What test should be adopted for exclusion of the doctrine?
85 The pre-existing freedom test, like any rule expressed in abstract and generalised terms, has to be applied to an infinite range of possible situations. Anomalies are inherently likely to occur, as is demonstrated by Heydon in "The Restraint of Trade Doctrine", (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1999, at 51-53). To take but one of the examples given by the learned author, if V owns two shops and sells one to P, with mutual covenants that neither shop will be used as a butcher's shop, the doctrine will apply to V's covenants but not to P's. Yet the impact on competition is the same.
86 One might add that anomalies are not confined to hypothetical cases. In Esso the covenantor was giving up its pre-existing freedom to sell whatever brand of petrol it chose at its existing sites. The doctrine applied. In Pamag the covenantor was not giving up any such freedom. It was setting up a new bakery business at Moranbah. But the doctrine also applied. Stephen J points out (at 285) in a passage already quoted above (par 46) that there are good reasons why a trader setting up business may have special needs for trade supplies or finance which can only be obtained by giving trade ties. So one could mount a reasonable argument that the setting up of a new business should be encouraged by the law and thus the doctrine should not apply. The accessibility of a market to new entrants will go far towards determining the degree of competition in the market. But such an argument would be inconsistent with the decision in Pamag itself. Thus in the context of setting up a business the pre-existing freedom test seems to draw a distinction between restraints applicable to the acquisition of one kind of business asset (land) and all other forms of assets. The distinction is not logical in an age when knowledge and intellectual property are often more important than physical assets, including land. A new entrant, who necessarily is not giving up a pre-existing freedom, for that very reason ought to be the object of protection by competition law. So in this setting the pre-existing freedom test tends to work against competition principles.
87 Moreover, a generalised normative test lends itself to artificial attempts at evasion, such as occurred (albeit unsuccessfully) in Amoco and Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 303.
88 Very often the result will be the same whichever of the Esso tests is applied. Counsel for a covenantor will argue that the restraint meets all tests and thus the doctrine applies. Counsel for the covenantee will argue the converse. Distinguishing between the Esso tests, or propounding a fresh one, is not seen as forensically useful. And so it happened in the present case.
89 However if the pre-existing freedom test is to be applied in the present case, there is substantial ground for an argument that the doctrine does apply.
90 It is true that in a strict sense the respondent had no pre-existing freedom to go on to the Tip. On each occasion his entry by licence was conditioned by the stipulated contractual terms. Subject to any express statutory prohibition such as anti-discrimination legislation, the appellant had the absolute right to determine who should enter upon its land and on what terms: Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487 at 507,511.
91 However, this may be too confined a view. As the learned primary judge pointed out, it is unrealistic to look at each licence granted to the respondent and other scavengers as if it bore no relationship to any other. Moreover, the whole point of the doctrine of restraint of trade is that, where applicable, it overrides "absolute" rights, such as the right to enter into binding contracts. The doctrine may even override contracts to which the plaintiff is not a party: Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353.
92 The cases dealing with warning-off individuals from racecourses are instructive. In Heatley the High Court held that such a notice issued under a statutory power conferred on the respondent Commission was invalid as being in breach of the rules of natural justice. The Commission was not an owner or occupier of racecourses. In Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242 the respondent club owned two racecourses itself but by contractual arrangements with other clubs effectively controlled all trotting in New South Wales. These arrangements included the "Rules of Trotting". The respondent issued a notice under r 28 excluding Mr Forbes, a professional punter, from its two racecourses. By the time the case reached the High Court, it was accepted that the rules of natural justice were applicable and had been breached. The club however sought to support the expulsion by reliance on its rights as proprietor. Gibbs J (at 269) held that the effect of the rules was to impose restrictions upon the manner in which the club could exercise its proprietary rights. The rules provided that on race days only the stewards had the right to expel persons. His Honour said:
"An owner who uses his land to conduct public race meetings owes a moral duty to the public from whose attendance he benefits; if he invites the public to attend for such a purpose, he should not defeat the reasonable expectation of an individual who wishes to accept the invitation by excluding him quite arbitrarily and capriciously. The rules recognize the public nature of the race meeting by placing some restrictions on the rights of the owner of the course."
93 Stephen J (at 272-3) and Aickin J (at 281) both thought an ineffective exercise of the r 28 power could not be saved by calling in aid the quite distinct power arising from the club's status as owner and occupier. Aickin J (at 282) and Murphy J (at 274) pointed out that, because of the arrangements with other clubs, the warning off notice had effects much wider than exclusion from the club's properties. Barwick CJ dissented.
94 One of the arguments advanced by Mr M H McHugh QC for the appellant was that the resolution of the club to issue the notice was in any event void, being against public policy as an unreasonable interference with the appellant's right to work. The club had an effective monopoly over a large industry. Interference with the appellant's capacity to invest money by betting attracted the doctrine of restraint of trade: Buckley v Tutty, Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633.
