HER HONOUR: These are proceedings under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). The defendant, Mr Malcolm Potier, is currently in prison serving a sentence imposed upon him in November 2006 after he was found guilty by a jury of the offence of soliciting a person to murder his ex-wife. Mr Potier has appealed against that conviction. The appeal has been heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal but not yet determined.
The term of imprisonment currently being served by Mr Potier is for a period of 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years. Mr Potier was eligible for release to parole on 7 August 2013 but, to date, has not been granted parole. His initial application for parole was rejected: see Potier v The State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1271 at [55] to [64]. A report prepared by Community Corrections in respect of a further application evidently recommended that parole should be granted: at [69]. I am not aware of the present status of that application. Mr Potier's sentence expires on 6 August 2018.
The principal application for vexatious proceedings orders against Mr Potier was determined on 25 February 2014: Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Potier [2014] NSWSC 118. I should record (although it is not relevant to the present application) that, in that judgment at [215], I expressed my agreement with the view of Handley A-JA in Potier v Director-General, Department of Justice & Attorney General [2011] NSWCA 105 at [10] that any proceeding which is not a criminal proceeding is a civil proceeding within the meaning of s 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 (NSW). My attention has since been drawn to the remarks of Basten JA in Patsalis v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 307; 81 NSWLR 742 at [43]-[55] where his Honour rejected the existence of that dichotomy; and see the additional remarks of Sackville A-JA at [111]-[118]. I respectfully accept that my conclusion on that issue appears to have been wrong.
The effect of the orders made by me was to prohibit the institution of any new proceedings (unless with leave under the Act) and to stay any existing proceedings. However, the orders expressly did not apply to Mr Potier's existing appeal against the criminal conviction. The vexatious proceedings orders were in the following terms:
(1) That, pursuant to section 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the defendant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales except interlocutory proceedings in his appeal proceedings pending in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal numbered 2005/14700 (including any bail application).
(2) That, pursuant to section 8(7)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, any proceedings already instituted by the defendant in New South Wales except his appeal proceedings pending in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal numbered 2005/14700 and any interlocutory proceedings in that appeal be stayed.
The conviction under appeal is Mr Potier's third conviction for solicitation to murder. His two earlier convictions relate to a previous solicitation to murder the same ex-wife and a solicitation to murder the man who became her boyfriend after she and Mr Potier separated. Mr Potier has exhausted his rights of appeal in respect of those convictions but has sought an inquiry into the convictions under Part 7 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). An application for an inquiry of that kind had been made before the commencement of these proceedings but that fact did not emerge at the hearing of the Attorney General's application for vexatious proceedings orders.
At the time the original application was made, it invoked the power of the Court under s 474D of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The parts of the Crimes Act dealing with such inquiries have since been repealed and transferred to the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. It was conceded on behalf of the Attorney General that the application under s 474D, if still pending, is governed by Part 7 of that Act. The relevant transitional provision (clause 13 of schedule 1 to the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act) provides:
a petition or application that was made under Part 13A of the Crimes Act 1900 before the repeal and transfer of that Part by the amending Act and that had not been finally determined under that Part immediately before its repeal is taken to be a petition or application under the corresponding provision of Part 7 of this Act.
Mr Potier now seeks an order varying the vexatious proceedings orders so as to allow him to pursue the Part 7 application. This judgment determines that application.
No requirement for leave to bring the present application
The notice of motion seeking the variation was filed together with a summons seeking leave to file the notice of motion "if leave be required". However, it was common ground at the hearing of the motion that Mr Potier does not require leave to bring the present application. Section 9 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act provides:
(1) An authorised court may, by order, vary or set aside a vexatious proceedings order that the court has made.
(2) An authorised court may make the order of its own motion or on the application of:
(a) the person subject to the vexatious proceedings order, or
(b) a person referred to in section 8(4).
(3) An application may be made by a person referred to in section 8(4)(e) only with the leave of the authorised court.
