[14] In my opinion, the Court should approach the questions involved in s 84(1) with care and caution. The making of an order under the section effects a significant curtailment of a citizen's rights. Once satisfied that the pre-requisites have been met, however, a court should act firmly and authoritatively to restrain and control new and existing vexatious litigation, to the extent the statutory power enables it to act. There is, of course, undoubtedly a discretion whether to act or not, even where the statutory pre-conditions have been established."
275 Proceedings are vexatious if they are either instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought, are brought for collateral purposes, and not the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise or, irrespective of the motive of the litigant, are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless. The collateral purpose need not refer to the sole purpose, but merely to a purpose for which the proceedings were brought and for which they should not have been commenced: see Donnelly v Capricornia Prospecting Pty Ltd [1999] NSWLEC 39; (1999) 102 LGERA 310 and the cases cited at 322. Litigation is vexatious if it is brought for collateral or ulterior purposes, or if it is not a bona fide attempt to have the questions in dispute adjudicated: Attorney-General for New South Wales v Solomon (1987) 8 NSWLR 667 at 674.
276 To form the basis for an order under s 84(1), the proceedings must be shown to have been instituted "without any reasonable ground" and such proceedings must have been instituted "habitually and persistently". As to the circumstances in which proceedings are commenced "without any reasonable ground", Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth at 491E was of the view that proceedings that are said to be so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless necessarily satisfy this requirement. In Attorney General v Bar-Mordecai, Patten AJ, while less categorical, nonetheless assumed that vexatious proceedings instituted with reasonable ground would constitute a "rare case": [2005] NSWSC 142 at [30].
The proper approach
277 While the Court looks to see whether each allegedly vexatious proceeding is in fact vexatious, an order is justified if the pattern emerges of vexatious proceedings being habitually and persistently instituted. In Attorney-General for New South Wales v Solomon at 673, Young J said the following:
"The Court must examine the proceedings under review. It looks to see whether each is vexatious, though it remembers that an order is justified although there may have been reasonable grounds for the proceedings in each case considered by itself if the pattern emerges of vexatious proceedings being habitually and persistently instituted: Re Chaffers (1897) 45 WR 365".
278 In Attorney General for the State of Victoria v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269 at [28] the Court said in relation to the Victorian equivalent to s 84:
"It is one thing to know what the word "vexatious" means. It is another thing to apply s 21(2) to the circumstances of a particular case. In the latter task the following matters are, according to the authorities, relevant: first, where an order has been made dismissing an action as frivolous or vexatious, or striking a pleading out, it is not for a court considering a s 21 application to go behind the order and go into the merits of the argument as a court of appeal would do. Second, findings which are required do not depend on viva voce evidence or credibility of witnesses. The critical evidence is to be found in court files - documents, judgments, orders and reasons. For that reason, any hearsay material contained in an affidavit in support of an application, even though objectionable, should be treated simply as a distraction, and ignored. Third, the question is not whether the manner in which a proceeding is conducted is vexatious; it is whether, having regard to its nature and substance, it should be so characterised. Fourth, and this is a more general proposition with respect to s 21, in determining whether the Attorney-General has made out a case, the court is not concerned with a minute individual examination of each proceeding. It must consider the overall impression created by the number of proceedings, their general character and their results"
279 Where a pattern of vexatious proceedings being habitually and persistently instituted is found to have emerged, the Court has a discretion to make an order notwithstanding that proceedings initiated by the defendant during a relevant period may have included some proceedings that cannot be characterised as vexatious: Attorney-General v Wentworth at 494 - 5.
The meaning of "any court" in s 84(1)
280 In Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that the Workers Compensation Tribunal of South Australia should be regarded as a "court" for the purposes of s 39 of the South Australian Supreme Court Act. In New South Wales the expression "proceedings in any court" to which an order under s 84 may be applicable corresponds to "proceedings … in the [Supreme] Court or in any inferior court" by reference to the vexatious character of which the jurisdiction to make such an order is enlivened. This does not extend to include proceedings in tribunals or in the courts of other jurisdictions. This view was expressed by Yeldham J in Pedler at 479:
"It will be seen that, provided the necessary conditions precedent are found to exist, the section empowers the Court to make orders of two kinds: the first, which, apart from statute, it does not otherwise possess, is the order that the vexatious litigant shall not, without leave of the Court, institute any legal proceedings against the person aggrieved in any court, which expression I take to mean the Supreme Court of New South Wales or any inferior State court"
281 In Attorney-General (NSW) v Betts, Hoeben J said at [3] that the reference to "any inferior court" means any New South Wales inferior court, which "of course excludes tribunals".
