APPROBATION AND REPROBATION
11 The principal ground upon which the Apotex parties resisted the proposed amendments was that, if the Court was to permit them to be made, then it would be allowing the Sanofi parties to approbate and reprobate. It was submitted that the interlocutory injunction granted by Gyles J, and the undertaking given to his Honour by Apotex, was obtained by the Sanofi parties on the basis that Apotex intended to obtain listing of its clopidogrel products on the PBS at the earliest possible date, that Apotex intended to begin marketing and supplying such products in Australia as soon as that occurred, and that Apotex was able to do these things. It was further submitted that the Sanofi parties should not be allowed to run a case inconsistent with the basis upon which the interlocutory relief was obtained and that, consequently, the Sanofi parties should not be permitted to dispute that Apotex intended to, or was able to, obtain the relevant PBS listing and thereafter commence to market and supply the relevant products in Australia.
12 The Apotex parties founded these arguments upon what was described by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C (as he then was) in Express Newspapers PLC v News (UK) Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 201 as a principle of law of general application. His Lordship said at 210:
There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.
13 In Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 Brennan J acknowledged the existence of the doctrine of approbation and reprobation. His Honour said (at 421) that it "… precludes a person who has exercised a right from exercising another right which is alternative to and inconsistent with the right he exercised as, e.g., where a person 'having accepted a benefit given him by a judgment, cannot allege the invalidity of the judgment which conferred the benefit': Evans v Bartlam [1937] 2 All ER at p 652, per Lord Russell of Killowen."
14 The doctrine has also been considered more recently in Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 173 (Jacobson, Nicholas and Yates JJ) at [200]-[203] and Mandurah Enterprises Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2008) 38 WAR 276 by the West Australian Court of Appeal at [95]-[125] per McLure JA. It was held that the doctrine did not apply on the facts of either case. In Mandurah Enterprises McLure JA expressed the view that the doctrine stood outside the recognised categories of election. However, her Honour also observed at [118] that "[o]n any view, the independent doctrine requires that there be a choice between two inconsistent courses of conduct or claims."
15 The Apotex parties also relied upon the decision of Arnold J in Lilly Icos LLC v 8PM Chemists Ltd [2010] FSR 4; [2009] EWHC 1905. In that case the claimants, which included Lilly Icos (Lilly), and other well-known pharmaceutical manufacturers, obtained interim injunctions against 8PM Chemists (8PM) and a number of related companies based in Turkey in respect of the supply by them of branded pharmaceutical products to online retailers based in Canada. Lilly and the other manufacturers alleged that the 8PM and the other defendants were guilty of trade mark infringement. The interim injunctions were ultimately discharged on the basis that the defendants did not infringe any of the claimants' trademarks. An inquiry as to damages payable under the cross-undertakings given by Lilly and the other claimants in support of the interim injunctions was heard by Arnold J.
16 Until they were enjoined, 8PM and another defendant (RDA) had been supplying pharmaceuticals to various businesses, including CanadaDrugs, which were supplying those products to patients resident in the USA who made purchases of pharmaceuticals by internet or telephone.
17 At the inquiry, Lilly (who obtained the first interim injunction) and the other claimants (who obtained "piggy back" interim injunctions) argued that the defendants could not recover on the cross-undertakings on public policy grounds because the importation of pharmaceuticals into the USA was illegal under US law. Arnold J accepted that the importation of such products into the USA was illegal under US law. However, he concluded that this did not prevent the defendants from recovering.
18 The only argument put to Arnold J with which I am presently concerned was founded upon the following four propositions. First, Lilly's counsel had argued before the judge who granted the interim injunction (Mann J) that the importation of pharmaceutical products into the US was illegal under US law. Secondly, Lilly's counsel did not suggest that recovery under the cross-undertaking would be barred as a consequence of such illegality, and thereby impliedly represented that such a claim would not be barred. Thirdly, the defendants relied upon Lilly's implied representation by not arguing that a bar on recovery under the undertaking showed the balance of convenience favoured the refusal of the interim injunction. Fourthly, Mann J also relied upon Lilly's implied representation in granting the interim injunction.
19 Although Arnold J considered the defendants' argument to have force if advanced as a case of estoppel by representation, he saw it as having more force when advanced by reference to the principle discussed in the Express Newspapers case. As Arnold J observed at [299], the principle was applied in that case by holding that it was not open to the plaintiff to advance inconsistent cases on the claim and on the cross-claim which to all intents and purposes were mirror images of each other. Arnold J then said at [300]:
In my judgment this principle is applicable to the present situation. Lilly persuaded Mann J to grant an interim injunction on the basis that the damage to the Defendants' business could be adequately compensated by an award under the cross-undertaking even though Lilly was contending that importation into the USA was illegal. The other Claimants subsequently adopted the same stance in obtaining piggy-back injunctions. It is quite inconsistent with that stance for the Claimants to turn around after the injunctions have been discharged and say such compensation is irrecoverable as a matter of law by virtue of that illegality.
