© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2007] NSWSC 1386
Supreme Court of NSW
2007-12-19
Bell J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CITATION : Attrill v Christie [2007] NSWSC 1386 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
DECISION : Award the sum of $110,000; Judgment will be entered in the sum specified with interest calculated at 2 per cent; The parties may bring in a minute of judgment incorporating the order for costs. In the event that there is any issue concerning a special order for costs, the matter may be re-listed on three days notice
CATCHWORDS : DAMAGES - Defamation Act 2005 - imputations of criminality
Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Limited (1992-1993) 178 CLR 44 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 Chakravarti v Advertisers Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519 Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176 Dingle v Associated Newspapers [1964] AC 317 CASES CITED : Hodge v TCN Channel Nine [2006] NSWSC 933 McGaw v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1147 NSW Aboriginal Land Council v Perkins (1998) 45 NSWLR 340 Obeid v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2006] NSWSC 1059 Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Limited (2003) 216 CLR 327 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR
PARTIES : Gerald Hart Attrill (Plaintiff) Ronald George Christie (Defendant)
COUNSEL : S M Littlemore QC / S Chrysanthou (Plaintiff) K P Smark SC / D Hand (Defendant)
SOLICITORS : Larbalestier & Co (Plaintiff) R Christie (Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION
20158/06 Gerald Hart Attrill v Ronald George Christie
JUDGMENT 1 BELL J: By statement of claim filed on 5 May 2006 the plaintiff claims damages for defamation arising out of the publication in or about February 2006 of certain words said by the defendant to a journalist employed by the licensee of TCN Channel Nine in the course of a video taped interview. The statements were made in the knowledge that they would be re-published as part of an item broadcast on the Nine Network in the program "A Current Affair" (the program). They were broadcast throughout Australia on 14 February 2006. The plaintiff sues the defendant for the publication of the words to the journalist and for their re-publication in the course of the broadcast of the program. 2 The words upon which the claim is brought and which it is acknowledged were published of and concerning the plaintiff are: (a) He's nothing more than a con man. (b) I've had so many phone calls and I've been in contact with so many families that have been absolutely devastated by losing their children to this man's particular occult. (c) The day he's behind bars will be a day when not only me but thousands of people and families around this country would be very happy and pleased to see. 3 In accordance with the Rules the plaintiff specified the imputations on which he relies as defamatory of him arising out of the matter: (a) That he is a criminal, being a con-man or confidence trickster. Particulars: This imputation is carried by the words at paragraph 2(a) above; (b) That by occult practices, he has devastated families by causing them to lose their children. Particulars: This imputation is carried by the words at paragraph 2(b) above; (c) That because he has conned thousands of people, he deserves to be behind bars. Particulars: This imputation is carried by the words at paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c). 4 The claim is brought under the Defamation Act 2005 (the Act). Section 8 of the Act provides that a person has a single cause of action for defamation in relation to the publication of defamatory matter about the person, even if more than one defamatory imputation about the person is carried by the matter. 5 The defendant concedes that the words, set out in paragraph [2] above, are defamatory of the plaintiff and acknowledges his liability for their re-publication during the broadcast of the program. 6 Mr Smark SC, who with Mr Hand, appeared on the defendant's behalf submitted that the ordinary reasonable viewer would not take from the words set out at paragraph 2(b) above that the plaintiff had separated children from their families by occult practices. He acknowledged that little may turn on the point given that no defence was raised which required consideration of a specific imputation and the concession that the matter was defamatory in the respects particularised as imputations (a) and (c). This is so. To the extent that anything turns on it, bearing in mind that this was a transient publication, I consider that the words set out in 2(b) above would have been understood by the ordinary reasonable viewer as conveying the meaning for which the plaintiff contends.
