The December decision
41 There were a number of applications to vary the Award as part of the four yearly review. As the Commission noted at [18] of its December decision, the "catalyst" for the review was the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Nojin v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCAFC 192; 208 FCR 1. To summarise the outcome in Nojin broadly, a majority of the Full Court found that a wage assessment tool known as BSWAT, indirectly discriminated against employees with an intellectual disability, treating them less favourably in the wage assessment process than those with a physical disability.
42 At [1] of its December decision, the Commission described the "main issue" before it in its four yearly review of the Award as:
the means by which minimum wage rates for disabled employees covered by the SES Award should be determined, and this decision is primarily concerned with determining that issue. The applications also raised some ancillary issues which are described later and dealt with in this decision.
43 The Commission set out the legislative framework applying to the four yearly review process from [2]-[8]. The Commission also noted (at [7]):
The general principles applicable to the conduct of the 4-yearly review established in Federal Court Full Court decisions and decisions of Full Benches of this Commission were summarised in Alpine Resorts Award 2010 as follows:
• section 156(2) provides that the Commission must review all modern awards and may, among other things, make determinations varying modern awards;
• "review" has its ordinary and natural meaning of "survey, inspect, re-examine or look back upon";
• the discretion in s 156(2)(b)(i) to make determinations varying modern awards in a review is expressed in general, unqualified, terms, but the breadth of the discretion is constrained by other provisions of the FW Act relevant to the conduct of the review;
• in particular the modern awards objective in s 134 applies to the review;
• the modern awards objective is very broadly expressed, and is a composite expression which requires that modern awards, together with the NES, provide "a fair and relevant minimum safety net of terms and conditions", taking into account the matters in ss 134(1)(a)-(h);
• fairness in this context is to be assessed from the perspective of the employees and employers covered by the modern award in question;
• the obligation to take into account the s 134 considerations means that each of these matters, insofar as they are relevant, must be treated as a matter of significance in the decision-making process;
• no particular primacy is attached to any of the s 134 considerations and not all of the matters identified will necessarily be relevant in the context of a particular proposal to vary a modern award;
• it is not necessary to make a finding that the award fails to satisfy one or more of the s 134 considerations as a prerequisite to the variation of a modern award;
• the s 134 considerations do not set a particular standard against which a modern award can be evaluated; many of them may be characterised as broad social objectives;
• in giving effect to the modern awards objective the Commission is performing an evaluative function taking into account the matters in s 134(1)(a)-(h) and assessing the qualities of the safety net by reference to the statutory criteria of fairness and relevance;
• what is necessary is for the Commission to review a particular modern award and, by reference to the s 134 considerations and any other consideration consistent with the purpose of the objective, come to an evaluative judgment about the objective and what terms should be included only to the extent necessary to achieve the objective of a fair and relevant minimum safety net;
• the matters which may be taken into account are not confined to the s 134 considerations;
• section 138, in requiring that a modern award may include terms that it is permitted to include, and must include terms that it is required to include, only to the extent necessary to achieve the modern awards objective and (to the extent applicable) the minimum wages objective, emphasises the fact it is the minimum safety net and minimum wages objective to which the modern awards are directed;
• what is necessary to achieve the modern awards objective in a particular case is a value judgment, taking into account the s 134 considerations to the extent that they are relevant having regard to the context, including the circumstances pertaining to the particular modern award, the terms of any proposed variation and the submissions and evidence;
• where an interested party applies for a variation to a modern award as part of the 4 yearly review, the task is not to address a jurisdictional fact about the need for change, but to review the award and evaluate whether the posited terms with a variation meet the objective.
44 At [9]-[10] the Commission set out the relevant clauses of the Award (extracted above at [23]) and described the system of pay grades within the Award. The Award is comprised of grades corresponding to classes of tasks "expressed in broad and generic terms" and minimum hourly and weekly pay rates. The Commission then at [14] set out cl 14.4 of the award and explained that it:
provides for employees with a disability to be paid a percentage of the rates of pay prescribed by clause 14.2 as assessed under an approved wage assessment tool chosen by an ADE.
