Balance of convenience
130 In my view the balance of convenience favours the grant of the interlocutory injunction sought by the cross-claimants. It is appropriate to begin by making a number of preliminary observations.
131 First, the status quo is that Apotex is presently not in the market.
132 Second, this is not a case where granting an interlocutory injunction will practically put an end to this litigation.
133 Third, the Patent is longstanding. Apotex has known of the Patent for some time, and that its products may infringe if the Patent is valid. But they have not, as the cross-claimants describe it, sought to "clear the way" by bringing revocation proceedings at an earlier time. I accept, as Apotex contends, that this does not necessarily need to have happened, but by not doing so Apotex took the risk.
134 Fourth, I accept that the strength of the prima facie case limb, in this case the strength of both the infringement case and the strength of the asserted grounds of invalidity, may inter-relate with and weigh with the balance of convenience question. But on this aspect, any such relative strengths weigh more to the advantage of the cross-claimants. They have a strong prima facie case on infringement, assuming validity. And as to the invalidity questions, Apotex only has a reasonably arguable position on lack of manner of manufacture and lack of inventive step, and a weaker argument on lack of novelty.
135 Fifth, no case has been put that Cipla would suffer damage if the injunction were to be refused.
136 Let me now elaborate on some of the principal points raised.
137 First, the status quo from the time DYMISTA was first sold on the Australian market in July 2014 until the commencement of the proceedings was that Meda Pharmaceuticals and Mylan Health have been the sole and continuous distributors of the combination product in the Australian market. Apotex has not sold the Apotex products. Since the launch of DYMISTA, Meda has developed a substantial business of selling DYMISTA to Meda Pharmaceuticals, and more recently Mylan Health, for distribution in the Australian market. In my view, the status quo and the maintenance thereof supports the grant of an injunction.
138 Second, the market for DYMISTA has been growing year by year since July 2014. The evidence before me suggested that there has been considerable investment in the marketing and education of the benefits of DYMISTA. This has significantly contributed to the growth of sales in Australia of DYMISTA. However, the evidence also suggests that the market is still developing and sales have not yet reached a steady state rate of growth. The cross-claimants contend that if Apotex is restrained from entering the market, Mylan Health intends to continue its substantial investment in the marketing and education benefits of DYMISTA which is aimed at having DYMISTA considered the gold standard for allergic rhinitis and to be recommended as first line therapy under Australian guidelines. I am prepared to accept that evidence although, in some respects, it might be seen to have been overstated. But generally speaking, in my view, such matters weigh in favour of the cross-claimants and support the grant of an injunction.
139 Third, DYMISTA is a significant product for both Meda and Mylan Health.
140 Fourth, the Patent has approximately 10 years to run to its expiry. Again, these are points that favour the cross-claimants.
141 Fifth, Apotex has acted with its "eyes wide open" since at least around one year prior to it obtaining ARTG approval for the Apotex products. Apotex is likely to have begun the process of applying to register the Apotex products on the ARTG irrespective of the Patent. Apotex took no steps to "clear the way" before launch and it seems that Apotex was prepared to take the risk. Again, in my view such matters favour the cross-claimants on the balance of convenience question.
142 Sixth, Apotex asserts that it will lose its first mover advantage if enjoined. I am prepared to accept that this is likely to be the case. But in my view, whilst the loss of the first mover advantage is a matter to be weighed in the balance, it is not a decisive consideration in assessing where the balance of convenience lies. As Yates J said in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Limited v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 763; [2012] FCA 239 at [178]:
I accept that the evidence discloses a benefit of being the "first mover" in the sense in which the respondent uses that term. It is clear, however, that that advantage is one that derives from what I have found to be a prima facie case of threatened infringement of the 772 patent. Thus it is an advantage that is sought to be derived at the expense of the applicants' asserted monopoly rights.
I would make a similar observation in the present context in response to Apotex's argument concerning its loss of first mover advantage.