A "person referred to in s 8(4)(e)" is a person who has been allowed to make an application for a vexatious proceedings order on the basis that, in the opinion of the court, the person "has a sufficient interest in the matter". By necessary implication, the imposition of a requirement for leave in such a case should be understood to mean that there is no requirement for leave in the case of an application to vary made by the person against whom the vexatious proceedings order was made. Dr Galbraith, who appears for the Attorney General, accepted that that is the proper construction of the Act.
Circumstances giving rise to the application to vary
As already noted, the vexatious proceedings orders made on 25 February 2014 are already subject to an express exception, being the appeal proceedings currently pending in the Court of Criminal Appeal and any interlocutory proceedings in that appeal. The exception of the substantive appeal proceedings was expressly sought by the Attorney General: see principal judgment at [14]. The Attorney General did seek an order prohibiting Mr Potier from instituting any interlocutory proceedings in connection with or incidental to that appeal but I was not persuaded that it was appropriate to prohibit or constrain the institution of any such proceedings by the mechanism of a vexatious proceedings order: see principal judgment at [218] to [220].
In considering Mr Potier's application to expand the exception to include the Part 7 application, it is necessary to understand aspects of the circumstances giving rise to Mr Potier's three convictions.
Mr Potier has always maintained that there is an important and intimate connection between his appeal against his third conviction (which has been heard but not determined) and his convictions for the first two offences (as to which he has exhausted his rights of appeal).
The relevant circumstances were summarised in my principal judgment in these proceedings at [5] to [13] and also in an earlier judgment of mine in the Court of Criminal Appeal: R v Potier [2011] NSWCCA 170 at [11] to [17]. The following is a summary drawn from those earlier judgments.
Mr Potier was in a relationship with his former de facto wife for 11 years until August 1999. They have a child from that relationship, who was still an infant when they separated. After the relationship ended, proceedings were commenced in the United Kingdom for custody and access orders relating to that child.
In August 1999, the mother travelled to Australia with the child, evidently against Mr Potier's wishes. Mr Potier made a successful application to the Family Court of Australia for an order that the child be returned to the United Kingdom.
Mr Potier, the mother and the child all returned to the United Kingdom. However in late December 1999 Mr Potier came back to Australia with the child using false passports. The child was ultimately returned to the mother and Mr Potier was taken into immigration detention. His travel visa was subsequently cancelled on the basis of his production of the false passport.
Shortly before being taken into immigration detention Mr Potier had formed an acquaintance with a woman who ran an Internet café in Melbourne. He told her that he had abducted the child from the United Kingdom because he was concerned about the mother's new partner. Mr Potier said he believed that the new partner was a paedophile who would harm the child.
The proprietor of the Internet café remained in contact with Mr Potier after he was taken into immigration detention. She says that, during that time, Mr Potier revealed a plan to kill the mother's new partner, later also discussing killing the mother as well.
At some stage police became involved. On 8 May 2000 Mr Potier was arrested and charged with the first two counts of solicitation to murder (relating to the mother and her new partner). The Crown case in support of those charges rested heavily on recordings of conversations by telephone and in person alleged to have taken place between Mr Potier and an undercover police officer.
Mr Potier denies the authenticity of those recordings. At his first trial, he put a case to the jury (and has maintained ever since) that some of the recordings had been altered or manufactured.
Evidence was given during that trial that police had obtained a "web trace" of the telephone line of the informant, the records of which disclosed that, as to nine recordings of telephone calls allegedly made by Mr Potier to the informant, five had failed to register as being received on the web trace. A witness called by the Crown (an employee of Optus Cable and Wireless) gave two alternative explanations for that fact: that the search methods of those administering the web trace were at fault and had failed to locate the missing calls and, alternatively, that the calls had not been made.
The witness suggested that the issue could be resolved by obtaining Telstra's records of the telephone accounts for the telephones from which the calls were allegedly made. No such records were made available at the first trial. After putting a case to the jury that he should be given the benefit of the doubt as to whether the calls were in fact made, Mr Potier was convicted of the two offences.
Before being sentenced for those offences, Mr Potier was charged with the third offence of soliciting to murder.