45 As noted above, cl 14.4(b) sets out an exhaustive list of tools that are an "approved wage assessment tool". The first of these is the Supported Wage System, and the clause includes 29 others.
46 The Commission noted at [16]:
The evidence before us demonstrated, and it was not in dispute that, with rare exceptions, disabled employees covered by the SES Award are paid a reduced minimum wage as a result of an assessment carried out with the use of a wage assessment tool pursuant to clause 14.4. Consequently, a significant proportion of such employees earn less than $450 per month…
47 The SWS is now (as a result of a variation to the Award) set out in Schedule D of the Award. The Commission set out Schedule D in full at [17].
48 At [28]-[32] the Commission described the claims for variation of the Award that had been lodged, including the claim of the applicant in this proceeding. The applicant sought a variation to the effect that under cl 14.4 the SWS was the only wage assessment tool permitted to be used. Some of the other respondents in this proceeding also sought variations to the Award, and we describe the final implementation of one of those variations below, in contrast to the present situation with the wage assessment tool variations.
49 The Commission then described the hearing process it undertook. On 10 July 2017, the Commission directed that any interested parties file evidence and submissions concerning the proposals to the Award. The matter was listed for hearing before the Commission in February 2018. The Commission described an extensive evidence-gathering process, including conducting inspections of five ADEs and hearing from witnesses who were cross examined at the February hearing. The Commission issued a statement on 16 April 2018 expressing "provisional views". The Commission extracted the relevant parts of the April 2018 statement at [36]:
[14] During the hearing we conducted inspections of a number of ADEs in Sydney and Wollongong, received witness statements and heard evidence from a large number of witnesses, including expert witnesses, and were assisted by extensive written and oral submissions from the parties. We will in due course, subject to what we state below, issue a full decision stating our findings as to the evidence and our final conclusions as to the matter. However because we do not propose to grant any of the claims relating to wages and wage assessment in the form proposed by the respective claimant organisations but rather consider it likely that it will be necessary to vary the Award in terms not proposed by any party, we consider that the proper course is to state a number of provisional conclusions we have reached and to give the parties an opportunity to consider them, confer and, if necessary, advance further submissions concerning them.
[15] The provisional conclusions we have reached are as follows:
(1) Supported employment covered by the Award has a valuable and socially significant role in providing employment to primarily intellectually disabled persons for whom, at current or foreseeable levels of government support, the achievement and maintenance of open employment would not be viable. ADEs are able to employ disabled persons by adjusting their daily job tasks to suit their abilities, in circumstances where an equivalent open employment job role may not be able to be completed by a single ADE employee.
(2) The determination of wages for supported employees by the use of the wage assessment tools currently prescribed in clause 14.4 of the Award does not meet the modern awards objective because:
• they produce different wage outcomes for persons performing equivalent tasks at equivalent levels of competency;
• in substance they permit employers to establish their own classification structure and pay rates rather than apply pay rates properly derived from the Award; and
• may in some cases contravene the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 for reasons similar to those found in the Nojin decision in relation to the BSWAT assessment tool.
(3) The SWS does not, by itself and in its current form, represent an appropriate method of determining the wage rates for supported employees in ADEs because it:
• does not take into account the proper range of work value considerations used to assess award wage rates, namely the nature of the work, the level of skill and responsibility involved in doing the work and the conditions under which the work is done (which, in the context of supported employment, would include the complexity of the task(s) performed, the range of tasks performed, and the level of support required in order for the task(s) to be performed);
• may not adequately measure non-productive time at work on the part of supported employees; and
• does not provide a sufficiently objective and relevant means of identifying the performance benchmark by which any SWS assessment is conducted.
We emphasise that we express no conclusion about the operation of the SWS in the context of open employment.
(4) The modified SWS to be introduced into the Award effective from 1 July 2018, by consent and in the context of the current arrangements which allow an employer to choose from a range of wage assessment tools, does not adequately address the second problem identified above, and does not address at all the first and third problems.