The meaning of "legal proceedings"
282 The expression "legal proceedings" in s 84 includes criminal proceedings: see Attorney General for New South Wales v Solomon at 672 per Young J and Attorney-General v Van Reesema (1986) 43 SASR 170 per O'Loughlin J.
The relevant question to consider
283 The relevant question for the Court to consider is not whether the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously, but whether they are in fact vexatious: Attorney General v Vernazza [1960] 1 QB 197 at 208; Attorney-General v Wentworth at 492. The inquiry is directed to the subject matter of the proceedings, not to the manner in which the proceedings are conducted: Pedler 485.
284 The Court's discretion is enlivened in any case where there has been a "great mass of litigation of a vexatious character, habitually and persistently instituted without any reasonable ground": Re Chaffers; Ex parte Attorney General (1897) 76 LT 351 per Wright J at 352. In such a case, the Court has a discretion to make an order notwithstanding that proceedings initiated by the defendant during a relevant period may have included proceedings that cannot be characterised as vexatious: Attorney-General v Wentworth at 494-5.
"Habitually", "persistently"
285 "Habitually" suggests that the institution of such proceedings occurs as a matter of course, or almost automatically, when the appropriate conditions exist; "persistently" suggests determination, and continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition, with a degree of stubbornness: Attorney-General v Wentworth at 492. The courts have been reluctant to formulate a definition of these terms, but the above test has been followed subsequently: Valassis v South Sydney City Council [1996] NSWLEC 232; (1996) 92 LGERA 275 at 280, Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 0907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 at 290, Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Bhattacharya and Attorney-General (NSW) v Betts.
Material to be considered
286 Material which may be considered by a court in considering an application under s 84 includes the initiating process in the allegedly vexatious proceedings, judgments, proceedings in other jurisdictions, applications for interlocutory relief brought in proceedings and related judgments and out of court statements.
287 The initiating process is obviously relevant to determining the nature of the proceedings, although it may be necessary to go behind the claim to determine conclusively whether the proceedings are vexatious in nature. Judgments have been referred to in order to establish that the proceedings were obviously groundless: Attorney-General for New South Wales v Solomon, Attorney-General v Wentworth, Valassis v South Sydney City Council and Armidale City Council v Connell [1997] NSWLEC 127. Comments by judges in dismissing litigation are relevant but not conclusive: Attorney-General for New South Wales v Solomon at 672. The result of proceedings in appellate courts can be relevant to whether the proceedings appealed from were vexatious: Re Cameron [1996] QCA 37; [1996] 2 Qd R 218, Ramsey v Skyring and Valassis v South Sydney City Council.
288 Judgments in proceedings in other courts on similar subject matter may assist in establishing the habitual and persistent nature of the litigant's pursuit of proceedings: Re Cameron; Valassis v South Sydney City Council. Findings of fact in such judgments may also assist in establishing whether a factual basis existed for bringing the allegedly vexatious proceedings: Attorney-General v Wentworth.