143 Seventh, I accept that the impact on Apotex's business, if it is restrained, will be to deny it a significant revenue stream, and for some time. But the cross-claimants have offered Apotex security for $10 million in the form of a bank guarantee in respect of any claim for damages (under any future enforcement of the undertaking as to damages) for the period up to the hearing and determination of the trial. The trial has been set down for December 2018. The intervening period during which Apotex would be enjoined is likely to be approximately one and a half years. The amount of the bank guarantee would appear to be sufficient to cover any reasonable claim for damages by Apotex for that intervening period. But I accept that the delay in the hearing and determination of a trial and any appeal may effectively lock Apotex out of the relevant market for some time and may provide an advantage to its competitors. I have taken this into account.
144 Eighth, if the Apotex products are exploited in the Australian market, then the loss to Meda and Mylan Health is likely to be immediate and significant. This is a very substantial matter weighing in favour of the cross-claimants. Generally speaking I accept the following on the evidence:
(a) Mylan Health distributes DYMISTA through wholesalers who on-sell to both pharmacy groups and individual pharmacies. The terms (including price) for the supply of DYMISTA to pharmacy groups or individual pharmacies are agreed between Mylan Health and those entities. If Apotex is permitted to enter the market, the price for which Mylan Health will be able to sell DYMISTA may have to be significantly reduced in order for Mylan Health to compete with Apotex in the market. This is because the decisions of the pharmacy groups and individual pharmacists as to whether to purchase DYMISTA or the Apotex products are likely to be driven by price. The reduction in the price of DYMISTA is likely to occur quickly (within the first six months).
(b) Further, approximately 80% of retail pharmacies in Australia are members of a buying group (which brokers a price for all pharmacies within the respective groups), with the remaining 20% comprising independent pharmacies. DYMISTA is a non-PBS prescription drug. A generic entrant in the non-PBS prescription market is likely to quickly take market share away from the originator. The share of the azelastine hydrochloride/fluticasone propionate nasal spray market that the Apotex products are likely to take away from DYMISTA in the first six months and then over the next three years is likely to be significant.
(c) Further, Meda is likely to directly suffer loss if DYMISTA loses market share to the Apotex products. This is because Meda sells DYMISTA to Mylan Health for sale in Australia. Presently, in respect of each unit of DYMISTA purchased by Mylan Health, Meda makes a profit. If Apotex enters the market with the Apotex products, the number of units sold by Mylan Health and, therefore, the number of units sold by Meda to Mylan Health is likely to be reduced significantly. Every sale of DYMISTA lost by Mylan Health as a result of the Apotex's sale of the Apotex products represents a sale of DYMISTA which Meda would have made to Mylan Health. The loss to Meda is likely to be significant. This is likely to have a significant effect on the total revenue and profit earned by Meda in respect of the sales of DYMISTA in the Australian market. If Mylan Health is forced to reduce the price of DYMISTA to customers in order to compete with the lower priced Apotex products, this may also compel Meda to reduce the price at which it sells DYMISTA to Mylan Health. This will further reduce the profit made by Meda in respect of its sales of DYMISTA to Mylan Health.
(d) Further, Mylan Health is also likely to directly suffer loss if the Apotex products are permitted to enter the market. Now even though Mylan Health does not have rights as a patentee or exclusive licensee under the Act, its interests should be taken into account. A reduction in price and market share for DYMISTA is likely to cause a reduction in the total revenue and profit that Mylan Health will make in respect of this product.
(e) Further, if the Apotex products enter the market, then Mylan Health may reduce its promotional and educational activities for DYMISTA, which may lead to significant reputational damage to both the DYMISTA brand and Mylan Health.
(f) Further, if Apotex is permitted to enter the market with the Apotex products (i.e. I refuse the injunction) but is permanently restrained from selling the Apotex products after the trial (i.e. I dismiss Apotex's principal proceeding and uphold the cross-claimants' cross-claim), then damage may continue for the life of the Patent. Having reduced the price of DYMISTA to compete with the Apotex products during the intervening period, Mylan Health may have difficulties in reinstating the price of DYMISTA to its previous level after the determination of the trial.
145 Let me now deal with a separate topic. Each of the parties contended that there would be significant difficulties forensically in calculating the damages each would or might suffer:
(a) in the case of the cross-claimants, if the injunction were to be refused; and
(b) in the case of Apotex, if the injunction were to be granted.
