Assurance Holdings No. 3 Pty Ltd v Wollongong City Council

Judgment (4 paragraphs)

[1]

The applicant's written request to contravene the height of buildings development standard

The first opinion of satisfaction required by cl 4.6(4)(a)(i) of LEP 2009 is that the applicant's written request seeking to justify the contravention of a development standard has adequately addressed the matters required to be demonstrated by cl 4.6(3) (see Initial Action at [15]), as follows: (a) that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, and (b) that there are sufficient environmental planning grounds to justify contravening the development standard
The applicant bears the onus to demonstrate that the matters in cl 4.6(3) have been adequately addressed by the written request in order to enable the Court, exercising the functions of the consent authority, to form the requisite opinion of satisfaction (Initial Action at [25]). The consent authority has to be satisfied that the applicant's written request has in fact demonstrated those matters required to be demonstrated by cl 4.6(3) and not simply that the applicant has addressed those matters (RebelMH Neutral Bay Pty Limited v North Sydney Council [2019] NSWCA 130 at [4]).
The common ways in which an applicant might demonstrate that compliance with a development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary are summarised by Preston CJ in Wehbe v Pittwater Council (2007) 156 LGERA 446; [2007] NSWLEC 827 [42]-[51] ("Wehbe") and repeated in Initial Action at [17]-[21]: 1. the objectives of the development standard are achieved notwithstanding non-compliance with the standard; 2. the underlying objective or purpose of the development standard is not relevant to the development, so that compliance is unnecessary; 3. the underlying objective or purpose would be defeated or thwarted if compliance was required, so that compliance is unreasonable; 4. the development standard has been abandoned by the Council; 5. the zoning of the site was unreasonable or inappropriate so that the development standard was also unreasonable or unnecessary (note, this is a limited way of establishing that compliance is not necessary as it is not a way to effect general planning changes as an alternative to strategic planning powers).

Whether the proposal is in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the contravened development standard and the zone

The second opinion of satisfaction in cl 4.6(4)(a)(ii) of LEP 2009 is that the proposal will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the development standard that is contravened and the zone objectives. The consent authority must be satisfied that the development is in the public interest because it is consistent with these objectives, not simply that the development is in the public interest (Initial Action at [27]). The consent authority must be directly satisfied about the matters in cl 4.6(4)(a)(ii) (Initial Action at [26]).
I am satisfied that the proposal will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the development standard and the zone, for the reasons given by the applicant in the written request.

Contravention of the FSR development standard

The proposal, on the basis of the Council's interpretation of the Definition for GFA in LEP 2009, has a FSR of 0.52:1 for the site (and for each proposed allotment).
The applicant provided a written request seeking to justify the contravention of the FSR development standard, prepared by Mecone and dated July 2020.
Clause 4.6(4) of LEP 2009 establishes preconditions that must be satisfied before a consent authority or the Court, exercising the functions of a consent authority, can exercise the power to grant development consent (Initial Action Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council (2018) 236 LGERA 256; [2018] NSWLEC 118 at [13] "Initial Action"). The consent authority must form two positive opinions of satisfaction under cl 4.6(4)(a). As these preconditions are expressed in terms of the opinion or satisfaction of a decision-maker, they are a "jurisdictional fact of a special kind", because the formation of the opinion of satisfaction enlivens the power of the consent authority to grant development consent (Initial Action at [14]). The consent authority, or the Court on appeal, must be satisfied that the applicant's written request has adequately addressed the matters required to be addressed by cl 4.6(3) and that the proposal will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the contravened development standard and the zone, at cl 4.6(4), as follows: (4) Development consent must not be granted for development that contravenes a development standard unless - (a) the consent authority is satisfied that - (i) the applicant's written request has adequately addressed the matters required to be demonstrated by subclause (3), and (ii) the proposed development will be in the public interest because it is consistent with the objectives of the particular standard and the objectives for development within the zone in which the development is proposed to be carried out, and (b) the concurrence of the Planning Secretary has been obtained.
On appeal, the Court has the power under cl 4.6(2) to grant consent to development that contravenes a development standard without obtaining or assuming the concurrence of the Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment, pursuant to s 39(6) LEC Act, but should still consider the matters in cl 4.6(5) (Initial Action at [29]).

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Judgment (4 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (6)