Mellor J came to the same conclusion but expressed his reasons thus:
"I think that the object of the 2 nd rule of Order IX was to obviate the difficulties that the plaintiff might be exposed to by reason of a defendant's going abroad and keeping abroad, and it being impossible to effect personal service, and to prevent the plaintiffs' right being entirely defeated by reason of these difficulties. It was intended, in my opinion, in such cases to enable the Court to order substituted service, and that when such substituted service is directed it should have all the effects of personal service. Under these circumstances the judgment in this case was perfectly regular; and though I think it is competent to us to let the defendant in to defend, the defendant can, in my opinion, only be so let in on satisfying us that he has merits, and that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. The proceedings being regular, if he had known of them, I think he would have been in the same position as if he had been served with the writ."
47 In the present case Mr Atkinson's evidence cannot be regarded as reliable. I am not satisfied that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. Indeed, it is probable that the notices sent by the CTTT reached him and that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the proceedings despite their denials and assertions. The Direction given by the Chairperson as to substituted service was open to her on the materials before her and it is reasonably probable both that the method of service adopted would have brought the proceedings to the attention of the plaintiffs and that they had knowledge of the proceedings.
48 Counsel for the plaintiffs stressed the terms of section 35 of the CTTT Act which provides:
"The Tribunal must ensure that each party in any proceedings is given a reasonable opportunity:
(a) to call or give evidence and otherwise present the party's case (whether at a hearing or otherwise), and
(b) to make submissions in relation to the issues in the proceedings."
49 I have also considered ss 65(3) and s 78. My attention was directed by counsel for the Crowleys not only to s 78(6) but s 78(1)(b) which provides that a notice or document may be served on a person by sending it by post to the business address of the person that was last known to the person serving the document. Mr Atkinson conceded that his business address was as set out in his email of 27 January 2009, namely, Xact Solutions Ltd, Level 42, Australia Square Sydney with the telephone, fax and mobile phone numbers he gave. He also gave his email address. Of course, Xact Solutions Ltd had been de-registered and Quaestor occupied the same office as Gamma Capital and Mr Atkinson.
50 Counsel for the plaintiffs asked the Court to accept the plaintiffs as witnesses of truth when they asserted that they had no knowledge of the proceedings. I did not do so.
51 Counsel for the plaintiffs also submitted that the rules of procedural fairness had in any event not been complied with in that only the materials of the Crowleys had been considered and that the plaintiffs had neither led nor been able to lead their evidence. Further, they had not been able to make submissions. With their knowledge of the proceedings the plaintiffs had the opportunity to do so but neither availed themselves of that opportunity nor utilised it.
52 The Crowleys submitted that the plaintiffs should be refused relief in the exercise of the Court's discretion in that they had not shown that they had an arguable defence on the merits. The Crowleys pointed out that, in paragraph 5 of his affidavit of 13 December 2009, Mr Atkinson said that the plaintiffs "did not arrange for any other building work on the premises (other than the construction of a swimming pool) apart from the concrete stairs … All other work was carried out by myself." This does not come to grips with other quite extensive work done and the alleged defects.
53 Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that it was not appropriate to explore the question, at this stage, whether the plaintiffs had a defence on the merits as that could lead to the primary complaint of a denial of procedural fairness being sidetracked.
54 I did not envisage a lengthy enquiry as to the merits of any defence, but it would have been useful to have been told what arguable defence on the merits the plaintiffs had. At first blush it seemed that the plaintiffs as owner-builders were liable for any defects in the work done and that the materials advanced by the Crowleys suggested that there were substantial defects to be remedied at a cost which appeared to have been substantiated. Relief must also be refused on this alternate ground.
55 I dismiss the summons. I order the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the defendants of the summons.