(5) The existing classification structure in Schedule B of the Award, in relation to which the wage assessment tools are intended to operate, is also inadequate and unlikely to meet the modern awards objective. This is principally because it has not been structured with the specific circumstances of supported employment in mind, has not been drafted in a way which clearly identifies the work tasks and skills required of a fully competent employee at each grade, and may on one view be read as entitling supported employees in ADEs who perform only disaggregated parts of a single job to the full classification rate.
(6) The classification structure proposed by ABI/NSWBC, although we accept it was advanced in a somewhat embryotic form, is not appropriate for adoption or further development because it requires the formation of excessively subjective judgments on the part of the employer in classifying employees and focusses upon the individual characteristics of the employee to be classified rather than the nature and value of the work to be performed and the degree of support required to be provided by the employer.
(7) We consider that the use of all the existing wage assessment tools should be phased out over a period of time. They should be replaced by a redesigned classification structure for Grades 1-3 of the Award which sets the full award wage rates together with a single prescribed method for the adjustment of the award wage rates for supported employees. This new wage assessment mechanism should meet the objectives of fairness, equality, objectivity, independence and sustainability, and be non-discriminatory.
(8) The new classification structure should, at each grade, generally describe the range of tasks which a fully competent employee would have the capacity to perform to the reasonable output and quality standard required by the employer in a given industry or occupational area of work. At Grade 2, this would involve a simple and repetitive range of tasks performed under a normal industry-standard level of supervision, and Grade 3 would involve a range of somewhat more complex tasks.
(9) The new wage assessment mechanism would be a hybrid model involving two elements:
(a) An assessment of the "size" of the job actually assigned to the supported employee compared to a job which would attract the full Award rate of pay at Grade 1, 2 or 3. This would involve a work value assessment with particular focus on the range of tasks required to be performed compared to the relevant Award classification, the complexity of those tasks and the skills required to perform them, and the degree of support necessary to allow the employee to perform those tasks. This might involve, for example, an actual job assigned to a supported employee being "sized" in increments of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% of a job to which an Award classification in Grades 1-3 would apply.
(b) Once the job was properly "sized", a modified SWS-type assessment would be carried out to determine the output of the supported employee in discharging that job compared to the output of a person without that employee's disability performing the same job. This assessment would have to take into account any non-productive periods on the part of the supported employee and provide for an objective and consistent method of benchmark-setting.
The result would be, for example, that if the job was "sized" at 60% of a full Award classification job, and if the supported employee could perform that job at an output level of 50% compared to another person who can perform to the employer's reasonable expectation of output, the wage rate would be 30% of the Award classification minimum rate of pay. A minimum of 12.5% of the full award hourly rate would continue to apply.
(10) The interested industry parties and the Commonwealth will be given an opportunity to participate in a conferral process conducted by a member of this Full Bench in order to design a new classification structure and wage assessment mechanism consistent with the above conclusions. This conferral process will include consideration of:
• the length of the phase-out period for the existing wage assessment tools;
• the establishment of objective criteria for the "sizing" of jobs performed by supported employees;
• how the SWS might be modified, or an analogous mechanism established, for the measurement of the output of a supported employee in a particular job; and
• transitional arrangements concerning existing wage rates and transitional time periods for ADEs with a demonstrated economic incapacity to pay.
(11) We consider it highly desirable that both elements of the new wage assessment mechanism be supported by the provision by the Commonwealth of trained and independent assessors. We therefore consider that the close involvement of the Commonwealth in the design of the detail of the new wage assessment mechanism would be in the public interest.
(12) The new wage assessment mechanism should be trialled early in the phase-out period to determine its wage cost impact and to identify any other difficulties before the Commission approves its inclusion in the Award.
(13) If a broad consensus about the design of the new wage assessment mechanism cannot be reached within a reasonable timeframe, then this will be determined by us.
[16] A report-back hearing concerning the above provisional conclusions will be listed after the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to consider the contents of this Statement. We will state our conclusions concerning the UWU's claim for increased superannuation contributions and Our Voice Australia's claim for a "Rights at Work for Supported Employees" clause in our final decision.
(Emphasis added.)
50 The passages in bold indicate, in our opinion, that while the Commission had undertaken a thorough and extensive consideration of the material before it and the options presented to it, and had certainly formed some detailed views of its own, which did not necessarily accord precisely with any of the positions put to it, the Commission was careful to indicate its views were provisional, that it wished to hear further from all interested parties, and that it wished to conduct a trial.