20 There was no finding that the illegality relied upon by Lilly and the other manufacturers would have prevented any of the defendants from carrying on business as they had done before the interim injunctions were granted. On the contrary, Arnold J made an express finding that, were it not for the interim injunctions, the defendants would have continued to engage in profitable trade with, among others, CanadaDrugs.
21 Arnold J's reasoning on the Express Newspapers point seems to come down to this. Because Lilly obtained its interim injunction on the basis that the defendants could be compensated by an award of damages pursuant to the cross-undertaking in the event that they were ultimately found not to have infringed in the knowledge that the trade in pharmaceutical products in which CanadaDrugs was engaged was illegal under US law, it was not open to Lilly to resist the defendants' claims on the cross-undertaking on the basis that any damage suffered by the defendants was irrecoverable by reason of such illegality.
22 The Sanofi parties referred to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2013] RPC 21. This was an appeal from another decision of Arnold J: Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2011] RPC 20; [2011] EWHC 730 (Pat).
23 The claimant (Servier) obtained an interim injunction against the defendants, Apotex Inc, and a related company, restraining infringement of a European patent. The patent was later held to be invalid. A preliminary issue heard by Arnold J concerned the Apotex defendants' attempt to recover damages on Servier's cross-undertaking. Servier argued that they could not recover damages on the cross-undertaking by reason of the application of the rule of law reflected in the Latin maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no action can arise from an illegal or immoral act) because the Apotex defendants, in order to supply their products, would have had to manufacture them in Canada, where Servier held a valid patent which would have been infringed.
24 The Apotex defendants contended that Servier could not invoke the ex turpi causa rule because, having given an unqualified cross-undertaking, that would involve approbating and reprobating. Arnold J accepted that the ex turpi causa rule applied. In rejecting the Apotex defendants' argument, his Lordship distinguished his previous decision in Lilly Icos v 8PM Chemists.
25 The principal judgment in the Court of Appeal was delivered by Etherton LJ (with whom Kitchin and Laws LJJ agreed subject to what, for present purposes, may be put aside as some immaterial qualifications). Everton LJ said at [61]:
I do not accept Mr Watson's starting position that the court is precluded from even considering the illegality defence because that would be contrary to the principle that a party cannot both approbate and reprobate. I agree with him that, contrary to the view expressed by the judge, it was apparent to Servier at the time Mann J granted the interlocutory injunction on 8 August 2006 that the goods that Apotex was to be injuncted from importing or selling would have been manufactured in Canada and nowhere else. I do not accept, however, that Servier is, for that reason, precluded from running the illegality defence. There is no evidence that Servier had at that date actually formed any intention to run any such defence in the future to a claim on the cross-undertaking. No authority was cited by Mr Watson for the proposition that the principle that a party may not both approbate and reprobate applies in such circumstances. In substance the submission amounts to an argument that, whenever an interim injunction is granted against a defendant, and the claimant subsequently fails in the action, the claimant will never be entitled to defend a claim on the cross-undertaking by relying on facts of which the claimant had knowledge at the time the injunction was granted, whether or not at the time the claimant had in mind a future defence based on those facts. I can see no obvious justification for such a draconian policy or principle, and, in the absence of any authority to support its existence, I reject it.
26 The present case raises a very similar problem for the Apotex parties to that which confronted them in their dispute with Servier. Manufacture of the clopidogrel products in Canada would, as I understand, have infringed Canadian Patent No. 1,336,777 (the Canadian Patent). In 2011, in proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada between Sanofi and Apotex Inc, the Canadian Patent was held invalid. Quite recently, however, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision on that issue, with the result that the Canadian patent is valid unless Apotex Inc can succeed in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada which it can only bring if it obtains leave to do so.
27 The Apotex parties ask me to refuse the application for leave to amend on the basis that the Sanofi parties' reliance upon arguments to the effect that Apotex could not, or would not, have obtained PBS listing for, and commenced to sell, clopidogrel products in Australia, as well as the Sanofi parties' reliance upon the ex turpi causa rule, must fall foul of the principle of law that prevents a party from approbating and reprobating. I would not refuse the application for leave to amend on that basis unless I was satisfied that the principle of law relied upon by the Apotex parties clearly precluded the Sanofi parties from relying upon these arguments. It is sufficient to say that I am not persuaded that this is the case.