The arrangement between Edison and the CEPU
135 It was not in dispute that there was a contract, arrangement or understanding between Edison and the CEPU in relation to Edison's engagement of electrical contractors to perform work at the Loy Yang B site. The parties differed about the nature, scope and content of that contract, arrangement or understanding.
136 As I have already noted, the ACCC put its case in essentially two ways. Its primary case was that prior to 23 August 2001 Edison and the CEPU made a contract or arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, that all electrical contractors performing work at Loy Yang B must have a current certified agreement with the CEPU prior to commencing work at the site. The ACCC contended that this contract, arrangement or understanding was broader than, and overshadowed and controlled, the provision that was subsequently inserted in the heads of agreement.
137 The CEPU disputed the existence of any contract, arrangement or understanding other than that embodied in the express terms of the heads of agreement.
138 It is convenient to consider the ACCC's primary case, and the CEPU's response to it, before turning to consider the ACCC's alternative argument that in any event the heads of agreement contained a provision that contravened s 45E(3). For ease of reference, I will use the expression 'arrangement' rather than the more cumbersome 'contract, arrangement or understanding'. Obviously, the terms 'arrangement' and 'understanding' are much broader than the term 'contract', and they are often equated in the authorities: TNT at 25; and Amcor at 359-360 [75]. However, neither party suggested that anything turns on the differences that exist between the three concepts.
139 In advancing its primary case, the ACCC argued that the arrangement between Edison and the CEPU is to be gleaned from all of the evidence concerning the conduct engaged in by Edison and the CEPU over the relevant period. The ACCC pointed to the events that pre-dated the signing of the heads of agreement on 23 August, including the 9 and 10 August meetings, the 9 and 10 August teleconferences, the 13 August letter, the meeting between Buckley and the Nabulsi on 13 August and the team meeting on 16 August to support the wider arrangement for which it contends. It also pointed to events subsequent to Edison's execution and delivery of the heads of agreement, including DJN's exclusion from work at the site, Edison's decisions consequent upon the ACCC's letter of 27 October 2003, and DJN's resumption of work at Loy Yang B in 2004.
140 The ACCC's case is, to some extent at least, based on inferences from the facts to which I have already referred. In drawing inferences of fact of this kind, the civil standard of proof applies, but the facts and inferences upon which the ACCC relies must be proved to a level of satisfaction that is commensurate with the seriousness of the allegations. The allegations made against the CEPU are very serious and can give rise to substantial penalties.
141 The High Court's enunciation of the civil standard of proof in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 is frequently cited, but Dixon J's statement at 361-362 bears repeating:
'Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.'
I have applied these principles to the determination of the issues in this case.
142 Based on the factual findings and applying the legal principles which I have set out above, I am satisfied that prior to 23 August 2001 Edison and the CEPU made or entered into an arrangement that included a provision that Edison would not engage electrical contractors to perform work at Loy Yang B unless they have a current certified agreement with the CEPU prior to commencing work at the site. The arrangement involved a commitment on Edison's part not to permit electrical contractors who did not have a certified agreement with the CEPU to work at Loy Yang B. In exchange, the CEPU committed to signing the Simon Engineering site agreement. The evidence establishes, in my view, that Edison and the CEPU made or entered into this arrangement prior to 15 August 2001. The heads of agreement was entered into in accordance with, and was controlled by, this arrangement. I will elaborate my reasons for these findings in the course of considering the arguments advanced by the CEPU.
143 The CEPU submitted that the evidence showed only one 'meeting of the minds' between Edison and the CEPU - that is, the heads of agreement of 23 August 2001. The CEPU contended that the communications and events surrounding the making of the heads of agreement are insufficient to prove that there was a meeting of the minds between Edison and the CEPU; rather, they are evidence of the negotiations and canvassing of proposals which ultimately culminated in the heads of agreement on 23 August. In my view, these submissions do not grapple with the overall force and effect of the evidence that is before the Court.