51 Having set out that part of the April 2018 statement, in its December decision the Commission then described how the parties had been unable to reach a consensus about the conferral process it had proposed and accordingly, the Commission did not proceed with such a process. We pause in the chronology at this point to note that the parties' inability to reach such a consensus illustrates the depth of the divisions between some of the parties, and the somewhat entrenched positions they hold. There is no doubt but that the Commission is acutely conscious of these divisions. That fact is important in characterising what is said by the Commission in its December and March decisions, and in a proper understanding of the process the Commission has yet to undertake.
52 The Commission then described how on 11 September 2018 it issued a further statement setting out the state of affairs as to the conferral process, and making directions for written submissions in response to the April 2018 statement to be filed. A further hearing on these issues was held on 5 and 6 November 2018.
53 At [42]-[43] the Commission described correspondence it received from the Department of Social Services, which advised that a new pricing structure for employment support was scheduled to be announced by the National Disability Insurance Agency in October 2019, under which most ADEs would be financially better off. The Commission extracted its own reply and noted its view that such a change would be a significant development as "the likely cost to ADEs of implementing the SWS as the sole wage assessment tool is an important consideration in the outcome we have determined". The Commission invited the Department to make further submissions on the matter, and summarised the Department's submissions from [45]-[50]. A further hearing was held on 23 October 2019 and immediately after the Commission issued directions inviting parties to file written submissions in response to the Department's submission.
54 At [55]-[120] the Commission set out the parties' positions and submissions on its provisional proposals, and on the proposals the parties favoured. These included submissions from the parties in this proceeding, and a large number of other parties not joined to this proceeding. The Commission described at length the evidence before the Commission at the hearing at [121]-[245]. The Commission provided a detailed description of the evidence given by each witness.
55 The Commission then set out its present consideration of the issues before it, beginning with a discussion of the history of wage fixation for disabled employees. This included, at [207]-[313], a summary of the decision in Nojin. At [314] the Commission said:
We draw the following broad conclusions from the above analysis of the history of wage fixation for disabled employees:
(1) Independent reports concerning the appropriate method of wage fixation for disabled persons who would, because of their level of disability, be unable to obtain employment in the labour market at full award rates, have consistently recommended that their wage rate be assessed by use of a hybrid mechanism which takes into account the value of the work they perform and the employee's level of productivity in performing that work. Views consistent with this approach have been stated in the Ronalds Report, the Dunoon/Green Report, the First KPMG Report, the First HOI Report and the Second HOI Report.
(2) The SWS was not designed or intended for use in the ADE sector, and its use in that sector has only even been envisaged as being subject to major adaptive change or as one of a number of available wage assessment tools. However, as a measure of productivity simpliciter, it has been recognised (particularly in the Second KPMG Report) as fair and objective.
(3) The Nojin litigation demonstrates that the work value element of the wage assessment of a disabled employee in an ADE environment should not proceed on the basis of notional core or industry competencies which have no substantive relationship to the classification descriptors for minimum pay rates in the applicable award or to the work actually performed by the employee. An assessment carried out on this basis will be likely to be inherently disadvantageous to and thereby discriminatory towards intellectually disabled employees.
56 In light of these conclusions, the Commission considered (from [315]) the claims of the applicant in this proceeding, and whether the SWS should become the sole wage assessment tool. The Commission described the applicant's claim as involving two propositions:
(1) The existence of a multiplicity of wage assessment tools in clause 14.4 of the SES Award does not achieve the modern awards objective in s 134(1) or the minimum wages objective in s 284(1) of the FW Act and, contrary to s 153, is discriminatory in nature or at least permits discrimination to occur.
(2) The SWS should be the sole wage assessment tool, operating in conjunction with the existing classification structure.
The Commission stated at [316] that it accepted the first proposition but not the second. It stated at [317] that it considered that the following propositions were demonstrated on the evidence and other material before the Commission:
(1) The existence of a multiplicity of wage assessment tools means that many ADEs are permitted, in practice, to set their own minimum wages for supported employees rather than have them determined objectively pursuant to the provisions of a modern award. In this respect, disabled employees are treated differently to non-disabled employees both within the SES Award itself and more generally.
