Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd
[1999] FCA 1161
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
1999-08-26
Before
Lindgren J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (19 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (No 2) INTRODUCTION 1 I heard these two proceedings together, having ordered that the evidence in one be evidence in the other, subject to all proper exceptions. The proceedings arise out of the marketing of an "ion mat" ("the Mat") by the first respondent ("GW"). The Mat is a mat or mattress on which one lies when it is connected to a source of electricity. 2 The applicant ("the ACCC") alleges that in promoting the Mat, GW made misrepresentations in contravention of ss 52 and 53(c) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TP Act"). The misrepresentations can be broadly described as being to the effect that as a result of its emission of negative ions, the Mat benefits the health of persons who sleep on it. I will call this part of the ACCC's case the "misleading or deceptive conduct" part. 3 The ACCC further alleges that in connection with the promotion and sale of the Mat, GW engaged in a practice of "referral selling" in contravention of s 57 of the TP Act, and promoted a scheme involving membership of a "Giraffe Club" ("GC") and of a "Grow Rich System" ("GRS") which constituted a "pyramid selling" scheme ("the Scheme"), in contravention of s 61 of that Act. 4 The second respondent ("Mr Misuma") founded GW and was at all material times a director of GW. He also appears to have been its "Chairman". GW and Mr Misuma were represented by the same solicitors and counsel. 5 The third respondent ("Mr Han") was a shareholder in GW and, until November 1998, its President and Chief Executive Officer. Initially, the solicitors and counsel for GW and Mr Misuma also represented Mr Han. However, on the first day of the hearing, I was informed that the solicitors had had no contact with him for a considerable period of time and had been unsuccessful in attempts to take instructions from him. They foreshadowed that they would cease to represent him. There was evidence that Mr Han knew of the dates on which the hearing was to take place. On the third day of the hearing, I granted the solicitors leave to file and serve a notice of change of solicitor in respect of Mr Han. Accordingly, the solicitors and counsel afterwards represented only GW and Mr Misuma. 6 The fourth respondent ("Mr Scotte") and the sixth respondent ("Ms Orr") gave "presentations" to persons who were potential buyers of the Mat and were participants in the Scheme. They appeared in person. 7 Pursuant to leave, the ACCC discontinued against the fifth, seventh and eighth respondents. 8 Mr Scotte and Ms Orr adopted the submissions made by counsel for GW and Mr Misuma. As well, they made submissions of their own. For convenience, I shall use the expression, "the respondents", to refer to GW, Mr Misuma, Mr Scotte and Ms Orr, and, in the context of submissions, the abbreviation "GW" to refer to the chief protagonist and to include a reference to Mr Misuma. 9 In the second proceeding, GW sues the ACCC for damages for defamation. The background to the defamation proceeding is found in certain events associated with the ACCC's proceeding. In the ACCC's proceeding, on 6 May 1998 I granted the ACCC ex parte interlocutory injunctions restraining GW in certain respects in the carrying on of its business and by way of an asset preservation order. The next day, 7 May 1998, the ACCC published a media release reporting on that interlocutory proceeding. GW alleges that the media release carried imputations defamatory of it. On 8 and 11 May 1998, GW obtained variations of the orders of 6 May. It alleges that notwithstanding this, as of 13 May, the ACCC was still distributing and publishing the original media release. GW further alleges that in mid-May 1998, in a telephone conversation between Geoffrey Williams of the ACCC and Malcolm Finger of the New South Wales Department of Fair Trading, the ACCC published certain matters of and concerning GW, and that the Department, in its electronic mail and in communications with members of the public, republished those matters, which carried imputations defamatory of GW. 10 I find it convenient to postpone further discussion of the defamation proceeding until I have dealt with the ACCC's proceeding. 11 In relation to the misleading or deceptive conduct part of the case, the ACCC adduced expert evidence directed to establishing that the Mat did not emit negative ions and did not have the therapeutic effects represented. It also led evidence from a small number of persons who bought the Mat and joined the GC and the GRS and who claimed that the Mat did not benefit their health as represented. GW, on the other hand, has led evidence from some sixty "satisfied customers". Each of these users of the Mat has testified to its beneficial effects. More accurately, each has described relevant aspects of his or her health, before and after using the Mat, the latter being an improvement on the former. The ACCC submits that I should treat all that evidence as illustrative of "the Placebo effect" or "autosuggestion". 