D THE VOIR DIRE - RELEVANT EVIDENCE & FINDINGS
18 In order to make the advance ruling, evidence was adduced on the voir dire and, apart from the First Nicholls Affidavit, the ACCC relied upon a further affidavit of Mr Nicholls affirmed 15 December 2017 (Second Nicholls Affidavit), two 'chain of custody' affidavits by solicitors, and an affidavit of Mr Scott Peter Gregson affirmed on 16 February 2018 (Gregson Affidavit). The balance of the ACCC's evidence was a CD-ROM, correspondence and, importantly: (a) audio recordings of further calls made in June 2016 to an additional nine Apple Stores (which, together with the Relevant Calls, I will describe compendiously as the June Calls); and (b) a bundle of file notes made by Mr Nicholls of telephone calls made to Apple Stores in April 2016 (April Calls). Mr Nicholls and Mr Gregson were cross-examined. For Apple, the only tender was a letter from its solicitor, Clayton Utz, to the ACCC dated 29 July 2013.
19 It is unnecessary to make reference to some of this material, but from the evidence adduced on the voir dire, I make the following relevant findings:
(a) in undertaking its enforcement role under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), the ACCC uses a number of investigative tools including, on occasion, what it describes internally as "Jo Consumer enquiries" (Jo Consumer enquiries); Jo Consumer enquiries involve ACCC investigators making enquiries of traders, and occasionally purchasing goods or services from traders, without disclosing that they are ACCC officers;
(b) types of Jo Consumer enquiries may differ, including in-store, online or phone enquiries, or attending seminars or forums; the information gleaned from Jo Consumer enquiries is used for three main purposes: (i) compliance assessments, as part of reviewing particular representations or conduct across an industry; (ii) investigations, to gather evidence about alleged contraventions; and (iii) enforcement action, including obtaining evidence as to alleged contraventions;
(c) guidance is provided by the ACCC to investigators as to how investigations may be undertaken and there has been "some material available on Jo Consumer investigations at different points in time" (T 12) and, according to Mr Nicholls, there were (at least at some time) guidelines as to how to conduct such operations, setting out the circumstances in which covert calls are to be made (T 28);
(d) as a general proposition, ACCC investigators endeavour to make Jo Consumer enquiries closely resemble the interaction of consumers with businesses; dissembling the fact that the officer making the enquiry is an ACCC investigator enables the relevant officer "to gather highly relevant information about how a business interacts with consumers" (see Gregson Affidavit at [12]);
(e) again, as general propositions: (i) there are advantages to conducting Jo Consumer enquiries, including where the investigation involves oral representations and there is a need to obtain evidence of what statements are being made, and consumers may be unwilling or unable to assist in providing evidence; and (ii) "Jo Consumer enquiries are an important investigative tool for the ACCC to carry out its enforcement activities" (see Gregson Affidavit at [14]);
(f) Mr Gregson, as the head of the Enforcement Division of the ACCC, "would certainly want [a Jo Consumer enquiry] to be done within the framework that [the ACCC] set[s] our investigators" and the use of Jo Consumer enquiries would be inappropriate if it went beyond what was necessary for the purposes of investigation as a matter of principle (T 8);
(g) although Mr Gregson was aware of the relevant Apple investigation and that it involved Jo Consumer enquiries, he had no recollection of knowing who was involved or the specific set up of the April Calls or June Calls, nor was he involved in the process of approving use of the technique in the present case;
(h) in April 2016, in making the April Calls, Mr Nicholls engaged in what was, in effect, "a trial run, to try out some investigative techniques"; the records of the April Calls were not intended or envisaged to form part of the evidence in any case brought by the ACCC, but constituted Mr Nicholls "just testing the waters with some investigative techniques to see how it might play out" (T 15);
(i) there were two outcomes in the April Calls: either a communication from an Apple employee that the fictional consumer had no rights under the ACL to a free repair; or, alternatively, there was no indication either way as to ACL rights, but rather a request was made by the Apple employee that the fictional iPhone be brought into an Apple Store with the intention that it be looked at by Apple technicians (T 16);
(j) after the making of the April Calls, Mr Nicholls thought about how he could hone his technique and obtain the most effective evidence in conjunction with his colleagues; before Mr Nicholls decided to make the June Calls, he added an important additional element to the fictional consumer's scenario he was to portray: this was, that whatever Apple Store he called, he was to represent to his interlocutor that the fictional consumer lived an inconvenient distance away, thereby suggesting it was impracticable for the fictional consumer to come into the Apple Store (T 20); this was a detail deployed quite deliberately (T 21); importantly, this investigative technique (of identifying a consumer at an apparently inconvenient location) was adopted by Mr Nicholls in the June Calls to try to push the conversation along with the Apple employee to make it more likely that there would be an answer given by that employee relevant to the question as to whether ACL rights existed (T 21); put another way, the adoption by Mr Nicholls of this technique reflected a general strategy in the June Calls to attempt to direct the conversation to the point of the Apple employee expressing a view about whether the fictional consumer had a right to free repair under the ACL (T 23);
(k) as to the June Calls, again Mr Nicholls only obtained two outcomes to his enquiries: one was a request by the Apple employee for the fictional consumer to bring the defective iPhone into the Apple Store; the other was for the Apple employee to make a statement to the effect that the fictional consumer did not have a right to free repair under the provisions of the ACL; it follows, that in none of the June Calls was there a conversation during which an Apple employee said that there was a right to free repair under the ACL (T 24); this outcome was obtained in circumstances (given Mr Nicholls' previous communications) where he considered, at the time of the making of the June Calls, that this was the most likely response, that is, that there was no right to a free repair, and when he obtained such a response he made certain to get the Apple employee to repeat it (T 24); Mr Nicholls adopted this course of conduct because he was conscious of trying to make sure that the evidence, being the admissions made by Apple employees, was as clear and definite as possible as to what the Apple employee was saying concerning the ACL (T 26);
(l) although the June Calls comprised 22 calls, in the First Nicholls Affidavit, reference was only made to 13 telephone calls (being the Relevant Calls), and no reference whatever was made in that affidavit to the April Calls (or, obviously enough, those of the June Calls which were not the Relevant Calls).