144 While I do not propose to rehearse all of the findings of fact that I have set forth above, it is appropriate to emphasise some of them. On 9 August, Mighell told the Edison executives that the CEPU required Edison to agree that all electrical contractors working on the Loy Yang B site must have a certified agreement to which the CEPU was a party. The Simon Engineering site agreement was not expressly mentioned at the 9 August meeting. But the context in which the meeting took place must have made it clear to all participants that the CEPU was taking the position that it would not sign the Simon Engineering site agreement unless Edison accepted the two requirements that the CEPU advanced, ie site access and the requirement that all electrical contractors on the Loy Yang B site must have a certified agreement with the CEPU. I also infer that those present at the 9 August meeting knew that the delay in the execution of the Simon Engineering site agreement was delaying the construction of the peaker plant. The CEPU was a necessary signatory to the Simon Engineering site agreement. I infer that Mighell knew that the CEPU's refusal to sign the Simon Engineering site agreement was exerting heavy pressure on Edison, and that he was consciously exploiting that situation in making the demands he did of Edison concerning site access and electrical contractors.
145 By the end of the 10 August teleconference, which was shortly before 3.00 pm, Edison's senior executives responsible for the Loy Yang B business had agreed that Edison would accede to the CEPU's requirements for site access and that electrical contractors only be permitted to work at the Loy Yang B site if they had a certified agreement in place with the CEPU. Furthermore, Driscoll instructed Sutherland, Burns and others that an agreement accepting these requirements should be concluded with the CEPU as quickly as possible.
146 Immediately after the 10 August teleconference, Sutherland arranged an urgent meeting with Mighell and met with him at Mighell's office.
147 On Monday 13 August, Sutherland drafted and signed a letter to Mighell which stated that, further to his discussions with Mighell the previous week, Sutherland was able to confirm the proposal concerning contract work being undertaken at Loy Yang B. The proposal stipulated in the letter was that Edison and the CEPU would agree that all electrical contractors performing work at Loy Yang B must have a current certified agreement with the CEPU prior to commencing work at the site. Of itself, Sutherland's signature on this letter indicates that he did in fact have discussions with Mighell to the effect described during the previous week.
148 Edison took various actions on and from 13 August to implement its arrangement with the CEPU. On the afternoon of 13 August, Buckley told Nabulsi in unequivocal terms that DJN's services would no longer be utilised by Edison because Edison had been asked by the CEPU not to permit contractors on site who did not have an EBA with the CEPU. Buckley conveyed this advice to Nabulsi because he was instructed to do so.
149 On 15 August, the CEPU signed a memorandum of understanding recording that it had reached agreement with Simon Engineering and other unions on a site agreement for Loy Yang B. I infer that the CEPU would not have taken the step of signing the Simon Engineering MOU unless it had received a communication from Edison that Edison agreed to its demands.
150 On 16 August, Pearson and Buckley informed the maintenance team leaders that Edison had entered into, or was entering into, an arrangement with the CEPU whereby electrical contractors would not be permitted to work at Loy Yang B if they did not have a certified agreement with the CEPU.
151 DJN was not offered any new contracting work at the Loy Yang B site between August 2001 and about January 2004. It was permitted to complete pre-existing commitments at the Loy Yang B site up to about 20 September 2001, which was entirely consistent with Edison's decision to 'grandfather' DJN's existing contractual commitments.
152 After receiving the ACCC's letter of 27 October 2003, Edison decided that it would no longer comply with its agreement with the CEPU. It immediately ceased its practice of requiring all electrical contractors to have a current certified agreement with the CEPU before they could commence work at the Loy Yang B site. Pursuant to this change in practice, DJN was invited early in 2004 to once again tender for work at Loy Yang B and it resumed work as an electrical contractor at the site on or about 2 March 2004.
153 Taken together, these events and the concurrence of timing, direction and result they display support the findings I have made at [142] above.
154 My finding that the letter of 13 August was dispatched to the CEPU on 13 August is supported by the same events and by the following additional considerations:
(1) Having been signed, the letter would be posted by Sutherland's secretary in the normal course of business. There is no evidence that Sutherland stopped or intercepted the dispatch of the letter, or that he had any reason to do so.
(2) The dispatch of the letter is entirely consistent with the instructions that Sutherland received on 10 August from Driscoll, ie fix the impasse to the Simon Engineering site agreement urgently by acceding to the CEPU's requirements. Those instructions never changed.
(3) Sutherland did not take any action on or after 13 August to stop Pearson and Buckley implementing the decision that was taken at the 10 August teleconference.
(4) It is consistent with Burns' evidence that he became aware of the 13 August letter in December 2001, and that he recalls seeing an email version of the letter much earlier than October 2003.
155 When he was examined by senior counsel for the ACCC, Sutherland was not asked whether he had any discussions with Mighell the previous week to the effect described in the 13 August letter. He was not asked about any telephone discussions. Consequently, Sutherland did not deny having discussions of the kind referred to in the 13 August letter. Sutherland did say, however, that he did not put forward a solution at his meeting with Mighell on 10 August. As noted above, I have reservations about this evidence.
