Ground three: the defence under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code
41 The primary judge considered the reasonableness of the Master's actual mistaken belief as to the fact that the "red line" shown on the GPS represented the location of the AFZ border and that by positioning the Mitra north of that line it would be outside the AFZ. His Honour considered the authorities in the context of s 9.2 of the Criminal Code and set out at [106] four propositions with which the Authority does not take issue. They are that the word "reasonable" in s 9.2:
(a) does not involve the hypothetical ordinary or reasonable person test;
(b) requires that the belief be that of the accused;
(c) requires the accused's belief to be objectively reasonable, ie. rational, based on reason, or capable of sustaining belief; and
(d) requires the objective reasonableness of the accused's belief to be assessed by reference to the subjective circumstances in which the accused was placed, including the accused's personal attributes and the information available to him or her at the time.
42 The relevant ground in the notice of appeal is in the following terms:
His Honour erred in considering whether the defence under section 9.2 of the Criminal Code was available to the Master in asking whether it was reasonable for the Master to proceed on his mistaken belief, and not whether the Master's belief was reasonable.
43 That is, the Authority contends that the primary judge asked himself the wrong question.
44 As the primary judge observed, propositions (c) and (d) needed to be addressed. His Honour, at [107], considered the issue to be the rationality of the Master's mistaken belief, by reference to his personal attributes and the information available to him at the time. At [109], his Honour rejected the Authority's submission that the circumstances reasonably required the Master to make inquiries that would have revealed his mistake, as that introduced into the assessment a consideration of the information that a reasonable person would have obtained by inquiry, rather than the information that the Master had actually obtained or had available to him at the time he formed his belief. His Honour considered that 'such a requirement would be likely to render nugatory the defence of mistake of fact under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code because the reasonable person's inquiries are, of necessity, almost always likely to reveal the mistake'. The Authority does not contend on appeal that that was an erroneous approach.
45 The primary judge then considered the two questions raised by the Authority's submissions, which, in his view, were relevant:
1. Was there any information (available to the Master) that should have alerted him to his mistake?
2. Did the Master fail to have regard to any information that would have revealed his mistake?
46 As to the first question, the primary judge took into account the Master's personal attributes and the information available to him. He considered the matters on which the Authority relied:
· The Master should have realised that the "red line", as a straight line, did not reflect the border between Australian and Indonesian waters.
· Cross-hatching on the GPS screen indicated that the "red line" was the border of the GPS chart and not the AFZ borderline.
· Other charts within the GPS showed red lines.
· Cross-hatching on the GPS chart is also present on the "north of the 50 nautical mile" view and the "20 nautical mile" view for the GPS charts covering other geographical areas.
47 His Honour rejected, for the detailed reasons that he gave, each of these factors as information that the Master must have actually considered at or before the time he formed his mistaken belief which should reasonably have alerted him to his mistake such that his mistaken belief was not rational or capable of being sustained.
48 At [122], the primary judge rephrased the second question: did the Master unreasonably fail to have regard to any information that was available to him at the time, which would have revealed his mistake, so that his mistaken belief was not rational or capable of sustaining belief? The two items of information relied on by the Authority were:
1. the charts present on the Mitra showing the AFZ borderline in the area where the Mitra was boarded; and
2. the availability of other Taiwanese fishing vessels by radio contact.
49 His Honour's view, as explained in some detail at [123]-[126], was that there was nothing in the circumstances that reasonably required the Master to have regard to those items of information or, specifically, to have cross-checked his GPS with a paper chart or by radio inquiry (at [124] and [126]).
50 The primary judge's ultimate conclusion, expressed at [128], was that it was reasonable for the Master to proceed as he did in all the circumstances on the mistaken belief that the "red line" was the AFZ borderline. The primary judge does couch his discussion in [122] to [127] in terms of the reasonableness of the Master's actions but his Honour is there dealing with the Authority's contentions that the Master should have done something more to test his belief. It does not affect the correctness of the starting point of his Honour's reasoning on this aspect, at [122], that the Master's actual mistaken belief was required to be reasonable in the requisite sense.
51 For those reasons, the primary judge properly identified the correct question to be addressed namely whether, in the particular circumstances, the belief of the Master that the Mitra was outside the AFZ was objectively a reasonable belief. His Honour did not ask or answer the wrong question in his consideration of the availability of the defence under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code.
52 His Honour concluded that, apart from his reading of the GPS, there was no other information which should have been considered by the Master and which would have shown that his belief was mistaken. He then concluded at [123] that it was reasonable that the Master relied on what he had been told by the Taiwanese supplier of the GPS unit. He said that the Authority did not really suggest otherwise. There was no submission that his Honour was wrong about that. Then his Honour rejected the contention of the Authority that the belief was not a reasonable one because the Master could have (but did not) cross check the GPS with a paper chart or by radio inquiry with another vessel. On that contention of the Authority, his Honour was also not satisfied that any such inquiries by the Master would have exposed to him that the Mitra was in the AFZ. Those steps in reasoning indicate that the correct question under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code was asked, and answered, including by addressing the particular matters put by the Authority in submissions on that question.
53 The Authority drew attention to the concluding remarks of the primary judge in his reasons at [128] to [130] concerning the reasonableness of the Master's actions. His Honour said that it was reasonable for the Master to proceed as he did in all the circumstances on the mistaken belief that the "red line" was the AFZ borderline, and said there were two factors which led him to that conclusion. The first was that, because the Mitra was not at the time being used for commercial fishing but merely drifting on the tide while the engineers were fixing its engine, the conduct was "objectively innocent" and there was no sensible reason why the Mitra might knowingly be in the AFZ in those circumstances. The second was that the conduct being "innocent", that is not deliberate, it is not an affront to the purposes of the Fisheries Act that the owners of the Mitra should be excused from criminal responsibility in the circumstances.
54 Were those remarks to have been part of the primary judge's reasoning leading to his conclusion that the defence under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code was available, the contention of the Authority that the primary judge took irrelevant considerations into account may have had merit. Those remarks, if not seen in their context, might be taken to indicate that the primary judge had asked the wrong question by focusing on whether the Master's conduct was reasonable rather than upon whether his mistaken belief was reasonable.
55 It is not necessary to read them that way, nor is such a reading consistent with the structure of the primary judge's reasons. The absence of any apparent reason why the Master may have allowed the vessel to drift into the AFZ, so exposing it to forfeiture, may well be a consideration relevant to whether his evidence was to be believed. It is inherently improbable that he would intentionally do so. Such an outcome would legitimately attract the proposition that such circumstances would not "affront" the purposes of the Fisheries Act. That is what s 9.2 of the Criminal Code provides.
56 However, we do not need to determine precisely what those final paragraphs of the reasons convey. They clearly do not comprise the critical part of his Honour's reasoning. The earlier section of the reasons addresses and resolves the availability of the defence under s 9.2 of the Criminal Code.