In April 2002, Mr Potier was sentenced for the first two offences.
In his appeal against the first two convictions, Mr Potier relied, in part, on allegedly fresh evidence. He claimed that, after he was convicted, he became aware that the Crown Prosecutor had sought and obtained the Telstra records referred to in the evidence of the Crown witness who gave evidence about the web trace. It is Mr Potier's contention that the telephone records reveal that the very same five telephone calls not detected on the web trace are also absent from the Telstra telephone records, suggesting a reasonable possibility consistent with Mr Potier's defence at the trial that the calls were never made (and, implicitly, that the purported recordings of those calls put in evidence at the first trial were recordings that had been altered or manufactured).
On 17 February 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal: Potier v R [2006] NSWCCA 27. The Court held that the evidence was not "fresh" (at [49] per McClellan CJ at CL, Hislop and Rothman JJ agreeing at [97] and [98] respectively): The Chief Judge said:
I have already referred to the position in relation to Mr Finlay's evidence. With respect to the Telstra material, the Crown tendered evidence on the appeal, which indicates that the relevant material was included in the Crown brief, which was provided to the appellant's solicitors before the trial. Accordingly, any submission that the material is fresh evidence, which could now be of assistance to the appellant, must be rejected.
Mr Potier says that the decision was plainly wrong in that respect, being based on a misapprehension of the evidence (which revealed that the Telstra records, as opposed to the Optus records, formed no part of the police brief and indeed were not made available to Mr Potier until after his conviction).
On 21 July 2006 Mr Potier wrote to the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal stating that he wished to seek "a review" of his conviction and asking the Registrar to send him the appropriate form. In due course Mr Potier submitted a summons in the Court of Criminal Appeal dated 25 July 2006. The relief claimed in the summons was "that this court does review its decision in file 60695/01 and does quash the applicant's conviction". In terms, the summons was directed to the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing the conviction appeal from the first trial. To that extent, the relief sought was misconceived. The summons was nonetheless treated within the Registry as an application pursuant to s 474D of the Crimes Act for an inquiry into the conviction.
On 14 September 2006, the s 474D application was referred to Howie J for determination.
Meanwhile, following the dismissal of the appeal against the first two convictions, the Crown relied upon evidence from the first trial as tendency or coincidence evidence to prove the third offence. In October 2006, Mr Potier was convicted of that offence. The appeal proceedings expressly excluded from the vexatious proceedings orders relate to that conviction. Mr Potier's essential point is that, had the convictions entered in the first trial been quashed (as he contends they should have been), evidence relating to those charges would not have been admitted to prove the third offence. He relies upon the alleged inadmissibility of that evidence to impugn his conviction for the third offence.
On 9 November 2006 Mr Potier wrote to Howie J in respect of the s 474D application. In that letter, Mr Potier stated that he had applied for legal aid and requested the judge to take no further action on the application for a period of 21 days. Mr Potier wrote again to the judge on 30 December 2006 stating that he hoped to have the assistance of a particular barrister and asking the judge to "defer final judgment" on the application. Following further correspondence sent at the request of Mr Potier, the associate to Howie J confirmed receipt of the request to defer final judgment on the application.
There was no further correspondence on the file until 15 October 2010, when the Registrar wrote to Mr Potier informing him that, since the matter had been in abeyance for a substantial period, she proposed to close the file and "to re-open it when and if you make such a request". Mr Potier took no further steps in respect of the s 474D application until at least September 2013.
On 9 November 2011, Mr Potier filed an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Court of Criminal Appeal's dismissal of his appeal against the first two convictions. Pursuant to r 41.13.1 of the High Court Rules, that application was deemed to have been abandoned on 12 September 2012.
Accordingly, at the hearing of the Attorney General's application for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act in November 2012, Mr Potier's conviction appeal in respect of his first two convictions had been dismissed and no application for special leave to appeal was pending in the High Court. Mr Potier said he wished to pursue the application for special leave but had been unable to do so for want of a grant of legal aid. He was hopeful that the Crown would in due course join in the application in light of the Court of Criminal Appeal's alleged misapprehension of the facts: cf Burrell v R [2008] HCA 34; 238 CLR 218 per Kirby J at [92]-[93], [131].
