It is possible to see that in England there has always been a distinction between what may perhaps loosely be called legitimacy for the purpose of inheritance to land and legitimacy for other purposes. It may be that the distinction has not always been clearly defined but it has persisted and, indeed, it persisted in one form until the Legitimation Act, 1926. In modern times the distinction is to be observed in the case of persons who, though not born in wedlock, are legitimate according to the law of their parents' domicil at the time of birth. The existence of this distinction led the author of one of the articles previously referred to "to call attention to the peculiar status in England of a child who is born in Scotland of unmarried parents domiciled there and is afterwards legitimated by their subsequent marriage. In England", it is then said, "this child is partially legitimate; he is not legitimate there for the purpose of succession to real property in England, the descent of which is governed by the law of England, but he is legitimate in England for all other purposes" (Law Quarterly Review (1920) vol. 36 p. 261). These observations are founded upon the opinions of the Judges in Birtwhistle v. Vardill [1] where it was held that a child born in Scotland, of parents domiciled there, who at the time of his birth were not married, but who afterwards intermarried in Scotland, though legitimate by the law of Scotland, could not take, as heir, lands of his father in England. But I find it difficult to understand how it can be said that a child may be partly legitimate and partly illegitimate or - in spite of the fact that I have used the expression loosely - how a child may be legitimate for some purposes and illegitimate for others. The true explanation of the decision in the case mentioned is, I think, given by Lord Brougham in the following passage: "The learned Judges have given no opinion upon the question whether or not a person legitimated by subsequent marriage in a country where that law prevails, is therefore legitimate all the world over: nor, perhaps, was it incumbent on them to argue this for the purpose of answering the question put to them by the House. They contend that the statute, or rather the common law recognized and declared by the statute, requires something beyond mere legitimacy to make an heir to English real estate. They agree with the Court below, that legitimacy alone is not sufficient; it must be as was there said (5 Barn. and Cress. 454), legitimacy sub modo, - legitimacy and being born in wedlock. Consequently they appear plainly to admit, that a person may be legitimate for all other purposes, and yet incapable of taking land by descent - that we ought not to say "a man's eldest lawful son is his heir at law", but "his eldest lawful son if born in lawful wedlock" " [2] . Later, in In re Goodman's Trusts [3] , the Court of Appeal held that a child born before wedlock, of parents who were at her birth domiciled in Holland, but legitimated according to the law of Holland by the subsequent marriage of her parents, was entitled to a share in the personal estate of an intestate dying in England as one of her next-of-kin under the Statute of Distributions. In the course of his reasons James L.J. referred to Vardill's Case [1] and said: "What the assembled Judges said in Doe v. Vardill, and what the Lords held, was, that the case of heirship to English land was a peculiar exception to the rights incident to that character and status of legitimacy, which was admitted by both Judges and Lords to be the true character and status of the claimant. It was only an additional instance of the many anomalies which at that time affected the descent of land. Legitimate relationship in the first degree was of no avail if the claimant were an alien, or if he were of the half-blood, or in the direct ascending line, which, pace Professor Blackstone, were precious absurdities in the English law of real property. But in this particular case, the exception is, at all events, plausible. The English heirship, the descent of English land, required not only that the man should be legitimate, but as it were porphyro-genitus, born legitimate within the narrowest pale of English legitimacy. Heirship is an incident of land, depending on local law, the law of the country, the county, the manor, and even of the particular property itself, the forma doni. Kinship is an incident of the person, and universal. It appears to me that a statement of the law so given, and so accepted nearly fifty years ago, which has been adopted without question by jurists as a correct statement of English adhesion to the universal law and comity of nations, is not to be questioned at this time by any tribunal short of the House of Lords, and I should humbly think not by them" [1] . (See also per Cotton L.J. [1] and per Romer J. in In re Bischoffsheim: Cassel v. Grant [2] and Bamgbose v. Daniel [3] ). These authorities, which recognized the right of a person legitimate according to the law of his parents' domicile at the time of his birth to share in his father's personal estate in England, but which denied him the right to inherit his father's English land unless born in wedlock, show that the rules concerning succession to English land have been worked out on very special principles. Accordingly it does not necessarily follow that because a person is disqualified as an heir to English land he must be regarded by English law as the illegitimate offspring of his parents. If he were to be so regarded the anomalies would be obvious as James L.J. so colourfully pointed out in Goodman's Case [4] : "What is the rule which the English law adopts and applies to a non-English child?" This is a question of international comity and international law. According to that law as recognized, and that comity as practised, in all other civilized communities, the status of a person, his legitimacy or illegitimacy, is to be determined everywhere by the law of the country of his origin - the law under which he was born. It appears to me that it would require a great force of argument derived from legal principles, or great weight of authority clear and distinct, to justify us in holding that our country stands in this respect aloof in barbarous insularity from the rest of the civilized world. On principle, it appears to me that every consideration goes strongly to show, at least, that we ought not so to stand. The family relation is at the foundation of all society, and it would appear almost an axiom that the family relation, once duly constituted by the law of any civilized country, should be respected and acknowledged by every other member of the great community of nations. England has been for centuries a country of hospitality and commerce. It has opened its shores to thousands of political refugees and religious exiles, fleeing from their enemies and persecutors. It has opened its ports to merchants of the whole world, and has by wise laws induced and encouraged them to settle in our marts. But would it not be shocking if such a man, seeking a home in this country, with his family of legitimated children, should find that the English hospitality was as bad as the worst form of the persecution from which he had escaped, by destroying his family ties, by declaring that the relation of father and child no longer existed, that his rights and duties and powers as a father had ceased, that the child of his parental affection and fond pride, whom he had taught to love, honour, and obey him, for whom he had toiled and saved, was to be thenceforth, in contemplation of the law of his new country, a fatherless bastard? Take the case of a foreigner resident abroad, with such a child. If that child were abducted from his guardianship and brought to this country, can any one doubt that the Courts of this country would recognize his paternal right and guardianship, and order the child to be delivered to any person authorized by him? But suppose, instead of sending, he were to come himself to this country in person, would it be possible to hold that he would lose his right to the guardianship of the child in this country because of the historical or mythical legend that the English barons and earls many centuries ago cried out in Latin, Nolumus leges Angliae mutare? Can it be possible that a Dutch father, stepping on board a steamer at Rotterdam with his dear and lawful child, should on his arrival at the port of London find that the child had become a stranger in blood and in law, and a bastard, filius nullius?