17 However, that is not directly to the point of the present case: the plaintiff says that it is entitled to be indemnified under the FAI policy, because it is a person "for whom the work is to be done". However, the defendants submitted that since the Act did not require a subcontractor to obtain insurance under Pt 6, it is unlikely that the Act, properly construed, meant that a head contractor, such as the plaintiff here, should be regarded as one of the persons entitled to the benefit of a contract of insurance if, in an appropriate case, the owner of the land on which the work is being done and/or the head contractor is a "developer", as defined.
18 The plaintiff submitted that there was no evidence that it was a developer. However, the contract between Developmentlink and the plaintiff described the work to be done as "warehouse conversion into 29 home units", and the specification to that contract appears to describe work constructing residential home units; and whilst the body of the contract between the plaintiff and Horvat did not itself expressly describe the works to be carried out, the annexed documents refer to a typical unit, and to provide a mass of detail concerning master and other bedrooms, bath rooms, kitchens, living and dining areas, and the like, and there are references (Exhibit B, pages 147 and 156) to council approval for converting an existing warehouse into 33 home units or residential units.
19 The principal argument of the defendants was that s 103I of the Act only operated to provide indemnity to a person who was entitled to the benefit of a contract of insurance entered into under Pt 6 of the Act; and they submitted that it could not be said that the plaintiff was such a person: when one read Pt 6 properly, it did not extend to require a subcontractor to obtain a contract of insurance that indemnified a head contractor. I accept this as correct. Although one can see an argument that the plaintiff was a person for whom Horvat did the work, that argument seems strained and artificial.
20 The defendants also emphasised the expression appearing, for example, in s 99(1)(b) of the Act, to the "successors in title" to the person for whom the work is done, submitting that these words point to the person for whom the work is done being a person who has a title, or an estate or interest in the land on which the work is done. I accept this as an indication in favour of the construction for which the defendants contend.
21 In De More Constructions Pty Ltd v Garpace Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 132, as in this case and other cases concerning the Act, submissions were made as to how the Act should be construed, by reference to the relevant second reading speech. It is clear from this, if it is not otherwise clear, that an object of the Act is to protect "consumers". However, as De More establishes, this is not the sole object of the act; and in that case the Court of Appeal held that an unlicensed subcontractor might recover from its head contractor a sum of money for work done and materials supplied by the subcontractor pursuant to the terms of the subcontract, the head contract being one relating to residential building work.
22 However, the present case raises a different question. The plaintiff subcontracted the work, or some of the work it had contracted to do, to Horvat. Clause 3 of the FAI insurance contract provided that the insurer was to indemnify the insured against the risks mentioned; the insured was defined to mean the owner, and the owner's successors in title; the owner was defined as meaning the person for whom the work is to be done; and the work was defined as the residential building work to be carried out by the contractor for the owner as described in the contract.
23 In my view, the plaintiff's argument strains the language of the FAI policy, and of the Act, too much. It is only the circumstance of (I assume) the insolvency of HIH that means that the present claim is brought; and if HIH was not insolvent, then it having indemnified the plaintiff, it would have been entitled to be indemnified by the second defendant, by way of subrogation, if the plaintiff's arguments are correct. I do not think that this can have been the legislative intention.
24 There is another circumstance that seems to be at least not insignificant. Clause 5.1(l) of the FAI policy points towards the view that the person for whom the work is done is a person who has acquired, or will acquire the dwelling in question, that is, someone who is or will be the owner in the ordinary sense of the land on which the work is done, rather than a head contractor or an intermediate contractor.
25 I give judgment for the defendants, and order the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs.