that the duty imposed by s15 of the OH&S Act is in regard to the system of work.
37 In support of these submissions Mr Lloyd referred me to the judgment of Glynn J in Workcover Authority of New south Wales (Inspector Mansell) v Air Express International (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 83 IR 64 in which her Honour at 71 sets out the principles governing the assessment of penalty for a breach of the OH&S Act:
The principles governing the assessment of penalty are well established in this jurisdiction: 'properly considered ... the true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence and not merely the result of the offence' (see Independent Cargo and Wool Services Pty Ltd v Mingare (unreported, NSW Industrial Court, Full Court, 10 March 1996, p 4)).
It was said by Hill J in Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 at 5:
... However, the gravity or otherwise of the potential risk flowing from breach and its foreseeability are clearly relevant as are the measure of gravity of the breach itself and the measure of culpability .
In Inspector Graeme Mauger for the WorkCover Authority of NSW v P Ward Civil Engineering Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Industrial Court, Fisher CJ, 21 December 1995) Fisher CJ noted:
'This case is similar to that described in Hannah v Wonar Pty Ltd (1992) 34 AILR 377, where it was said that there was a known and perceived danger, unchecked and left in place. The seriousness of those errors was not open to denial and the case must be assessed on that basis.
It was further said:
The primary factor falling for consideration in relation to penalty, is the nature and circumstances of the offence. The result of the circumstances may be relevant in a very limited way, in the sense that it may illustrate the seriousness of the act or omission in the breach of statutory duty being assessed. Obviously, a breach that was quite unlikely to lead to serious consequences, might be assessed on a different basis to a breach where there was every prospect of serious consequences.
Applying these principles it has to be said that the nature and quality of the offence did involve a failure that was a serious and obvious one. The accident could be readily prevented by the abandonment of an essentially hazardous system of work…."
38 Mr Lloyd submitted that the weight of medical evidence in this matter suggests that further injury to Mr Lowe is not foreseeable and that the gravity of risk does not approach by any degree that sufficient to warrant termination of employment. Mr Lloyd submitted that on the medical evidence provided Mr Lowe was at no greater risk than any other employee.
39 Mr Lloyd submitted that the company's behaviour in its attitude towards Mr Lowe's further employment is properly categorised as over zealous and inflexible, founded on an incorrect interpretation of its obligations under the OH&S Act. Mr Lloyd submitted that there must be an appropriate balance between the company's perception of the risk to health and safety and the rights of Mr Lowe as an employee to continue in his employment.
40 Mr Lloyd supported this submission with an argument that where an employer places restrictions on an employee due to perceived risk, this should be commensurate with the level of risk and at all times reasonable in the circumstances. Mr Lloyd put that termination of employment is a restriction of last resort only available when all other means of protecting the health and safety of an employee have been exhausted. Mr Lloyd submitted that any perception of risk developed by an employer must be well grounded and genuine.
41 Mr Lloyd submitted that the medical advice available does not ground a genuine risk to Mr Lowe giving rise to a real and tangible threat of injury should he continue to perform his pre-injury duties. Mr Lloyd put that the medical evidence from all three medical practitioners, Dr Sooy, Professor Ryan and Dr Kafataris, is that Mr Lowe has recovered from the injury sustained on 6 December 2000, the only difference between them being Dr Kafataris' view of future potential risk. Mr Lloyd suggested that the first report of Dr Kafataris (att. B to ex 6) was flawed as it was based on the false premise that Mr Lowe was required to work a 10 hour shift, which is not the case.
42 Mr Lloyd submitted that if the company was concerned that a potential for injury arises from the way in which the work is required to be carried out, then that should properly be addressed by an alteration to the work arrangements and the introduction of appropriate technology such as the use of hydraulic or other lifting apparatus so as to mitigate any such risk.
43 Mr Lloyd submitted that in consideration of this alternative the resources available to an organisation of the size and capacity of George Weston Foods Pty Ltd is a relevant consideration. Mr Lloyd put that George Weston Foods Pty Ltd, owner and operator of Tip Top Bakery, is a large organisation of vast resources which ought properly undertake alternative risk alleviation in preference to termination of employment.
44 Mr Lloyd submitted that the termination of Mr Lowe's employment would be harsh, unreasonable and unjust when examined against the provisions of s88(b) of the Act which provides that the Commission may, if appropriate, take into account the reason for termination of employment, its nature and whether it has a basis in fact. Mr Lloyd submitted that the reason proffered by the company has no basis in fact as it is not supported by available medical opinion, nor proper application of the requirements of the OH&S Act.
45 Mr Lloyd further relied upon the requirement of s88(b) of the Act which goes to the opportunity provided to an applicant to make out a defence or give an explanation, submitting that proper opportunity to make out a defence or give an explanation was never afforded to Mr Lowe on the basis that the report of Dr Kafataris, upon which the company relied to support the termination of employment, was not provided to Mr Lowe until the commencement of these proceedings.
