THe appeal
16 The appellant sought and was granted a number of extensions of time with which to comply with directions requiring her to file particulars of the grounds of appeal and an outline of argument, on the ground that she wished to instruct lawyers for the purpose, but did not at the time have the means to do so. In the end, amended grounds of appeal were filed, and they were accompanied by an outline of argument signed by counsel which addressed those grounds. The appeal came on for hearing on 29 October 2003, but was adjourned. I will return to the circumstances of the extensions of time and adjournments shortly.
17 On 21 November 2003 the appeal again came on for hearing. The appellant was unrepresented but was provided with the services of a Sinhalese interpreter. She relied on the amended grounds of appeal and the outline of argument. She also made a number of oral submissions. She said, in summary, that:
(a) She recalled what happened in Sri Lanka and said that she would be murdered if she returned.
(b) Two people had recently come to her house looking for her.
(c) Her parents were sick and could not protect her. If she was murdered they would die of sorrow.
(d) Her parents were also threatened because of her.
(e) She could not understand the decision of the Tribunal because it was in English.
(f) She needs a lawyer to represent her, but has no job and no money. Consequently, she sought a further adjournment to find a lawyer.
18 The issues raised in pars (a) and (b) seek to controvert the fact findings made by the Tribunal. They do not give rise to any errors of law which would attract the jurisdiction of the Court.
19 The issues raised in pars (c) and (d) are humanitarian considerations that do not relate to any matter which the Court can consider in this appeal.
20 As to the matter raised in par (e), the appellant has had ample opportunity to take steps to have the decision explained to her. She was represented by solicitors and counsel following the Tribunal's decision for the purpose of mounting the High Court challenge.
21 Finally, the adjournment sought referred to in par (f) was refused on the ground that the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity to obtain representation. On 20 June 2003, the parties agreed to orders for the timetable of the procedural steps to be taken in preparation of the appeal for hearing. The date agreed for the filing of the appellant's submissions was 29 August 2003, allowing her more than two months in which to prepare. On 3 July the appellant came before the Court to seek pro bono legal assistance. This application was refused, but the appellant assured the Court that she would be able to find her own legal assistance and file her submissions by the due date. On 22 August, however, the appellant returned to the Court and again applied for pro bono legal assistance. This application was again refused, but the appellant was granted an extension of time of one month, until 30 September 2003, to file her submissions on the basis that she would obtain legal assistance in that time. Her submissions were received, and in due course the appeal was listed for hearing on 29 October 2003. On this day, the appellant claimed that she had not been able to meet with a lawyer, but had arranged an appointment in the next few days. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned until 21 November 2003 for the appellant to seek legal advice.
22 At the hearing on 21 November, a further short adjournment until 26 November 2003 was granted. Counsel for the respondent referred to the written outline of submissions when he commenced his oral submissions. The Court enquired of the appellant whether she had received a copy of this outline. She said that she had not. The respondent produced a copy letter to the appellant purportedly enclosing the submission. The letter was correctly addressed. Nevertheless, in order to prevent any possibility of prejudice to the appellant she was given a short time to seek advice as to any reply she might wish to make to the written submissions of the respondent.
23 Today, 26 November 2003, the appellant again sought an adjournment to allow her to obtain legal representation. She said she had made an appointment with Legal Aid for Friday 28 November 2003. In light of the previous opportunities to obtain legal representation, the application for further time was refused.
24 It is now necessary to consider the amended grounds of appeal. They read as follows:
'The Tribunal's failure to exercise its powers of inquiry relevant to the contentions of the Applicant particularised below, amounted to an error of law in that it was, unfair, a breach of the rules of natural justice, provided for a reasonable apprehension of bias, and as such, amounted to jurisdictional error.