(2) The capacity of employers to access differently-constructed wage assessment tools at their discretion also means that disabled employees may be paid differently depending upon which tool is chosen by the employer. This means that disabled employees performing work that is the same or is of the same work value across different enterprises are permitted to be paid different minimum rates of pay. In this respect, they are again treated differently from non-disabled employees under the SES Award, who will always be entitled to the same minimum wage rate for the same work or for work of the same work value, regardless of the employer for whom the work is performed.
(3) Some of the wage assessment tools listed in clause 14.4(b) of the SES Award may, in their application, result in disabled employees having an entitlement to a minimum wage rate which is less than that applying to a non-disabled employee under the SES Award for the same work or work of the same value.
(4) Some of the wage assessment tools listed in clause 14.4(b) are constructed in a manner that is similar to the BSWAT and may in their application contravene the Disability Discrimination Act for reasons similar to those found in the Nojin decision.
(5) The wage assessment tools are generally complex, contained in documents external to the SES Award, and lack transparency and enforceability.
(6) A number of the wage assessment tools listed in clause 14.4(b) are obsolete.
57 The Commission then illustrated the reasoning for the first five of the points above by "by reference to the Greenacres and Skillsmaster tools, two of the most commonly used tools". The Commission explained at [319] that the Greenacres tool was specifically developed for people with intellectual disabilities, and provided for 6 wage levels under which the employee is paid a percentage of the Award rate for their position. The Commission set out the wage level structure in a table that showed a percentage of wage ranging from 10% to 55% corresponding to different bands. Employees who are above the 55% wage level are assessed using the SWS. The Commission then explained how different workers are assessed and placed at the different levels, and set out example "task skills", being lists of minimum capabilities to be assessed as being at each level. The examples included, for the most basic level, expectations such as:
Fine Motor Skills - KC7
• Basic hand-eye co-ordination, e.g. can hold one item and complete task with remaining hand.
• Elementary level of dexterity i.e. holds items firmly or gently as required.
• Placement of items/ objects into bags, containers, boxes, jigs, etc.
• Basic assembly (with/ without a match to sample item and/ or jig).
58 The Commission explained at [327] that ADEs using the Greenacres tool assign particular jobs to particular wage levels, by reference to the kinds of task skills required for each job. The Commission then set out its analysis of the Greenacres tool (at [328]-[330]):
Although the Greenacres tool nominally operates by reference to SES Award rates of pay, it is in reality a self-contained, autonomous classification system which operates independently of the SES Award. The five-level classification structure, and the process by which jobs are assigned to those classifications by reference to the tasks, skills and underpinning work skills utilised, have no real reference point in the SES Award. For example, the skills required to be classified at Level E of the Greenacres structure, under which employees are entitled to payment at 45-55 percent of the award rate, are in the terms described at least the same as or are in some instances higher than for a Grade 2 employee under the SES Award. The Level E employee, as set out above, is required to check and correct the work of co-workers, but in the SES Award quality control of the work of other employees does not appear as a responsibility until Grade 4. Level 5 employees may be required to "oversee small groups of employees for limited periods", but the Grade 2 employee under the SES Award has no such responsibility and it is not until Grade 4 or 5 of the SES Award that any element of supervision or responsibility for other employees arises. One of the task skills of a Level E employee is said to be "transporting large volumes of product in a truck (up to 8 tonnes GVM)", and associated navigation skills are required. Road transport work is not included in the indicative tasks set out in the SES Award classification structure, but under the Road Transport and Distribution Award 2010 such work is performed by a Grade 3 employee, which is roughly equivalent in terms of pay rate to a Grade 4 employee under the SES Award. Assessed as a whole, there is nothing in Level E which discloses any impediment or restriction on the capacity to perform explicit and implicit work skills as compared to a non-disabled employee classified under Grade 2 of the Award, and perhaps also compared to nondisabled employees classified higher than that.
