The nature and extent of the breach: s 294(a)
27 By the liability judgment at [169] and [170], it was found that the AGL Entities had:
(1) committed 3,531 contraventions of r 31(1) of the Retail Rules;
(2) committed 3,531 contraventions of r 31(2) of the Retail Rules;
(3) committed 9,094 contraventions of r 31(3) of the Retail Rules; and
(4) contravened s 273(1) of the Retail Law.
28 Each of the 483 Affected Customers had contracted with one or more of the AGL Entities for the provision of electricity or gas. Each of the Affected Customers was also a recipient of welfare payments provided through Services Australia and had authorised deductions to be made directly to the AGL Entities from their welfare payments to pay their electricity and/or gas bills through the Centrepay system facilitated by Services Australia: LJ [24]-[26].
29 The AGL Entities' use of the Centrepay system was governed by an agreement with Services Australia: LJ [3]-[4]. Among other things, that agreement:
(1) forbade the AGL Entities from collecting deductions from a person who was no longer an ongoing customer: LJ [35(4)];
(2) required the AGL Entities to cancel deductions within three business days if a customer ceased to receive the relevant electricity or gas service to which it related, and did not require AGL to obtain the customer's consent to do so: LJ [35(3)]; and
(3) required the AGL Entities to take reasonable care and, later, to have processes to avoid receiving deductions exceeding what they should have received, and from 10 December 2018, the AGL Entities represented and warranted that they had adequate arrangements, processes, documentation and systems in place to support their agreements with customers and participation in Centrepay: LJ [35(5)] and [35(6)].
30 The AGL Entities' use of the Centrepay system was managed through a set of online services. One of those online services delivered computer-readable deduction payment reports to the AGL Entities, the purpose of which was to allow the AGL Entities to reconcile the payments made by Services Australia into their bank accounts with the particular customer details to which the payments related. Deduction payment reports were provided each business day on which a deduction was made through the Centrepay arrangement: LJ [43]-[46].
31 The AGL Entities had developed their own script and batch processing program to automatically process deduction payment reports by identifying the relevant customer account in their own computer systems and recording the payment against that account: LJ [51]. Through these means, the AGL Entities accessed deduction payment reports from Services Australia and updated Affected Customer accounts in its own system accordingly each evening: LJ [49]. The AGL Entities intentionally designed its computer systems such that payments would be posted to a customer account even if it was inactive and in credit or with a zero balance: LJ [52]. Irrespective of the awareness of the obligations imposed by r 31, AGL should have ensured that the payments were returned to customers promptly, as Ms Egan accepted. Mr Waterson agreed that it was a "suboptimal process" and that the funds "should have been with the customer".
32 During the relevant period (which was more than four years in length), each of the Affected Customers ceased to obtain electricity or gas from one of the AGL Entities. However, the relevant AGL Entity did not cancel their deduction from the Centrepay system as required by their agreement with Services Australia: LJ [28]. By operation of the computerised arrangements put in place by the AGL Entities, the AGL Entities continued to receive and process deductions from these customers' welfare payments even though they were no longer being supplied the relevant electricity or gas and even after all their bills from the AGL Entities had been fully paid: LJ [29].
33 For the purposes of r 31 of the Retail Rules, the AGL Entities "became aware" of improper deductions in relation to a former customer when they applied a deduction recorded in a deduction payment report to the account of a customer whose account had been closed or become inactive and who did not owe any money for the electricity or gas they had consumed: LJ [31], [162].
34 This same issue had previously come to the attention of the AGL Entities on 14 June 2013, when Services Australia informed them that deductions had been made by AGL Sales Pty Ltd in relation to former customers. Services Australia indicated that it regarded this as a serious non-compliance which needed to be remedied and prevented in future: LJ [60]. From August 2013, the AGL Entities implemented a "short-term manual reporting solution" to identify Centrepay customers whose accounts had become inactive, had been issued a final bill and had a zero or credit balance: LJ [62]-[63]. On 25 October 2013, the AGL Entities told Services Australia that they had made changes to enable AGL to ensure future compliance: LJ [61]. However, the manual reporting process ceased in January 2016 for reasons which were not explained: LJ [65]. This is wholly unsatisfactory in light of my finding that AGL's SAP system could readily identify the facts relating to each overcharge to a person who was employed within the payments team of AGL: LJ [159].