46 Mr Lloyd submitted that the termination of Mr Lowe's employment would be harsh as he would then become unemployed at a relatively advanced age in an area where employment is not readily available and with an employment background of the specialised skills of a bread vendor.
47 Mr Lloyd relied upon the decision of Peterson J in Wells v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWIRComm 157 in which his Honour discussed the concept of harshness, adopting therein the comments of McHugh and Gummow JJ in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 465 where is was said by their Honours:
"termination of employment may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity to the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted."
48 Mr Lloyd further relied upon the judgement of a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union on behalf of M S Kennedy v Cumnock No 1 Colliery Pty Ltd Print No 901496, wherein it was held that the perceived risk to Mr Kennedy (employed in the arguably more dangerous occupation of an underground coal miner) which may arise should he fail to take prescribed medication was not sufficient grounds upon which to terminate his employment.
49 Mr Lloyd further referred to the Bread Vendors (Tip Top Bakeries - Newcastle) Award 316 IG 558 ('the award') which, at clause 21, Termination of engagement, requires three months notice in writing to a bread vendor to terminate the employment. Mr Lloyd noted that whilst the company had expressed an intention to terminate Mr Lowe's employment, the required notice pursuant to cl 21 of the award has not been given.
50 Mr Lloyd further relied upon s169 of the Act which requires that the Commission must, in the exercise of its functions, take into account the principles contained in the Anti Discrimination Act 1997 (ADA). Mr Lloyd put that the ADA makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the grounds of disability, or in this case supposed disability, to treat a person less favourably than others in the same situation without the disability or the supposed disability. Mr Lloyd noted that the defence available to the employer in such circumstances is the inherent requirements of the job. Mr Lloyd argued that Mr Lowe suffers no disability, is capable of performing the inherent requirements of the job, and is to be discriminated against by being treated differently to other persons on the basis of a perceived limitation which he put is offensive to the provision of the ADA.
51 Ms Pattison submitted that it is the company's belief that as a result of Mr Lowe's injury, which she emphasised is not an injury which brings the applicant within s91 of the Act, he is unable to return to his pre-injury duties.
52 Ms Pattison submitted that termination of employment would not be harsh, unreasonable or unjust, putting that a proper reason, being the concern of the company that future injury may occur, was advanced and Mr Lowe given an opportunity to respond. Ms Pattison submitted that the communications to Mr Lowe detailed in the evidence in this matter demonstrate that he has been treated fairly.
53 Ms Pattison relied upon s8 of the OH&S Act which imposes a duty of care upon an employer to ensure the health, safety and welfare of an employee. Ms Pattison put that it is the company's belief that to allow Mr Lowe to return to work as a bread vendor would be inconsistent with that requirement. Ms Pattison noted that whilst Mr Lowe's injury is not one compensable pursuant to the WCA, s47 of that act remains a relevant consideration. S 47, Incapacity deemed to exist in certain cases, states:
A worker who, as a result of injury, is unable without substantial risk of further injury to engage in employment of a certain kind because of the nature of that employment shall be deemed to be incapacitated for employment of that kind.
54 Ms Pattison submitted that it is the company's belief that Mr Lowe does have a substantial risk of further injury. She submitted that this conclusion is supported by the period of eight weeks absence due to incapacity, exacerbated by the fact that no active treatment had been undertaken during the period of incapacitation, and the absence of any recommendation from Dr Sooy that Mr Lowe undertake physiotherapy. Ms Pattison submitted that, whilst Dr Sooy had certified Mr Lowe fit for full duties, the company remained concerned that Dr Sooy did not comprehend the nature of the duties that he had certified Mr Lowe fit to undertake, leading to the reference to Dr Kafataris and the subsequent workplace assessment detailed above.
55 Ms Pattison relied upon the reports of Dr Kafataris to support her submission that if Mr Lowe were to return to his pre-injury duties there would remain a risk of lower back pain and disk herniation. Ms Pattison noted that the workplace assessment revealed that the job of a bread vendor is quite strenuous, involving manual handling, lifting and pushing.
56 Ms Pattison relied upon the evidence of Mr Houston that there are no alternative duties or job modifications available which would alter the circumstances as perceived by the company.
57 Ms Pattison acknowledged the report from Professor Ryan stating that Mr Lowe was fit for duty, however the company remains concerned as to Professor Ryan's understanding of the tasks required and preferred the opinion of Dr Kafataris, whom she put had a detailed understanding of the tasks and functions of a bread vendor.
58 Ms Pattison canvassed the evidence of communications between the company and Mr Lowe and his union representatives, submitting that there was no flaw in the communications and accordingly no difficulty when the events and reason for termination were considered against the requirements of s88(b) of the Act.
59 Ms Pattison submitted that Mr Lowe had been given a "fair go" by the company, however had failed to reciprocate having regard to his reluctance to participate in the workplace assessment, only doing so after proceedings before Bishop C; the filing of a workers compensation claim for an injury which did not occur during the course of his duties; and adopting a volatile disposition during several telephone conversations with company representatives.