The percentage of the award rates assigned to Level E, and to each of the other wage levels, have been determined externally to the award-making process. These percentages appear to be arbitrary, so that for example it is unclear why a Level E employee (who, as discussed, appears to undertake equal to or exceeding a Grade 2 SES Award employee) is assigned a maximum 55 percent of the award rate, which thus forms the upper limit of the whole structure. On its face, it appears that a disabled employee who would qualify at Grade 2 in the SES Award by reference to the tasks performed by the employee may, by the use of the tool, be paid significantly less than minimum pay rate for Grade 2 (or Grade 1) under the SES Award. By permitting the use of the Greenacres tool, the SES Award in effect authorises the employer to use a method of wage fixation for disabled employees which effectively was designed and established and operates independently to the modern award system and is in some respects inconsistent with it. There is no analogue of this in the modern award system applicable to non-disabled employees.
We emphasise that this conclusion is not intended to be read as a finding that, on the evidence, any disabled employee employed by an ADE using the Greenacres tool has not in actuality been paid a wage rate that is objectively appropriate having regard to the employee's disability. The evidence before us did not descend to the circumstances of individual employees. Our conclusion is essentially one based upon a conceptual or "desktop" analysis of the Greenacres tool compared to the SES Award.
(Emphasis added.)
59 The Commission completed a similar analysis of the Skillsmaster tool from [331]-[337], coming to the same conclusion at [337], that "the Skillsmaster tool is essentially a self-contained system of wage fixation for disabled employees which only has a nominal reference point in the SES Award".
60 The Commission also compared the two tools, and noted that while they mirrored each other to a point, there were also aspects of wage calculation on which they radically differed, with the result that
there is no serious likelihood that, if both the Greenacres tool and the Skillsmaster tool were applied to the same disabled employee performing the same job, they would produce the same wage assessment outcome.
61 Pausing again here, as the applicant contended in substance before this Court, it is possible to describe what is said by the Commission in passages such as those just extracted as "findings". Indeed the Commission itself used that term in the extracts above. The Commission is certainly explaining, by way of references to evidence and arguments, why it does not agree with the position put to it by various parties, and why it found some of the other wage assessment tools were likely to be incompatible with work values and do not meet modern award objectives.
62 At [342]-[343] of the December decision, the Commission found that:
For these reasons, we do not consider that clause 14.4, insofar as it represents the means by which the SES Award sets minimum wages for disabled employees, meets the modern awards objective in s 134(1) by providing a fair and relevant safety net of terms and conditions. In this connection we have had particular regard to paragraphs (a), (e) and (g). In respect of paragraph (a), disabled employees to whom clause 14.4 applies are the lowest paid persons within the entire modern award system, and while there are as earlier discussed important social and economic policy reasons for this, it is essential that the award system regulates them fairly, equitably, consistently and in a non-discriminatory, transparent and enforceable way. The current system does not do this. Paragraph (e) of s 134(1) is concerned with equal remuneration for men and women workers, as the definition of that expression in s 302(2) makes clear. As we have demonstrated, the use of the different wage assessment tools authorised by clause 14.4(b) of the SES Award results in a situation whereby an employee of one gender performing work at a particular ADE using a particular authorised tool will not be entitled to the same rate of pay as an employee of another gender performing the same work, or work of equal or comparable value, at a different ADE using a different authorised tool. As to paragraph (g), the current system is as we have stated complex and lacking in transparency and is not "simple [or] easy to understand".
For similar reasons we do not consider that clause 14 of the SES Award meets the minimum wages objective in s 284(1). Paragraphs (a)-(d) of s 284(1) are repetitive of considerations in s 134(1), and our conclusions in respect of them are relevantly the same. In respect of paragraph (e), we do not consider that clause 14 provides for minimum wages for employees with a disability that are "fair", because as explained they result in outcomes which do not provide consistent minimum wage outcomes for work of equal or comparable value and treat disabled employees differently to non-disabled employees.
(Emphasis added.)
63 These statements formed an important part of the applicant's submissions in this proceeding. To this point, we apprehend the applicant in substance agreed with the positon taken by the Commission - that is, that the suite of wage assessment tools should not be retained because some of them were likely to produce wage outcomes which were not compatible with the modern award objectives (and other core aspects of the Fair Work Act).