12 The time set aside for the hearing proved to be inadequate to allow for the making of submissions. Accordingly, directions were given for the filing and service of written outlines of submissions to be followed by brief oral elaboration on a date to be fixed. The ACCC provided its outline. GW provided an outline in relation to the referral selling and pyramid selling parts of the case. Prior to the furnishing of an outline in relation to the misleading or deceptive conduct part, however, GW appointed Steven John Sherman as administrator of the company and the solicitor for Mr Misuma (who had also appeared for GW down to the time of the appointment of the administrator) informed me that he had been instructed to incur no further costs, and sought leave for himself and counsel briefed by him to be excused from further attendance. I granted that leave. The administrator gave his written consent to the continuation of proceeding NG 421 of 1998, against GW for the purposes of s 440D(1)(a) of the Corporations Law, but indicated that he wished to play no further role in either proceeding. In the result, in relation to the misleading or deceptive conduct part of the case and the defamation proceeding, I have had the assistance of submissions from the ACCC alone. OUTLINE OF PLEADING AND FACTS IN RELATION TO REFERRAL SELLING AND PYRAMID SELLING 13 There is little, if any, dispute about the facts relevant to the allegations of referral selling and pyramid selling. The respondents submit that as a matter of law the facts do not fall within the statutory prohibitions. It is convenient to note at once that all of the relevant conduct of GW, a trading corporation, took place in trade or commerce. 14 GW conducted "Happiness Circle" meetings (sometimes referred to simply as "Happiness Circles" or "HC's" within GW, - I will speak of "HC meetings"). At these meetings the health benefits of the Mat were extolled in on-stage "presentations" to prospective buyers in an audience. It was by being invited to attend and attending a HC meeting that a person was introduced to GW, the Mat, the GC and the GRS. Those attending were told that upon paying $2,900 for the Mat, $50 as a "membership application fee" and $300 as a "membership fee", they could become members of the GC. To become a member of the GC they had to sign an application form and their application had to be accepted by GW. It was possible to buy the Mat without joining the GC, but this possibility was not emphasised if it was ever volunteered at all. Persons in the audience were also told that if they joined the GC they were eligible to apply to join the GRS. In order to join the GRS, they had to sign a separate form of application for membership and be accepted by GW. It was also made clear that pre-conditions of their admission to membership of the GRS were that a person had to attend a "Business School" (often referred to within GW as "BS"), attend a two-day "Management Consultant Class" (often referred to within GW as "MCC") and "pass an interview". (Mr Paul Hsu, the Chief Executive Officer of GW, deposed that in practice, attendance at the Management Consultant Class was a precondition, not of membership of the GRS, but of advancement from the rank of "Giraffe Member" to "Giraffe Leader" (see below), however nothing turns on the matter). Membership of the GC gave the right to attend the Business School and the Management Consultant Class as well as to be interviewed with a view to acceptance as a member of the GRS. No additional money beyond the $3,250, necessarily paid in order to attain membership of the GC, was payable for membership of the GRS. Importantly, however, it was membership of the GRS that was the key to entitlement to earn "commissions" (I need not distinguish between "commissions" and "bonuses" and will refer only to "commissions") in the manner referred to below. 15 I need not describe every aspect of the GRS, and, therefore, of the Scheme of which the GRS was the most important part. It suffices that I give an outline at this stage. A member of the GRS was entitled to be paid commission by GW for successfully "introducing" newcomers. The evidence is not clear as to what the notion of "introduction" meant. Ultimately, nothing turns on the point, and I will assume in favour of GW and as it contends, that the commission earning event was the introduction of someone who bought a Mat, whether or not that person also joined the GC or the GRS or both. 16 The commissions earned were calculated according to a formula based on "Business Volume" measured by dollar amount. Each successful introduction had a Business Value of $2,500. There is ample evidence, and it is not and could not be disputed, that an introduction of a person who bought the Mat, joined the GC and joined the GRS, and therefore paid out $3,250, generated a Business Volume of $2,500. There is also some evidence that an introduction of a person who only bought the Mat also did so. But all the promotional activity by and on behalf of GW strongly emphasised the desirability of "going all the way" by joining the GC and the GRS, and does not seem to have drawn attention at all to the possibility of buying the Mat alone. Nonetheless, as stated above, I proceed on the assumption that the introduction of a person who bought the Mat alone generated a Business Volume of $2,500 and that if the person also joined one or both of the GC or the GRS, this did not give rise to the crediting of additional Business Volume beyond the sum of $2,500. Thus, member A of the GRS would earn a direct commission for introducing another person (B) to buy the Mat, and if B became a member of the GRS, A would earn indirect commissions as B introduced others to buy the Mat. 17 