34 In relation to these two submissions Mr Cahill responded as follows. First, the submission of the Commissioner was contrary to the natural and ordinary meaning of s 4.4.7(2)(c), which provides that the requirement to investigate a complaint does not apply to a complaint dismissed under Part 4.2 of the LPA. Second, the Commissioner's submission is contrary to the natural and ordinary meaning of s 4.2.10(1)(f), which contemplates that an investigation may have been commenced at the time the complaint is dismissed. Third, the submission of the Commissioner would lead to an absurd outcome whereby he would be required to continue to investigate complaints which he had determined did not require further investigation. A construction that produces an unreasonable, irrational or capricious outcome should be avoided.[4] Fourth, reliance placed by the Commissioner on the decisions in Byrne v Marles & Anor[5] and Byrne v Legal Services Commissioner[6] is misconceived because the cases relate to an entirely different issue, that is, the preliminary assessment of whether the complaint is in the civil stream or the disciplinary stream. Fifth, to the extent that the Commissioner's submission depends upon a distinction being drawn between a complaint and an investigation, the distinction is illusory and not supported by the statutory text. The complaint is a precondition to an investigation. If the complaint is dismissed, the power to investigate under s 4.4.7 must also fall away. Finally, the submission that the conditions to exercise the power to dismiss had not been fulfilled because the Commissioner had not formed the view that the complaint required no further investigation was based on hindsight reasoning and not on the evidence of any relevant witness, and should be rejected.