64 It is the next part of the Commissions' reasoning that is challenged in a substantive way by the applicant, as this is where the Commission rejects the position put to it by the applicant. At [344] the Commission stated that it did not consider that varying the award such that the SWS was the only wage assessment tool would be "the solution to the problem we have identified with cl 14.4 or would meet the modern awards objective".
65 The Commission then described the SWS, its benefits and what it perceived to be defects in its methodology. At [364] the Commission concluded:
Our conclusion, based on the above analysis, is that the adoption of the SWS as the single mandatory wage assessment tool within the current wage structure of the SES Award as proposed by the AEDLC would not achieve the modern awards objective of a fair and relevant minimum safety net of terms and conditions. In this respect we have paid particular regard to paragraphs (a), (c) and (f) of s 134(1) as being of relevance and weight. In relation to paragraph (a), the adoption of the AEDLC proposal would likely have the effect of increasing the wages paid to many supported employees, although the financial benefit of this would be diminished by a reduction in their DSP payments. In respect of paragraphs (c) and (f), the mandatory adoption of the SWS as proposed would lead to a very large increase in the employment costs, which would result in a significant loss of jobs for disabled person in ADEs and thus would diminish rather than promote the social inclusion of disabled person by reducing their level of workforce participation. With respect to the minimum wages objective, we have taken into account the considerations in paragraphs (a)-(d) of s 284(2) in the same way as the equivalent considerations in s 134(1). In respect of the paragraph (e), we do not consider that that the adoption of the SWS in its current form as the sole determinant of wages for disabled persons in ADEs would be "fair" to either ADEs and employees or disabled employee for the reasons we have earlier given.
66 From [365]-[366] the Commission considered the claim of another party not relevant to this proceeding.
67 At [367], the Commission asked itself what, in the circumstances of its findings, was "the way forward". That the Commission posed that question for itself is not unimportant to the question of how its December and March decisions should be characterised. In our opinion, the Commission was describing the continuation of an iterative process between itself and the interested parties, a component of which - an important component- was the expression of the provisional views it had reached on the material before it to this point.
68 The Commission then set out what it described as its "preferred approach". That is (at [371]-[375]):
We have concluded that the issue of the work value of jobs that are created or tailored for the purpose of providing work which is within the capabilities of disabled person should be dealt with by the more direct, simple and traditional means of establishing new award classifications and pay rates applicable to such jobs. That will necessarily mean that there will be classifications in the SES Award will provide for rates of pay that are below the National Minimum Wage. There is nothing in the FW Act which requires that minimum pay rates in an award be at or above the level of the National Minimum Wage, and the current position is that the SES Award expressly provides for the payment of wage rates below the National Minimum Wage. No party contended for any change this position, and the claims of the AEDLC and ABI were advanced on the basis that disabled employees would under their proposals be paid amounts below the National Minimum Wage. We are of course proceeding on the basis that the affected employees are in receipt of the DSP, and this will operate in conjunction with the prescribed pay rate to ensure that the employee receives a total income that it socially acceptable in contemporary circumstances.
We consider that:
(1) There should be two new classifications (Grades A and B) below the current Grade 1 in the SES Award. The classifications should be applicable only where the employer has created a position consisting of tasks and a level of supervision that has been tailored or adjusted to meet the circumstances of the employee's disability and which does not fall into Grades 1-7 of the classification structure. We emphasise here that we are not talking about the situation where an employer simply makes a reasonable adjustment to allow a disabled person to perform a pre-existing vacant position. Additionally, the employee must meet the criteria for eligibility to receive the DSP.
(2) Grade A shall provisionally have a rate of $7.00 per hour, and shall apply to employees who perform one or more simple tasks consisting of up to three sequential actions under direct supervision and constant monitoring.
(3) Grade B shall provisionally have a rate of $14.00 per hour, and shall apply to employees who perform one or more simple tasks consisting of more than three sequential actions, which may involve the use of mechanical or electrical equipment or tools, under direct supervision with regular monitoring.