In addition to being entitled to be paid commissions by GW in respect of purchases of the Mat by individuals introduced by him or her, a member of the GRS was also entitled to be paid further commissions by GW as his or her "downline agents" introduced further persons. But a downline agent was necessarily himself or herself also a commission earner, that is, a member of the GRS. In sum, a successful introduction generated the earning of commissions only for members of the GRS and it was in the interests of the immediate introducer as well as his or her "uplines", that an "introducee" should not only buy the Mat, but also join the GC and the GRS. 18 Both in the GW literature and in oral statements, references were made to the earning of commissions by "introducing". It is clear that in many instances this non-specific term was being used to refer to the introduction of a person to buy the Mat and to join the GC and the GRS. And it must be remembered that membership of the GRS predicated a purchase of a Mat and membership of the GC. Accordingly, to speak of paying $3,250 to join the GRS was to speak of paying that sum to buy the Mat, join the GC and join the GRS. 19 There were eight classes of membership of the GRS. They were ranged in ascending order beginning with "Giraffe Member" or "GM". As with so much of GW's business, acronyms were used to denote the various classes of membership. The higher one's category of membership, the more "downline" agents one had and the more indirect commissions one could earn. The progression of memberships was as follows: Giraffe Member (GM) Giraffe Leader (GL) Giraffe Retail Assistant (GRA) Giraffe Retail Manager (GRM) GRM 3 Star GRM 5 Star GRM 7 Star GRM Super Star 20 The system was pyramidal: each member of any particular class had more than one member of the class immediately below as a downline, that is, more than one "downline", with GM at the base. A member's progress upwards depended on the "Business Volume" credited to the member, that is, on the number of successful introductions made by the member or, more significantly, by his or her downline agents. For each successful introduction, the direct introducer was credited with a Business Volume of $2,500, while each upline agent of the introducer was credited with an amount determined by reference to his or her position in the pyramid in relation to the introducer. It was in a member's financial interests that his or her downlines should introduce new members. 21 A person was able to buy the Mat for $2,900 without becoming a member of either the GC or the GRS, although, as noted earlier, it is clear to me that this possibility was not emphasised. Apparently, as at 3 April 1999, 330 persons had bought the Mat alone. Obviously it was not in the interests of uplines or even the longer term interests of the immediate introducer that a newcomer should merely buy the Mat and not join the GC or the GRS. 22 Similarly, a person could pay the sum of $3,250 for the Mat and membership of the GC without joining the GRS. No doubt this might happen because the GC member did not apply to join the GRS or did not attend the Business School or the Management Consultant Class or attend or pass the interview. Apparently, as at 3 April 1999, 1,196 persons had bought a Mat and become members of the GC, but had not become members of the GRS. As indicated above, however, a person who did not join the GRS was not entitled to earn commissions. And if such a person introduced others, he or she would not generate indirect commissions for members of the GRS. Again, it was in the interests of the immediate introducer and of his or her upline agents that the introducee should join the GC and the GRS as well as buy the Mat. 23 Apparently as at 3 April 1999, 4,656 persons had bought the Mat, joined the GC and joined the GRS. Apparently of those 4,656 persons, 3,238 had each applied to join the GC and the GRS on the same date, while the remaining 1,418 had each applied to join them on different dates. 24 Against the above background it is convenient now to note the relevant provisions of the TP Act. THE STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS 25 The ACCC relies on ss 51A, 52, 53(c), 57 and 61 of the TP Act which provide, relevantly, as follows (emphasis supplied): "51A (1) For the purposes of this Division, where a corporation makes a representation with respect to any future matter (including the doing of, or the refusing to do, any act) and the corporation does not have reasonable grounds for making the representation, the representation shall be taken to be misleading. (2) For the purposes of the application of subsection (1) in relation to a proceeding concerning a representation made by a corporation with respect to any future matter, the corporation shall, unless it adduces evidence to the contrary, be deemed not to have had reasonable grounds for making the representation. (3) ................................................................................................................. 52. (1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. (2) Nothing in the succeeding provisions of the Division shall be taken as limiting by implication the generality of subsection (1). 53. A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in connexion with the supply or possible supply of goods ... or in connexion with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods ... : (a) ... (aa) ... (b) ... (bb) ... (c) represent that goods ... have ... approval performance characteristics, ... uses or benefits they do not have; ..." 