Category D - Annexures and attachments to Cabinet submissions and minutes
122 Documents 2-5, 8-9, 15, 24-28, 31, 34-44, 47-49, 51-54, 56-60, 61-78, 83-106 (including 97a) are said to be annexures and attachments to Cabinet submissions and minutes.
123 The following points may be made concerning these documents.
124 First, almost all of these documents are reports, or interim versions of reports, or extracts from or copies of reports, prepared by large external advisory or consultancy firms, including Morgan Stanley, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Environmental Resources Management Australia (ERM), GHD and Minter Ellison. Without going into any detail in relation to the contents of these reports, each of them dealt with various commercial, technical or legal aspects of the State's proposed privatisation of Port Botany, Port Kembla and the Port of Newcastle. The "client" of these firms was said to be New South Wales Treasury. The project in relation to this transaction was at times referred to as "Project Pembroke".
125 Second, save for the fact that some of the reports are marked "Cabinet-in-Confidence", for the most part there is nothing in the reports themselves to suggest that they were prepared for the purpose of being provided to Cabinet or that they were at any point annexed or attached to Cabinet minutes or submissions. The client of the authors of the reports was New South Wales Treasury and the reports contain recommendations to "Government", but that does not necessarily mean that the reports were specifically prepared for the purpose of being put before or considered by Cabinet.
126 The Secretary's case that these reports were prepared for the purpose of being provided to Cabinet and were at some point annexed or attached to Cabinet submissions or minutes was based entirely on a short global assertion to that effect made by Ms Boyd. Her evidence was that the documents within category D were "prepared for the express purpose of informing Cabinet" and "became attachments or annexures to Cabinet Submissions and Minutes". That statement was not challenged by the ACCC, though the weight to be given to it is another matter, particularly given the earlier observations made about Ms Boyd's evidence. More significantly, the Cabinet decisions, minutes and submissions that are amongst the documents over which public interest immunity is claimed refer, at most, to the attachment of the executive summary of the Morgan Stanley scoping report. There is no indication in the Cabinet decisions, minutes or submissions that the full version of the Morgan Stanley report or reports, or the reports prepared by the other advisers or consultants, were ever provided to Cabinet.
127 Ms Boyd's general assertion that the Category D documents, including the external adviser's reports, were in fact annexed to Cabinet submissions or minutes was also somewhat ambiguous and equivocal. Her evidence included the assertion that some of the reports were prepared at the request of the then Treasurer for the purpose of the Treasurer receiving advice in respect of matters that were "intended to be brought before Cabinet". The suggestion appeared to be that the reports were provided to the Treasurer so that the Treasurer would subsequently be in a position to provide advice to Cabinet should the subject-matter of the advice be before Cabinet. That is inconsistent with the suggestion that the reports themselves were annexed to Cabinet minutes or submissions or were otherwise provided to Cabinet in their entirety.
128 Third, for the most part, the reports do not deal with government policy, even approaching the notion of policy in a broad sense. Rather, in general terms, the reports deal with technical aspects of the proposed transaction: the Morgan Stanley reports dealt primarily with commercial and financial aspects of the proposed transaction; the GHD report provided engineering advice; ERM provided environmental advice; and Minter Ellison provided legal advice. While it may be accepted that some of the technical advice may have been informed by or otherwise involved elements of government policy, the predominant focus of the advice was commercial, contractual, technical and transactional.
129 It should perhaps be noted, in this context, that no claim of legal professional privilege was made in relation to the Minter Ellison report, at least in this application. The issue concerning the disclosure of this report has been approached on that basis. If a claim of legal professional privilege is made in respect of the report, it should be dealt with separately.
130 Fourth, as has already been noted in other contexts, the subject matter of these reports is no longer current or controversial. So much so was conceded by the Secretary. The transactions that were the subject matter of the reports provided by the external advisers were completed many years ago. There is, in fact, no evidence that the transactions were even considered to be particularly controversial at the time they were proposed, entered into or completed.
131 Fifth, and related to the previous points, the Secretary did not contend that the disclosure of the specific content of these documents was contrary to the public interest. The Secretary's contention was, put simply, that it was contrary to the public interest to disclose these documents because they fell within a class of Cabinet documents. That contention was supported by the evidence of Ms Boyd, which was referred to at length earlier. Relevant to this particular category of documents was Ms Boyd's evidence that if this category of documents was to be disclosed, advice provided to the Government in the future, including by external consultants, may be drafted in such a way as to "minimise controversy"; or might "exclude[e] discussion of a controversial issue"; or avoid "controversial recommendations"; or be expressed in only "vague terms".