95 Aickin J (at 282) thought it better to leave such questions "for an occasion which makes it necessary to examine them". Two other members of the Court dealt with the argument. Murphy J accepted it. His Honour said (at 274-5):
"The respondent is not only an owner of land, it is registered under the Gaming and Betting Act, 1912 (N.S.W.), as amended, to conduct race meetings on the lands and, under the Totalizator Act, 1916 (N.S.W.), as amended, to permit tote betting on the lands. Because of this, the respondent exercises power which significantly affects members of the public, tens of thousands of whom go to watch the spectacles, many to bet as a hobby, and some, like the appellant, to try to make a living by betting. Many hundreds depend on it for their livelihood in occupations such as bookmaking, training and driving. The functions of the respondent in relation to the conduct of race meetings on its lands are qualitatively different from that of the ordinary householder exercising his private property rights. A householder, exercising his property rights, may do so against the public, and ordinarily this is sensibly regarded as the exercise of a private right and of private power, although the right stems from a public source and is ultimately enforceable through public administrative and judicial authorities. A householder exercising his property rights of exclusion is not in the same position as persons with licences to conduct public halls, restaurants, theatres or racecourses. From early times the common law has declined to regard those who conduct public utilities, such as inns, as entitled to exclude persons arbitrarily (see White's Case (1558) 2 Dyer 1586, 73 ER 343). However, in Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse Co. Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605, the Court, in my opinion wrongly, dealt with exclusion from a racecourse as if the case were concerned with private rights only. That case differs from the present case in that there the person was removed from one meeting during its course; here the exclusion is from all meetings indefinitely.
When rights are so aggregated that their exercise affects members of the public to a significant degree, they may often be described as public rights and their exercise as that of public power. Such public power must be exercised bona fide, for the purposes for which it is conferred and with due regard to the persons affected by its exercise. This generally requires that where such power is exercised against an individual, due process or natural justice must be observed. There is, [sic] of course, legislative and executive powers affecting individuals which traditionally have been treated as not being required to conform to natural justice. There is a difference between public and private power but, of course, one may shade into the other. When rights are exercised directly by the government or by some agency or body vested with statutory authority, public power is obviously being exercised, but it may be exercised in ways which are not so obvious. In my opinion, a body, such as the respondent, which conducts a public racecourse at which betting is permitted under statutory authority, to which it admits members of the public on payment of a fee, is exercising public power. It may not arbitrarily
exclude or remove such a person from the lands during a race meeting. It was conceded that there are ample powers to remove persons who misbehave. As the lands in question are used in this public way only during race meetings, the exercise of public power is confined to those times. In so far as the land reverts to a private use from which members of the public are excluded at other times, there is no reason why the respondent's ordinary private rights may not be exercised at those times. Exercise of power to exclude persons not in the position of members of the public, that is, drivers or others who use the racecourse on other days, does not now call for consideration."
96 Barwick CJ (at 260-261) rejected the argument. His Honour thought that the club's resolution did not prevent Mr Forbes from betting; access to a course or courses was not indispensable to the pursuit of a punter's activity. Moreover the law did not enforce a "right to work", it only removed unreasonable impediments upon the capacity to work. Nagle v Fielden was distinguishable because in the instant case the club did not have the sole control of punting. And punting did not fall "within the area of trade or employment with which relevant public interest is concerned in connexion with restraint of trade".
97 The argument in Forbes that public policy and the doctrine of restraint of trade may override the absolute rights of an occupier was accepted by one member of the High Court although rejected by another. A similar argument could be put in the present case, given the public nature of the appellant and the community function served by the Tip.
98 Moreover, persons coming onto land to carry on a trading activity might be said to have a legitimate expectation of being able to continue that activity. Exclusion by the owner may be subject to some external constraints, such as the rules of natural justice or the doctrine that restraints of trade be reasonable.
99 If the doctrine of restraint of trade is to be excluded in the present case, a more satisfactory basis is needed.
100 As already mentioned, Lord Wilberforce's trading society test seems to have attracted on balance the approval of the High Court. If one might respectfully say so, it accords more satisfactorily with common law methodology and with the need for the law to adapt to methods of doing business which are constantly changing.
101 While acknowledging that the trading society test "has the great advantage of flexibility" Heydon (op cit, at 61 et seq) does point out some of its drawbacks. Public opinion may be incapable of seeing the evils of the restriction and commercial people may all be interested in keeping the system going. And will courts be able to apply the reverse process so as to bring within the doctrine a practice once seen as innocuous but now recognised as pernicious?
102 However, in Australia there is a substantial statutory competition law regime to be found in Parts IIIA, IV, VII, VIII, XIA, XIB and XIC of the TPA. (The common law is preserved: ss 4M, 51(2)(e)). Parliament regularly amends this legislation in the light of the changing needs of business and consumers and the fundamental importance of competition for the health of the economy. The legislative scheme is enforced by a powerful statutory body, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. The existence of such a legislative regime must mitigate the concern that the trading society test may be ineffective to meet changing business practices, or community views of them.
103 In any case, the common law doctrine necessarily leaves a large gap in the regulation of anti-competitive conduct. Parties to an agreement or arrangement in restraint of trade will, as long as they happen to find it mutually beneficial, be unaffected by the doctrine in any practical way. When one party does seek to invoke the doctrine it will usually not be for any lofty motives of public interest. It has not escaped the notice of courts that sometimes parties of relatively equal bargaining strength freely enter into a contract but later one finds a more attractive proposition elsewhere and seeks to be released: Pamag at 265, Amoco at 294.
104 Australian statutory competition law has thus supplemented the common law as did the Sherman Act 1890 in the United States. In United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co 86 F 291 (1898) Judge Taft, later to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, said (at 279):
"Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for damages in favor of one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and were not enforced by the courts. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] App. Cas. 25; Hornby v. Close, L.R. 2Q.B. 153; Lord Campbell, C.J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, 66; Hannen J., in Farrer v. Close, L.R. 4 Q.B. 602, 612. The effect of the act of 1890 is to render such contracts unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense, and punishable as a misdemeanor, and to create a right of civil action for damages in favor of those injuried [sic] thereby, and a civil remedy by injunction in favor of both private persons and the public against the execution of such contracts and the maintenance of such trade restraints."
105 The trading society test should be adopted.