PARTICULARS
a) Though the Applicant said she had told her migration agent that she had been a member of the JVP, and was then advised by the agent to say she belonged to the 'Youth Socialists' because Australians did not know about the JVP, there was no attempt to contact the agent or reason given for not doing so;
b) Though the Applicant said she had formed a friendly association whilst sharing a train to work with a woman named Padmi, who claimed to be a spy for the anti government organisation LTTE, and that this woman disappeared after being removed from the train in April 1999, there was no attempt made to verify whether a woman called Padmi had been removed from a train in April 1999, and if so, whether charged with being a member of LTTE, and no reasons given for not doing so;
c) Though the Applicant claimed that because of her former membership with JVP, and friendship with Padmi, she had heard that a few days after she left Sri Lanka security forces were looking for her, there was no attempt to verify this information and no reason given for not doing so.'
25 As these grounds were not taken before the Federal Magistrate, the appellant requires leave to raise them now. Such leave will be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice: O'Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310 per Mason J; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1348, per Branson and Katz JJ at par 6; Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; Branir Pty Ltd v Owsten Nominees (No. 2) [2001] FCA 1833 at par 38. A central consideration in the assessment of the interests of justice is a determination of the question whether the arguments now sought to be relied upon have a reasonable prospect of success. I turn to that issue.
26 In each instance, the particulars of the amended grounds of appeal assert a failure of the Tribunal to make its own inquiries to verify the appellant's case. They assert that the Tribunal should have inquired into whether Padmi was removed from the train and charged with being a member of the LTTE, whether the appellant's migration agent was told by the appellant that she had been a member of the JVP, and whether the security forces were looking for the appellant after she left Sri Lanka. The outline of submissions explained the argument as follows:
'The Appellant made three major contentions relevant to her claim that she had a well-founded fear of being persecuted if she returned to Sri Lanka, and as such, was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. These are particularised in the Notice of Amendments. In each instance, the issue which is the subject of this appeal is that the decision maker failed to make any inquiry to test the Appellant's contentions, or give any reason for not making inquiry, relying solely on a subjective assessment as to the Appellant's credibility.'
27 The first observation to be made about this submission is that it is quite wrong to say that the Tribunal relied solely on a subjective assessment of the appellant's credibility. The description of the Tribunal's reasoning set out earlier in these reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal relied upon both an assessment of the probabilities of the circumstances put forward by the appellant and country information, as well as on an assessment of the appellant's credibility. Of course, the Tribunal had no option but to consider the credibility of the appellant in the course of determining her application. The Tribunal's decision under consideration in this appeal stands in stark contrast to those decisions of the Tribunal that rely solely on the assessment of the claimant's credit.
28 The appellant put forward evidence of her dealings with Padmi, her instructions to her migration agent concerning membership of the JVP, and of the people seeking her out in Sri Lanka. It was open to the appellant to bring forward further evidence if she desired. It was her application and the Tribunal had no obligation to make her case for her: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, per Gummow and Hayne JJ at 576; Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277, per French J at par 29. The application of this approach can be seen particularly in relation to the alleged obligation of the Tribunal to make inquiries from the appellant's migration agent. It was open to the appellant to bring forward evidence from the migration agent herself.
29 The failure of the Tribunal to make its own inquiries, for instance by use of its power under s 427(1)(d) of the Migration Act, will rarely amount to legal error: Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39; Azzi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 195 ALR 166.
30 In Prasad, Wilcox J held that a Tribunal may fall into legal error if it fails to make inquiries where it is obvious that material, which was centrally relevant to the decision, was readily available. In the present appeal it cannot be said that evidence of Padmi being charged, or of the security forces searching for the appellant was readily available. But, in any event, in relation to Padmi it would not avail the appellant if the Tribunal had made inquires and found that Padmi had been charged with being a member of the LTTE, because the Tribunal based its decision on a number of alternative bases, which included an acceptance of the appellant's version that she gave assistance to Padmi. For instance, the Tribunal said:
'Even if the Tribunal accepted the applicant's claim of her friendship with, and assistance to, a LTTE spy, which the Tribunal has not done, it is not credible that the security force would not follow up any leads expeditiously in what amounts to a terrorist war situation between the government and the LTTE, but wait for over 10 months to do so.'
31 In relation to the allegations that the security forces were seeking the appellant after she left Sri Lanka, the Tribunal carefully assessed the documentary evidence in the passage set out in par 14 of these reasons. The conclusions which it drew did not obviously call for any further inquiry, even if there was a readily available means for such inquiry.