In determining what, if any, is the penalty appropriate to be imposed on a person found guilty of a contempt of court, it is proper for the Court to have regard to such matters as the objective seriousness of the contempt found established, the culpability - as, for example, whether the relevant statement was made, or the relevant act was done, deliberately, within intent to interfere with the administration of justice, or recklessly, or as the result of gross negligence, or, although intended, without any appreciation of the potential consequences of the act or statement - of the person found to have been guilty of the contempt, and any other subjective factors (see, for example, Director of Public Prosecution v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation 7; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Wran 8; Director of Public Prosecutions v. John Fairfax & Sons Limited 9; Attorney General for New South Wales v. Dean 10; Registrar of the Court of Appeal v. Maniam (No. 2) 11). As well, so it seems to me, the Court, when determining what, if any, penalty should be imposed in a particular case, should, to the extent to which it is possible, attempt to ensure consistency in the approach taken to like cases in the past, so that the assessment of penalties is seen to be part of a principled process rather than as but the product of the idiosyncratic views of particular judges (see, for example, Director of Public Prosecutions v. John Fairfax & Sons Limited 12).