Declarations
5 The Commission proposes detailed declarations that identify with precision the facts that led the Court to the conclusion that contraventions had occurred. Global One and 6G propose a form of declaration which declares that Global One and 6G's conduct contravened ss 52 and 53(e) of the Act in respect of each of the four advertisements the subject of the proceedings (the Advertisements), but nothing more.
6 In support of their submission that their proposed declaration is sufficient, Global One and 6G rely on the statement of Gray, Branson and North JJ in Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde (2001) 105 FCR 437 at [8] that:
The remedy of a declaration of right is ordinarily granted as final relief in a proceeding. It is intended to state the rights of the parties with respect to a particular matter with precision, and in a binding way. The remedy of a declaration is not an appropriate way of recording in a summary form, conclusions reached by the Court in reasons for judgment. This is even more strongly the case when the conclusion is not one from which any right or liability necessarily flows.
7 Global One and 6G submit that the "legal rights of the parties" as determined by the Court were that Global One and 6G's conduct contravened ss 52 and 53(e). According to Global One and 6G, the Commission's proposed declarations seek to have subordinate contentions or findings recorded as part of the declarations made, which would go beyond declaring the legal rights of the parties as determined by the Court. The Commission's proposed declarations, say Global One and 6G, contain findings that were not made by the Court at all or, alternatively, findings from which no 'right or liability necessarily flows'.
8 Global One and 6G point out that their approach is consistent with Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89, where the Full Court made a declaration in terms that the published advertisement in that case was 'misleading and deceptive contrary to the provisions of s 52 of the [Act]'.
9 However, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1, Gray J observed that it was clear that the vagueness of the declaration in Tobacco Institute was in part attributable to the result of the different views taken by the members of the Full Court as to the precise misleading or deceptive effect of the advertisement concerned. Indeed, in Tobacco Institute, after referring to the differences of reasoning among the members of the Full Court, Hill J stated at 113:
I have considered whether there was some possibility of making declarations which sought to spell out the relevant meaning of the words used, but… I have reached the conclusion that the making of such a declaration could itself give a false impression of what actually was decided by the Court
10 In Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53, the High Court expressed disapproval of the making of declarations in the barest terms. In Rural Press, the trial judge had made declarations that the appellants had contravened or been directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in the contravention of ss 45 and 46 of the Act. The appellants did not appeal the content of the declarations to the Full Court or the High Court. Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon (with whom Gleeson CJ and Callinan J agreed) stated at [89]-[90]:
The declarations spoke merely of "an arrangement" having a purpose and effect, without giving any content to that expression and without indicating the gist of the findings of the primary judge identifying the arrangement.
These declarations provide a bad precedent and were of a kind which the trial judge should not have agreed to make even if urged to do so by the parties. Close attention to the form of proposed declarations, particularly those "by consent", should be paid by primary judges.
11 Their Honours set aside the declaration of the Full Court and replaced it with a more detailed declaration of the contravention that had occurred.
12 In Francis, Gray J was of the view that the majority of the High Court in Rural Press had indicated that the making of declaratory orders by a 'mechanical process' should not continue. His Honour said that attention must be given to the form of the declaration, so that it is 'at least informative as to the basis on which the court declares that a contravention has occurred' (at [113]). Justice Gray made the following relevant observations:
A declaration must be of significance; what is declared must have some effects on the rights and obligations of the parties to the proceeding in which the declaration is pronounced.
The mere expression of a conclusion in the form of a declaration, particularly a conclusion as to the facts, will generally fall short of this requirement.
It is difficult to see how an issue is resolved by an order which is not comprehensible except by recourse to the reasons for judgment.
It is difficult to see how the rights of a member or members of the public under the Act can be vindicated by the mere recording of the conclusion that a contravention has occurred.
13 In BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 207 ALR 452, the appellant was alleged to have failed to comply with a prescribed product safety standard for vehicle jacks and specified safety instructions accompanying vehicle jacks. The trial judge had made a general declaration that the appellant's conduct had contravened s 65C(1)(a) of the Act. The Full Court was of the view that the form of the declaration made by the trial judge was a 'bad precedent'. At the very least, the Full Court said, the declaration should have disclosed the basis on which the vehicle jack and the owner's manual supplied failed to comply with the prescribed consumer product safety standard relating to vehicle jacks (at [35]).
14 It is clear from these authorities that the declarations proposed by Global One and 6G, which merely express that contraventions of ss 52 and 53(e) of the Act have occurred, are inappropriate. However, I am also of the view that most of the details contained in the Commission's proposed declarations, including the precise cost of the subscription fees and ongoing fees, the SMS number to which the consumer was required to respond and the method by which the consumer could end his or her subscription, are unnecessary and unsuitable for the terms of the declarations in question. Excluding these details from the form of the declarations will have little impact on the utility of the declaratory relief. Effects such as the promotion of awareness among other content service providers of what constitutes a contravention of the Act and the protection of consumers from misleading conduct will still be obtained with a shorter form of declarations.
15 Accordingly, the declarations that I will make include the detail of the sections of the Act contravened and provide the basis for the contravention, being the representation in each of the Advertisements that 'any consumer responding to the [particular] Advertisement by sending an SMS message would purchase a one-off service at a one-off cost when in fact the consumer was subscribing to a service with an initial sign-up fee and an ongoing subscription fee'.