146 The parties each filed expert accounting evidence to support their positions.
147 The cross-claimants have principally contended the following:
(a) First, the market for DYMISTA is not a static market. Rather it is still being developed and the growth trends in sales of DYMISTA are not predictable. This is in large part as a result of the considerable marketing and educational investment that Mylan Health has made in respect of DYMISTA. If the Apotex products enter the market then this investment may stop. It would be very difficult to calculate how the DYMISTA market would have grown had the investment continued and the Apotex products not entered the market.
(b) Second, the market for medicines for treating allergic rhinitis is complex. Although DYMISTA is a prescription medicine, it competes with over the counter (OTC) medicines such as Nasonex, Claratyne and Zyrtec. This makes it difficult to predict consumer behaviour in the market. It is said that as a result of Mylan Health's educational efforts and clinical studies, the market is now starting to shift back from OTC preparations (a self-medicated, in-pharmacy environment) to DYMISTA supplied on prescription. But this market shift is in its early stages and requires continued support by Mylan Health to reach its full potential. If Mylan's Health's investment in marketing and education ceases, then the OTC preparations may gain ground over the total market for DYMISTA and the Apotex products (and any other generic products that enter this market). Now Mr Millichamp for Apotex took issue with some of what Mr Gupta said about such matters. But I cannot presently resolve the conflict in the evidence on this aspect. All I can say is that the cross-claimants' contentions have some force.
(c) Third, if Apotex is not restrained, it is likely that additional generic suppliers will quickly obtain ARTG listing of generic azelastine hydrochloride/fluticasone propionate nasal spray products. This would cause further price reductions and loss of market share for DYMISTA. It would also be difficult to attribute and quantify damage to the respective generic entrants.
(d) Fourth, the difficulties in calculating Meda's damages and the risk that Meda will not, therefore, be adequately compensated is compounded by the extended period of time over which damage will occur during the unexpired term of the Patent.
(e) Fifth, damages will not be an adequate remedy in circumstances where Meda has the burden of prosecuting a damages claim that is likely to be complex and difficult.
148 Contrastingly, Apotex contends the following:
(a) First, the imposition of a restraint on Apotex will, if it is successful at trial, result in Apotex incurring very substantial expense over many years to recover damages on the undertaking as to damages, in circumstances that make the determination of such damages very complex and imprecise.
(b) Second, a very difficult component of the exercise would be an estimation of the hypothetical volume of sales Apotex would have made, including the rate of growth of those sales, during a period in which Apotex will not have made any sales at all by reason of the restraint. There will not be any real-world data on which to base the estimation. This greatly complicates the exercise of estimating what Apotex's sales might have been. By contrast, Meda and Mylan Health are in a monopoly position in the market such that the impact of Apotex's conduct, if any, on them, if ultimately found to infringe a valid patent, will be reasonably capable of quantification and compensation.
(c) Third, the damage that would be suffered by Apotex if restrained includes damage that would be very hard to quantify, including loss of opportunity to advertise, promote and sell its products in the Australian market and consequent loss of profit and loss of opportunity to maintain its position as a first mover in the generic product market and the consequent effect that has on market penetration and, in turn, sales.
149 Now I accept that there is some force in Apotex's position concerning its own difficulties and some force in its contention that some of the difficulties put forward by the cross-claimants may be problematic in degree. But I cannot resolve these issues at an interlocutory level. In particular, I cannot resolve the competing positions of Apotex's expert (Mr Samuel) and the cross-claimants' expert (Mr Stone) notwithstanding Apotex's suggestion that I should find Mr Samuel's position more persuasive. Nor can I resolve the competing positions between Mr Millichamp for Apotex and Mr Gupta for the cross-claimants. But I do accept Apotex's points that:
(a) There will be no PBS price drop if Apotex enters;
(b) To some extent, if there was no injunction, any Apotex sales in the interim could be recorded with details captured, which may assist in making the damages payable by Apotex more readily quantified; and
(c) Although it is said that Mylan Health would have to cut back on promotional expenditure in Australia should Apotex be permitted to enter the market, the margins made from sale of DYMISTA in Australia may be sufficient to enable such activities to continue even with a large loss of market share.
150 In my opinion, the forensic difficulties that each of the parties face in proving their damages (under relevant scenarios) are equally matched.