Australian Agricultural Company v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia [1913] HCA 41

Australian Agricultural Company v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia [1913] HCA 41 - HCA 1913 case summary — Zoe

[45]

are the plaintiffs, and the organization which is the claimant in the arbitration is the defendant. The plaintiffs may be classed as the northern and southern collieries of New South Wales, though there are other collieries, both northern and southern, which are not parties to this action. The writ claims an injunction restraining the defendant organization from proceeding against the plaintifis with the plaint No. 6 of 1910 in the Commonwealth Court of Con- ciliation and Arbitration, filed by the defendant organization against the plaintiffs, in violation of the terms of the agreements between the several plaintifis and the defendants dated 13th December 1910, 3rd, 5th and 18th May 1911, respectively. The plaint is that which was in question in the special case just dealt with, and the agreements are those which were relied upon in that case so far as the present plaintifis are concerned. The motion before us was for an injunction until after the trial of the action. The terms of the agreements, their intention as gathered therefrom, and the circumstances surrounding their execution have been very fully discussed. The main incidents in the dispute in the course of which the agreements were made have been described in my judgment in the special case. During certain arbitration proceedings under a plaint which has turned out to have been a nullity during the time of the execution of the agreements, negotiations took place between several of the plaintiffs and the defendants for the settle- ment of the proceedings which were then supposed by both parties to be effective, and the agreements in question were framed in pur- suance of prior agreements between the organization and the as- sociated proprietors of the northern and southern collieries respect- ively. Those agreements are not before us, but it is apparent tome from the terms of the consequent agreements and from the conduct of the parties in the arbitration proceedings, that they confused an industrial agreement with an agreement under sec. 24. They seem to have thought that the agreements as framed would operate as industrial agreements, and would, if filed, as they were filed, in the office of the Industrial Registrar, operate under sec. 24 also. It is probable that both sides had it as their object and intention to obtain from those agreements every security and advantage that the Arbitration Act could afford. The agreements, as was decided

[48]

Ausrrarran quently, they are without the sanctions and attributes which Acnice" they would have possessed had they conformed to the terms Pupniarep Of the Statute. The parties supposed that a valid industrial agree- ae Seat ment executed during arbitration proceedings would operate Frremen's under sec. 24 as well, but the dominant intention was that these oy eae should be effective industrial agreements within Part VI. of the sta. Act. It is now contended that if not good as industrial agree- Barton A.C.J. ments, and in my opinion they are not good as such, they were intended to operate at common law failing a valid operation under Part VI.; but the plaintifis base their claim for an injunction mainly upon that supposedly valid operation, and they have only relied on the effect of them (if any) at common law as a possible alternative, though very naturally they were more insistent on that aspect of the matter as the failure to comply with Part VI. became more apparent. There are many other questions in the case, but I cannot avoid the conclusion that the substance of the matter lies in this question : - Do these documents represent actually and fully the intended agreements between the parties? It appears to me clear that they do not. The parties were aiming at the pro- duction of an instrument which would have certain statutory effects and give them certain statutory remedies in case of breach, and they looked no further than that. They have failed to compose an agreement with these attributes. 1 think the circumstances shown in evidence negative the idea that they ever in their minds assented to and executed these particular agreements for the sake of or in contemplation of any effectiveness they might possibly possess at common law. They had no thought of common law obligations. They were thinking only how they might secure the statutory advantages and remedies. My belief is founded a good deal upon the evidence read to us concerning the proceedings in the Arbitration Court both before and after the passage of the amending Act. I believe upon all the facts that if they had been told that the form adopted would not secure these results they would not have entered into these agreements at all, or into any that would not secure what they wanted. Both sides

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that the agreements or memoranda of them were filed so that they might have operation under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and that unless they had such operation they should have no operation at all. It is now clear that they could have no operation under the Act, and accordingly there is no ground for restraining the defendants from proceeding with their plaint. The opinion which we have just expressed is, we understand, prac- tically identical with that of the four other members of the Court sitting in the present case, and in our view it is not consistent with the judgment of the majority of the Court in J. C. Williamson Ltd. vy. Musicians' Union of Australia (1). That case was decided by the Chief Justice and Barton J., forming the majority of the Court, Isaacs J. dissenting. The Chief Justice was strongly disposed to think that the agreement, which for present purposes may be regarded as practically identical in form, and in the circumstances under which it was made, with the agreements now sued on, was an industrial agreement within the meaning of the Commonwealth Con- ciliation and Arbitration Act. We have just decided in Federated Bn- gine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. [No.3] (2), that that view cannot be maintained. Both Justices were of opinion that the agreement, if not an indus- trial agreement within the Act, was binding at common law and, subject to certain grounds for invalidating it set out in the pleadings

which if established would have invalidated any agreement - was enforceable against the defendants; on that ground they decided that an injunction could go. If that agreement was enforceable these agreements are enforceable, and if an injunction could have gone in that case there is no reason why an injunction should not go in this. It is true that the view which now commends itself to all members of the Court was not considered in that case, and for that reason it is said that our decision in this case should not be regarded as overruling J. C. Williamson Ltd. v. Musicians' Union of Australia (1). It is equally true that in the judgments of the Chief Justice and Barton J. there is no reference to the question of public policy which induced Zsaacs J. to come to the conclusion that no injunction could be granted ; they express no opinion on a matter

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (247 paragraphs)