Proceedings in tribunals and other jurisdictions
289 As noted above, the received view is that the proceedings by reference to the vexatious character of which the Court's jurisdiction to make an order under s 84 is enlivened, and hence the only proceedings the vexatious character of which is placed directly in issue on an application under s 84, are proceedings in the Supreme Court or inferior courts of New South Wales. In determining whether particular proceedings instituted in one or more of those courts were or are in fact vexatious, it may nonetheless be appropriate to take account of proceedings in courts and tribunals other than the Supreme Court and inferior courts of New South Wales where those proceedings have authoritatively resolved the particular issue against the person instituting the proceedings. In Re Cameron, Mackenzie J stated at 224:
"To make a declaration that a person is a vexatious litigant it is necessary that the court be satisfied that the person has instituted vexatious legal proceedings and has done so frequently and without reasonable grounds. … However one of [the plaintiff's counsel's] submissions was that proceedings in courts other than Queensland courts could be regarded as 'legal proceedings' for the purpose of determining whether a person had frequently and without reasonable grounds instituted legal proceedings. It was conceded that a consequence of this argument was that the Supreme Court might make a declaration, for example, in a case where a person had instituted numerous proceedings in the Federal Court or the courts of other States without reasonable grounds and it was apprehended that he was likely to commence actions in Queensland. I do not accept this proposition. The jurisdiction given by the Vexatious Litigants Act is a protective jurisdiction and it is the frequency of the proceedings brought without reasonable grounds in Queensland courts which enlivens it. However once the elements of frequency and lack of reasonable grounds are established it is legitimate, in a case where it is necessary, to have regard to the fact that groundless proceedings have been brought in other jurisdictions and what their outcome was to aid in establishing that proceedings brought in Queensland are vexatious."
290 In Ramsey v Skyring, Sackville J stated at 389-90:
"The terms of FCR O 21, r 1 can be satisfied, however, only by proceedings instituted in this court. Even so, in determining whether particular proceedings instituted in this court are in fact 'vexatious', it may be appropriate to take account of proceedings in other courts where, for example, they have authoritatively resolved the particular issue against the person instituting the proceedings: cf O'Shea v Cameron, at 6, per Mackenzie J, with whom Pincus JA agreed."
291 The relevance of proceedings in other jurisdictions for such a purpose is consistent with what may well be a wider general principle, that proceedings in courts and tribunals other than the Supreme Court and inferior courts of New South Wales may be "relevant for the light which they throw upon" proceedings in those courts: Public Trustee v Gittoes aka Caldar at [3]. As the Court has a discretion whether or not to make an order once the essential conditions precedent have been established, proceedings in other jurisdictions may also be considered in determining whether the discretion should be exercised in a particular case: Re Cameron at 222.
Applications for interlocutory relief
292 Applications for interlocutory injunctions, and judgments on those applications, have been considered to assist in determining whether proceedings have been brought on "reasonable grounds": Donnelly v Capricornia Prospecting Pty Ltd. Regard can be had to the evidence given in proceedings to form opinions on the issue of whether or not allegations made in proceedings had any basis. This may be most appropriately done by reference to findings of fact in judgments, whether in the allegedly vexatious proceedings or other proceedings: Attorney-General v Wentworth.
293 However, affidavits filed in support of the substantive proceedings and the transcript of argument might disclose the basis of the proceedings in a way that may not otherwise appear on the face of the proceedings, and may assist in drawing the conclusion that the proceedings are vexatious in nature: Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303 at 308. Whilst interlocutory documents (such as notices of motion) and affidavits in support of applications were referred to in Attorney-General v Wentworth, Roden J cautioned that a thorough analysis of the specific complaints and allegations the subject of the litigation should be undertaken before concluding that there was an element of vexatiousness.
Out of Court statements
294 Statements made out of court threatening litigation, or discussing litigation, have been admitted to demonstrate persistence: Donnelly v Capricornia Prospecting Pty Ltd, and such statements have also been admitted to demonstrate a collateral purpose for which litigation may have been brought.
Additional background
295 Section 84(1) was modelled on s 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (UK). In Attorney General v Vernazza, a submission that, for the purposes of s 51 of the UK Act, the "vexatious" character of legal proceedings was to be assessed wholly subjectively by reference to "whether the [defendant] was acting maliciously or otherwise than in good faith" was rejected by the English Court of Appeal. Ormerod LJ remarked (at 208) that "the question is not whether [proceedings] have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious".
296 In Attorney-General v Wentworth, Roden J noted the decision in Attorney General v Vernazza alongside a consistent line of authority for the proposition that, in the context of both inherent and statutory powers to restrain abuse of process, the test for the "vexatious" character of legal proceedings was capable of being satisfied according to a "purely objective test". On the basis of those authorities, he concluded that "the requirement of vexation for the purposes of s 84(1) [is] capable of being satisfied even in the absence of malice or improper motive on the part of the litigant": at 490A.
