Armidale Local Aboriginal Land Council v Transgrid

Indigenous monitors nominated by the applicant have been employed by the respondent on the of the relevant section of the works at all times when work has been undertaken by the respondent or by its contractors. That is to say, the works undertaken by the respondent have been carried out in accordance with the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan and in the presence of monitors nominated by the applicant.

I have noted that the proceedings were commenced by the filing of an application in the Court on 15 May 2000. The present motion for interlocutory relief was also filed on 15 May 2000. The work has been proceeding for some time and, as I have said, in the presence of monitors nominated by the applicant.

If the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan had not been developed in consultation with the applicant or its representatives then the question arises as to why the applicant has left it until now to seek the relief it now seeks.

I am not satisfied at this stage of the proceedings that the applicant has established that the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan was not developed in consultation with the applicant. The evidence discloses that the applicant nominated archaeologists from the University of New England to act on its behalf in the preparation of the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan. In that event I would have thought that there was a consultation between the respondent and the applicant (by its representatives, the archaeologists it had nominated from the University of New England). Moreover, the fact that work has proceeded for some time in the presence of monitors nominated by the applicant suggests that the applicant was aware that such work was proceeding in accordance with the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan and that it had no complaint about either the work itself or the Indigenous Heritage Management Plan. Moreover, it gives rise to a discretionary consideration. Why should a court grant urgent relief when an applicant's tardiness in applying for it casts doubt on the reality of the alleged breach? I am not satisfied, therefore, that on the present state of the evidence there is a serious question to be tried.

The principles governing the grant of interlocutory relief are settled. For example, in Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v The State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 Sir Anthony Mason said (at 153):

The principles governing the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions in private law litigation have been applied in public law cases, including constitutional cases notwithstanding that different factors arise for consideration. In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless the injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. 15. The applicant has not overcome the first hurdle described by Sir Anthony Mason. It is thus not strictly necessary for me to consider, in particular, the important question of the balance of convenience. Two matters suggest, however, that the balance of convenience is against the granting of relief. The first is the delay in the bringing of these proceedings. I have referred to the principle which governs this consideration. The second is the absence of any undertaking as to damages. The Court does not normally grant an interim or interlocutory injunction without requiring the party in whose favour the injunction is sought to give an undertaking to be liable for any damage suffered by the opposing party by reason of the injunction in the event that, at the time at the trial, the claim for final relief fails. There are of course exceptions. Those exceptions relate to cases where the party seeking the injunction is a liquidator, or where the party seeking the injunction is the Crown, or where the party is seeking to enforce a planning or environmental law. In the latter case however, the presence or absence of an undertaking as to damages is merely another matter which the Court should take into account on the balance of convenience, the presence or absence of an undertaking being one of the considerations in the balancing exercise.

16. In the present case the balance of convenience suggests that injunction should not be granted. Firstly, because of the delay in the bringing of these proceedings; secondly, third parties would be prejudiced; thirdly, the respondent is under contractual obligations to third parties; and fourthly, the orders sought appear to be too wide and relate to of land areas which are apparently outside that of the Armidale Local Aboriginal Land Council.

17. The formal order is that the applicant's notice of motion dated 12 May 2000 is dismissed.

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