20 As can be seen from the above, my findings, in effect, involve acceptance of much of the evidence given by both Mr Nicholls and Mr Gregson in their affidavits, as clarified during cross-examination. Before passing from the findings, there is an additional matter which requires specific comment.
21 The impression I received from the evidence was that the ACCC, or at least Mr Gregson, treated the use of deceptive investigative techniques with apparent insouciance. This is despite the evidence, noted above, that Mr Gregson wanted any Jo Consumer enquiry to be performed within the 'framework' set for the investigator and his view that the use of Jo Consumer enquiries ought not go beyond what was necessary for the purposes of an investigation (see [19(f)] above).
22 The Gregson Affidavit was couched at a high level of generality, and when asked about this topic in cross-examination, the following evidence was given (T 8):
And as a general rule, you wouldn't endorse the use of deceptive techniques of this kind until proper consideration had been given to exhausting non-deceptive investigative techniques?---No, I don't agree with that proposition.
So is it the case that you would accept that even if there are non-deceptive techniques available to gather evidence, it would still be equally legitimate to use deceptive techniques to gather the same evidence?---Well, quite possibly, depending on the circumstances.
23 When I later asked for specific clarification of this evidence (at T 12), Mr Gregson indicated that he would not have chosen the word "deceptive" and that in circumstances where there may be evidence from consumers of "very isolated instances" of potential contravening conduct, it "may be appropriate to corroborate or test how broad" the impugned conduct was by use of Jo Consumer enquiries. This answer did not assist me in directly clarifying the evidence as to why the use of deceptive techniques could "quite possibly" be adopted, depending on the circumstances, prior to exhausting (or at least dismissing as impracticable) non-deceptive investigative techniques.
24 No evidence was adduced of the ACCC guidelines (despite their apparent existence, at least at some time) nor of "the framework that [the ACCC] set[s] our investigators". No contemporaneous documentation was adduced such as memoranda proposing or approving the calls or revealing a considered approach to the relevant authorisation being made. This cannot be taken too far, notwithstanding the principle that where a party fails to adduce evidence-in-chief on a relevant matter within the knowledge of witnesses the party calls, the court should not draw inferences favourable to that party: see Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 at 418E per Handley JA. It is possible to conclude, however, that although there was unchallenged hearsay evidence of authorisation (by Mr O'Shaughnessy and Mr Zawa), I do not know the reasoning processes which led to the authorisation, nor do I know whether the conduct was consistent with pre-existing guidelines or "the framework that [the ACCC] set[s] our investigators".
25 What I conclude on the evidence adduced is that a casual approach was taken to choosing the technique of Jo Consumer enquiries in the present case and without exhausting (or dismissing as impracticable) non-deceptive investigative techniques to obtain similar evidence. On one level, this criticism might be thought to have a logical difficulty, as the Relevant Calls are relied upon only for a limited purpose - to make out the ACCC Representation case, that is, misleading or deceptive conduct directed specifically to the regulator with regard to the Relevant Calls. In this narrow sense, there was no alternative evidence to that procured and relied upon to make out this particular aspect of the ACCC's case. However, the point I make is a broader one: despite the general but compelling evidence given as to the importance (and perhaps the critical importance) of Jo Consumer enquiries in appropriate cases, here the regulator was seeking to procure evidence to support a misleading or deceptive conduct case against Apple in relation to consumer warranties. In relation to this investigation and evidence gathering as to that general case against Apple, I am not satisfied that the covert activity was embarked upon by reference to any perceived difficulty in obtaining evidence relevant to the impugned conduct of Apple, which was the topic of investigation. I used the expression above, 'apparent insouciance', because the impression I received was that, within the ACCC, what Mr Nicholls did was regarded (at least by the head of the ACCC's Enforcement Division) as nothing out of the ordinary. It was also far from being a technique employed after, and only when, other techniques, which did not involve deception, were discounted as being impracticable. Put another way, despite Mr Gregson's evidence that the use of Jo Consumer enquiries would be inappropriate if they went beyond what was necessary for the purposes of an investigation, the evidence does not support the conclusion that they were, in fact, necessary for investigation of Apple's conduct.
26 Finally, in dealing with findings, I should make reference to a not unrelated point. As set out above, Apple tendered Exhibit VDA and it was said by Apple to be relevant because the letter dealt with the provision of documents pursuant to a notice issued to Apple under s 155(1)(a) and (b) of the CCA. The argument went that the letter was evidence of the fact that 80% of calls to Apple Call Centres (but not Apple Stores) were recorded and given consumers were more likely to place calls to the Apple Call Centres than to Apple Stores in relation to queries as to phone faults, it should be inferred that there was an available repository of recorded interactions between 'real life' consumers and Apple employees which were ignored by the ACCC in preference to conducting the Jo Consumer enquiries. For at least three reasons I would decline to draw such an inference: first, the letter speaks of practices in and before July 2013 and I have no idea whether such practices remained in place during the relevant period with which we are presently concerned; secondly, connected to the first point, the letter itself notes that the practice of Apple was to delete this recorded data "automatically" (although this deletion practice, at least in 2013, was said to have been "temporarily discontinued"); thirdly, the records would only record communications with Apple Call Centres which, for all I know, might be outside Australia and, in any event, may not necessarily reflect similar interactions in calls made to Apple Stores.