On 18 December 2012, Mr Potier filed a summons in the High Court seeking an order that the application for special leave be reinstated. That application was dismissed by Heydon J on 11 February 2013: Potier v R [2013] HCA Trans 13. In dismissing the application, Heydon J recorded part of the explanation for the delay provided by Mr Levet on behalf of Mr Potier in the following terms:
Where one is dealing with a person who is extremely focused on his case and has produced a large amount of documentation and wants to talk about it at great length it is hard to ensure that the case will be presented convincingly.
Mr Levet had submitted that it was "difficult to get instructions from a person of that character who was in custody and can only be seen for limited periods of time and wants only to talk about things which do not actually help his case".
However, notwithstanding the decision of Heydon J, Mr Potier was evidently successful in having the application for special leave listed for oral hearing later that year. The application for special leave was dismissed on 6 September 2013: Potier v R [2013] HCA Trans 207.
After the hearing of the Vexatious Proceedings Act application, the Attorney General obtained leave to re-open his case to adduce evidence of Heydon J's decision. However, the ultimate determination of the application for special leave was not put in evidence before me in the Vexatious Proceedings Act application.
Mr Potier asserts that, following the High Court's final rejection of the application for special leave in September 2013, he promptly took appropriate steps to re-open the s 474D application. At that stage, his conviction appeal in respect of the third conviction was pending in the Court of Criminal Appeal and was being dealt with in the Registrar's list. It was in that context that Mr Potier says he raised the s 474D application. In the absence of transcript of any appearances before the Registrar, the Attorney General does not accept that the issue was raised with the Registrar and disputes that Mr Potier has demonstrated an appropriate degree of diligence in pursuing the application.
Unusually, Mr Potier managed to secure an occasion for mentioning the s 474D application before Johnson J in open court. The present application was re-opened to admit the transcript of that hearing. His Honour noted that proceedings seeking an inquiry into a conviction are not judicial proceedings and do not give rise to any entitlement to a hearing. Unsurprisingly, His Honour was at a loss to understand how the matter had come to be listed before him. Johnson J also noted that, so far as the material before him revealed, Mr Potier's application under s 474D had not been proceeded with. His Honour requested Mr Potier to lodge a document stating that he wished to make an application under Part 7 of the Crimes (Appeal & Review) Act. Mr Potier duly wrote to the Registrar on 21 November 2013 stating that he wished his s 474D application, which he described as "part heard", to be continued and converted into a Part 7 application. For the reason identified by Johnson J, the application could not in fact be regarded as "part heard". Further, Howie J had by then retired.
Whether the Part 7 application is a proceeding
It is necessary to address a threshold issue raised by the parties. The vexatious proceedings orders operate so as to prohibit the institution of "proceedings" and to stay any "proceedings" already instituted. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Potier that an application for an inquiry under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act is not "proceedings" within the meaning of those orders (it was assumed that the orders reflect the meaning of the same expression in the Vexatious Proceedings Act). On that interpretation, the relief sought would not be required - the application (and indeed any further application) could be pursued unimpeded by the vexatious proceedings orders. Mr Brezniak, who appears for Mr Potier, explained that it was nonetheless sought to have a determination of the Court against the risk that his interpretation was wrong.
Section 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act defines "proceedings" in the following terms:
(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and
(b) any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and
(c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way.
The mechanism for an inquiry under Part 7 (which is relevantly the same as it was under s 474D) is to make an application to the Supreme Court: see s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. Section 79 provides that, after considering the application, the Court may direct that an inquiry be conducted by a judicial officer or refer the whole case to the Court of Criminal Appeal to be dealt with under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). In either case, such action may only be taken if it appears that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person's guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case. A case referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal could result in the verdict of the jury or the judgment of the court of trial being set aside: s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act. Referral to an inquiry would ultimately result in the furnishing of a report by the Court to the Governor, following which "the Governor may then dispose of the matter in such manner as to the Governor appears just": s 82(4) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. Each of those courses is apt to call the jury's verdict into question.
