The starting point for the assessment of obviousness
145 It is not in dispute that the obviousness of the claims of the Patent is to be assessed under s 100(1)(e) of the 1952 Act. That is, whether 'the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification … was obvious and did not involve an inventive step having regard to what was known or used in Australia on or before the priority date of that claim'.
146 In Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 235 CLR 173, the High Court restated, shortly, the history of the introduction of obviousness as a ground of invalidity and the distinction between novelty and obviousness. The Court also emphasised the balance of policy considerations in patent law, to encourage and reward inventors without impeding advances and improvements by skilled, non-inventive persons. The High Court reaffirmed at [51]-[56] a number of the principles to be applied to a determination of obviousness including, relevantly:
· "Obvious" means "very plain".
· The question whether an invention is obvious is a question of fact.
· The question of inventive step is one of degree. Ingenuity is relative, depending on relevant states of common general knowledge.
· The question is always 'is the step taken over the prior art an "obvious step" or "an inventive step"'.
· There is no distinction between obviousness and a lack of inventive step.
· There must be "some difficulty overcome, some barrier crossed".
· The essential question to be posed when considering obviousness under the 1952 Act was that set out in Wellcome Foundation Limited v VR Laboratories (Aust) Proprietary Limited (1981) 148 CLR 262: the question of obviousness involves asking whether the invention would have been obvious to a non-inventive worker in the field, equipped with the common general knowledge in that field, without regard to documents in existence but not part of common general knowledge.
· Common general knowledge, as explained in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v Beiersdorf (Australia) Limited (1980) 144 CLR 253 at 292, is the background knowledge and experience which is available to all in the trade in considering the making of new products, or the making of improvements in old.
· For the purpose of determining inventiveness, prior disclosures which were not part of common general knowledge are excluded from consideration.
147 The High Court in Lockwood (No 2) also made some general observations regarding the patentability of ideas:
· An invention may, and usually does, involve three processes:
o The definition of the problem to be solved or the difficulties to be overcome;
o The choice of the general principle to be applied in solving this problem or overcoming these difficulties; and
o The choice of the particular means used.
Merit in any one of these stages, or in the whole combined, may support the invention.
· There is a distinction between the idea or concept or principle informing an invention and the means of carrying it out or embodying it in a manner of new manufacture.
· Invention may lie in the idea of taking the step in question. An inventive step can be having an insight rather than a mere development and application of existing ideas.
148 Apotex claims that all of the claims in dispute are obvious but accepts that this depends on the starting point for that assessment. Apotex contends that the correct starting point is the racemic mixture, PCR 4099. As neither that compound nor any of the prior art patents were part of common general knowledge in Australia at the priority date, Apotex accepts that if common general knowledge is the starting point, the claims are not obvious. Sanofi contends that the correct starting point is the common general knowledge of the hypothetical non-inventive worker in the field as at the priority date of the Patent.
149 There is no dispute that 'what was known or used in Australia' (s 100(1)(e) of the 1952 Act) means the common general knowledge in the relevant field (Minnesota Mining). If PCR 4099 is the correct starting point, Apotex and Spirit rely on the unchallenged findings of the primary judge as to the content of common general knowledge in support of their assertion that the subject matter of the claims was obvious.
150 Apotex submits that the primary judge erred in applying different starting points for the purpose of assessing the obviousness of different claims. In any event, the key issue is the correct starting point.
151 Obviousness and inventive step are antitheses. What is obvious does not involve an inventive step and vice versa (Lockwood (No 2) at [52]).
152 Section 100(1)(e) makes it clear that the question to be addressed is whether the invention, so far as claimed in the particular claim, is obvious and does not involve an inventive step. That requires a determination of the invention, as described in the specification. What is claimed may then equate with, or be less than the totality of or scope of, the invention. The specification of the Patent makes it clear that the selection of PCR 4099 as the racemate to be resolved formed no part of this invention as described and claimed. From the primary judge's reasons, no such claim was made. It was the process of separation of the enantiomers of that mixture to obtain the enantiomers, and, in turn, the pharmaceutically acceptable salts of the d-enantiomer, that broadly, were the subject matter of the claims. The invention to be assessed for obviousness is ascertained from the patent and the obviousness or inventive step of the invention as claimed is then assessed by reference to common general knowledge in Australia at the priority date.