7 The plaintiff does not claim special damages, nor damages by way of a general loss of business or custom. The claim which is pleaded in paragraph 6(b), for aggravated damages, was abandoned at the hearing. 8 The defendant did not rely on any defence and the hearing proceeded as an assessment of the damages. The plaintiff gave evidence of injury to his feelings and to his reputation and led evidence from a number of witnesses going to these issues. 9 No evidence was led of the size of the audience of the program. It was conceded by the defendant that the determination of the plaintiff's damages should be approached upon the basis that the re-publication of the defendant's words in the course of the program was to a wide audience throughout Australia. 10 The segment of the program, which included the statements made by the defendant, was a rather sensational piece focussed on the plaintiff, which occupied around three minutes. The defendant's statements were edited into the segment close to halfway through it and very close to the end of it. The transcript of the entire segment is in evidence. It is reproduced below. 1. Tracey Grimshaw : Well now to the man whose followers believe he is Jesus Christ. But our 2. investigation shows there is nothing divine about him. In fact quite the
KING : The Divine Presence as he calls himself doesn't mix with people like you
and me. We're way too toxic. But there is one way you can get close to
this man who wields so much power over his followers. And that is
through this door. In this building in Murwillumbah we are offered
thousands of dollars worth of products. There's disks, pendants,
GLORIA NELSON : The last time I talked to my daughter was really ten years ago.
KING : Gloria Nelson from Wisconsin in America is a heartbroken mother. In
1996 mother and daughter were tourists in Australia. Gloria went home
to the States but Ingrid stayed behind with friends. She met the cult
leader on the Gold Coast and severed all contact with her family.
NELSON : You know, I don't have those, those phone calls anymore.
SHAW : They put you against your family. Jessa used to say that my mother was
36 No evidence was led by the defendant in mitigation of damages. 37 The maximum damages amount has been increased to the sum of $267,500, by declaration published in the Government Gazette on 15 June 2007. 38 In making an assessment of the damages to be awarded under the Act the Court is to have regard to the purposes of damages for defamation explained in the joint reasons in Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Limited (1992-1993) 178 CLR 44 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 60. These are consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused by the publication, reparation for the harm done to the plaintiff's reputation and vindication of his reputation. Their honours observed that the three purposes overlap and approved the observation made by Windeyer J in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR at 150 that, "the amount of the verdict is the product of inextricable considerations". 39 In the joint reasons in Carson their Honours commented on the "need to ensure a rational relationship between the scale of values applied in defamation and in personal injuries cases" (at 64). The Defamation Act 1974 (the former Act) was amended after Carson to insert s 46A. Section 46A(1) was in the same terms as s 34 of the Act. Section 46A(2) required the court in determining the amount of the award of damages for non-economic loss in proceedings brought in defamation to take into consideration the general range of damages for non-economic loss in personal injury awards (including awards made under any statute regulating the amount of the award) and has no counterpart in the Act.
40 Mr Littlemore QC, who with Ms Chrysanthou appeared on the plaintiff's behalf, submitted that this was a serious defamation, which required that vindication be accorded central importance. The plaintiff had been accused of criminal conduct deserving of imprisonment and the award should be such that the plaintiff can point to it as demonstrating the utter falsity of the allegations: Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 at 61. I accept that is so. 41 In Mr Littlemore's submission the maximum damages amount specified in s 35(1) of the Act serves to cap awards for non-economic loss but does not otherwise inform the determination of the appropriate sum. In his submission, the Court fixes a sum by reference to the purposes of damages as explained in Carson, ensuring the appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded, but without regard to the maximum damages amount. In his submission, if it had been intended that the maximum damages amount fix the upper limit of a range it is to be expected that it would have been stated to represent a most extreme case or the like. 42 In Mr Littlemore's submission the seriousness of this defamation was deserving of an award of general damages in an amount of or above the maximum damages amount. He sought to illustrate this by reference to a number of cases in which very substantial awards had been made: Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176; NSW Aboriginal Land Council v Perkins (1998) 45 NSWLR 340; Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Limited (2003) 216 CLR 327; McGaw v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1147; Hodge v TCN Channel Nine [2006] NSWSC 933 and Obeid v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2006] NSWSC 1059.