57. A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, induce a consumer to acquire goods or services by representing that the consumer will, after the contract for the acquisition of the goods or services is made, receive a rebate, commission or other benefit in return for giving the corporation the names of prospective customers or otherwise assisting the corporation to supply goods or services to other consumers, if receipt of the rebate, commission or other benefit is contingent on an event occurring after that contract is made." 61 (1) A corporation contravenes this section if: (a) the corporation is the promoter of, or (if there are more than one) one of the promoters of, or is a participant in, a trading scheme to which this section applies; and (b) a person who is a participant in that trading scheme, or has applied or been invited to become a participant in that trading scheme, makes any payment to or for the benefit of the corporation, being a payment that he or she is induced to make by reason that the prospect is held out to him or her of receiving payments or other benefits in respect of the introduction (whether by himself or herself or by another person) of other persons who become participants in that trading scheme. (2) A corporation also contravenes this section if: (a) the corporation is the promoter of, or (if there are more than one) one of the promoters of, is a participant in, or is otherwise acting in accordance with, a trading scheme to which this section applies; and (b) the corporation, by holding out to any person the prospect of receiving payments or other benefits in respect of the introduction (whether by himself or herself or by another person) of other persons who become participants in that trading scheme, attempts to induce that person: (i) if he or she is already a participant in that trading scheme, to make any payment to or for the benefit of the promoter or any of the promoters or to or for the benefit of a participant in that trading scheme; or (ii) if he or she is not already a participant in that trading scheme, to become such a participant and to make a payment of a kind mentioned in subparagraph (i). (2A) A corporation also contravenes this section if the corporation promotes, or takes part in the promotion of, a scheme under which: (a) a payment is to be made by a person who participates, or who has applied or been invited to participate, in the scheme to or for the benefit of the corporation or another person who takes part in the promotion of the scheme or to or for the benefit of another person who participates in the scheme; and (b) the inducement for making the payment is the holding out to the person who makes or is to make the payment the prospect of receiving payments from other persons who may participate in the scheme. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), (2) or (2A); (a) a prospect of a kind mentioned in that subsection shall be taken to be held out to a person whether it is held out so as to confer on him or her a legally enforceable right or not; (b) in determining whether an inducement or attempt to induce is made by holding out a prospect of a kind mentioned in that subsection, it is sufficient if a prospect of that kind constitutes or would constitute a substantial part of the inducement; and (c) ... (4) For the purposes of this section, a scheme is a trading scheme to which this section applies if the scheme includes the following elements: (a) Goods or services, or both, are to be provided by the person promoting the scheme (in this section referred to as the "promoter") ...; and (b) the goods or services so provided are to be supplied to or for other persons under transactions arranged or effected by persons who participate in the scheme (each of whom is in this section referred to as a 'participant'), being persons not all of whom are promoters. (5) .............................................................................................................. " THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF s 57 (REFERRAL SELLING) 26 With respect, I have some difficulty in understanding GW's submission in relation to the construction of s 57. I accept that under s 57 it is necessary to consider in the case of each consumer whether, by making a representation of the kind described in the section, GW in fact induced that consumer to acquire goods or services. But the respondents submit that in the present case, at least typically, the commission was earned at the very time when the relevant contract was entered into, rather than later as contemplated by s 57. According to the submission, the "relevant contract" for the purposes of s 57 is that by which the person introduced buys a Mat. The respondents submit that at the time when that contract is entered into, there is no commission or other benefit yet to be earned contingently on the occurrence of a subsequent event. 27 In amplification, GW submits that there are three contracts to be considered: first, a contract by which A becomes a member of the GC; second, a contract by which A becomes a member of the GRS; and third, a contract which is entered into between A and GW each time A sells a Mat to a consumer (who may or may not at the time of the purchase apply for membership of the GC or of the GRS). Counsel submits that in the concluding words of s 57, " ... if receipt of the ... commission or other benefit is contingent on an event occurring after that contract is made", the words "that contract" refer to the third of these contracts. He says that the words "that contract" should be construed as referring to the third contract because: "1. In terms of wording proximity, the closest referent contract is the contract under which the commission must arise. 