297 Where the vexatiousness of proceedings can be established according to this "purely objective test", the motive of the defendant in bringing the proceedings need not be proved. This is exemplified by Valassis v South Sydney City Council where the respondent to a successful application under s 70(2) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 was found to be seeking in substance to re-litigate against a local council a claim that the Court of Appeal had held to be untenable in a decision from which special leave to appeal to the High Court had been refused. Although an inference might reasonably have been drawn from all of the evidence that the repeat proceedings were part of a sustained campaign of harassing conduct, the ultimate objective of which was to induce the council to amend or retreat from its zoning policy, Stein J noted that the council did not allege any such collateral purpose, but relied solely upon the fact that the proceedings satisfied the test for objective vexatiousness.
298 As to what must be shown to satisfy that test, Roden J quoted passages from both English and Australian decisions on the power of courts to restrain abuse of process by means of striking out or summary dismissal and stated (at 490G - 491A) the following:
"What these cases, and the line of authorities of which they form part, make clear, is that where an objective test is applied to determine whether the court should exercise its power to prevent litigation from running its normal course - either by striking out or summary dismissal - what amounts to 'utter hopelessness' must be shown. It seems to me that when there is an application for the far more drastic s 84(1) order, which would deny or limit a citizen's right of access to the courts, and that is considered on a purely objective assessment of proceedings instituted by [the defendant], nothing less than that 'utter hopelessness' must be shown."
299 When, in a subsequent passage of the judgment, his Honour formulated the three-limbed test for vexatiousness that appears in the published headnote to the judgment, and which has subsequently been regarded as authoritative, he expressed the "third limb" or objective test to be whether proceedings are "so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless": at 491D. The Attorney General submitted that on a strictly grammatical reading of this "third limb" of the statutory test for vexatiousness, the proper starting point for its application is not the question simpliciter whether proceedings are "utterly hopeless", but rather whether they may properly be characterised as such on the basis of the degree or extent to which they are "obviously untenable" or "manifestly groundless". The Attorney General contended that the test that Roden J intended to be authoritative should have been so carefully formulated was unsurprising because the descriptions "obviously untenable" and "manifestly groundless" are each (and the phrase "utterly hopeless" is not) to be found in the judgment of Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129, to which his Honour specifically referred.
300 The test for "utter hopelessness" was the subject of further consideration by the Western Australian Full Court in Attorney-General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181. The case was an appeal from a decision of Wheeler J in Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia v Michael (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wheeler J, 30 July 1998, unreported). In that case, Wheeler J had declined to make an order under the (now repealed) Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 (WA) which, like s 84(1), was consciously and closely modelled on s 51 of the 1925 UK provisions. Her Honour had referred to the views of Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth and concluded that:
"If actions are not 'utterly hopeless', then the use of misconceived procedures, defects of pleading, placing of irrelevant material before the court, and matters of that kind fall to be dealt with, not under the Act but under the rules of Court."
301 In Attorney-General v Michael the Full Court dismissed the appeal but only on the basis of upholding her Honour's finding that the conduct complained of fell just short of being "habitual and persistent": at [133]. Speaking of Roden J's test of "utter hopelessness", Anderson J, with whom Pidgeon J and Steytler J concurred, remarked at [126]:
"With all respect, if this means that, absent male fides in one form or another, proceedings will not be vexatious unless they are "so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless", I think that test is too narrow as a test of general application under our Act. I think proceedings may be vexatious for the purposes of the Western Australian statute without necessarily being "utterly hopeless", which I take to mean plainly devoid of any merit whatever."
302 Anderson J continued at [126]:
"The litigant who sees dark conspiracies and the threat of great harm to himself or herself in the trivial wrongs of another may provide an example. Commencement of an action by such a person, containing outlandish allegations and seeking forms of relief that the courts do not grant, may be vexatious, notwithstanding that it may be possible for the court to identify for the litigant a cause of action for which, arguably, there may be some form of remedy."