60 Ms Pattison submitted that this conduct demonstrates a general unwillingness and lack of cooperation, and should be seen to be in breach of s12 of the OH&S Act which required the employee to cooperate with the employer. Ms Pattison put that these events further demonstrate a breakdown in the employment relationship which renders continuing employment impractical.
61 Ms Pattison submitted that as a bread vendor Mr Lowe is required to work unsupervised and is the company's point of contact with customers, requiring a particular level of trust and confidence, which she submitted has been shattered by the lack of cooperation on the part of Mr Lowe and the filing of his workers compensation claim.
62 Ms Pattison submitted that the matter should not descend to a contest as to which medical advice is to be preferred, putting that this is an issue the company declined to adopt, preferring in her submission, the proper course of setting out the advice of Dr Kafataris, the reasons it was followed, and the belief that the conclusion to terminate Mr Lowe's employment was not harsh, unreasonable or unjust.
63 Ms Pattison submitted that the report of Dr Kafataris could not be regarded as flawed on the basis that it states the length of shift worked by Mr Lowe as 10 hours, as compared to the evidence of Mr Lowe that the shift is approximately five hours. Ms Pattison submitted that Mr Lowe must be the source of any flaw in that report as the information provided to Dr Kafataris came from him via the workplace assessment process. Ms Pattison submitted that whether the required deliveries in any one shift were completed in five hours or 10 hours depended entirely upon the speed at which Mr Lowe performed his duties, putting that the risk of injury increased as the speed at which Mr Lowe chose to work increased.
64 Ms Pattison submitted that the company came to the conclusion that given the nature of the bread vendor's duties and the significant risk outlined by Dr Kafataris, Mr Lowe could not be allowed to return to work as these risks cannot be managed nor the duties modified. Ms Pattison submitted that Mr Lowe's desire to return to work does not automatically equate to a capacity to perform that work.
65 Ms Pattison submitted that termination of employment would not be harsh and relied upon the definition of "harsh" found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as "cruel and unfeeling" to support this contention. Ms Pattison submitted that it would be cruel and unfeeling, and accordingly harsh, to allow Mr Lowe to return to his pre-injury duties and expose him to significant risk of further impairment as detailed in the report of Dr Kafataris.
66 Ms Pattison distinguished the present circumstances from Kennedy in which Mr Kennedy was suffering a major depressive illness capable of treatment by medication, the risk being that Mr Kennedy would fail to take his medication which Ms Pattison put did not go to the inherent nature of the work as does a back injury, which is the case here, when considered against the duties of a bread vendor.
67 Ms Pattison submitted that the circumstances faced by the company were difficult and distasteful, brought about by the competing requirements of the OH&S Act to ensure the health, safety and welfare of the employee, and the right to continue employment. Ms Pattison submitted that on balance the company is unable to ignore the assessment of significant risk made by Dr Kafataris and that to allow Mr Lowe to return to pre-injury duties in those circumstances would be a disservice to him and expose the company to accusations of negligence.
68 Ms Pattison submitted that Mr Lowe's capacity as a union delegate and his refusal to move from his vendor's role are not elements of consideration in this matter, which has been pursued purely on the basis of obligation to health and safety.
69 Ms Pattison submitted that the entire process has been expensive and difficult for the company, made more so by the lack of cooperation by Mr Lowe resulting in a period of 10 months since he has carried out work of a bread vendor, which she put further reduced his capacity to return to that employment as he is by now deconditioned to this type of work.
70 In supplementary written submissions received on 21 September 2001, Ms Pattison relied upon an attached report from Dr Kafataris of 20 September 2001 which analyses the opinions of Professor Ryan, previously put in evidence. Ms Pattison submits that the report of Professor Ryan dated 14 August 2001 (ex 1) lacks sufficient specificity to be relied upon and that this report of Professor Ryan reads more in the nature of an advocate than a professional witness and the value of his opinion is thus diminished.
71 Ms Pattison refers to a decision of Maidment J in Betty Bouchub Silaphet v South Western Area Health Service [1998] NSWIRComm 122.
72 Ms Pattison relies upon the comments of Dr Kafataris that the work of cottage renovation could not be considered comparable to that of a bread vendor as in the former tasks Mr Lowe could work at his own pace, whilst engaged as a bread vendor the work must be completed within time constraints. Dr Kafataris disputes the view of Professor Ryan that the work of a bread vendor may be considered "light duties" and, while conceding cottage renovation may indeed be relatively heavy work, it is in his opinion different and the capacity for tolerance different, noting that "if vendor duties were indeed quite light, then it is unlikely that there would have been several cases of significant spinal injury with these duties in the past".
73 In the report of 20 September 2001 Dr Kafataris offers the following opinion:
OPINION
While I take Professor Ryan's comments and opinion, and agree that he currently has no symptoms referrable to his spine, I have not seen any evidence that alter my previous opinion particularly with respect to his prognosis.