(1) I was advised of three complaints made against me on 3 August 2021 and was required to respond to the complaints and provide additional documentation under s 164G by 5 August 2021. I responded to the complaints, disagreed with the complaints and enquired about particular regulations I may have breached. I was unable to provide the requested documentation due to the very limited timeframe and enquired about the basis of being given 2 days. On 9 August 2021, I was advised that the matter will now be dealt with under s 150 of the above law. The matter did not need to be dealt with under s 150.
- The discretion available to be exercised by the Council under s 150 is wide. The practitioners appeal suggests that the discretion of the Council may have miscarried in the sense of House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 (House v The King) at 504-5; [1936] HCA 40, which raises a question of law.
- In House v The King at 504-5 Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ stated:
"The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution, for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."
- In Australian Health & Nutrition Association Ltd v Hive Marketing Group Pty Ltd (2019) 99 NSWLR 419; [2019] NSWCA 61 (AHNA) Bathurst CJ and Leeming JA at [9]-[10] explained the nature of the error when a decision "is unreasonable or plainly unjust" in the following terms:
"[9] It is one thing for the reasons given by the primary judge to disclose appellable error. If so, that is addressed by the formulations of principle in the first half of the passage from House v The King. That is not an end of the matter. There may be cases where the reasons do not disclose why the impugned orders were made. In such cases, even though no error of principle or other well recognised basis for appellate intervention may be discerned on the face of the reasons, an appellate court may nonetheless intervene. The reason is that it may be inferred in light of the result that there was appellable error in the unstated reasons which led to the order. This is plain from the passage when read as a whole:
"It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred." (House v The King at 505)
[10] It is wrong to seek to apply the references to "unreasonable or plainly unjust" in that passage in isolation. The premise of this aspect of the test in House v The King is that the reasons do not explain the result reached."
- It is fundamental that deference is to be given by an appellate court to the discretionary decisions of judges at first instance, insofar as it is insufficient for the appellant merely to persuade the appellate court that it would have decided the matter differently: AHNA at [13], [18]-[19] (Bathurst CJ and Leeming JA).
- The practitioner has not identified any error of law in the Council deciding to deal with the complaints and proceed under s 150 of the National Law. We accept the submissions of the Council that it is mandatory for the Council to act under s 150 of the National Law if: "satisfied it is appropriate to do so". The terms of s 150 require a Council "… if at any time it is satisfied it is appropriate to do so for the protection of the health or safety of any person or persons … or if satisfied the action is otherwise in the public interest … (b) by order impose on a registered health practitioner's registration the conditions relating to the practitioner's practising the health profession the Council considers appropriate".
- The practitioner did not reply to the Council within the short time requested. Despite the truncated period to reply, the Council could decide to proceed to act under s150 if satisfied it was appropriate to do so. The Council on 9 August 2021 decided to proceed to consider action under s 150 because the practitioner failed to adequately respond to the initial request for information as required by s 164G of the National Law. A hearing for the s 150 enquiry was fixed for 18 August 2021. A timetable was set for the exchange of information.
- It is evident in the letter of 9 August 2021, the Council was satisfied it was appropriate to proceed under s 150 of the National Law as it considered it was in the public interest to do so to protect a person's health and safety, because of the nature of the complaints. The decision to do so was not unreasonable or unjust in the circumstances. We find there was no error in the exercise of the Council's discretion to proceed with the complaints under s 150 of the National Law.