Mr Brezniak submitted that the Part 7 application does not fall within paragraph (a) of the definition of "proceedings" set out above because it is not an "inquiry" but only an application for an inquiry. That is probably correct. However, as submitted by Dr Galbraith, the application may properly be seen as a "matter" within the jurisdiction of the Court. Dr Galbraith further submitted that a Part 7 application is "a calling into question of a decision" within the meaning of paragraph (c) of the definition set out above. At the hearing of the application I raised the issue whether the verdict of a jury is a "decision" within the meaning of that paragraph. It may not be. In any event, I am satisfied that a Part 7 application is a "matter" within the meaning of paragraph (a). It is an application which invokes a statutory power of the Supreme Court which falls to be determined by the Court: s 79(1).
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Part 7 application is governed by the vexatious proceedings orders.
Application of the vexatious proceedings orders
The purpose of the present application is to seek a variation of the orders so as to ensure that the prosecution of the Part 7 application is not impeded.
The variation was sought in respect of both orders made in the principal judgment (set out above). Logically, however, it can only fall within one or the other order but not both. If a Part 7 application is pending, there is no need to institute proceedings but they are stayed by order 2. If no Part 7 application is pending, order 2 has no application but the institution of such an application (without leave) would be prohibited by order 1.
The Attorney General submitted that the Part 7 proceedings instituted by Mr Potier have "lapsed". On that premise, it was submitted that it would not be appropriate to vary the vexatious proceedings orders so as to create an exception for any new application. It was submitted that to do so would undermine the detailed scheme in the Act by which leave is required to institute fresh proceedings that would otherwise be prohibited.
The point reached in Mr Potier's original application under s 474D was that, before the decision was made whether to take either of the courses permitted under s 79, Mr Potier requested Howie J not to make a final determination pending the resolution of his legal aid application. Further, although the file was closed, it was contemplated that it could be re-opened at Mr Potier's request and he has in fact made that request. Contrary to Mr Potier's submissions, it is not accurate to say that the application "was adjourned" or "on hold" pending the determination of the special leave application. It does appear that Howie J acceded to a request that he not make a final decision at that point. It may also be noted that the Act expressly contemplates (in s 79(3A) that the determination of an application for an inquiry might be deferred until any appeal proceedings are concluded. However, contrary to the contentions on which the present application was premised, the only reason in fact articulated for the request to defer a decision was the outstanding application for legal aid; no representation was made by Howie J that the application could abide the appellate process or be revived at whim.
When the file was later closed, it was expressly contemplated that it could be re-opened at Mr Potier's request. He has in fact made such a request, albeit many years later (and after the retirement of the judge to whom the request for deferral of a decision was made).
In those circumstances, I think the prudent approach is to regard the Part 7 proceedings as remaining on foot. The closure of the file in 2010 was a step taken by the Registrar (perfectly reasonably) for reasons of administrative convenience. The application has been made and never finally determined by the Court. The closure of the file by the Registry does not amount to a dismissal or determination of the application. In my view, the application should be regarded as one pending in the Court. Accordingly it is order 2, rather than order 1, which must be considered. I accept, as submitted by the Attorney General, that it would not be appropriate to vary order 1 so as to permit the institution of a fresh Part 7 application - to do so would subvert the scheme of the vexatious proceedings legislation.
Nature of the power to vary vexatious proceedings orders
The Attorney General's written submissions on the present application noted that there is little authority on the circumstances in which the Court might exercise its broad discretion under s 9 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act to vary or set aside a vexatious proceedings order that the Court has made. The Court of Appeal expressly declined to consider that issue in Macatangay v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWCA 237 at [39] per Sackville A-JA; Macfarlan and Leeming JJA agreeing.
