3 It will be observed that the clause relates to a defined term, namely "Exclusivity Period". This sets an outside date to the period of exclusivity of some five months. However, in practical terms the scheme, so far as what are called "Third Conditions Precedent", must be fulfilled by 30 April 2001. These embrace the usual conditions concerning shareholder approval and court approval of the scheme. Hence in practice the period of exclusivity is not excessive.
4 The issue of practical constraints upon alternative merger proposals is a difficult one. Such constraints may take a variety of forms. One prevalent form particularly in the United Kingdom and United States involves the payment of what are sometimes termed inducement fees, or break fees. That feature is not present here though has on occasion arisen in other schemes.
5 The present arrangements by way of exclusivity contain no financial disincentive. Rather, there is an obligation not to have any discussions or dealings with any other person that might result in the merger effected by the scheme not proceeding.
6 However, that embargo is subject to a proper overriding qualification. It is that any obligation so imposed must not involve a breach of the duties of the directors of Arthur Yates & Co Limited ("Yates"), the proponent of the scheme, or be unlawful on any other basis. There is then an appropriately qualified acknowledgment that this overriding obligation must not be used as a pretext to permit Yates to justify the solicitation of possible purchasers or the initiation of discussions or dealings in relation to the possible purchase of Yates. That qualification is that the acknowledgment does not operate if failure so to act would involve a breach of the duties of the directors of Yates.
7 These and analogous issues arise in other jurisdictions. Thus the London Takeover Panel has a rule specifically directed at inducement fees and other forms of frustrating action; Rule 21. In July 2000, a new subrule was added, Rule 21.2. That subrule only permits inducement fees in the following circumstances:
· any such fee must be de minimis (normally no more than 1% of the offer value);
· the offeree board and its financial adviser must confirm to the Panel in writing that, inter alia, they each believe the fee to be in the best interests of shareholders;
· any fee arrangements must be fully disclosed in the press release announcing the offer and the offer document, with relevant documentation being put on display; and
· the Panel must be consulted at the earliest opportunity.
8 In a commentary on such inducement fees, the point is made that these fees give rise to issues other than under the Takeover Code including in relation to directors' fiduciary duties; see publication by Linklaters and Alliance on the Revised Takeover Code - July 2000 edition.
9 The present clause does not involve any break fee though to a degree there are overlapping issues. It is important that an exclusivity clause satisfy the following concerns: