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[2015] FCA 1274
Federal Court of Australia
2015-11-18
Edelman J
Original judgment source is linked above.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 180 of 2015
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
AND: RECKITT BENCKISER (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 003 274 655)
JUDGE: EDELMAN J DATE: 18 NOVEMBER 2015 PLACE: BRISBANE
Introduction 1 On 3 November 2015, I published reasons for decision refusing the application by The Nielsen Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (Nielsen), for an order restricting access to, and disclosure of, its confidential information in these proceedings. The order was sought under s 37AF, alternatively s 23, of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). I refused that application due to various concerns I had with the proposed confidentiality regime and with the lack of conferral between Nielsen and the parties: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1184. 2 Nielsen now brings a fresh application, after conferral, which purports to address the concerns that I raised. Nielsen sought to have its application determined on the papers. No other party sought to be heard. 3 None of the proposed orders 2 to 7 sought by Nielsen is necessary or appropriate. None should be made. However, it is appropriate now, in the circumstances of this case, to make proposed order 1 which gives effect to the proposed Confidentiality Regime.
The orders sought by Nielsen 4 The orders sought by Nielsen are as follows: 1. Subject to any further order of the Court, pursuant to section 37AF, or in the alternative section 23, of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the publication or other disclosure of the Nielsen Confidential Information by the Applicant or the Respondent and their external solicitors, counsel and/or independent experts be restricted in accordance with the Confidentiality Regime in Annexure A to this Application on the ground that non-disclosure of the Nielsen Confidential Information is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. 2. The Nielsen Confidential Information, and those parts of any affidavits or written submissions containing Nielsen Confidential Information, be marked as confidential on the Court file when filed, tendered or read, and not be made available for public inspection in the Registry. 3. The Nielsen Confidential Information shall not appear in the Court transcript other than in a confidential copy of the transcript, which shall only be made available to the Court and to the Applicant and Respondent. 4. The Applicant and Respondent notify The Nielsen Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (Nielsen) or its solicitors Minter Ellison, within 1 business day of the delivery of judgment in Federal Court Proceedings No NSD 180 of 2015, of any paragraphs of the judgment that contain Nielsen Confidential Information. 5. Nielsen file and serve within 5 business days of being notified under Order 4, the specific orders sought by Nielsen in relation to Nielsen Confidential Information contained within the judgement, as well as any supporting evidence and submissions relied upon by Nielsen in support of these orders. 6. The issue of whether the reasons for judgment should be redacted to retain the confidentiality of the Nielsen Confidential Information be decided on the papers. 7. Such further or other order as the Court thinks fit. In these Orders: "Nielsen Confidential Information" means the information contained within the attachment to the letter from Allen & Overy to Webb Henderson dated 25 September 2015 entitled 'Confidential - data extracted from the Nielsen database', included by the Applicant at Tab 105 in the Court Book in the proceedings, and any extracts thereof, including Tab 18 of the Exhibit to Hien Nguyen's affidavit (at tab 102 of the Court Book in the proceedings).
Proposed orders 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 sought by Nielsen 5 I commence with the orders other than order 1. 6 Proposed order 2 is not an order directed at the parties but, instead, seeks to have the court give a direction to the Registry although the proposed order does not specify whether it is the Sydney registry where this file is managed or the Brisbane registry where I am located. As to this proposed order, Nielsen does not identify which "parts" of which affidavits, or which "parts" of which written submissions, contain Nielsen Confidential Information and should therefore be marked by Registry. Further, as to inspection by a non-party, a non-party cannot inspect submissions or affidavits under r 2.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) without leave. If an application is made by a non-party to inspect submissions or affidavit evidence in these proceedings that contains Nielsen Confidential Information then Nielsen should then be given the opportunity to be heard in opposition to that application. 7 The terms of proposed order 3 are unclear. It is also unclear to whom it is addressed. It appears by its terms to be directed to Auscript, who are responsible for producing court transcript. But it is unclear how Nielsen contemplates that the Court might prohibit Auscript from allowing Nielsen Confidential Information to appear in the transcript. Certainly, the proposed order does not contemplate any list of Nielsen Confidential Information being provided to Auscript so that the information could be marked confidential on the transcript. Nor does the proposed order contemplate any redacting process after the transcript is produced to mark on the transcript any mention of Nielsen Confidential Information as confidential. 8 It may be that the purpose of order 3 is a concern that counsel for one of the parties might make submissions concerning Nielsen's Confidential Information in open court in a manner which disclosed that information. If that occurred, and if that matter were to involve a breach of an obligation of confidence, then it might then be appropriate for parts of a transcript to be marked as confidential. It might not otherwise be appropriate. But, in any event, it is not appropriate to close a court or to attempt in advance, in vague terms, to suppress a transcript of public proceedings in order merely to guard against the possible release of confidential information (about which there has been no contradictor to prove the confidence). 9 Proposed order 4 is unnecessary. Reasons for decision are usually published online within hours of being published in open court. Notice is published online of the listing of publication of reasons for decision. Nielsen would be in a better position to assess whether any paragraphs of the reasons for decision contain its own confidential information than either of the parties. If Nielsen wishes to attend at the handing down of reasons for decision and to obtain a hard copy of the judgment handed down it is welcome to do so. 10 Proposed orders 5 and 6 are both excessive and unnecessary. If Nielsen wishes to make an application for suppression of any part of the Court's judgment on the basis that the reasons for decision would reveal Nielsen's confidential information then it can make that application at, or shortly after, the handing down of the hard copy of the reasons for decision. Programming orders for any evidence and submissions to be filed by Nielsen can be made at that time. When making that application, Nielsen should bear in mind, as s 37AE of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides, that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. The suppression of parts of reasons for decision that are necessary or integral to the reasoning process, for purely commercial reasons, may not be an appropriate counterbalance for the important principle of open justice. 11 Proposed order 7 is an unnecessary catch-all order that is often included by parties who fear that they may have forgotten to include a possible order. It is hard to see how there is anything that Nielsen could have forgotten to include. 12 None of the proposed orders 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 is necessary or appropriate in this case.