153 This analysis of the invention assists in determining the correct starting point for the application of the common general knowledge of the hypothetical person of skill in the art in order to decide whether the invention as claimed in the claims was obvious or involved an inventive step. The invention presupposes that the hypothetical worker was in possession of the racemate and the knowledge that it had platelet aggregation inhibiting activity. As the primary judge said, the desire to separate the enantiomers should be taken for granted. Knowledge of the kind of activity was a prerequisite to testing the enantiomers for that activity which led to the asserted unexpected result that the l-enantiomer did not exhibit any such activity. However, the hypothetical skilled worker would not know the contents of the French prior art patent or, indeed, the other prior art patents, that were not part of common general knowledge.
154 The "problem/solution approach" yields the same result.
155 In Wellcome, Aickin J expressed the test for obviousness as:
whether the hypothetical addressee faced with the same problem would have taken as a matter of routine whatever steps might have led from the prior art to the invention, whether they be the steps of the inventor or not.
156 Minnesota Mining at 292 talks of the'process of applying such common general knowledge to the solution of a problem'.
157 In Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2002) 212 CLR 411, the patentee accepted that the notional addressee is to be told the nature of the problem but is not provided with information not part of common general knowledge and obtainable only by testing. The majority, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, referred at [40] to what was said by Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc (1996) 36 IPR 438:
A proper statement of the inventive concept needs to include some express or implied reference to the problem which it required invention to overcome.
158 While their Honours apparently questioned the English (and European) approach of "problem and solution", they referred to the earlier acknowledgment by Buckley LJ in Re Beecham Group Ltd's (Amoxycillin) Application [1980] 97 RPC 261 to the solution of 'some recognised problem' and the meeting of 'some recognised need'. Their Honours also referred expressly to the consistory clause in the Hässle patent, which stated that the claimed invention was designed to obtain a pharmaceutical dosage form of omeprazole to answer the problems identified in the specification. Omeprazole itself was not part of common general knowledge. Their Honours stated that it was the interaction between the combination of integers of the formulation that was the essential requirement for the presence of an inventive step.
159 The High Court in Lockwood (No 2) re-stated or clarified its position on the "problem and solution" approach and, again, cited the reference of Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc to the problem which it required invention to overcome. The High Court now makes it apparent that it does not reject such an approach, where appropriate. The question of obviousness is not confined to a problem/solution approach. It may not be appropriate or sufficient where, for example, no skilled person in the art had thought of a general idea or general method of solving a known difficulty with respect to a known product or where the appreciation that there was a problem with a known product was itself part of the inventive concept. As the High Court said at [105], while not every invention constitutes a solution to a problem, it is commonplace so to describe an invention where it is appropriate to do so. However, admissions about a problem in a specification need to be weighed with evidence of the perception of any problem by the person of skill in the relevant art, before exposure to the solution contained in the invention.
160 The problem addressed in the Patent is the resolution of the enantiomers of PCR 4099. The problem described is the difficulty of purifying the d-enantiomer and of obtaining suitable salts. Accordingly, the hypothetical skilled worker armed with common general knowledge would have that racemic mixture as the starting point. The question is then whether, from that starting point, the claimed invention was obvious; whether there was an inventive step, as assessed by reference to the common general knowledge, in resolving the enantiomers and obtaining pharmaceutically acceptable salts of the d-enantiomer. It should be emphasised that the base line or starting point may itself be part of the inventive step or inventive process but that is not the case here. The selection of PCR 4099 for resolution was not claimed to be inventive.
161 The French prior art patent as referred to in the specification of the Patent does assist in understanding the starting point and context of the invention described and claimed. However, it is clear, as the primary judge accepted, that the reference to the French prior art patent in the specification of the Patent does not make that patent part of common general knowledge. It does not make that patent available to tell the notional skilled addressee the results of the testing of formulations of PCR 4099.
162 As the Full Court said in Insta Image Pty Ltd v KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd (2008) 78 IPR 20, close attention should be given to the terms of the individual specification to understand what admissions are made and also to understand the invention. In Insta, previous patents of the same inventor were cited but this did not constitute an admission that the inventions the subject of those patents had become part of common general knowledge. Rather, the specification described the inventor's own inventive journey (at [84]) and his own familiarity with the inventions the subject of earlier US patents (at [104]). Importantly, the claim in that case was to an entire structure or construction, which included the subject matter of those earlier US patents with additional features described in the specification. The invention was not limited to the introduction of new features into an existing structure (at [92]).
163 Sanofi chose to file a separate patent for the claimed invention, the d-enantiomer, its pharmaceutically acceptable salts and the process for obtaining that enantiomer from the racemic mixture of PCR 4099. The invention of the Patent starts with a biologically active racemate.