ATH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 1155
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2016-09-23
Before
White J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (9 paragraphs)
- The appeal is dismissed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
WHITE J: 1 The appellant is a Sri Lankan national who arrived in Australia by boat on 2 August 2012. His application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister and that refusal was affirmed on review by the former Refugee Review Tribunal (the RRT). 2 The appellant then sought judicial review of the RRT decision in the Federal Circuit Court (the FCC), pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). His application was based on a single ground alleging error by the RRT in relation to the evidence concerning the harm that he would suffer if returned to Sri Lanka. The FCC Judge considered that the appellant was seeking, in effect, a review of the RRT decision having regard to the underlying merit of his claim for a protection visa, and that this was not a function of the FCC. Accordingly, he dismissed the application for the review: ATH15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 837. 3 The appellant now appeals to this Court. He was unrepresented on the appeal, as he had been at the FCC hearing. 4 I am satisfied that the appellant's appeal should fail. The following are my reasons for that conclusion. 5 In the RRT, the appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground for three reasons. First, he said that in the period between 2003 and 2012 he had had a sexual affair with the wife of a powerful criminal, to whom I will refer as "W", who had sworn revenge on him. Secondly, he feared recrimination and harm because of his membership and support of the United National Party (UNP) in the March 2011 election, having previously been a member and supporter of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Thirdly, he said that he feared harm if returned to Sri Lanka by reason of his status as a failed asylum seeker. 6 The sole ground upon which the appellant sought judicial review in the FCC was as follows: The RRT erred in not giving consideration to the evidence provided by the Applicant to the effect that the Applicant will be harmed upon his return to his home country. The Applicant also provided evidence that the authorities of the Applicant's home country will arrest and detain the Applicant and torture and/or imprison him being a failed asylum seeker. The Tribunal has not given consideration to the evidence provided. Accordingly the Tribunal has erred as a matter of law. 7 In the RRT, the applicant's case was that his "main problem" related to W who had powerful connections. The RRT member considered that the vengeance which the appellant feared from W was a matter of personal revenge and did not attract Australia's obligations for protection under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugees Convention). 8 In relation to the appellant's claim of fear of persecution by reason of his political membership and activities, the RRT member considered that there had been a number of changes, variations and inconsistencies in the appellant's claims. She said that the "shifting accounts, new claims raised and dropped, as well as inconsistencies all raise[d] … concerns about the applicant's credibility". The member did not accept that there was a real chance that the applicant would be mistreated for reasons of his political opinion or membership. Further, having reviewed in some detail the evidence bearing upon the way in which those who have left Sri Lanka illegally are treated upon their return, the member did not accept that there was a real chance that the applicant would be mistreated because of his membership of a particular social group and, in particular, the group of failed asylum seekers. She reached a similar conclusion with respect to the applicant's claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. 9 As already noted, on the application for the review in the FCC, the FCC Judge considered that the appellant sought a fresh assessment as to whether he would be at a risk of real harm should he return to Sri Lanka. Understandably, the Judge regarded that assessment as being beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC on the application for judicial review. 10 The FCC Judge also rejected the claim of the appellant that the RRT had not considered the evidence bearing upon the risk of harm. Instead, the Judge considered that the RRT had considered in detail the evidence and the claims made by the appellant. 11 The appellant's notice of appeal to this Court contains six grounds. To a substantial extent (but not wholly) these grounds match the grounds in the notice of appeal filed by the applicant ARO15 in respect of whom I have also published reasons today: ARO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1154. As I pointed out in that decision, the grounds of appeal appear to have a "template" quality about them or, at the least, represent an undifferentiated amalgam of grounds gathered from other cases, without regard to the particular features of the decisions which have been made in relation to the appellant's claims. For the reasons which I gave in ARO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1154, the grounds also indicate that the appellant does not appreciate the role of this Court on an appeal of the present kind. Further still, the grounds go beyond the matters which the appellant raised on his application for judicial review in the FCC. 12 The difficulty for this Court is increased by the fact that the appellant did not file any outline of submissions. Nor did his oral submissions really address any of the grounds of appeal, let alone the basis upon which his application for judicial review was unsuccessful in the FCC. 13 Counsel for the Minister said that the Minister would not be prejudiced if the appellant were permitted to argue grounds which had not been agitated in the FCC and did not oppose leave being granted to him to do so. In these circumstances, I have thought that the most expedient course is to consider each of the grounds.