The issue was referred to briefly in Bar Mordecai v Attorney General (NSW); Bar Mordecai v State of NSW [2012] NSWCA 207. In that case, the Court held that the vexatious proceedings orders against Mr Bar Mordecai did not extend to requiring leave under the Vexatious Proceedings Act in order to obtain an order for discovery in properly instituted proceedings. Basten JA noted that the broader construction contended for by the State "could transfer much of the case management from the trial court to the Supreme Court and could lead to the constant interruption of trials for the institution of applications for leave in the Supreme Court". In that context, his Honour observed that, if the Court's construction of the order were incorrect, "there might be much to be said" for varying the order so as to limit its operation: at [43]; Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) and Sackville A-JA agreeing at [2] and [67] respectively.
Otherwise, there is little guidance as to the exercise of the power to vary an order beyond the obvious proposition that it must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the objects of the Act.
Whether the orders should be varied
On the premise that the Part 7 proceedings are pending and are governed by order 2 made 25 February 2014, the Attorney General submitted that the Court should not exercise its discretion to vary the order in the present case. The considerations put forward on behalf of the Attorney General for refusing the application focused primarily on procedural considerations. In particular, the Attorney General noted that Mr Potier was legally represented and also personally present during the hearing of the vexatious proceedings application and did not raise the Part 7 application during those proceedings. It was further submitted that the delay in raising the question of those proceedings is unexplained, particularly since 25 February 2013 when the Attorney General reopened his case to tender the transcript of the application to the High Court determined by Heydon J on 11 February 2013.
Dr Galbraith submitted that the Court should infer that the failure to mention the existence of the Part 7 proceedings during the hearing of the Vexatious Proceedings Act application was a deliberate choice by Mr Potier. However, as noted by Mr Brezniak, the failure to raise the issue at an earlier point in time operates to Mr Potier's detriment, not his benefit. If the failure to draw the Court's attention to the Part 7 application was tactical, it was not a particularly clever tactic.
I am not persuaded that Mr Potier made a considered decision not to draw the existence of the Part 7 application to my attention during the hearing of the Vexatious Proceedings Act application. As recorded by Heydon J in the remarks set out above, it may be accepted that Mr Potier does not always focus on the issues which might enable those representing him to present the most convincing case that can be put on his behalf. In my view, the more likely explanation is that the Part 7 proceeding was simply not brought to mind during the conduct of the application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
A further factor relied upon by the Attorney General against varying the order is that, if the present application is refused, Mr Potier's rights are only restricted, not denied. It was submitted that the refusal of the application would enable the Court to consider detailed evidence in order to form a view as to whether there is a prima facie ground for the application for an inquiry. It may be noted in that context that Part 7 itself confers a broad discretion comprehending ample scope not to order an inquiry. In particular, the Court may refuse to consider or otherwise deal with the application if not satisfied that there are special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action. However, the Court having reached the view that Mr Potier has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, there is force in the argument that the process for seeking leave under the Act is the more appropriate mechanism for addressing the question whether a Part 7 application should proceed. The issue is very different from the practical consideration addressed by Basten JA in Bar Mordecai.
I have reached the conclusion that the discretion to vary the vexatious proceedings order should not be exercised in favour of Mr Potier in the circumstances of the present case. Although the Part 7 application technically remains on foot, Mr Potier took no step to advance the application for a period of almost 7 years. In the meantime, an analysis of the many proceedings instituted by Mr Potier over many years has produced the conclusion that he is a vexatious litigant. I considered it appropriate to exclude the criminal appeal from the consequences of that finding but it by no means follows inexorably that there is merit in the Part 7 application.
I accept that the Court should be loath to impede the pursuit of any avenue of review of a conviction for a serious criminal offence. However, as noted in supplementary submissions filed for the Attorney General (with leave), there is nothing before this court to suggest the existence of any fresh material or argument that has not been considered in the several appeal proceedings that have been pursued since the original s 474D application. There may be new or different arguments beyond those brought forward in those proceedings but that is not a matter I am in any position to judge. The appropriate course, in my view, is for the question of the fate of any further application for an inquiry to be determined within the deliberately restrictive regime of s 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
For those reasons, the application is rejected.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 17 March 2015
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales