In the first place, the law of trusts does not enable a testator or
settlor to control and direct the future use of his property as an
independent power but only as a means to an end. His directions
are not enforced simply because he has given them by an instrument
in proper form and independently of the nature and description of
the remoter purposes they are found to subserve. If they do not
concern the creation, devolution or enjoyment of estates or interests,
they are enforced only when they answer some purpose of a defined
class allowed by law as tending to the public benefit: See Law
Quarterly Review, vol. 31, p. 361; Law Quarterly Review, vol. 53,
pp. 26-35 ; Law Quarterly Review, vol. 54, p. 258, and Hobart Savings
Bank v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1). The reason why
the specific directions given by an instrument declaring a charitable
trust receive effect is because they tend to a purpose falling within
the legal description of charity. The existence of that purpose is,
therefore, the foundation of a valid trust. In the next place, the
very idea of a trust for a purpose beneficial to the community
involves the distinction between ends and means. If property is
devoted to an abstract end or purpose, the details of its application
or use must be considered as a means to the end. Where the trust
instrument does not leave such matters to the administration of the
trust but formulates an elaborate plan or scheme or gives particular
directions, there is reason in the view that the exact plan or directions
are not of the essence of the disposition. In the third place, as the
purpose of the trust need not, and, indeed, most usually does not,
involve the expenditure or consumption of corpus, continuity and