43 In Mr Smark's submission there is little to be gained by considering the range of awards for non-economic loss in defamation actions prior to the Act. He submitted that the maximum damages amount is to be taken as representing the presumptive outer limit of awards for non-economic loss. His submission drew on the judgment of Hayne J (with whose judgment on the question of damages Gleeson CJ and Gummow J concurred) in Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 52; 216 CLR 327 at 353 dealing with the relationship between subsections (1) and (2) of s 46A of the former Act:
[76] The second effect of s 46A(2) flows from both the reference to the "general range" of damages allowed in personal injury cases and the inclusion, within the class of personal injury cases to be considered, of cases where the damages to be allowed are regulated by statute. Treating cases where the damages allowable are capped by statute as included within the "general range" to be considered shows that those statutory limits imposed in cases of motor or workplace accident are not to be taken as being indirectly imposed as limits on the amount to be allowed in defamation. But the reference to the general range of damages does identify the highest sums awarded for the non-economic consequences of personal injury as what might be called a presumptive outer limit to awards for defamation. So much follows from the fact that rarely, if ever, will the harm done by a defamation be greater than the most serious form of physical injury which leads to permanent and serious disabilities. And if that represents the presumptive outer limit to awards for defamation, each particular award that is made must find a place within a range which is marked out in that way. 44 I approach the matter on the basis that the maximum damages amount provided by s 35 is to be understood as fixing the outer limit of damages for non-economic loss (in cases which do not warrant an award of aggravated damages) and by analogy with the approach explained by Hayne awards for non-economic loss are to find a place within a range marked out in this way. This is not to say that an award of the maximum damages amount in a case not warranting an award of aggravated damages is to be reserved for the worst defamation imaginable.
45 In determining the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff I am required to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by him and the amount of the award. In this case it is necessary to make that assessment in circumstances in which the plaintiff's evidence of the hurt to his feelings must be assessed in a context which includes that the allegations for which the defendant is not liable were also hurtful to him. This does not involve mitigating the damages to be awarded by any consideration that the plaintiff's reputation was damaged by the publication of the allegations for which the defendant is not responsible on the program: Dingle v Associated Newspapers [1964] AC 317; Chakravarti v Advertisers Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519. 46 What it is necessary to do is to fix an amount that properly reflects the injury to the plaintiff's reputation and hurt to his feelings brought about by reason of the defendant's statements which were re-published during the program. The task is made more difficult by the circumstance that the plaintiff did not see the program until well after the present proceedings were commenced. The distress that he experienced in the aftermath of the broadcast was as the result of the things told to him by others about it, which included the substance of the things said by the defendant and the substance of allegations made by others. I am satisfied that the plaintiff suffered significant hurt on learning of the defendant's statements and in particular those that imputed criminality to him. He led evidence, which I accept, of the damage done to his reputation among members of the general community in Murwillumbah.
47 The harm done to the plaintiff, by the re-publication of the defendant's defamatory statements on a popular television program having a wide viewing audience justifies a substantial award of damages. The injury done to the plaintiff's reputation is significant and it is necessary that the award clearly signify that the allegations are without foundation. Weighing up these considerations I have concluded that the appropriate award is the sum of $110,000. 48 Mr Littlemore did not press the submission advanced in written submissions concerning the calculation of interest. Judgment will be entered in the sum specified with interest calculated at 2 per cent. 49 The parties may bring in a minute of judgment incorporating the order for costs. In the event that there is any issue concerning a special order for costs, the matter may be re-listed on three days notice.
21/12/2007 - Inclusion of Ms Chrysanthou - Paragraph(s) [40]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Attrill
Christie
(1993) 178 CLR 44
(1998) 193 CLR 519
(1996) 41 NSWLR 176
(1998) 45 NSWLR 340
(2003) 216 CLR 327