156 It is improbable that nothing happened on 10 August when Sutherland met with Mighell at an urgently convened meeting, other than Sutherland asking Mighell to repeat the demands that Mighell had made at the 9 August meeting. Yet this is the effect of Sutherland's evidence. In these circumstances, and bearing in mind the unreliability of Sutherland's evidence generally and the statements in Sutherland's letter of 13 August, I do not accept Sutherland's evidence that he did not convey any solution to Mighell at the 10 August meeting because he had no solution to offer. However, I will not attempt to make any findings as to what occurred at the meeting. I do not need to do so. My conclusions overall do not depend on a finding as to whether Sutherland conveyed a solution at the 10 August meeting because there were other relevant communications between the CEPU and Edison. Indeed, Sutherland's evidence leaves open the possibility that he had other discussions with Mighell between 9 August and 13 August, outside the context of their meeting on 10 August.
157 Senior counsel for the ACCC urged me to apply the principles enunciated by the High Court in Jones v Dunkel to support the inference that Edison and the CEPU made an arrangement to the effect alleged by the ACCC. While it is clearly open to me to infer from the CEPU's failure to call evidence from key players at the CEPU who would have direct knowledge of the events in question that those witnesses would not assist the CEPU's case, there are limits to the Jones v Dunkel principle. The principle allows me to draw inferences that are open on the evidence more confidently than might otherwise be the case; but it cannot be used to make up for gaps in the evidence. In this case, the inferences that I have drawn from the evidence are so clear that I do not need to rely upon Jones v Dunkel. It is, nonetheless, correct that the absence of evidence adduced by the CEPU from Mighell and Mooney allows me to infer with greater confidence that the CEPU received the letter of 13 August from Sutherland and that it did so before Mooney signed the Simon Engineering MOU on 15 August. More generally, the absence of evidence from the CEPU allows me to conclude, more confidently, that Edison had communicated to the CEPU by 15 August the fact that Edison agreed to the CEPU's requirement that electrical contractors not be permitted to perform work at Loy Yang B unless they had a current certified agreement with the CEPU.
158 The CEPU advanced a series of reasons why I should infer that the 13 August letter was not sent to the CEPU.
159 First, it argued that to infer that the 13 August letter was sent is inconsistent with the fact that Burns and Sutherland agreed to seek advice from Corrs on 10 August or in the week of 13 August. Sutherland gave evidence that he recalled having some discussions by telephone with Burns at Loy Yang B and arising from those discussions they thought that Edison should get some advice from Corrs. He said that Burns agreed to approach Corrs to get the advice. He also said that he believed his discussion with Burns by telephone took place on 10 August and that the proposed legal advice was to relate to both the site access issue and the electrical contractors issue. Sutherland said that Burns made the contact with Corrs, although Sutherland was involved in an initial meeting with Corrs. Sutherland confirmed that Corrs drafted the heads of agreement. On the other hand, Burns said he was not involved in giving any instructions to Corrs to prepare the draft heads of agreement.
160 I do not accept Sutherland's account of Corrs' retainer. I accept Burns' evidence that he had no involvement in giving instructions to Corrs about the heads of agreement. I find that Sutherland, not Burns, made the decision to instruct Corrs and that thereafter Sutherland dealt with Corrs. I also find on the balance of probabilities that Sutherland contacted Corrs shortly after 13 August.
161 The agreed demarcation of responsibility between Sutherland and Burns was that Sutherland would deal with the electrical contractors issue and Burns would deal with the site access issue. There is no evidence that Corrs provided any advice in relation to the site access issue. Sutherland was the person involved in the only meeting with Corrs that is referred to in the evidence. I infer that the draft heads of agreement prepared by Corrs was sent by Corrs to Sutherland. Certainly, Sutherland forwarded the draft heads of agreement by email to Mighell at Mighell's email address on 20 August.
162 Sutherland's covering email to Mighell on 20 August said:
'Dean - Attached is the draft agreement as prepared by our solicitors. Please call me on Tuesday, if you can.
Regards
Col'
The terms of this email indicate Sutherland had previously discussed the question of a draft agreement with Mighell and that Mighell was aware that a draft agreement between Edison and the CEPU dealing with contract labour was being prepared by Edison's solicitors.