The classification descriptors for the existing Grades 1-7 will be modified so that they are expressed in terms of generic indicators of work value. We consider that the current lists of indicative tasks should be removed to make it clear that the mere performance of one of those tasks in circumstances in relation to job which has been established or tailored to align with a disabled employee's level of capacity is not sufficient or intended to fall within any of these grades. Instead, alignments with other award classifications which provide for the performance of work commonly performed in the ADE sector will be included to provide proper guidance as to the work intended to be comprehended at each classification level. Grades A-B and 1-7 will, taken together, provide a classification structure which accommodates in a comprehensive way the jobs which the evidence shows actually exist in the ADE sector and properly reflects their work value.
We consider that disabled employees classified in any grade (Grades A and B or 1-7) may be paid a percentage of the specified rate for the classification based upon an assessment of their productivity as compared to that of a relevantly non-disabled person. The only wage assessment tool which may be used for that purpose will be the SWS, subject to the following modifications:
(1) Where an employee performs more than one major task in their job, the SWS assessment must measure a representative sample of the tasks performed and weight them appropriately.
(2) The SWS assessor must independently determine that benchmark to be used for the assessment is valid and appropriate.
(3) Where an employer collects workplace data as to the employee's productivity levels, that data must be assigned a 50% weighting in the overall assessment, regardless of the degree of disparity with the result of the SWS assessor's assessment.
(4) There will be an absolute minimum payment of $3.50 per hour. This amount will also serve as the minimum rate payable to a disabled employee during an initial assessment period in their employment.
Finally, we consider that no existing ADE employee should suffer a reduction in remuneration as a result of the introduction of the new wages structure which we propose.
69 The determination that the Commission considered could implement this view was included at Attachment A to the December decision.
70 On any view, this is a detailed and comprehensive proposal. It is the product of a comprehensive and carefully reasoned explanation of why, at December 2019, the Commission's view was that this was the appropriate way forward in its four yearly review of the Award. The applicant's position before us required the Court to assume, or find, that the Commission was immovable on this proposal, aside from the dollar amounts it proposed for Grades A and B. For reasons we explain below, there is no basis to make such an assumption, and it would be inappropriate for this Court to do so.
71 The Commission then noted (at [378]) further steps that it found were necessary to take before any determination varying the Award would be made. The whole of [378] and [379] should be set out:
It will be necessary to undertake a number of steps before any determination arising from this decision takes effect. Firstly, we wish to give parties an opportunity to make further submissions about the determination which we presently consider should be made. We would particularly be assisted if such submissions addressed the proposed rates of pay and classification descriptors for the new Grades A and B, the new classification descriptors for Grades 1-7 and the implementation timetable (see below), as well as any other issues the parties consider relevant. We would also be assisted if the Commonwealth could advise as to its preparedness to provide the financial support which we have identified as being necessary. Secondly, we propose then to conduct a conference of those parties who are interested in endeavouring to achieve a consensus position as to the terms of the award variations to give effect to this decision, having regard to the draft determination in Attachment A. With the benefit of the submissions and the conference process, we will then be in a position to finalise the new wages structure which is to be the subject of the trial.
We consider that the trial should be conducted over a period of three months, subject to any submissions on this issue which might be received. Once the trial is completed, the results should be made public, and interested parties will then be given an opportunity to make further submissions. We will then issue a final determination varying the SES Award. The results of the trial in terms of any changes to overall labour costs will be taken into account by us in setting the final wage rates for the new Grades A and B. We consider that the determination should not take effect until a further 14 months have passed, in order that ADEs have a proper opportunity to phase out the use of the existing wage assessment tools and transition to the new wages structure.
72 From [380], the Commission then set out procedural details and a timetable for how it considered preparation for the trial and the trial itself should be run. The timetable also included an opportunity for further evidence to be filed, for further submissions and for a further hearing. The Commission envisaged in this timetable that a final determination would be made around 30 October 2020 (that is, approximately ten months after its December decision). The timetable also provided for the operative date of the determination to be postponed until 1 January 2022. We return to this feature of the Commission's timetable below.
73 The Commission finally went on to set out its views on other claims not relevant to the proceeding in this Court.