132 For the reasons given at some length earlier, Ms Boyd's views to that effect are deserving of minimal weight. It is, with respect, highly doubtful that Ms Boyd was in any real position to opine about what external advisers to the Government might or might not do if the confidentiality of their reports cannot be assured. Even putting that to one side, the notion that external advisers or consultants of the size and sophistication of those involved in this matter would operate on the basis that their advice may never be disclosed, or might temper or alter their advice simply because they could not be assured that their advice may never be disclosed, is highly dubious, if not somewhat fanciful. It is certainly not a notion that should be uncritically advanced or accepted in all circumstances.
133 Ms Boyd also expressed the view that it was "imperative" that Cabinet have the ability to obtain advice from external advisers with the "expectation" that the reports would be treated with the "same degree of confidentiality" as reports prepared by "internal advisers". Ms Boyd did not, however, explain why that was so. It may be accepted that Cabinet would expect that advice that it received from external advisers would generally remain confidential, in the sense of not being publicly disclosed, particularly when first prepared and provided. It is not, however, entirely clear why Cabinet would necessarily expect, or be entitled or justified to expect, that such reports might not subsequently be required to be produced pursuant to court processes if, for example, the subject matter of the report became the subject of a legal dispute. The protection afforded by public interest immunity is not absolute.
134 The Secretary also submitted, in this context, that the disclosure of the external advisers' reports would result in Cabinet being more reluctant to seek such advice in the future, or would lead Cabinet to seek advice in the future in more limited terms, or only to seek advice internally. That general proposition is, to say the least, doubtful, particularly in the particular circumstances of this case. It is very difficult to accept that if a Minister, or Cabinet generally, thought it necessary or desirable to obtain external advice concerning commercial, contractual or technical aspects of a transaction that the State proposed to enter into, that advice would not be sought, or would only be sought in limited terms, simply because the Minister, or Cabinet, considered there to be a risk that, some years later, the State may be required to produce the advice pursuant to a court process because it was considered to be relevant to a matter that had become litigious.
135 It should also be noted in this context that, in the unlikely event that there is any continuing need to preserve the confidentiality of some of the commercial or technical aspects of parts of these reports, that is a matter that can be dealt with by the making of suppression or non-publication orders in the substantive proceeding. The requirement to produce documents to the Court or the ACCC pursuant to discovery obligations does not mean that the documents will necessarily be made public. If there is a genuine need to prevent any information in these documents from being disclosed to the public generally, that need can be attended to or accommodated without completely depriving the ACCC or the Court of access to the documents.
136 It may also be accepted that some past authorities have advanced these sorts of rationales for protecting advice provided to Cabinet from disclosure. It is possible to see some logic in this rationale when the relevant advice is advice concerning controversial policy issues and is provided by a bureaucrat. The logic largely disappears, however, when the advice is commercial, legal, engineering, accounting or environmental advice and that advice is provided by a large and sophisticated external adviser. Indeed, the public interest in transparent decision-making by government would suggest that such advice should generally be available for scrutiny, save perhaps where contemporaneous disclosure of the specific content of the advice might result in prejudice for commercial or legal reasons.
137 Sixth, it is largely unnecessary to address separately the content of the individual reports of ERM, GHD and Minter Ellison or the extracts from them which dealt with the proposed transactions to sell Port Botany and Port Kembla. That is because those reports are all reproduced as annexures or attachments to the final Morgan Stanley scoping report in relation to Port Botany (document 52). If it is determined that this document should be produced, there would be no point in separately considering whether the individual reports that are included in it should also be disclosed.
138 The final Morgan Stanley scoping report concerning the sale of Port Botany and the annexures to it is lengthy, detailed and dense. It occupies two lever arch folders. The annexures also include a report from PwC in respect of the accounting and tax implications of the proposed transaction, though this report is not reproduced as a stand-alone, individual document. Aside from Ms Boyd's general assertions, there is nothing to suggest that the entire scoping report was ever provided to Cabinet. All of the observations that have been made in relation to the individual reports of Morgan Stanley, ERM, GHD and Minter Ellison apply to this compendious document: as a whole, it deals with technical aspects of the proposed transactions and their execution, as opposed to matters of government policy; its subject matter is no longer current or controversial; and it is not suggested that there is a public interest in preventing the disclosure of any of its contents.