163 It is clear that Sutherland was in direct discussion with CEPU officers about the heads of agreement. In addition to the suggestion in the 20 August email that Mighell should call Sutherland on Tuesday, the CEPU's email of 23 August shows that Sutherland was in direct discussion with Mooney about the heads of agreement. Between 20 August and 23 August, most probably on 23 August, Sutherland told Burns that the way the draft heads of agreement was worded was not satisfactory to the CEPU because it did not give the union anything. This exchange confirms that Sutherland was in direct discussion with Mooney, and perhaps other CEPU officers, about the heads of agreement.
164 In my opinion, the fact that Edison sought and obtained Corrs' assistance in drafting the heads of agreement in the week of 13 August does not alter the probability that the 13 August letter was dispatched by Sutherland on 13 August. It is not uncommon for those charged with finding a solution to a commercial problem to arrange a solution and then seek legal advice in relation to the documentation of that solution, especially when the matter is urgent.
165 Secondly, the CEPU argued that to infer that the 13 August letter was sent by Sutherland is inconsistent with the parties having subsequently entered into the heads of agreement on 23 August. It was said that if the agreement between the parties was expressed in the 13 August letter and that letter was received by Mighell in the week of 13 August, one would expect Mighell to have raised the issue of the prior agreement upon receiving the draft heads of agreement from Edison on 20 August. This did not occur; rather the response from the CEPU on 23 August was described by the CEPU as 'a fine tuning' of the draft heads of agreement. The CEPU asked rhetorically: why would the CEPU have bothered finessing the draft heads of agreement if the real agreement between the parties was contained in the 13 August letter?
166 I do not agree with these submissions. There is no inconsistency between the dispatch of the 13 August letter to the CEPU, and a decision by Edison and the CEPU that their agreement should be recorded somewhat differently, and in some respects more extensively, in a more formal legal document. The 13 August letter records a form of words proposed by Edison. On the evidence, Edison's proposed language exactly matched the requirement that Mighell had laid down on 9 August. It is possible that Mighell, or someone else within the CEPU or within Edison, raised concerns about the explicit language in which Edison had expressed its proposed agreement in the 13 August letter. It is also possible that a decision was taken, perhaps on Corrs' advice, to record the parties' agreement in ambiguous or opaque language, without altering the underlying arrangement between the parties. Furthermore, I consider that the CEPU's argument is inconsistent with the actions that were undertaken by Edison on 13 and 16 August and by the CEPU on 15 August.
167 On the whole, the evidence supports the clearest of inferences that by 15 August Edison had communicated its acceptance of the CEPU's requirement that electrical contractors not be permitted to perform work at the Loy Yang B site unless they had a current certified agreement with the CEPU. The critical thing is that Edison communicated its acceptance of this requirement to the CEPU and that this communication resulted in an arrangement between Edison and the CEPU. The existence of such an arrangement is not inconsistent with the proposition that the parties then proceeded to record their arrangement in a document prepared by Corrs.
168 Thirdly, the CEPU pointed out that the 13 August letter does not refer to the signing of the Simon Engineering site agreement by the CEPU as the quid pro quo for Edison's agreement to the proposal set out in the 13 August letter. The CEPU contrasted this aspect of the 13 August letter with the express reservation in Edison's email of 23 August that the heads of agreement would be signed by Edison 'on the proviso' that the CEPU signed the Simon Engineering site agreement. In my opinion, this argument does not impair my finding that the 13 August letter was sent to the CEPU. As of 13 August, it was implicit in the discussions between the CEPU and Edison that the CEPU would proceed to sign the Simon Engineering site agreement if Edison met its demands concerning site access and the requirement that all electrical contractors at Loy Yang B have a current certified agreement with the CEPU. That this is so is confirmed by the actions that were taken on 13, 15 and 16 August to implement their arrangement. I infer that neither Edison nor the CEPU would have taken those actions in the absence of a communication from Edison to the CEPU that Edison agreed to the CEPU's requirement that contractors on the Loy Yang B site must have a current certified agreement with the CEPU. The CEPU's actions in signing the Simon Engineering MOU on 15 August clearly indicate that an arrangement had been made between Edison and the CEPU before 15 August in the terms set out in the 13 August letter. The proviso in Edison's email to the CEPU of 23 August was no doubt an appropriate precaution for Edison to take, but by then the CEPU had already taken steps to complete the signing of the Simon Engineering site agreement.
