DECISION
20 The legislation, aided by the second reading speech to which reference has been made, indicates an intention to relieve the Nominal Defendant from liability in certain circumstances, particularly where there is likely to be other insurance, such as public liability insurance. Furthermore, it is clear that the Nominal Defendant is relieved from liability in some cases which might be considered anomalous. For example, if one takes an ordinary vehicle that is used for ordinary purposes, and accordingly is a vehicle which could not reasonably be considered a candidate for a UVP, and if that vehicle has a major mechanical defect and through negligent driving causes injury in a road accident, an injured party can plainly recover against the third party insurer if the vehicle is registered. However, if the vehicle happens not to be registered, the injured party cannot recover against the Nominal Defendant, because the vehicle does not satisfy the requirement of s.33(5)(b)(ii), since it has more than minor defects.
21 There is force in some of the arguments for a narrow construction of the provision.
22 First, if one reads the definition in subsection (5) of s.33 into the operative provision in subsection (1), then one would have together in subsection (1) the expression "its lawful use or operation on a road in New South Wales" and also the expression "the use or operation of this vehicle on a road in New South Wales"; and this could suggest that the same use and operation, and the same road, is referred to in both places.
23 Next, as submitted by Mr. Bartlett, the words "immediately before" in s.33(5)(b)(ii) could suggest that the earlier history of the vehicle is irrelevant; and so its candidacy for the issue of a UVP must depend on its use at this time.
24 Third, it might be thought that, if a narrow construction is not adopted, there would be virtually no limit to vehicles satisfying the requirements of s.33(5), because there are no hard and fast limits to the issue of UVPs which would make lawful some use of a motor vehicle on some road.
25 On the other hand, the legislature certainly did not intend that, in the case of vehicles that actually have a UVP, the access of a person injured in a road accident to third party insurance should be available only if the vehicle is used as authorised by the UVP. This is made clear by s.10. The third party policy will answer if the vehicle with a UVP (and otherwise unregistered) is being used or operated on any road in any part of the Commonwealth when the fault of the owner or driver causes injury, irrespective of whether the UVP authorises its use on that road or authorises that particular use. It can therefore be argued that the legislature would not have intended that, in the event that a UVP had not been obtained for that vehicle, the injured party would in the very same circumstances have no recourse to the Nominal Defendant.
26 Another consideration is that the legislature could, but did not, express s.33(5)(b)(i) as limited to the use or operation referred to in s.33(1): s.33(5)(b)(i) is apt in its expression to refer to any use or operation on any road in New South Wales, not just the use or operation and/or the road referred to in s.33(1).
27 Also, the words "immediately before" in s.33(5)(b)(ii) could be taken as directing attention to the physical condition of the motor vehicle, as suggested by the qualifications referring to "repair of minor defects"; that is, as not excluding consideration of a substantial and continuing use of the motor vehicle from some time before the accident and intended to be continued after the accident. If, for example, one had a motor cycle extensively used in farming, and if an accident occurred on a short deviation from such use, one might still say that it was, immediately before the accident, capable of having a UVP in respect of its substantial and continuing use.
28 On that approach, there would be some significant limitations on the vehicles that could qualify under s.33(5) by reason of capability of having a UVP. That is, it must be shown that the vehicle has some substantial ongoing use or purpose which would make the issue of a UVP appropriate. However, if there is shown to be such a use, as in effect the primary judge found in this case, then the circumstance that, immediately before the accident, it was being put to some other use would not prevent s.33 applying.
29 My review of the opposing considerations indicates that the matter is finely balanced. On the whole, although I recognise that the legislature has disclosed an intention to place limits on the circumstances in which the Nominal Defendant can be made liable, it is in my opinion appropriate to give weight to the overall purpose of giving persons injured by motor vehicles in motor accidents on roads access to insurance money; and it is of course to be remembered that the Nominal Defendant is, by s.39 of the MAC Act, given recourse against the owner and/or driver of the vehicle.
30 For those reasons, in this case, in my opinion the motor cycle was one required to be registered to enable its lawful use or operation on a road in New South Wales, in particular the road passing through the Whalan property on which the accident occurred; and, immediately before the motor accident, it was capable of being registered to enable its lawful use or operation on that road, in the sense of having a UVP to enable its lawful use or operation on that road for farming purposes for which it had been used and for which, one may infer, it was intended to be used in the future. The circumstance that the use or operation at the time of the accident would not have been authorised by such a UVP does not prevent the application of s.33.
31 For those reasons, in my opinion the following orders should be made:
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Judgment below set aside.
3. In lieu thereof, judgment for the appellant in the sum of $230,637.64, and the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings.
32 I have assumed from the lack of appeal or cross-appeal in relation to the other matters that the third order is the appropriate one. The question was not directly addressed in oral argument. If either party wishes to put forward a contrary submission, then that submission should be put in writing within 7 days, and if that happens, the other party can respond with a written submission with a further 7 days.
33 TOBIAS JA: I agree with Hodgson JA.
34 CRIPPS AJA: I agree with Hodgson JA.
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