139 Seventh, and most significantly, the final Morgan Stanley scoping report clearly contains some information and statements that would appear to be clearly relevant and most likely material to the issues that will arise in the substantive proceeding. It is both unnecessary and obviously undesirable to consider at length the parts of the document that appear to contain material evidence. It suffices to say that the report and its attachments consider, in some places in considerable detail, competition issues, including issues arising from the potential development of a container terminal at the Port of Newcastle. There is a sound basis to infer or conclude that some of the contents of the report may be material to the "purpose" and "effect" elements of the ACCC's case concerning the compensation provisions.
140 When the competing public interests are weighed together, the balance tips in favour of requiring disclosure of the final Morgan Stanley scoping report and all its attachments. On the one hand, for the reasons just given, the public interest in protecting this document from disclosure on the basis that it is supposedly a Cabinet document is, in all the circumstances, fairly slight. On the other hand, the public interest in favour of disclosure, being the public interest in the administration of justice, is significant. The document contains information and statements that are, or are highly likely to constitute, material evidence in the substantive proceeding commenced by the ACCC. It is in the public interest that all material evidence be available for tender in that proceeding, particularly given the important regulatory nature of the proceeding. In the particular circumstances of this case, that public interest outweighs the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the document simply because it was, or is, a Cabinet document, in the sense that it, or part of it, was prepared for the purpose of informing Cabinet, or was provided to Cabinet.
141 Eighth, the documents that are included in Category D also include reports prepared by ERM, GHD and Minter Ellison for the purposes of a scoping report concerning the sale of the Port of Newcastle (see, for example, documents 29, 30 and 43 and 44). There does not, however, appear to be a final compendious Morgan Stanley scoping report in respect of the sale of the Port of Newcastle which annexes those reports. Somewhat curiously, there is a version of the executive summary of a Morgan Stanley scoping report in respect of the sale of the Port of Newcastle (document 31) included among the category D documents, thus suggesting that it is a final version, though that document is marked as a draft. As will be seen, there is also a draft of what appears to be a full version of Morgan Stanley's scoping report in respect of the Port of Newcastle transaction included in the Category F documents, but apparently no final version of that document.
142 An inspection of the ERM and GHD reports concerning the proposed Port of Newcastle transaction revealed that, as perhaps may be expected given that they deal essentially with environmental and engineering considerations, they contain no apparently relevant or material evidence in respect of the substantive proceeding. The executive summary of the Morgan Stanley scoping study (document 31) and Minter Ellison report or reports (documents 43 and 44) dealing with the proposed Port of Newcastle study do, however, contain some potentially relevant and material evidence. It is again unnecessary and undesirable to identify or discuss that evidence. It is sufficient to note that both reports include statements concerning competition issues and considerations that are, or are likely to be, material to the ACCC's "purpose" and "effect" allegations. In all the circumstances, the public interest against disclosure of the Minister Ellison reports is outweighed by the public interest in favour of disclosure arising from the fact that the reports contain material evidence. It should again be noted that there is no indication that any claim of legal professional privilege is made in relation to this report and the question of whether it should be disclosed has been approached on the basis that no such claim has been or is made.
143 Two other documents, document 40 and document 77, also need to be specifically addressed. Document 40 is the minutes of a steering committee meeting and document 77 is apparently a steering committee paper. The nature and significance of these documents and why they may have been put before Cabinet is, to say the very least, unclear and obscure. It is, however, unnecessary to dwell on them further as they contain nothing which could be of relevance to the substantive proceeding. On balance, therefore, they should not be disclosed. The public interest against disclosure outweighs any public interest in favour of disclosure.
144 The other documents within Category D would appear to be either copies, or extracts from or slightly different versions of the reports which have already been considered. For the reasons already given, it is unnecessary to consider them separately.
145 The end result is that it has been determined that the following documents in Category D should be disclosed: documents 31, 43, 44 and 52. If needs be, the ACCC may request the State to disclose duplicates of any of those documents or parts thereof. It is, however, or at least should be, unnecessary to order specifically that the duplicates be produced.