169 My conclusion regarding the scope of the contract, arrangement or understanding between Edison and the CEPU is similar to the conclusion reached by Smithers J in Gibbins, a case concerning the original form of s 45E. In Gibbins, the second respondent ('Borthwicks'), entered into an agreement with the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union ('AMIEU') as a result of conciliation proceedings under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). Essentially, the agreement provided that the Borthwicks would not 'invite or engage' carriers of livestock who were banned by the AMIEU to come onto its abattoir works to deliver stock. Smithers J observed at 467:
'It is clear that the immediate purpose of including the provisions in the agreement was, with the consent of Borthwicks, to lessen the likelihood that banned carriers would come upon the abattoir and to ensure, again with Borthwicks' consent, that if they did the stock were not to be unloaded or killed by Borthwicks' Union employees. But it went further than that. It obviously was designed to prevent Borthwicks from engaging banned carriers for carrying services.'
Smithers J held that the exclusionary purpose was part of a wider understanding between the parties, at 470-471:
'It is clear that the conciliation agreement not only governs by its own strength but has given rise to an understanding of a slightly wider nature, namely by the exclusion from an invitation to come onto the works or from being engaged to come onto the works, not only of carriers who have passed the picket lines but to those who according to Union judgment have done so or have done the equivalent.'
Smithers J found that the wider understanding arose out of the conciliation agreement and in connection with its implementation: at 472.
170 The CEPU submitted that the existence of an agreement or arrangement in the week of 13 August would render the subsequent heads of agreement a sham. The CEPU's submissions on this point are misguided. To adapt the words of Smithers J in Gibbins, the heads of agreement was expressed in its own terms, but it implemented a wider arrangement or understanding. In my opinion, Edison and the CEPU intended that the heads of agreement should be controlled by, and operate in accordance with, the arrangement that had been agreed upon by the parties and put into place in the week of 13 August.
171 The CEPU also argued that DJN's continued presence on site at Loy Yang B gives rise to an inference that the agreement was not intended to exclude DJN from continuing to supply services at Loy Yang B. The fact that DJN continued to perform some work on site at Loy Yang B in August and September 2001, under pre-existing contractual arrangements and as a subcontractor, does not affect my conclusion that the arrangement rendered DJN ineligible from continuing to supply services to Edison. Rather, as Burns' file note of the 9 August meeting shows, Edison implemented a process of 'grandfathering' DJN's existing contracts.
172 The CEPU submitted that, as the heads of agreement is a binding contract, the Court's task is to interpret the words of the contract, without regard to negotiations which transpired beforehand, so long as the words of the contract are clear: Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337 ('Codelfa'). It said that cl 4.1 of the heads of agreement merely obliged Edison to 'request' that electrical contractors have acceptable industrial arrangements. On the CEPU's preferred reading, cl 4.1 simply provided that having a current certified agreement with the CEPU was one way, but not the mandated way, that an electrical contractor could have acceptable industrial arrangements for the purposes of the heads of agreement.
173 Under s 45E of the TPA, I am not limited to an examination of the words of cl 4.1. This is not a proceeding to enforce a contract. Section 45E is not concerned only with written agreements; it is also concerned with the making of an 'arrangement' or arriving at an 'understanding'. An arrangement or understanding may be informal and unenforceable: Lutovi at 444. The concept of an 'understanding' is a broad and flexible one: L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd v Nu-Statt Decorating Pty Ltd, supra, at 89; TNT at 25; and David Jones at 463-464. For the reasons explained above, I am satisfied that there was a broader arrangement between the parties which overshadowed and controlled the language used in the heads of agreement. It was understood and agreed between the CEPU and Edison that the heads of agreement imposed an obligation on Edison not to retain electrical contractors at the Loy Yang B site if they did not have a current certified agreement with the CEPU, and that this is the way in which Edison would implement it. Nothing in cl 4.1 prevented Edison implementing its arrangement with the CEPU in this way.
174 None of the CEPU's additional arguments cause me to doubt my finding that as at 15 August, and as at 23 August after the execution of the heads of agreement, there was a contract, arrangement or understanding between Edison and the CEPU that included a provision that Edison would not engage an electrical contractor to perform work at Loy Yang B unless the contractor had a current certified agreement with the CEPU. The next issue is whether this provision was included in the contract, arrangement or understanding for the purpose, or for purposes including the purpose, of preventing or hindering Edison from acquiring or continuing to acquire electrical services from a person who qualifies as a second person for the purposes of s 45E(3) of the TPA.