Proposed order 1 13 Although Nielsen's proposed order 1 is also based on both s 37AF and s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), it is hard to see how s 23 can add anything to that ground for the power in s 37AF which is carefully defined in s 37AG(1)(a). This is particularly in circumstances in which Nielsen points to no other reason for the confidentiality orders other than the order is necessary "to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice". 14 Nielsen's proposed order 1 seeks to give the force of a court order to its proposed confidentiality regime. This proposed order seeks to revisit the previous application made by Nielsen, which I refused in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1184. 15 The reasons why Nielsen's previous application was refused were essentially because the terms of some of the orders sought were not appropriate and because the parties had not properly conferred. Nielsen has now conferred with the parties. It has also addressed the concerns that I raised. 16 In the previous application I explained that I was satisfied on the basis of the uncontested affidavit evidence filed by Nielsen that the information which is described as the Nielsen Confidential Information was confidential and that public disclosure of it could cause damage to Nielsen's, and its licensors', commercial interests. 17 In the previous application I was also prepared to proceed on the basis that the unnecessary disclosure of this confidential information could prejudice the proper administration of justice within the meaning of s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Because the application was refused it was unnecessary to determine that point finally. 18 No party in these proceedings has made any submissions as a contradictor. Hence, I have before me no articulated position concerning whether prejudice to the commercial interests of a third party by disclosure of information is "prejudice to the proper administration of justice" either generally or in this case. 19 One factor, in this case, which might, arguably, support a conclusion that such commercial prejudice could affect the proper administration of justice is that Nielsen had sought to enter confidentiality agreements with each of the parties to this litigation but neither had agreed to enter such an agreement. This is in the context of a Confidentiality Regime which is centrally concerned with the manner of use of information about which Nielsen's claims to confidentiality is not currently disputed. 20 It has also been said that the Court can consider as a factor concerning the administration of justice whether the process of litigation could "become a vehicle for advantaging or prejudicing trade rivals": Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Origin Energy Electricity Ltd [2015] FCA 278 [148] (Katzmann J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1082 [23] (Greenwood J). 21 In the absence of any contradictor on this point, and hence without creating any precedent, I am prepared to make the order sought: CSR Ltd v Eddy [2005] HCA 64; (2005) 226 CLR 1, 11 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ).
Conclusion and costs 22 It is appropriate in this case to make an order, order 1 as proposed by Nielsen, giving effect to the proposed Confidentiality Regime. 23 In the previous application I expressed a preliminary view that Nielsen should pay the costs of the parties in relation to the application. Nielsen has now filed lengthy submissions concerning why the costs order for that application, and this application, should be that there be no order as to costs. Unsurprisingly, in circumstances in which the costs of responding might exceed any costs awarded, no party has sought to be heard in response and no other party seeks its costs (although no party opposed the order I had foreshadowed). 24 On the one hand, I take into account the misconceived nature of parts of Nielsen's previous application and the inconvenience and disruption caused by that to the proceedings. On the other hand, I also take into account (i) Nielsen's position as a third party stranger to the proceedings and the unusual nature of third party costs orders, (ii) Nielsen's attempts to reach a confidentiality agreement with the parties prior to bringing its application, and (iii) the reason for Nielsen's application being the desire of the parties to use documents containing Nielsen's confidential information. Ultimately, I consider that there should be no order as to costs of this application or the application decided on 3 November 2015. I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Edelman.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Reckitt Benckiser