303 This passage echoes the observations of Yeldham J in Pedler at 484C that "a close perusal" of a statement of claim filed by defendants (whom his Honour described at 484G as having pursued litigation "with paranoid-like persistence") satisfied him "beyond doubt that the claims made [were] quite untenable and the relief sought [was] such as no court could or would possibly give".
304 Referring to a particular action that had been the subject of the unsuccessful application in Attorney-General v Michael and which exemplified the kind of objectively vexatious proceeding to which he was referring, Anderson J said:
"Whilst it is not possible to say that the claim of nuisance in respect of the loud playing of music is 'utterly hopeless', the allegations as to that, and the relief sought in respect of it, are so deeply buried in bizarre allegations and untenable claims for relief that the court ought to be able to say, as a matter of judgment, that it is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the section."
305 Single judges in Queensland and Victoria have approved the decision of the Western Australian Full Court in Attorney-General v Michael. It was followed in Lohe v Bird [2004] QSC 23 at [5] by McMurdo J with respect to cognate Queensland legislation. In Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314 Whelan J, though holding that the WA Full Court's "qualification to, or amplification of" Roden J's formulation in Attorney-General v Wentworth was unnecessary to dispose of the case, approved at [15] what had been said in Attorney-General v Michael. His Honour considered at [19] that a complete absence of any evidentiary basis for a proceeding was an example of a finding that would justify the characterisation of a proceeding as objectively vexatious for the purposes of the Victorian equivalent of s 84(1) even though such a proceeding would not and could not have been struck out on such a basis.
Consideration
306 The Attorney General relied on the following matters in asking the Court to exercise its discretion to make the orders sought. First, Ms Klewer repeatedly institutes proceedings that are vexatious, hopeless or otherwise an abuse of process. See for instance proceedings numbered 52/0218 of 1994, 41127 of 2002 (motion), 40600 of 2003 (motion), 101 of 2004, 236 of 2004 and 52/10203 of 2005.
307 Secondly, proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer are regularly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See for instance 10781 of 2000, 129 of 2001, 12423, 12431, 12432, 12440, 28337 and 28345 of 2002, 09569 of 2003 and 33039 of 2003.
308 Thirdly, Ms Klewer exhibits an inability to accept rational decisions made against her. Her inability or refusal to comprehend the basis on which an adverse decision has been made is exemplified by her pursuit of relief against the Coffs Harbour Council in respect of its detention of her dogs. Her initial application was determined against her on the basis of a finding by Simpson J that the dogs had not in fact been seized by the council's ranger, on which supposition there was no reasonable prospect of establishing any breach of the statutory provision on which Ms Klewer relied. Notwithstanding this finding, Ms Klewer thereafter pursued (in all cases unsuccessfully) an application for leave to appeal, an application for a stay of the decision refusing such leave, a motion to set aside the decision refusing to grant such a stay, two motions seeking to stay various costs orders that had followed upon her previous failed applications, and an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.
309 Ms Klewer's litigation against Ray Benson Motors similarly manifests an inability or refusal on her part to accept that the evidence of others has been preferred to her own. Following the Fair Trading Tribunal's dismissal of her application for rehearing of an adverse decision that had been made on this ground, Ms Klewer filed three successive applications - one in the Supreme Court for judicial review and two in the Local Court alleging breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), all of which were summarily dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
310 Fourthly, Ms Klewer regularly seeks an adjournment or says she can't attend or fails to appear. This occurred in proceedings 52/0218 of 1994, 4 of 1996 (x 2), 591167 of 1997, 52/0316 of 1997, 675 of 2001 (x3), 20543 of 2001, 40597 of 2001, 41127 of 2002, 40205 of 2003, 101 of 2004 and 52/10203 of 2005.
311 Fifthly, Ms Klewer, having invoked the jurisdiction of a court or other tribunal, regularly leaves the court during the conduct of the proceedings. See for instance 52/0218 of 1994, 52/0086 of 1996, 648 of 1999, 96 of 2001 (x2), and 52/10203 of 2005.
312 Sixthly, Ms Klewer regularly makes scandalous allegations of bias or corruption by police and judicial officers during the course of the vexatious proceedings. See for instance 22/0308 of 1991, 52/0319 of 1996, 675 of 2001, 13825 of 2001, 10608 of 2002, 10788 of 2005, and 52/10203 of 2005.