2. If the intent were that 'that contract' mean the 'Contract for the acquisition of goods or services' (used earlier in the section), it would have been more usual or natural to expect the same formulation of words to be repeated." Counsel further submits that the result for which he contends is in accordance with "expectations of commercial reality", since sales commissions are paid for selling, not for supplying the names of prospective customers, which may prove to be of no value. Counsel's submission continues: "Thus, the suggested interpretation would not proscribe the offering of payment for mere provision of lists of 'prospective' customers, whether such lists were supplied before or after the consumer makes the original contract or acquisition of the goods. What would be proscribed is the situation where the corporation offers a commission which becomes payable upon any sale made to one of the names of prospective customers which name had been previously provided." 28 I do not accept GW's submission. In my view the expression "that contract" refers to the contract by which the consumer acquires goods or services. 29 For the purposes of the TP Act, a person is a consumer in relation to the acquisition of particular goods or services in the circumstances described in s 4B(1) of that Act. I need not set out the provision. It is not, and could not be, disputed that persons who acquired the Mat and the rights conferred by membership of the GC and the GRS did so as "consumers" for the purposes of the TP Act. (Later I will explain that the membership of each of the GC and the GRS involved the provision of "services" by GW to members.) The cash price for the Mat was $2,900, and $300 was payable as a GC "membership fee" and $50 as a "membership application fee". (Some GW documents referred to the total sum of $3,250 as a "membership fee", even in contexts in which the sum of $300 is also referred to as the membership fee.) Even the total of $3,250 was well below the $40,000 level stipulated in s 4B. The question which s 57 raises here is whether GW induced a consumer to acquire the Mat or the membership rights, or both, by representing that that consumer would afterwards receive commissions in return for assisting GW to supply the Mat or such membership rights to others, if receipt of the commissions was contingent on an event occurring after the consumer made his or her own contract. 30 The section is directed against the evil that a person might be induced to buy goods or services by an expectation that he or she will subsequently receive a rebate, commission or other benefit (after this, simply "commission") for assisting the supplier to supply its goods or services to other consumers, when there is no assurance that the commission will in fact be received because receipt of it is subject to a contingency. The contingency is something over and above the rendering of the assistance or the doing of any other act by the consumer alone. 31 An illustration given in s 57 itself is the giving to the supplier of the names of prospective customers. If a commission were to become payable by reason of nothing more than the giving of the names, the section would not be contravened. In such a case, the earning of the commission would not be contingent on the occurrence of an event which was both later than the acquisition by the consumer and distinct from the giving of the names itself. But, as the respondents' submissions correctly recognise, the typical arrangement would provide for receipt of the commission to be contingent on acquisition of goods or services by one or more of the prospective customers whose names had been supplied. 32 In sum, the expression "that contract" in s 57 refers back to the "contract" expressly referred to in the section, that is, the contract for the acquisition of goods or services made by the original consumer. There will be a contravention of s 57 by GW if GW induced a consumer to acquire any one or more of the Mat, the GC membership rights or the GRS membership rights, by representing that the consumer would, after that contract was made, receive commissions in return for assisting GW to sell any one or more of the Mat and those rights to other consumers, if receipt of the commission was contingent on those other consumers' actually doing one or more of buying the Mat, joining the GC or joining the GRS. 33 GW finally submits that if I should reject its threshold submission (as I do), it remains a question in relation to each consumer whether GW in fact induced that consumer to acquire any one or more of the Mat or the membership rights by a representation of a kind described. I accept the correctness of this submission. Accordingly, it will be necessary for me later to turn to the factual issue of what it was that operated as an inducement on the minds of particular consumers. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF s 61 (PYRAMID SELLING) 34 GW also makes a threshold submission that s 61 does not apply in the circumstances of the present case for the following reasons: