But the interpretation of sec. 114 of the Constitution raises another difficulty. The section itself mixes up two distinct subjects. It forbids a State to raise a naval or military force without the consent of the Commonwealth Parliament; and it forbids a State to impose a tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth. Then, apparently, it occurred to the draughtsman that a similar prohibition should be inserted against the Commonwealth taxing State property. The prohibition as to State taxation was, no doubt, suggested by the British North America Act, sec. 125. But by substituting the word "property" for "lands or property," the intention - if it was the intention - to confine the prohibition to what are known as "property taxes" has been somewhat obscured. Property is, by the Constitution, subject to be taxed at the instance of the State as well as of the Commonwealth; Customs taxation is solely a matter for the Commonwealth (sec. 90). Taxes of retaliation, as between the States and the Commonwealth, are possible as to property taxes; but are impossible as to Customs taxes. But whatever may have been the motive which led to this express prohibition, in addition to the prohibition which this Court has held to be implied from the nature of the Constitution as to the taxation of State or Commonwealth agents, the phraseology is such as to point to taxation of property as property as being the subject of this express prohibition. "A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament or the Commonwealth, ... impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State." But is a Customs tax a tax on property as such? The Customs Tariff 1902 speaks of "duties ... on ... goods," and the expression is roughly accurate, although, probably, if fully expressed it would be a tax on persons in respect of the importation of goods; just as a property tax is usually, though not necessarily, a tax on persons in respect of their property. A Customs tax is a tax, not on property as such, but on persons in respect of the act of importation. There is a fundamental difference between taxing men for having property, and taxing men for moving property - and, in particular, for moving property into the country from over seas. A turnpike toll, or an octroi tax, is not, properly speaking, taxation "imposed on property," although the person who moves the animals or goods through the gate or into the city has to make a payment based on the number or character or value of the things which enter. Unless they enter, there is no tax; if they enter, there is a tax - which has to be paid by the person who brings them in, whether he is the owner or not. In other words, it is not a "property tax." The case of succession taxes in the United States is analogous. Congress cannot, according to the doctrine of M'Culloch v. Maryland[48], tax State agencies; but it can tax a bequest of money or a devise of land to the State. It can tax the movement from the dead hand into the hand of the State: Snyder v. Bettmann[49]. Another analogy may be found in the distinction between taxation by a State of United States bonds, the property of a corporation, and taxation levied on the franchise or business of the corporation; although the amount of the tax may depend on the value of the bonds in each case: Home Insurance Co. v. New York[50].