313 Seventhly, Ms Klewer regularly withdraws the complaint or discontinues the proceedings or the proceedings are ultimately deemed abandoned. See for instance 4 of 1996, 40429 of 2001, 40597 of 2001, 17961 of 2002, 12423, 12431, 12432, 12440, 28227 and 28345 of 2002, 04441 of 2002, 40600 of 2003, 96 of 2004, 285 of 2005, and 5116 of 2005.
314 Eighthly, Ms Klewer's credibility is regularly doubted or the court does not believe her. See for instance 22/0308 of 1991, 52/0218 of 1994, 52/0312 of 1995, 52/0319 of 1996, 52/0316 of 1997, 648 of 1999, 96 of 2001, 8622 and 8623 of 2002, 41127 of 2002, and 12804 of 2005.
315 Ninthly, Ms Klewer regularly seeks indulgences (such as the waiver of court filing fees), or the seeking of sympathy based on having seven children and other personal circumstances. See for instance 12844 of 1998, 30098 of 1998, 40267 of 1998, 40534 of 1996, 41127 of 2002, and 40052 of 2006. In this respect Judge Ducker has said:
" [Ms Klewer] seems to think the courts should give her some special treatment and allow her to proceed or not proceed according to her whim. . . . I see no reason to be sympathetic to a person who was well aware of the hearing date of a matter, failed to turn up, and then seeks to have this Court assist her, long after the time for an appeal has expired. Ms Klewer well knew that the hearing was on. She gives an attempted explanation, which I do not accept for failing to lodge the appeal on time."
316 This is redolent of comments by Gyles J as follows:
"It was, I endeavoured to persuade her, not simply a matter of turning up unrepresented and throwing herself upon the mercy of the Court so the Court would conduct the case for her".
317 The Attorney General also submitted that three characteristics emerged from all of this, which encapsulate Ms Klewer's approach to litigation. The first is her inability to understand the difference between allegations and evidence. She seems to believe that merely making allegations or claims, no matter how extreme or fanciful, in some way constitutes evidence of the matters alleged. Secondly, she habitually refuses to accept the adverse decisions of the court. Thirdly, she has an inability or an unwillingness to understand or comprehend the reasons that have led to the failure of her applications. This has caused her on a regular basis to distort or simply to ignore the findings made against her.
318 It is important immediately to record that Ms Klewer made no submissions on the issue of why the orders sought against her should not be made. That is not to say that Ms Klewer did not contest the making of the orders, as her vigorous and passionate opposition to the Attorney General's claim throughout the proceedings unambiguously reveals. Ms Klewer did not, however, formulate or present reasons why she should succeed in this case in any logical or meaningful or comprehensible way. In particular, Ms Klewer did not offer me at any stage of the proceedings a single reason why I should conclude that any particular proceeding commenced by her, upon which the Attorney General relies, was not vexatious. I should indicate that I would have been greatly assisted by submissions of this type. This is because Ms Klewer quite obviously and somewhat tragically takes a quite different view to the commencement and continuation of proceedings, as a response to the ups and downs of daily life, than most members of the community. Her particular motivations or reasons for the commencement of these manifold actions might arguably have gone a long way to explaining what on one view appears inexplicable, even if in the final analysis the test of what is vexatious is not one to be decided solely by reference to her subjective intentions. I re-emphasise that from my point of view it is extremely regrettable that Ms Klewer did not attend to these submissions in her own best interests with the same determination and apparent single-mindedness that she brought to the commencement of the proceedings in the first place.
319 This is revealed and emphasised when the transcript of her submissions in Coffs Harbour is examined. Ms Klewer concentrated on several matters there apart from the main issues in the proceedings. One of those was her persistent attempt to have me re-visit her earlier unsuccessful application to adjourn the proceedings on medical grounds, which had proceeded before me during the whole of the first week of the hearing: see Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 454. Following my refusal to return to that issue, an exchange occurred between Ms Klewer and me that included the following:
" HIS HONOUR : The effect of what I said Mrs Klewer is that I'm not prepared to adjourn the matter further on medical grounds and that--