35 At the relief hearing, Ms Egan agreed that AGL is not able to provide an explanation. She expressed the view that the processes were not "embedded in [AGL's] systems" or "formalised enough", and agreed that AGL's compliance function had failed to detect that suitable processes were not being used between January 2016 and the end of 2020. Notwithstanding these concessions, Ms Egan baulked at the self-evident proposition that this indicated weaknesses within AGL's compliance and government structure.
36 In October 2019, as part of a broader program of remediating customers with high credit balances, the AGL Entities identified that Centrepay customers were among that cohort: LJ [68]. In these proceedings, the AGL Entities conceded that they became aware (for the purposes of the Retail Rules) of the contravening conduct in respect of a class of Affected Customers by 14 May 2020.
37 In an internal document dated 8 December 2020, Ms Egan's predecessor (Ms Corbett) was identified as the "responsible officer" and Mr Waterson as the "issue owner". That document stated the following:
As part of a program of work commissioned earlier this year to remediate excessive customer credit balances, AGL identified overpayments on 1,855 customer accounts, which included credits on Centrelink payments from Services Australia totalling $765,000.
AGL engaged Services Australia to return the residual credits which culminated in receiving the Remedy Notices in December 2020 to remediate AGL's underlying processes in managing overpayments. The notices have been issued to AGL Retail Energy Ltd, AGL Sales Pty Ltd, AGL South Australia Pty Ltd and Powerdirect Pty Ltd.
To address the issue, AGL has implemented system fixes to cancel Services Australia's deductions upon move-out and developed new processes to refund/reduce customer payments where appropriate. The remediation for the 1,855 customers is expected to be completed by February 2021. The completion dates for the remaining requirements are currently in discussion with Services Australia to ensure full compliance going forward.
A similar breach occurred in 2013 for failing to comply with obligations regarding overpayments and for failing to cancel customer's Centrepay deductions when customers ceased to be an ongoing customer.
38 Notwithstanding these matters, the first customer was only remediated on 7 September 2020 and the last customer was remediated on 31 July 2022, nearly two years later. Some customers were no longer alive. No customer was paid any interest, or offered an explanation or an apology for what had occurred. To the contrary, a template of a sample letter which was sent to customers appeared to blame them for what had occurred, stating that "[w]e noticed that after you left us, you didn't update your Centrepay arrangement". Ms Egan accepted that she thought that the decision not to pay interest on the overcharged amounts was the "wrong decision": T21.14.
39 Although AGL states that it accepts that its conduct was serious, it also seeks to downplay it. It submits that the contravening conduct was "not large scale". It submits that the Affected Customers comprised approximately 1% of the total number of AGL's customers that were using Centrepay during the relevant period, that AGL generally processes payments associated with approximately 25 million bills issued each year and that the total amount overcharged was approximately $468,000, which equates to around $37 for each instance of overcharging.
40 This is, however, looking at things in the wrong way. The correct perspective is that of each customer, who did not receive the benefit of his or her full welfare entitlements. This is considered in more detail below.
41 Further, the contraventions by AGL occurred over a prolonged period of more than four years, during which time AGL contravened the relevant law over 16,000 times. AGL's conduct had a direct and negative impact on 483 people who were individuals in receipt of welfare payments and therefore among the more economically and socially vulnerable of AGL's customers. Such conduct was, on any view, "large scale". It was very serious and it cannot be brushed aside because these customers constitute a small fraction of AGL's total customer base or because, if one massages the numbers a certain way, they appear to be small in comparison to AGL's total billings. For example, another way of looking at it is that, on average, each customer was deprived of nearly $1,000.
42 Further, Mr Waterson's evidence was that over 40,000 customers, each of them welfare recipients, were using the Centrepay arrangement during each financial year within the relevant period, and each of these customers' Centrepay deductions were processed using the same computer processing system. Thus, each of these customers was, in effect, exposed to the risk of overcharging as a consequence of AGL's deliberately designed system, and would likely have been caused actual harm in the form of an overcharge in the event that they had decided to leave AGL and render their accounts inactive. The fact that such a large number of customers was exposed to the risk of harm increases the seriousness with which AGL's conduct must be viewed: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Westpac Securities Administration Limited (2021) 156 ACSR 614; [2021] FCA 1008 at [66] (O'Bryan J).
43 For these reasons, I consider that the nature and extent of the contraventions weigh strongly in favour of a substantial penalty.